THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 

DAVIS 


POLITICAEyHISTORY 


OF  THE 


UNITED  STATES 


BY 

DR.  H.  VON  PIOLST, 

PROFESSOR   AT  THE  UNIVERSITY   OF  FREIBURG. 


TRANSLATED  FROM  THE  GERMAN 

BY  JOHN  J.  LALOR  AND  ALFRED  B.  MASON. 
1750-1833. 

STATE  SOVEREIGNTY  AND  SLAVERY 


VOL.  I. 


CHICAGO : 

CALLAGHAN  AND  COMPANY. 

1889. 


LIBRARY! 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 


Entered,  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  (he  year  1876, 

PY  CALLAGUAN  &  Co. 
In  the  Office  of  the  Librarian  of  Congress,  in  Washington. 


STATE  JOURNAL  PRINTING  COMPANY 
PRINTERS  AND  STEREOTYPERS. 

MADISON,  WIS. 


TO    THE 

HON.    THOMAS    M.    COOLEY, 

ONE   OP  THE  JUSTICES   OP  THE 

SUPREME  COURT  OF  MICHIGAN, 

AND  ONE   OK   THE 

MOST  EMINENT  EXPOUNDERS  OF  OUR  CONSTITUTION, 

THIS   TRANSLATION    IS   RESPECTFULLY   DEDICATED. 


PREFACE. 


WKITTEN  IN  ENGLISH  BY  THE  AUTHOR. 


The  United  States  are  about  to  commence  the  second 
century  of  their  life  as  an  independent  commonwealth  and 
as  a  republic.  It  is  a  curious  fact  that,  at  the  same  time, 
they  evidently  are  entering  upon  a  new  phase  of  their  po 
litical  development.  The  era  of  buoyant  youth  is  coming 
to  a  close:  ripe  and  sober  manhood  is  to  take  its  place. 

I  take  it  to  be  a  good  omen  for  the  success  of  this  work 
that  just  at  this  moment  an  English  translation  of  it  is  to 
be  offered  to  the  American  public.  As  all  the  sources  I 
have  been  able  to  use,  are,  without  a  single  exception, 
printed  books  well  known  to  every  student  of  American 
politics,  no  new  facts  are  to  be  found  in  the  work,  and  1 
even  cannot  claim  that  new  views  of  importance  have  pre 
sented  themselves  to  my  mind.  Yet  I  trust  that  it  will  not 
be  considered  as  lost  labor.  There  are,  among  the  authors 
who  have  written  on  the  constitutional  law  or  the  politics 
of  the  United  States,  more  than  one,  whom,  in  all  candid- 
ness,  I  do  not  pretend  to  equal  in  many  very  important 
respects.  But  I  vent'ure  to  assert  that  among  all  the  works, 
covering  about  as  large  a  ground  as  mine,  there  is  not  one 
to  be  found  which  has  been  written  with  as  much  sober 
ness  of  mind.  And  it  is  not  strange  that  it  should  be  so. 

Among  foreign  authors  there  is  but  one  whom,  to  some 
extent,  I  can  consider  as  a  predecessor.  Tocqueville's  work 
will  always  be  read,  not  only  with  interest,  but  also  with 
great  profit.  Yet  even  at  the  time  it  appeared,  it  failed  to 


VI 11  PREFACE. 

do  justice  to  its  subject.  The  great  French  scholar  was  a 
"  doctrinarian."  In  his  writings  on  French  subjects  the 
weakness  of  his  political  reasoning,  consequent  upon  this 
unhistorical  and  unpolitical  turn  of  his  mind,  is  to  a  great 
extent  made  up  by  the  vastness  and  thoroughness  of  his 
positive  knowledge.  In  his  work  on  "  Democracy  in 
America,"  on  the  contraiy,  it  makes  itself  strongly  felt  on 
every  page,  because  he  lacks  the  necessary  positive  knowl 
edge. 

As  to  my  American  predecessors  I  have  one  great  ad 
vantage  over  all  of  them:  I  am  a  foreigner.  This  I  con 
sider  to  be  an  advantage,  though,  during  my  sojourn  in 
the  United  States  (1867-1872),  I  had  frequently  to  hear: 
"  You  are  a  foreigner,  you  cannot  fully  understand  our  sys 
tem  of  government." 

I,  of  course,  do  not  deny  that  there  is  a  certain  something 
in  the  character  of  every  nation  which  a  foreigner  will 
never  be  able  to  completely  understand,  because  it  cannot 
be  grasped  by  the  judgment;  it  can  only  be  felt,  and  in 
order  to  feel  it,  one's  flesh  and  blood  must  be  filled  with 
the  national  sentiment.  But,  however  often  my  shot  may 
have  missed  the  mark  in  consequence  of  this  lack  of  the 
national  sentiment,  though  it  might  greatly  impair  the 
value  of  the  work  for  other  foreigners,  it  cannot  possibly 
be  fatal  to  it  with  regard  to  American  readers,  for  they 
have  the  necessary  corrective  in  their  American  feeling. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  is  much  easier  for  a  foreigner  to 
guard  his  judgment  from  being  betrayed  by  his  feeling. 
He  has  only  to  ward  off  his  prejudices.  This,  though  no 
easy  work,  can  be  done  to  a  high  degree,  while  it  is  impos 
sible  to  strip  one's  self  of  one's  national  sentiment,  because 
this  is  a  constitutive  part  of  the  individuality.  The  attempt 
to  do  it  would  inevitably  lead  from  Scylla  into  Gharybdis; 
it  would  result  in  an  effort  to  do  the  work,  so  to  say,  as  a 
reasoning  machine  without  ,any  feeling  whatever.  There 
are  historians  and  political  philosophers  who  pretend  that 


PREFACE.  IX 

this  is  the  only  correct  way  to  treat  historical  and  political 
problems.  They  may  be  good  chroniclers  and  quite  fit 
statesmen  for  some  commonwealth  in  the  clouds,  but  they 
will  never  be  able  to  write  a  history  or  to  make  us  under 
stand  the  nature  and  the  working  of  the  government  of  an 
actual  state.  There  is  nothing  in  the  life  of  a  nation  into 
which  the  nation's  way  of  feeling  does  not  enter  as  a  con 
structive  element  of  great  force;  and  in  order  to  under 
stand  a  nation's  way  of  feeling  one  has  to  feel  with  it. 

Several  European  critics  of  rny  work  have  been  of  opin 
ion  that  my  judgment  of  the  American  system  of  govern 
ment  and  its  working  is  an  almost  unqualified  condemnation, 
and  I  do  not  doubt  that  some  American  readers  will  receive 
the  same  impression  and  laugh  at  my  claiming  to  u  feel" 
with  the  people  of  the  United  States.  Yet  the  claim  is 
well-founded.  I  came  to  the  United  States  as  an  emigrant, 
and  one  of  the  first  things  I  did  was  to  have  my  declara 
tion  of  intending  to  become  a  citizen  registered  in  the  city 
hall  of  New  York.  I,  in  fact,  felt  with  the  people  of  the 
United  States,  before  I  commenced  to  study  them  and  their 
institutions.  For  a  considerable  time,  however,  this  feel 
ing  was  partly  of  a  kind  to  render  my  studies  pretty  fruit-  , 
less. 

On  the  continent  of  Europe  the  United  States  are,  even 
among  the  best  educated  classes,  in  a  really  astonishing 
degree,  a  terra  incognita.  Just  on  this  account  they  have 
always  been  used  with  predilection  as  an  illustration  in  the 
service  of  party  ends.  Their  fate  in  this  quality  has  been 
pretty  varied.  In  quick  succession  and  more  than  once 
they  have  run  through  all  the  phases  from  the  idol  to  a 
bugbear.  I  was  inclined  to  look  upon  them  in  the  light  of 
the  former,  for  Laboulaye  was  the  butler  who  had  filled  my 
knapsack  of  expectations.  So  I  was  rather  unprepared  for 
Tammany  Hall,  the  first  institution  I  got  somewhat  better 
acquainted  with. 

For  a  long  time  I  was  fairly  bewildered  by  the  throng 


X  PREFACE. 

of  most  opposite  impressions,  and  even  after  I  had  read 
and  studied  many  a  good  book,  I  searched  in  vain  for  a 
thread  to  lead  me  safely  through  this  labyrinth.  Only 
very  gradually  I  succeeded  in  finding  out  what,  up  to  this 
day,  seems  to  me  the  one  reason  why  all  my  efforts  thus 
far  had  resembled  so  much  a  wild-goose  chase.  Without 
being  fully  conscious  of  it,  I  expected  to  find  in  everything 
something  particular,  quite  different  from  what  was  known 
to  me  either  by  study  or  by  personal  observation;  and  this 
all  the  books  I  had  read  had  failed  to  distinctly  show  me  as 
a  mistake  which  could  not  but  be  fatal  to  the  success  of  my 
studies.  That  I  at  last  became  aware  of  the  mistake,  is  the 
explanation  of  the  claim  raised  before  that  I  have  studied 
and  written  with  more  soberness  of  mind  than  any  of  my 
predecessors.  And  I  beg  leave  to  add  that,  after  this  veil 
had  dropped  from  my  eyes,  my  interest  in  the  subject  as 
sumed  quite  a  new  character;  from  that  moment  it  was 
decided  that  I  had  found  the  principal  task  of  my  life  as  a 
student  and  as  a  writer,  for  it  is  the  work  of  a  lifetime  I 
have  undertaken.  Now  it  had  fully  come  to  what  I  would 
call  my  immediate  consciousness  that  here  was  only  an  act 
of  the  one  great  drama,  the  history  of  western  civilization; 
and  that — to  express  it  strongly  in  order  to  be  distinct — 
the  players  in  it,  the  principal  ones  as  well  as  the  great 
mass,  were  neither  demi-gods  nor  devils,  but  men,  strug 
gling,  under  many  shortcomings,  buf,  with  great  energy, 
their  way  onward,  not  with  startling  leaps,  but  advancing 
step  by  step,  just  as  all  the  rest  of  the  great  nations  of  the 
earth  have  had  to  do.  Nothing  was  left  of  either  the  misty 
vagueness  of  the  grand  and  wonderful  fairy-tale  or  of  the 
prickling  atmosphere  of  the  strange  puzzle;  I  felt  myself 
standing  in  the  fresh  and  clear  air  of  stern  historical  truth. 
The  reflecting  reader  will  find  in  this  "  confession  of 
faith"  the  clue  for  the  "method"  of  my  studies,  so  far  as 
he  heed  care  about  it.  Whether  my  hope,  based  on  its 


TKEFACE.  XI 

principles,  is  well  founded,  that  my  labor  is  not  lost, 
though  no  new  materials  of  any  kind  have  been  at  my  ser 
vice,  this  question  I  have  to  leave  to  my  readers  to  decide. 

H.  VON  HOLST. 
FBEIBURG,  1876. 


TRANSLATORS'  NOTE. 


"We  herewith  present  to  the  American  people  the  first 
part  of  the  most  important  work  on  the  internal  history  of 
the  United  States  that  has  emanated  from  the  European 
press,  and  one  of  the  most  valuable  contributions  that  has 
as  yet  been  made  to  our  historical  literature  by  any  writer, 
whether  native  or  foreign. 

We  were  led  to  undertake  the  task  of  its  translation  when 
ve  did  because  we  considered  the  Centennial  year  the  most 
opportune  time  for  its  publication.  The  people  of  the  United 
States  are  just  now  looking  back  with  intense  interest  over 
their  past  to  the  birth  and  growth  of  the  nation,  and  to  the 
lives  of  the  great  men  who  projected  the  scheme  of  govern 
ment  under  which  we  live.  At  such  a  time  they  cannot  but 
feel  disposed  to  welcome  a  production  in  which  so  much  abil 
ity  and  research  have  been  lavished  upon  the  subject  upper 
most  in  their  thoughts.  That  the  work  is  the  production 
of  an  eminent  foreigner,  will  give  it  a  zest  which  it  might 
not  have  coming  from  an  American  author. 

Professor  Yon  Hoist  possesses  in  an  eminent  degree  all 
the  qualifications  necessary  to  fit  him  to  accomplish  his  un 
dertaking  in  the  most  creditable  manner.  We  have  heard 
it  said  that  only  an  American  can  write  the  history  of  this 
country.  As  well  say  that  Grote  could  nqt  have  written  the 
history  of  Greece,  nor  Mommsen  that  of  Rome.  But  if  not 
an  American,  the  author  sojourned  long  enough  in  this 
country  to  catch  the  spirit  of  the  people,  of  their  history 


xiv  TRANSLATORS'  NOTE. 

and  institutions.  He  intends,  besides,  before  completing 
his  work,to  visit  us  once  more.  How  industriously  he  has 
collected  and  digested  the  material  at  his  command,  every 
page  of  his  work  bears  witness.  Americans  will  not  all 
agree  with  him  in  his  estimate  of  the  great  men  who 
founded  the  Republic,  nor  in  his  view  of  questions  which 
have  been  the  subject  of  debate  here  from  the  very  begin 
ning.  But  that  is  not  to  be  expected.  Removed  from 
the  influence  of  party  passion,  he  may  have  formed  a 
more  impartial  opinion  of  their  character  than  is  possible 
to  ourselves.  What  the  American  people  need  more  than 
anything  else  at  the  present  time,  is  to  take  an  objective 
view  of  themselves,  and  that  is  best  furnished  them  by 
foreign  writers. 

The  present  volume  is  only  an  earnest  of  those  which 

are  to  come,  and  which  will  excite,  we  are  confident,  a  de 
gree  of  interest  not  inferior  to  that  produced  by  De  Tocque- 
ville's  Democracy  in  America. 

THE  TRANSLATORS. 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  I. 

THE  ORIGIN  OF  THE  UNION,  THE  CONFEDERATION,  AND  THE 
STRUGGLE  FOR  THE  PRESENT  CONSTITUTION 1 

United  States  History  Mistakenly  Thought  Complex.— Necessity 
for  Independence  of  the  Colonies. —  Inter-colonial  Relations. —  The 
Revolutionary  Colonial  Congress. —  Declaration  of  Independence. 
Union  the  Result  of  the  Revolution. —  Beginning  of  Compromises. — 
Franklin's  Scheme,  1754.— The  Name  "American." — The  National 
View  and  Confederation. —  Influence  of  Particularism. —  The  Union 
Existent  Prior  to  the  Articles  of  Confederation. —  ' "Sovereignty"  in 
the  Confederation.—  Character  of  the  Union. —  Status  of  Congress. — 
Fear  of  Centralization. —  Rousseauism  and  the  French  Revolution. — 
Washington's  Influence. —  Poverty  of  Congress. —  Repudiation. — 
Shay's  Rebellion. —  Annapolis  Convention. — The  Federal  Conven 
tion. —  Secession  of  New  York  Delegates. —  The  Slave  Interest. —  Op 
position  to  the  Constitution  Among  the  States. —  New  York. —  Hamil 
ton. —  Madison.—  The  "Inspiration  "  Theory  of  the  Constitution. 

CHAPTER  II. 
THE  WORSHIP  OF  THE  CONSTITUTION  AND  ITS  REAL  CHARATER    64 

Sincerity  of  Secessionists'  Exaltation  of  the  Constitution. —  The 
Federalists  and  Anti-Federalists. —  Thorough  and  Discriminating 
Criticism,  of  the  Constitution  Lacking. —  Its  Fortunate  Capacity  for 
Elastic  Interpretation. —  The  Ideas  of  Disunion  and  Nullification. 

CHAPTER  III. 

THE  INTERNAL  STRUGGLES  DURING  WASHINGTON'S  Two  ADMIN 
ISTRATIONS.  ALEXANDER  HAMILTON.  THE  FIRST  DEBATE 
ON  THE  SLAVERY  QUESTION.  INFLUENCE  OF  THE  FRENCH 
REVOLUTION.  CONSOLIDATION  OF  PARTIES.  GRADUAL  IN 
TENSIFICATION  OF  GEOGRAPHICAL  DIFFERENCES 80 

Washington's  Faith  in  the  Possibility  of  Harmony. —  Hamilton 
and  Jefferson. —  Hamilton's  Financial  Policy.— Funding  Act  and 


XVI  CONTENTS. 

Assumption  Bill. —  Locating  the  Capital. —  Virginia's  Menace.— Anti- 
slavery  Among  the  Quakers. — Threats  in  Defense  of  Slavery. —  The 
Excise  War. —  Sympathy  Between  Militia  and  Insurgents. —  Hamil 
ton's  National  Bank. —  French  Revolution. —  Freneau. —  Genet's 
Mission. —  Jefferson  Leaves  the  Cabinet. —  The  First  Embargo. —  War 
with  England  Imminent. —  Jay's  Treat}7  of  Reconciliation.— The 
Almighty  Dollar. —  "Camillus"  Letters. —  Gouverneur  Morris  in 
France. —  Presidential  Succession. —  John  Adams. —  Federalist  Dis 
sension. —  Rise  of  the  Republicans. 

CHAPTER  IV. 
NOTIFICATION.    THE  VIRGINIA  AND  KENTUCKY  RESOLUTIONS.  ..  138 

Washington's  Retirement.—  Relations  with  France.—  The  X.  Y.  Z. 
Correspondence. —  Alien  and  Sedition  Laws. —  Rise  and  Development 
of  Nullification. —  Madison  and  the  Virginia  Resolutions. —  Jefferson 
and  the  Kentucky  Resolutions. —  Jefferson's  Character. —  The  Fed 
eral  Convention  and  Nullification. 

CHAPTER  V. 

THE  PRESIDENTIAL  ELECTION  OF  1801.  THE  FALL  OF  THE  FED 
ERALIST  PARTY.  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  PURCHASE  OF  LOUIS 
IANA.  THE  BURR  AND  FEDERALIST  INTRIGUES 168 

Burr's  Intrigues  for  the  Presidency.—  Hamilton's  Support  of  Jef 
ferson. —  Policy  of  Jefferson. —  Federalists  Fall  Away  From  Hamil 
ton. —  Louisiana  Purchase.— Growth  of  the  West  Feared  by  New 
England. —  Secession  Agitation  in  the  North. —  Power  of  Annexa 
tion. —  Jefferson's  Violation  of  the  Constitution.— Disunion  Plot  of 
Burr.—  Party  Relations.—  European  Affairs. 

CHAPTER  VI. 

THE  EMBARGO.  MADISON  AND  THE  SECOND  WAR  WITH  ENG 
LAND.  THE  HARTFORD  Con  MENTION ...  200 

France  and  England.— Napoleon.— The  Embargo  of  1807.  — In 
dustrial  Ruin  of  New  England.— Henry  Clay  and  Canadian  Con 
quest—War  of  1812.— Madison.— Embargo  of  1812.— Webster's 
Speech  for  a  National  Not  a  Party  War.— New  England  Re 
fuses  Aid.— Massachusetts  Protests.— Embargo  of  1813.— Treaty  of 
Ghent. —  Hartford  Convention. —  Madison's  Alarm. —  State  Sover 
eignty. 


CONTENTS.  XV11 

CHAPTER  VIL 

HISTORY  OP  THE  SLAVERY  QUESTION  TO  1787.     THE  COMPRO 
MISES  OF  THE  CONSTITUTION  ON  SLAVERY 273 

British  Right  of  Search.— Death  of  the  Federalist  Party.—  Slavery 
in  the  Colonies.  —  The  French  Idealists.— Early  Anti-slavery. — Dec 
laration  of  Independence.— Ordinance  of  1787. —  The  Three-fifths 
Compromise. —  Slave-trade  Reprieve. — Establishment  of  the  Slavo- 
cratic  Hold  over  the  Union. 

CHAPTER  VIII. 

HISTORY  OF  THE  SLAVERY  QUESTION  FROM  1789  UNTIL  THE  MIS 
SOURI  COMPROMISE 302 

Evil  Effects  of  the  Ultra  Liberty  Agitation  of  the  Revolution. — 
Abuse  of  Free  Negroes.  —  Slave  Code  of  the  District  of  Columbia.  — 
Petitions  to  Congress  Regarding  Slavery. — Slavery  "Purely  Munici 
pal,"  Recognized  in  Treaties. —  Fugitive  Slave  Law,  1793. —  Northern 
Slave-traders. —  Slave-trade  Prohibition  Ignored. —  Amelia  Island. — 
Mississippi  Abandoned  to  Slavery, —  Colonization  Society. —  Fugitive 
Slave  Clause  of  the  Treaty  of  Ghent. —  Indemnity  from  England. — 
Purchase  of  Florida. —  Seminole  War. —  Massacre  of  Indians  and 
Fugitive  Slaves  at  Fort  Appalachicola. — Slavery  Becomes  the  Domi 
nant  Issue. 

CHAPTER  IX 

THE   ECONOMIC   CONTRACT    BETWEEN    THE   FREE   AND   SLAVE 
STATES 340 

44  South  "  and  "  North." —  Perpetual  Peace  Between  the  Free  and 
Slave  States  Impossible. —  Free  and  Slave  Labor  Compared. —  The 
Cotton  Industry. —  Southern  Society,  Manufactures,  Trade,  Popu 
lation. —  Slave  Territory  Extension. —  Struggle  over  Missouri. —  Con 
ditions  of  the  Louisiana  Purchase  Treaty.  —  Powers  of  Congress  in 
Admission  of  New  States. —  Missouri's  Arrogance. —  The  Restriction 
Lost.—  Arkansas.—  Line  36°  30'.—  Free  Negroes  in  Missouri.— The 
Missouri  Compromise  Adopted. 

CHAPTER  X. 

DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  ECONOMIC  CONTRAST  BETWEEN  THE  FREE 

AND  SLAVE  STATES 383 

Monroe's  Re-election.— The  Bank  Question  Under  Madison.— 
Dallas'  Report.—  Democratic  Attitude.—  Supreme  Court  Decides  the 


XVI 11  ,        CONTENTS. 

Bank  Constitutional.—  Early  Views  as  to  Internal  Improvements. — 
Cumberland  Road.—  Interests  of  the  West.—  Erie  Canal.—  Improve 
ments  Under  Adams  and  Jackson. —  Southern  Opposition. —  The 
Tariff,  Revenue,  Protection. —  Views  of  Early  Statesmen. —  Tariff  of 
1816. —  Tariff  of  1824. —  The  American  System. —  Slavery  and  the 
Tariff. —  Nullification  Agitation  in  South  Carolina. 

CHAPTER  XI. 

THE  PANAMA  CONGRESS.    GEORGIA  AND  THE  FEDERAL  GOVERN 
MENT 409 

The  Panama  Congress. —  Clay's  Human  Freedom  League. —  Clay's 
Character. —  Adams' Position  and  Message  on  the  Congress. —  The 
Holy  Alliance. —  The  Monroe  Doctrine. —  Hayti,  the  Negro  Republic 

—  Cuba. —  Fear  of  European  Interference  with  American  Slavery.— 
The  Creek  and  Cherokee  Lands. —  Georgia's  Oppressive  Policy  and 
Rebellious  Measures, —  Troup  Defies  the  United  States  and  Proposes 
Southern  Union. —  Adams' Message. —  The  Indians  Forced  to  Emi 
grate. —  Georgia  Supported  by  Jackson. —  Wirt  Defends  the  Indians. 

—  The  Worcester  Case. —  Georgia  Defies  the  Supreme  Court. 

CHAPTER  XII. 

THE  DOCTRINE  OF  NULLIFICATION.     THE  COMPROMISE  BETWEEN 
SOUTH  CAROLINA  AND  THE  FEDERAL  GOVERNMENT 459 

Jackson's  Election. —  His  Inaugural. —  Calhoun,  Vice-president.— 
His  Character.— Breach  with  Jackson. —  Free  Trade  Hopeless  — 
South  Carolina  Expositition  of  Nullification. — Calhoun's  Fort  Hill 
Address. —  State-Rights  Theory  of  the  Constitution.—  Jackson's  Proc 
lamation  against  Nullification. —  Military  Preparations. —  The  Ver- 
planck  Tariff  Bill.— The  Force  Bill.— Clay  and  Calhoun.— The  Great 
Nullifier.—  Webster  on  Nullification.—  The  Compromise  of  1833.— 
The  Sovereignty  of  Law. 


STATE  SOVEREIGNTY  AND  SLAVERY. 


CHAPTER  I. 

THE  ORIGIN  OF  THE  UNION,  THE  CONFEDERATION  AND  THE 
STRUGGLE  FOR  THE  PRESENT  CONSTITUTION. 

The  opinion  is  not  uncommon  in  Europe,  that  American 
politics,  up  to  the  outbreak  of  the  civil  -war,  were  exceed 
ingly  complicated  and  difficult  to  be  understood.  Such, 
however,  is  not  the  case.  If  we  do  not  allow  ourselves  to 
be  confused  by  matters  of  secondary  consideration,  and 
once  get  hold  of  the  right  thread,  it  soon  becomes  evident 
that  the  history  of  the  United  States,  even  as  far  back  as 
the  colonial  period,  is  unusually  simple,  and  the  course  of 
their  development  consistent  in  a  remarkable  degree. 

Turgot1  and  Choiseul2  had  very  early  recognized  that 
the  separation  of  the  colonies  from  the  mother  country 
was  only  a  question  of  time;  and  this  irrespective  of  the 
principles  which  might  guide  the  colonial  policy  of  Eng 
land.  The  narrow  and  ungenerous  conduct  which  parlia 
ment  observed  towards  the  colonies  in  every  respect,  brought 
about  the  decisive  crisis  long  before  the  natural  course  of 
things  and  the  diversity  of  interests  growing  out  of  this 
had  made  the  breach  an  inevitable  necessity. 

1 1750.    DeWitt,  Thomas  Jefferson,  p.  40. 

2 1761.  Bancroft,  History  of  the  United  States,  IV.,  p.  399;  DeWitt, 
1.  c.,  p.  42.  Durand  wrote  in  August,  1766 :  "  They  are  too  rich  to  remain 
in  obedience." 


'2,  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY    AND    SLAVERY. 

To  this  circumstance  it  is  to  be  ascribed  that  the  colo 
nists  were  satisfied  that  an  amicable  solution  would  be 
found  to  the  questions  debated  between  them  and  the 
mother  country,  long  after  England  had  given  the  most 
unambiguous  proof  that  she  would  not,  on  any  consid 
eration,  yield  the  principle  in  issue.  A  few  zealots  like 
John  Adams  harbored,  during  the  English -French  colonial 
war,  a  transitory  wish  that  the  guardianship  of  England 
should  cease  forever.  But,  shortly  after  the  conclusion  of 
peace,,  there  was  not  one  to  be  found  who  would  not  have 
"  rejoiced  in  the  name  of  Great  Britain."1 

It  was  long  before  the  ill-will,  which  the  systematic  dis 
regard  by  parliament  of  the  rights  of  the  colonists  had 
excited,  triumphed  over  this  feeling.  Even  in  August  and 
September,  1775,  that  is,  half  a  year  after  the  battle  of 
Lexington,  so  strong  was  the  Anglo-Saxon  spirit  of  conserv 
atism  and  loyalty  among  the  colonists,  that  the  few  extrem 
ists  who  dared  to  speak  of  a  violent  disruption  of  all  bonds 
entailed  chastisement  upon  themselves  and  were  uni 
versally  censured.2  But  the  eyes  of  the  colonists  had 
been  for  some  time  so  far  opened  that  they  hoped  to  make 
an  impression  on  parliament  and  the  king  only  by  the 
most  energetic  measures.  They  considered  the  situation 
serious  enough  to  warrant  and  demand  that  they  should  be 
prepared  for  any  contingency.  Both  of  these  things  could 
evidently  be  accomplished  in  the  right  way  and  with  the 
requisite  energy,  only  on  condition  that  they  should  act 
with  their  united  strength. 

The  difficulties  in  the  way  of  this,  however,  were  not  in 
significant.  The  thirteen  colonies  had  been  founded  in 
very  different  times  and  under  very  different  circumstances. 
Their  whole  course  of  development,  their  political  institu- 

1  Works  of  John  Adams.  X.,  p.  394. 

''American  Archives,  III.,  pp.  21, 196,  644,  etc.  See  also  Dickinson's 
course  towards  J.  Adams,  in  the  Works  of  J.  Adams,  II.,  p.  423. 


ORIGIN   OF   THE    UNION.  3 

tions,  their  religious  views  and  social  relations,  were  so 
divergent,  the  one  from  the  other,  that  it  was  easy  to  find 
more  points  of  difference  between  them  than  of  similarity 
and  comparison.  Besides,  commercial  intercourse  between 
the  distant  colonies,  in  consequence  of  the  great  extent  of 
their  territory,  the  scantiness  of  the  population,1  and  the 
poor  means  of  transportation  at  the  time,  was  so  slight 
that  the  similarity  of  thought  and  feeling,  which  can  be  the 
result  only  of  a  constant  and  thriving  trade,  was  wanting. 

The  solidarity  of  interests,  and  what  was  of  greater  im 
portance  at  the  time,  the  clear  perception  that  a  solidarity 
of  interests  existed,  was  therefore  based  mainly  on  the 
geographical  situation  of  the  colonies.  Separated  by  the 
ocean,  not  only  from  the  mother  country,  but  from  the  rest 
of  the  civilized  world,  and  placed  upon  a  continent  of  yet 
unmeasured  bounds,  on  which  nature  had  lavished  every 
gift,  it  was  impossible  that  the  thought  should  not  come  to 
them,  that  they  were,  indeed,  called  upon  to  found  a  "  new 
world."  They  were  not  at  first  wholly  conscious  of  this, 
but  a  powerful  external  shock  made  it  soon  apparent  how 
widely  and  deeply  this  thought  had  shot  its  roots.  They 
could  not  fail  to  have  confidence  in  their  own  strength. 
Circumstances  had  long  been  teaching  them  to  act  on  the 
principle,  "Help  thyself."  Besides,  experience  had  shown 
them,  long  years  before,  that — even  leaving  the  repeated 
attacks  on  their  rights  out  of  the.  question — the  leading- 
strings  by  which  the  mother  country  sought  to  guide  their 
steps  obstructed  rather  than  helped  their  development,  and 
this  in  matters  which  affected  all  the  colonies  alike. 

Hence,  from  the  very  beginning,  they  considered  the 
struggle  their  common  cause.2  And  even  if  the  usurpa- 

1  The  census  of  1790  gives  the  population,  slaves  included,  at  3,929,827. 

a  The  duty  controversies  in  Massachusetts  and  James  Otis's  celebrated 
speech  against  the  writs  of  assistance  (Feb.,  1761)  found  it  is  true,  no 
echo  whatever  in  the  rest  of  the  colonies.  As  early  as  June,  1765,  how- 
ever,  Otis  induced  the  Massachusetts  assembly  to  reply  to  the  Stamp 


4  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY  AND   SLAVERY. 

tions  of  parliament  made  themselves  felt  in  some  parts  of 
the  country  much  more  severely  than  in  others,  the  prin 
ciple  involved  interested  all  to  an  equal  extent. 

Massachusetts  recommended,  in  1774,  the  coming  together 
of  a  general  congress,  and  on  September  4,  of  the  same 
year,  "  the  delegates,  nominated  by  the  good  people  of 
these  colonies,"1  met  in  Philadelphia.2 

Thus,  long  before  the  colonies  thought  of  separation  from 
the  mother  country,  there  was  formed  a  revolutionary 
body,  which  virtually  exercised  sovereign  power.3  How  far 
the  authority  of  this  first  congress  extended,  according  to 
the  instructions  of  the  delegates,  it  is  impossible  to  deter 
mine  with  certainty  at  this  distance  of  time.  But  it  is 
probable  that  the  original  intention  was  that  it  should  con 
sult  as  to  the  ways  and  means  best  calculated  to  remove  the 
grievances  and  to  guaranty  the  rights  and  liberties  of  the 
colonies,  and  should  propose  to  the  latter  a  series  of  resolu 
tions,  furthering  these  objects.  But  the  force  of  circum 
stances  at  the  time  compelled  it  to  act  and  order  imme 
diately,  and  the  people,  by  a  consistent  following  of  its 
orders,  approved  this  transcending  of  their  written  instruc 
tions.  The  congress  was  therefore  not  only  a  revolutionary 
body  from  its  origin,  but  its  acts  assumed  a  thoroughly  revo- 

Act  by  the  calling  of  a  congress.  A  congress,  in  fact,  met  on  Oct.  7 
of  the  same  year  in  New  York,  but  only  nine  of  the  colonies  were  rep 
resented  in  it. 

1  Story,  Commentaries  on  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  I.,  § 
200.    This  peculiar  designation,  which  the  congress  used  in  its  formal 
enunciations,  was  not  without  significance  in  after  years. 

2  All  the  colonies,  with  the  exception  of  Georgia,  were  represented. 

3  Story,  Comrn.  I.,  §  201,  maintains  that  this  congress  had  sovereign 
power  both  de  jure  and  de  facto.    He  bases  his  view  on  the  fact  that 
a  part  of  the  delegates  were  nominated  directly  by  the  people.    But  he 
forgets  that  the  view  that  the  people  alone  are  sovereign  and  the  only 
source  of  legitimate  power,  was  not  at  that  time  a  recognized  principle 
of  law  in  America.  Compare  Cooley  on  Constitutional  Limitations,  p.  7. 


THE  REVOLUTIONARY  CONGRESS.  5 

lutionary  character.1  The  people,  also,  by  recognizing  its 
authority,  placed  themselves  on  a  revolutionary  footing,  and 
did  so  not  as  belonging  to  the  several  colonies,  but  as  a  mor 
al  person;  for  to  the  extent  that  congress  assumed  power 
to  itself  and  made  bold  to  adopt  measures  national  in  their 
nature,  to  that  extent  the  colonists  declared  themselves 
prepared  henceforth  to  constitute  one  people,  inasmuch 
as  the  measures  taken  by  congress  could  be  translated  from 
words  into  deeds  only  with  the  consent  of  the  people.2 

This  state  of  affairs  essentially  continued  up  to  March 
1,  1781.  Until  that  time,  that  is,  until  the  adoption  of 
the  articles  of  confederation  by  all  the  states,  congress 
continued  a  revolutionary  body,  which  was  recognized  by 
all  the  colonies  as  de  jure  and  de  facto  the  national  gov 
ernment,  and  which  as  such  came  in  contact  with  foreign 
powers  and  entered  into  engagements,  the  binding  force  of 
which  on  the  whole  people  has  never  been  called  in  ques 
tion.  The  individual  colonies,  on  the  other  hand,  consid 
ered  themselves,  up  to  the  time  of  the  Declaration  of  In 
dependence,  as.  legally  dependent  upon  England  and  did 
not  take  a  single  step  which  could  have  placed  them 
before  the  mother  country  or  the  world  in  the  light  of 
de  facto  sovereign  states.  They  remained  colonies  until 
the  "  representatives  of  the  United  States"  "  in  the  name 
of  the  good  people  of  these  colonies  "  solemnly  declared 
"  these  united  colonies"  to  be  "  free  and  independent 
states."3  The  transformation  of  the  colonies  into  "  states" 

1  u  The  powers  of  congress  originated  from  necessity,  and  arose  out  of 
and  were  only  limited  by -events,  or,  in  other  words,  they  were  revolu 
tionary  in  their  very  nature.  Their  extent  depended  on  the  exigencies 
and  necessities  of  public  affairs."  Jay,  in  Ware  v.  Hyiton,  Dallas'  Re 
ports,  III.,  p.  232 ;  Curtis,  Decisions  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States,  I.,  p.  176. 

a  Story's  Commentaries,  I.,  §  213.  This  view  was  shared  by  chief 
justice  Jay  and  justices  Chase  and  Patterson,  all  very  distinguished 
(statesmen  of  the  Revolution.  Story,  Com.,  §  216. 

*  "  We,  therefore,  the  representatives  of  the  United  States,  do,  in  the 


6  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY    AND    SLAVERY. 

was,  therefore,  not  the  result  of  the  independent  action 
of  the  individual  colonies.  It  was  accomplished  through 
the  "  representatives  of  the  United  States;"  that  is,  through 
the  revolutionary  congress,  in  the  name  of  the  whole  peo 
ple.  Each  individual  colony  became  a  state  only  in  .so  far 
as  it  belonged  to  the  United  States  and  in  so  far  as  its 
population  constituted  a  part  of  the  people.1  The  thirteen 
colonies  did  not,  as  thirteen  separate  and  mutually  indepen 
dent  commonwealths,enter  into  a  compact  to  sever  the  bonds 
which  connected  them  with  their  common  mother  country, 
and  at  the  same  time  to  proclaim  the  act  in  a  common  man 
ifesto  to  the  world;  but  the  "one  people"  of  the  united 
colonies  dissolved  that  political  connection  with  the  English 
nation,  and  proclaimed  themselves  resolved,  henceforth,  to 
constitute  the  one  perfectly  independent  people  of  the 
United  States.3  The  Declaration  of  Independence  did  not 

name  of  the  good  people  of  these  colonies,  solemnly  publish  .... 
that  these  united  colonies  are,  and  of  right  ought  to  be,  tree  and  indepen 
dent  states."  Declaration  of  Independence.  Compare  also  C.  C.  Pinck- 
ney's  speech  in  the  house  of  representatives  of  South  Carolina,  on  the  18th 
of  January,  1788.  Elliott,  Debates,  IV.,  p.  301 ;  and  Ramsay,  History  of 
the  United  States,  ILL,  pp.  174 and  175. 

1  "The  states  have  their  status  in  the  Union,  and  they  have  no  other 

legal  status The  Union  is  older  than  any  of  the  states,  and 

in  fact,  it  created  them  as  states.      Originally  some  independent  [i.  e., 
independent  of  one  another]  colonies  made  the  Union;  and,  in  tuVn,  the 
Union  threw  off  their  old  dependence  for  them  and  made  them  states 
such  as  they  are.    Not  one  of  them  ever  had  a  state  constitution  inde 
pendent  of  the  Union."  Lincoln's  message,  July  4,  1861.  See  also  King's 
speech  in  the  constitutional  convention,  June  19, 1787.  Madison  Papers. 
Elliott,  Deb.,  V.,  p.  212. 

2  The  Declaration  of  Independence  says :  "  When  it  becomes  neces 
sary  for  one  people  to  dissolve  the  political  bonds  which  have  connected 
them  with  another  people,"  etc.      Calhoun's  view  that    the  colonies, 
when  they  separated  from  England,  remained  completely  independent 
of  one  another,  because  they  were  in  no  wise  dependent  on  one  another 
as  colonies,  is  not  at  all  tenable.    Calhoun  relies,  in  this  instance,  as  in 
so  many  others,  on  a  logical  abstraction,  undisturbed  by  the  contradic 
tion  of  the  most  undeniable  historical  facts.    See  Cal  houu,  A  Disquisition 
on  Government,  Works,  I.,  p.  190.    Besides,  Calhoun  is  here,  as  in  his 


BIRTH    OF   THE   NATION.  7 

create  thirteen  sovereign  states,  but  the  representatives  of 
the  people  declared  that  the  former  English  colonies,  under 
the  name  which  they  had  assumed  of  the  United  States  of 
America,  became,  from  the  fourth  day  of  July,  1776,  a 
sovereign  state  and  a  member  of  the  family  of  nations, 
recognized  by  the  law  of  nations;  and  further,  that  the 
people  would  support  their  representatives  with  their  blood 
and  treasure,  in  their  endeavor  to  make  this  declaration  a 
universally  recognized  fact.  Neither  congress  nor  the 
people  relied  in  this  upon  any  positive  right  belonging 
either  to  the  individual  colonies  or  to  the  colonies  as  a 
whole.  Rather  did  the  Declaration  of  Independence  and 
the  war  destroy  all  existing  political  jural  relations,  and 
seek  their  moral  justification  in  the  right  of  revolution 
inherent  in  every  people  in  extreme  emergencies. 

It  is  important  to  keep  these  points  in  view,  for  they 
became  of  the  very  highest  importance  in  later  years,  re 
mote  as  it  was  from  the  congresses  of  1774  and  1775,  and 
in  part  from  that  of  1776,  to  subject  these  subtle  questions 
to  an  exhaustive  investigation — Inter  arma  silent  leges. 
Congress  had  not  the  time  to  submit  its  powers  to  a  pain 
ful  and  minute  analysis.  The  moment  that  resistance  to 
the  mother  country  ceased  to  be  confined  to  legal  and 

nullification  doctrine,  Jefferson's  disciple.  He  accepts  throughout  the 
premises  of  his  master.  Unlike  the  latter,  however,  he  does  not  stop 
half  way,  but  carries  them  out,  with  the  most  relentless  logic,  to  their 
remotest  conclusion.  Jefferson  considered  the  Union  an  alliance  formed 
only  for  the  purpose  of  shaking  off  the  control  of  the  mother  country, 
and  one  which  should  have  ceased  "of  itself"  when  that  object  was  at 
tained.  Says  he:  "The  alliance  between  the  states  under  the  old  ar 
ticles  of  confederation,  for  the  purpose  of  joint  defense  against  the 
aggressions  of  Great  Britain,  was  found  insufficient,  as  treaties  of  alli 
ance  generally  are,  to  enforce  compliance  with  their  mutual  stipulations ; 
and  these  once  fulfilled,  that  bond  was  to  expire  of  itself,  and  each  state 
to  become  sovereign  and  independent  in  all  things."  See  also  Curtis, 
History  of  the  Constitution,  I.,  p.  39,  etc.;  Farrar,  Manual  of  the  Consti- 
tution,  pp.  50,  51;  Hurd,  Law  of  Freedom  and  Bondage,  I.,  p.  408,  and 
II.,  p.  354. 


8  STATE  SOVEREIGNTY  AND  SLAVERY. 

peaceable  measures,  and  recourse  was  had  to  force,  ques 
tions  of  law  were  naturally  little  considered.  The  Dec 
laration  of  Independence  put  them  aside  completely. 
The  question  now  was  one  of  facts,  and  the  facts  were  as 
related  above. 

Even  in  the  regulation  and  transformation  of  their  in 
ternal  affairs,  the  individual  colonies  did  not  take  the  in 
itiative,  although  they  refused  obedience  to  the  constituted 
powers  in  so  far  as  these  sided  with  England.  It  was  not 
until  congress1  had  recommended  them  to  do  so  that  they 
took  the  reins  into  their  own  hands.'2 

As  far  as  the  legality  or  illegality  of  this  step  is  con 
cerned,  it  is  entirely  indifferent  whether  it  was  the  leg 
islative  bodies  of  the  several  colonies  themselves,  or  con 
gress,  or  the  spontaneous  act  of  the  people  of  the  several 
colonies,  that  gave  the  impetus  to  it;  it  was  under  any  and 
all  circumstances  illegal.  The  colonies  were  engaged  in  a 
revolution,  and  therefore  there  is  nothing  to  be  said  of  a 
legal  sanction  of  their  measures.  But  the  same  blow  which 
had  destroyed  the  bonds  between  the  colonies  and  the 
mother  country,  threw  down  the  walls  which  had  hitherto 
prevented  the  political  union  of  the  thirteen  colonies. 
They  were,  in  fact,  thrown  together  so  as  to  constitute  them 
one  people,  endeavoring  to  conquer  their  national  independ 
ence  with  the  sword.  This  fact  could  be  changed  in  noth 
ing,  no  matter  how  much  it  was  desired,  when  the  new  state 

1  May  10,  1776.  Journal  of  Congress,  II.,  pp.,  166,  174.  Farrar 
Manual  of  the  Constitution,  p.  95.  Story,  Com.,  I.,  §  204. 

a  New  Hampshire  alone  had,  before  this  recommendation  of  congress 
given  herself  a  government  (Dec.,  1775),  but  she  expressly  declared  the 
new  order  of  things  to  be  provisional  "during  the  unhappy  and  unnatural 
contest  with  Great  Britain."  The  declarations  of  New  Jersey  and  of  South 
Carolina  contained  similar  clauses,  but  more  explicitly  framed.  Vir 
ginia  alone  completely  dissolved  her  government  as  it  existed  formerly 
under  the  crown  of  Great  Britain.  The  other  states  obeyed  the  recom- 
mendation  of  congress  only  after  the  publication  of  the  Declaration 
of  Independence. 


POWERS    OF    THE    CONGRESS.  9 

was  being  subsequently  organized  on  a  legal  basis,  to  retain 
something  of  the  separate  existence  of  the  colonial  period. 

Congress  had.  with  the  consent  of  the  people,  taken  the 
initiative  in  the  transformation  of  the  thirteen  colonies 
into  one  sovereign  state.  It  became '  thereby  per  se  the 
national  government  de  facto  and  by  the  success  of  the 
Revolution  gave  its  acts,  both  earlier  and  later,  an  addition 
al  and  legally  binding  force. 

Political  theories  had  nothing  to  do  with  this  develop 
ment  of  things.  It  was  the  natural  result  of  given  cir 
cumstances  and  was  an  accomplished  fact  before  anyone 
thought  of  the  legal  consequences  which  might  subsequent 
ly  be  deduced  from  it.  But  it  was  clear  from  the  very 
first  that  the  masses  of  the  people,  as  well  as  the  leaders  of 
the  movement,  would  almost  unanimously  oppose  to  the 
utmost  the  practical  enforcement  of  these  legal  conse 
quences. 

If  the  Revolution  threw  down  the  barriers  which  divided 
the  English  dependencies  in  America  into  thirteen  inde 
pendent  colonies;  if  it,  in  fact,  constituted  an  American 
people, — it  is  obvious  that  both  law  and  equity  demanded 
that  not  the  former  thirteen  colonies  should  be  represented 
in  congress,  but  the  population  of  the  colonies  as  a  part  of 
the  people.  This  consequence  was  too  palpably  plain  to 
remain  completely  unnoticed.  Patrick  Henry  of  Virginia 
showed  how  this  was  at  once  the  irresistible  conclusion  of 
reason,  and  the  only  right  policy.  In  the  congress  of  1774 
he  thus  solemnly  expressed  himself:  "  Government  is  dis 
solved Where  are  your  landmarks,  your  boundaries 

of  colonies?  ....  The  distinctions  between  Yirginians, 
Pennsylvanians,  New  Yorkers,  and  New  Englanders  are 
no  more.  I  am  not  a  Virginian:  I  am  an  American. 
Slaves  are  to  be  thrown  out  of  the  question,  and  if  the 
freemen  can  be  represented  according  to  their  numbers,  I 
am  satisfied.  I  go  upon  the  supposition  that  government 


10  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

is  at  an  end.  All  distinctions  are  thrown  down;  all  America 
is  thrown  into  one  mass."1 

Congress  could  not  resolve  at  once  to  take  a  decided  po 
sition  on  this  question.  It  decreed  that  "  each  colony  or 
province"  should  have  one  vote;  the  congress  not  being 
possessed  of,  nor  then  able  to  procure,  materials  for  ascertain 
ing  the  importance  of  each  colony.2 

Patrick  Henry's  view  was  then  indirectly  looked  upon  as 
right  in  principle,  whereas  the  opposite  principle  had  been 
virtually  adopted  before,  and  sedulous  efforts  were  made  to 
avoid  any  definite  expression  of  the  view  that  was  to  pre 
vail.  Thus  was  begun  that  infinite  series  of  compromises  by 
which  the  American  people  have  endeavored  to  put  to  one 
side,  by  devising  and  passing  resolutions  which  might  be  con 
strued  at  will  in  senses  the  most  diametrically  opposite,  diffi 
culties  which  they  ought  to  have  grappled  with  and  overcome. 
By  this  mode  of  procedure  delay  has  been  gained  in  every 
instance,  and  this  gain  has  frequently  been  of  the  highest  im 
portance.  But  wrhen  the  direct  conflict  of  opposing  views 
could  no  longer  be  postponed,  the  struggle  became  more  ob 
stinate  and  embittered,  in  proportion  as  the  delay  was  great 
er.  It  is  not  possible,  at  this  distance  of  time,  to  say  witli  any 
certainty,  whether  the  urgency  of  circumstances,  the  en- 

1  Works  of  John  Adams,  II.,  pp.  365,  368.    Wirt,  in  his  Life  of  Pat 
rick  Henry,  pp.  124,  125,  gives  a  glowing  description  of  this  speech. 
The  few  sentences  to  be  found  in  Adams  are  all  that  have  come  down  to 
posterity,  but  the  audience  unanimously  testified  to  the  powerful  im 
pression  it  made  on  them.    See  Curtis,  History  of  the  Const.,  I.,  p.  15 ; 
DeWitt,  Th.  Jeflersou,  p.  76;  Greene,  Historical  View  of  the  American 
Revolution,  p.  81. 

2  Sept.  6,  1774.    Elliott,  Debates,  V.,  p.  181;  Pitkin,  A  Political  and 
Civil  History  of  the  United  States  of  America,  I.,  p.  283.    The  dele- 
gates  of  Connecticut  wrote,  October  10,  1774,  to   governor  Trumbull: 
"  The  mode  of  voting  in  this  congress  was  first  resolved  upon ;  which  was, 
that  each  colony  should  have  one  voice;  but  as  this  was  objected  to  as 
unequal,  an  entry  was  made  on  the  journals  to  prevent  its  being  drawn 
into  precedent." 


COLONIAL   PREJUDICE.  11 

thusiasm  of  the  hour,  or  a  want  of  insight  into  the  im 
portance  of  the  question,  moved  congress  to  postpone  its 
final  decision;  but  it  is  probable  that  the  three  causes  co 
operated  to  this  end.  This  much  is  certain,  however,  that 
nearly  all  the  representatives,  the  moment  they  gave  any 
real  attention  to  the  matter,  declared,  without  a  moment's 
hesitation,  against  Patrick  Henry's  views. 

Franklin's  confederation  scheme  of  1754  suited  the  col 
onies  as  little  as  it  did  the  mother  country.  It  imposed 
no  limitations  or  restrictions  whatever  in  the  interest 
of  the  general  good,  although  the  French  invasion  called 
most  urgently  for  common  action.  And  there  had  been  no 
essential  change  as  yet  in  this  feeling,  although  the  mag 
nitude  of  the  dangers  threatening  the  colonies,  and  the  im 
portance  of  the  matters  in  controversy,  made  them  more 
inclined  to  a  firmer  union  among  themselves,  so  far  as  this 
was  necessary  to  resist  the  common  enemy.  .But  in  regard 
to  their  relations  to  one  another  they  were  involved  in  the 
same  short-sighted  and  ungenerous  particularism  as  before. 
"  A  little  colony  has  its  all  at  stake  as  well  as  a  great  one," 
major  Sullivan  bluntly  replied  to  the  patriotic  effusion  of 
Patrick  Henry.1  This  showed  clearly  that  only  the  common 
interests  of  the  colonies  induced  them  to  make  opposition 
to  England  their  common  cause,  or  at  least  that  their  com 
munity  of  interests  did  vastly  more  to  bring  this  about 
than  did  a  feeling  of  nationality,  for  which  the  war  first 
paved  the  way. 

The  colonists  were  certainly  not  wanting  in  a  kind  of 
national  feeling;  but  it  did  more  to  dampen  the  energy  of 
their  opposition  to  England  than  to  increase  it.  It  had 
scarcely  any  influence  on  their  attitude  towards  one  anoth 
er;  for  it  had  its  roots,  not  in  the  soil  of  the  new  world,  but 
in  the  home  of  their  ancestors.2  As  long  as  it  was  not  be- 

1  John  Adams,  Works,  II.,  p.  366. 

*  This  fact  is  frequently  too  much  lost  sight  of  in  Europe.  The  col 
onists  severed  themselves  from  England  with  bleeding  hearts.  Greene 


12  STATE  SOVEREIGNTY  AND  SLAVERY. 

yond  a  doubt  that  the  breach  with  England  was  incurable, 
and  until  the  old  love  and  veneration  for  the  mother  coun 
try  was  changed  to  bitter  hatred,  nearly  all  the  colonists 
were  first  the  children  of  their  own  particular  colony  and 
then  of  England.  The  name  American  was  up  to  that 
time  little  more  than  a  beautiful  prophetic  vision.  It  re 
ceived  the  impress  of  a  definite  and  lasting  reality  only 
through  the  war  of  Independence.2 

Hence  the  question,  how  the  people  were  to  be  repre 
sented  and  to  vote  in  congress  was  decided  even  before 
it  was  raised.  Luther  Martin  says  rightly  in  his  celebrated 

describes  their  feelings  for  the  mother  country  in  the  following  words : 
"  They  loved  their  mother  country  with  the  love  of  children  who,  for- 
-  saking  their  homes  under  strong  provocation,  turn  back  to  them  in 
thought,  when  time  has  blunted  the  sense  of  injury,  with  a  lively  recol 
lection  of  early  associations  and  endearments,  a  tenderness  and  a  long 
ing  not  altogether  free  from  self-reproach.  To  go  to  England  was  to  go 
home.  To  have  been  there  was  a  claim  to  special  consideration.  They 
studied  English  history  as  the  beginning  of  their  own ;  a  first  chapter 
which  all  must  master  thoroughly  who  would  understand  the  sequel. 
England's  literature  was  their  literature.  Her  great  men  were  their  great 
men.  And  when  her  flag  waved  over  them,  they  felt  as  if  the  spirit  which 
had  borne  it  in  triumph  over  so  many  bloody  fields  had  descended  upon 
them  with  all  its  inspiration  and  all  its  glory  •  •  •  They  loved  to 
talk  of  Saint  Paul's  and  Westminster  Abbey;  and  with  the  Hudson  and 
the  Potomac  before  their  eyes,  could  hardly  persuade  themselves  that 
the  Thames  was  not  the  first  of  rivers.  More  especially  did  they  rejoice 
to  see  Englishmen  and  converse  with  them.  The  very  name  was  a  talis 
man  that  opened  every  door,  broke  down  the  barriers  of  the  most  exclu 
sive  circle,  and  transformed  the  dull  retailer  of  crude  opinions  and  stale 
jests  into  a  critic  and  a  wit."  (Hist.  View  of  the  American  Rev.,  pp.  5, 
6.)  The  relation  of  England  to  the  colonies  he,  on  the  other  hand,  char 
acterizes  as  "  a  mere  business  relation."  Ibid,  p.  12.  The  same  judg 
ment  was  expressed  by  very  distinguished  Englishmen.  Thus  Adam 
Smith:  "A  great  empire  has  been  established  for  the  sole  purpose  of 
raising  up  a  nation  of  customers,  who  should  be  obliged  to  buy  from 
the  shops  of  our  different  producers  all  the  goods  with  which  those 
could  supply  them."  Inquiry  into  the  Nature  and  Causes  of  the  Wealth 
of  Nations,  II.,  p.  517. 

8  See  an  article  in  the  London  Public  Advertiser,  March  14,  1781. 
Moore,  Diary  of  the  American  Revolution,  II,  p.  395. 


PEOPLE   VS.    STATE.  13 

letter  to  the  Maryland  convention  that  the  voting  by 
states  was  not  on  account  of  "  necessity  or  expediency," 
but  that  "  on  the  contrary,  it  was  adopted  on  the  principle 
of  the  rights  of  man  and  the  rights  of  states."1  In  con 
gress,  however,  Patrick  Henry's  view  still  found  some 
warm  supporters,2  but  the  larger  states  did  not  feel  them 
selves  justified  in  insisting  on  their  demand,  glad  as  they 
would  have  been  to  have  seen  it  acknowledged.  Among 
the  numberless  amendments  to  the  articles  of  confederation 
suggested  by  the  several  states,  there  is  not  one  proposing  a 
change  of  the  provision  governing  the  mode  of  representa 
tion  or  the  manner  of  voting.3 

Reason  was  unquestionably  on  the  side  of  those  who 
advocated  the  national  view.  "  It  has  been  said  that  con 
gress  is  a  representation  of  states,  not  of  individuals.  I 
say  that  the  objects  of  its  care  are  the  individuals  of  the 
states.  It  is  strange  that  annexing  the  name  <  state'  to 
ten  thousand  men  should  give  them  an  equal  right  with 
forty  thousand.  This  must  be  the  effect  of  magic,  not  of 
reason."4  It  was  not  easy  to  advance  any  rational  argu 
ment  against  this  reasoning  of  "Wilson.  But  actual  cir 
cumstances  are  of  more  weight  in  politics  than  abstract 

1  1788.  Elliott's  Debates,  I.,  p.  355. 

*  Luther  Martin's  assertion  in  the  letter  above  referred  to,  that  Virginia 
was  the  one  state  which  represented  this  view,  is  not  correct.    Lynch 
agreed  with  Henry,  and  desired  only  that  besides  population,  "  proper 
ty"  should  be  considered.    Adams  agreed  in  this,  but  relied  also  on  the 
fact  that  congress  could  not  at  that  moment  ascertain  the  population. 
Wilson  was  afterwards  one  of  the  most  ardent  advocates  of  the  per  capita 
mode  of  representation.    The  sketch  of  a  federal  constitution  submit- 
ted  by  Franklin,  July  21,  1775,  to  congress,  provided  that  there  should 
be  one  representative  for  every  five  thousand  people.    G.  Morris,  to 
judge  from  a  speech  delivered  by  him  in  the  "  New  York  congress," 
considered  the  per  capita  mode  of  representation  a  matter  of  course. 
Sparks,  L  ife  of  Gouv.  Moms,  I.,  p.  103 ;  see  also  Elliott,  Deb.  I.,  pp.  74-76. 

•  See  Elliott,  Deb.,  L,  pp.  85-92. 

4  Wilson  of  Pennsylvania,  1777,  in  the  debates  upon  the  confederation. 
See  Elliott,  Deb.,  L,  p.  78. 


STATE    SOVEREIGNTY    AND    SLAVERY. 

theories,  however  conformable  to  the  demands  of  reason 
these  latter  may  be.  The  conclusion  drawn  by  Wilson 
from  these  premises  was  therefore  erroneous,  spite  of  the 
fact  that  his  argument  was  formally  correct.  He  closed 
the  argument  with  these  words:  "As  to  those  matters 
which  are  referred  to  congress  we  are  not  so  many  states: 
we  are  one  large  state.  We  lay  aside  our  individuality 
whenever  we  comfe  here." 

This  might  be  desirable  in  the  highest  degree,  but  it  was 
not  a  fact.  "  The  individuality  of  the  colonies"  was  not, 
in  reality,  as  Adams  claimed,1  a  "mere  sound;"  it  was  an 
undeniable  fact,  which  made  itself  felt  at  every  step. 
Wilson,  therefore,  demanded  an  impossibility  when  he  ask 
ed  that  the  representatives  should  put  it  aside,  and  leave 
it  at  home  when  they  came  to  congress,  as  if  it  were  a 
garment.  This  might  have  been  possible  to  Wilson,  for 
he  was  not  born  and  had  not  grown  up  in  America.  But 
particularism  had  become  to  such  an  extent  part  of  the 
flesh  and  blood  of  the  native-born  colonists  that  it  could 
not  be  renounced ;  nay,  that  it  became  a  measure  of  neces 
sity  to  acknowledge  its  supremacy  after  the  first  moment 
of  excitement  was  over,  and  the  separate  interests  of  the 
states  came  in  conflict,  whether  really  or  only  apparently, 
with  the  general  welfare. 

John  Adams,  Wilson's  most  energetic  supporter,  affords 
the  strongest  proof  of  this.  Reason  compelled  him  to 
adopt  the  national  view,  and  he  defended  it  with  great  zeal 
so  long  as  his  feelings  did  not  get  the  better  of  his  under 
standing.  The  moment,  however,  that  he  allowed  his  af 
fections  to  have  sway,  he  gave  evidence  of  his  leaning  to 
wards  the  doctrines  of  the  particularists. 

His  whole  reasoning  is,  in  consequence  of  this  internal 
conflict,  a  curious  mixture  of  intimately  connected  contra 
dictions,  and  affords  a  striking  illustration  of  Hamilton's 

1  Elliott,  Deo.,  I.,  p.  76. 


CONFEDE  RATION.  1 5 

saying  that  men  are  rather  "  reasoning  than  reasonable  " 
animals;  and  that,  therefore,  in  the  solution  of  political 
problems  no  valuable  or  lasting  results  can  be  obtained  by 
relying  solely  on  the  reason.1 

Adams  said,  in  the  debate  on  the  articles  of  confedera 
tion  :  "  The  confederacy  is  to  make  us  one  individual  only ; 
it  is  to  form  us,  like  separate  parcels  of  metal,  into  one  com 
mon  mass.  "We  shall  no  longer  retain  our  separate  in 
dividuality,  but  become  a  single  individual  as  to  all  ques 
tions  submitted  to  the  confederacy."2 

Adams  had  no  doubt  that  this  was  possible,  and  he  can 
scarcely  be  reproached  on  that  account,  as  the  whole  Amer 
ican  people  cherished  the  same  belief  until  late  in  the 
civil  war,  and,  for  the  most  part,  still  cling  to  the  same  in 
theory.  The  dictates  of  reason,  however,  could  not  be  made 
absolutely  to  harmonize  with  the  desires  of  the  people,  or 
with  actual  facts  over  which  congress  had  no  control.  It 
was  not  mere  caprice  that  from  the  very  first  moment  this 
led  to  unconscious  efforts  to  find  in  words  a  solution  for 
the  insoluble  contradiction. 

"  Wo  die  Begriffe  fehlen,  da  stellt  zu  rechter  Zeit  ein 
Wort  sich  ein."3  One  man4  alone  saw  clearly  from  the  first 
that  it  would  have  been  as  profitable  to  rack  one's  brains 
in  the  vain  endeavor  to  square  the  circle. 

The  American  statesman's  dictionary  was  wiitten  in 
double  columns,  and  the  chief  terms  of  his  vocabulary 
were  not  infrequently  inserted  twice:  in  the  right-hand  col 
umn  in  the  sense  which  accorded  with  actual  facts  and  was 
in  keeping  with  the  tendency  towards  particularism;  in 

1  "  Nothing  is  more  fallacious  than  to  expect  to  produce  any  valuable 
or  permanent  results  in  political  projects  by  relying  merely  on  the  reason 
of  men.  Men  are  rather  reasoning  than  reasonable  animals,  for  the  most 
part  governed  by  passion."  Hamilton  to  J.  A.  Bayard,  April,  1802,  Ham- 
ilton's  Works,  VI.,  p.  540. 

8  Elliott,  Defc.,  I.,  p.  76. 

1  Where  ideas  are  wanting,  a  timely  word  may  take  their  place.    ' 

4  Alexander  Hamilton. 


16  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND   SLAVERY. 

the  left  in  their  logical  sense,  and  the  sense  which  the  logic 
of  facts  has  gradually  and  through  many  a  bitter  struggle 
brought  out  into  bold  relief,  and  which  it  will  finally  stamp 
as  their  exclusive  meaning. 

Nothing  but  the  bitter  experience  of  many  years  has 
been  able  to  make  American  statesmen  even  partially  con 
scious  that  they  have  been  using  this  double-columned 
political  lexicon.  The  nature  of  the  state  was  to  such  an 
extent  a  seven-sealed  enigma  to  them,  that  they,  bona  fide 
and  in  the  very  same  breath,  used  the  same  word  in  the 
most  opposite  senses,  and  employed  words  as  synonymous 
which  denoted  ideas  absolutely  irreconcilable. 

It  never  occurred  to  the  acute  Adams  that  an  "  individ 
ual  "  could  never  be  formed  of  a  "  confederation,"  that 
is,  of  an  association  of  thirteen  states;  that  it  was  a  con 
tradiction  to  require  that  the  confederation,  in  all  matters 
of  which  it  had  cognizance,  should  be  a  single  individual. 
When  words  are  used  so  arbitrarily  that  the  terms  "  asso 
ciation,"  "  confederation,"  and  "  individual  "  are  con 
sidered  identical  in  meaning,  it  is  not  hard  to  make  the 
most  impossible  things  seem  possible;  nor  is  it  to  be  won 
dered  at* that  the  Americans  ventured  to  out-do  the  mystery 
of  the  Trinity  by  endeavoring  to  make  thirteen  one,  while 
leaving  the  one  thirteen.1 

The  practical  realization  of  this  theoretical  piece  of  art 
was  also  not  difficult;  but  the  results  were  as  melancholy 
as  they  were  simple.  "Washington  demonstrated  in  a  single 
word  the  untenablensss  of  the  theory,  the  absurd  spectacle 
presented  by  its  realization,  and  the  disastrous  consequences 
which  it  entailed.  He  writes,  1785 :  "  The  world  must  feel 
and  see  that  the  Union  or  the  states  individually  are  sov- 

1  "  Thirteen  sovereignties  were  considered  as  emerged  from  the  prin 
ciples  of  the  revolution,  combined  with  local  convenience  and  consid 
erations,  the  people  nevertheless  continuing  to  consider  themselves  in  a 
natiqnal  point  of  view  as  one  people."  Jay  in  Chisholm  v.  Georgia,  Dal 
las,  Rep.,  II.,  p.  470.  Curtis'  Decisions  of  the  Supreme.  Court,  I.,  p.  60 


MAKING   ONE    OF    THIRTEEN.  IT 

ereign  as  best  suits  their  purposes;  in  a  word,  that  we  are 
one  nation  to-day  and  thirteen  to-morrow.  Who  will  treat 
with  us  on  such  terms?"1 

"  To  balance  a  large  state  or  society,  whether  monarchical 
or  republican,  on  general  laws,  is  a  work  of  so  great  diffi 
culty  that  no  human  genius,  however  comprehensive,  is 
able  by  the  mere  dint  of  reason  and  reflection  to  effect  it. 
The  judgments  of  many  must  unite  in  this  work.  Expe 
rience  must  guide  their  labor.  Time  must  bring  it  to  per 
fection,  and  the  feeling  of  inconveniences  must  correct  the 
mistakes  which  they  inevitably  fall  into  in  their  first  trials 
and  experiments."2 

When  the  American  people  saw  themselves  compelled 
to  transform  the  former  thirteen  colonies  into  a  political 
unity,  they  were  not  only  destitute  of  all  practical  expe 
rience,  but  they  were  not  yet  clear  in  their  own  minds  how 
far  they  should  seek  to  bring  about  such  a  unity.3 

They  were,  in  addition  to  this,  unused  to  theorizing  on 
the  laws  of  state  organization.  Lastly,  they  had  no  leisure 
to  grapple  profoundly  with  the  many  new  and  difficult 
questions  which  arose,  without  compromising  their  whole 
future  from  the  very  beginning. 

It  is  not  therefore  to  be  wondered  at  that  reason  and  re 
flection  made  themselves  less  felt  than  might  have  been 

1  Marshall's  Life  of  Washington,  II.,  p.  97 ;  Life  of  Hamilton,  II., 
p.  331. 

a  Hume,  The  Rise  of  the  Arts  and  Sciences,  Essays,  I.,  p.  128,  Lon 
don,  1784. 

*  The  Mississippi  question  is,  through  its  various  stages,  one  of  the 
most  instructive  chapters  in  the  history  of  the  gradual  expansion  of 
the  narrow  colonial  horizon  to  the  conception  of  a  real  national  power, 
and,  finally,  of  a  continental  republic.  Draper  (History  of.  the  Amer 
ican  Civil  War,  I.,  p.  201),  speaking  of  the  universal  and  complete  ig 
noring  of  its  significance,  even  after  the  close  of  the  revolutionary  war, 
says:  "Even  Washington,  so  late  as  1784,  did  not  think  that  the  owner 
ship  of  the  Mississippi  would  be  of  benefit  to  the  republic ;  but,  on  the 
contrary,  was  afraid  that  it  might  tend  to  separate  the  western  country 
2 


18  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY    AND    SLAVERY. 

expected  from  the  character  of  the  men  who  composed  the 
first  congress,  had  the  circumstances  surrounding  them 
been  different.  It  was  above  all  things  important  to 
satisfy  the  demands  of  the  moment,  which  became  greater 
from  day  to  day  and  assumed  a  more  complicated  charac 
ter,  for  the  reason  that  the  revolutionary  movement  grad 
ually  but  necessarily  extended  beyond  its  original  purpose 
and  began  to  embrace  objects  not  at  first  contemplated. 
It  was  in  the  very  nature  of  things  that  even  in  the  most 
important  matters  action  frequently  followed  on  the  im 
pulse  of  the  moment,  and  that  the  leaders  of  the  revolution 
did  not  take  heed  what  might  be  the  logical  consequences 
which  at  some  future  time  might  be  drawn  therefrom,  or 
what  practical  results  might  follow  from  it,  when  there 
should  have  been  a  radical  change  in  circumstances,  at 
this  moment  beyond  the  possibility  of  conjecture.  This 
may  be  regretted,  but  it  were  as  foolish  to  reprove  the 
founders  of  the  republic  on  this  account  as  it  would  be 
absurd  to  deny  the  fact. 

Further,  as  there  was  a  glaring  contradiction  in  the  act 
ual  state  of  things,  it  was  a  natural  and  inevitable  conse 
quence  that  the  practical  measures  of  congress  at  first 
should  present  a  striking  contrast  to  one  another.  The 
struggle  with  England  demanded  that  the  colonies  should 
cling  closeh7  and  firmly  together.  The  more  this  struggle, 
therefore,  engaged  their  attention  at  the  moment,  the  more 
did  the  steps  taken  by  congress  assume  a  national  char 
acter.  And  the  more  exclusively  attention  was  given  to 
the  question  of  regulating  the  relations  of  the  colonies  or 
states  to  one  another,  the  more  did  the  spirit  of  particular- 

from  the  Atlantic  states.  His  ideas  slowly  expanded  from  an  Atlantic 
border  to  a  continental  republic.  He  wished  to  draw  commerce  down 
the  little  streams  that  run  through  the  old  colonies.  In  these  views  he 
was  by  no  means  singular,  the  general  opinion  of  the  time  being  that 
the  chief  value  of  the  western  lands  was  for  the  payment  of  the  public 
debt." 


INFLUENCE   OF   PARTICULARISM.  19 

ism  obtain  sway.  The  colonies  had  not  yet  realized  that, 
aside  from  their  struggle  with  England,  it  was  their  inter 
est  that  their  fusion  should  be  as  complete  as  possible. 

Moreover,  these  opposing  views  did  not  stand  directly 
arrayed  against  each  other,  but  the  divergent  interests  de 
manded  in  all  important  questions  almost  equal  considera 
tion.  The  contradiction  between  the  various  acts  of  con 
gress  became,  in  consequence,  ever  greater  and  more 
bizarre;  while  in  congress  and  out  of  it  the  obscurity  pre 
vailing  as  to  the  meaning  of  words,  and  the  confusion  of 
theories,  kept  increasing,  and  the  separate  interests  of  the 
colonies  came  by  degrees  to  be  the  only  ones  which  were 
consulted. 

At  the  very  moment  that  congress  recognized  that  com 
plete  separation  was  the  possible  and  even  probable  conse 
quence  of  the  quarrel  with  the  mother  country,  it  framed 
the  resolution  which  has  been  formally1  the  seed  from 
which  all  internal  conflicts  have  sprung,  and  which,  up  to 
the  year  1865,  and  after,  shook  the  Union  to  its  center. 

On  the  7th  of  June,  1776,  certain  resolutions  contempla 
ting  the  separation  of  the  colonies  from  the  mother  country 
were  introduced;  and  on  the  10th  of  June  it  was  resolved 
to  appoint  a  committee  to  draw  up  the  declaration  that 
"  these  united  colonies"  are  "free and  independent  states." 

1 1  would  again  insist  that  the  real  cause  is  to  be  sought  for,  not  in 
any  ill-judged  resolution  of  congress,  but  in  the  actual  condition  of 
affairs.  The  whole  secret  of  American  history  is  contained  in  these 
words  of  Gerry:  "  We  are  neither  the  same  nation  nor  different  nations. 
We  ought  not,  therefore,  to  pursue  the  one  or  the  other  of  these 
ideas  too  closely."  Elliott,  Deb.,  V.,  p.  278.  This  fact  explains  all  the 
internal  conflicts  of  the  Union  up  to  the  year  1865.  And  this  fact  could 
not  be  legislated  out  of  existence,  or  cease  to  be  a /act  in  consequence 
of  a  spontaneous  act  of  popular  volition.  It  is  an  altogether  different 
question  to  what  extent  political  ignorance  and  moral  weakness  or  cor 
ruption  contributed  to  perpetuate  these  opposite  views,  and  thus  to  make 
them  more  pronounced,  so  that  a  violent  disruption  became  inevitable, 
and  after  many  a  crisis  had  been  happily  passed,  the  cure  was  unduly 
delayed. 


20  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY    AND   SLAVERY. 

On  the  following  day  this  committee,  and  another  tx)  elab 
orate  a  scheme  of  confederation,  were  chosen.  No  one 
perceived  the  contradiction  lurking  in  these  two  acts,  which 
becomes  apparent  when  they  are  subjected  to  a  close  verbal 
criticism. 

On  the  fourth  of  July,  the  Declaration  of  Independence 
was  adopted,  the  import  of  which,  as  has  been  already  re 
marked,  was  in  accordance  with  the  resolution  of  the  10th 
of  June.  Eight  days  later,  on  the  12th  of  July,  the  last- 
named  committee  submitted  to  congress  the  draft  of  the 
articles  of  confederation.  On  the  15th  of  November,  1777, 
the  articles,  after  they  had  undergone  several  amendments, 
were  accepted  by  congress,  and  it  was  resolved  to  recom 
mend  them  to  the  legislatures  of  the  states  for  adoption. 
The  united  colonies  had,  therefore,  existed  over  a  year  by 
virtue  of  the  sovereign  will  of  the  people  as  an  indepen 
dent  political  commonwealth,  when  congress  submitted 
a  plan  to  the  state  legislatures,  which  placed  this  common 
wealth  on  a  basis  essentially  different  from  that  on  which 
it  had  hitherto  reposed. 

"When  the  legislatures  of  all  the  states  had  ratified  the 
plan  on  the  1st  of  March,  1781,  the  new  constitution  was 
universally  recognized  as  law.  That  the  legislatures  had 
no  right  whatever  to  vote  on  its  adoption  or  rejection  was 
completely  overlooked.  The  legislatures  were  not  purely 
revolutionary  bodies  existing  only  as  de  facto  governments. 
Their  powers  had  a  legal  character  and  were  strictly  deter 
mined  by  the  constitutions  which  the  people  of  the  several 
states  had  given  themselves  in  obedience  to  the  order  of 
the  revolutionary  and  therefore  unrestricted  congress,  and 
after  they  had  been  absolved,  by  its  Declaration  of  the 
fourth  of  July,  1776,  from  all  allegiance  to  England. 
Every  step,  therefore,  taken  by  the  legislatures  in  ex 
cess  of  the  powers  reserved  to  them  in  their  several  con. 
stitutions  was  ipso  facto  wanting  in  binding  legal  force. 
But  none  of  the  legislatures  had  constitutional  authority 


FICTION   AND   FACT.  21 

to  vote  on  a  plan  of  a  constitution  for  the  Union.1  As  to 
the  legal  validity  of  the  act,  it  was  a  clear  case  of  usurpa 
tion  based  on  an  untenable  fiction.  But  this  fiction  was 
then  considered  an  unquestionable  right,  and  naturally 
the  act  itself  was  not  therefore  viewed  in  the  light  of  a 
usurpation.  The  consequence  was,  that,  in  the  course  of 
time,  this  fiction  was  looked  upon  not  only  as  an  unques 
tionable  right,  but  as  a  notorious  fact,  which  had  been  al 
ways  recognized,  whereas,  in  reality,  it  gradually  became  a 
fact,  at  least  in  part,  only  as  a  result  of  this  confusion  of 
ideas. 

In  the  scheme  of  confederation  which  Franklin  intro 
duced  into  congress  on  the  21st  of  July,  1775,  there  was,  of 
course,  no  question  of  a  "  sovereignty"  of  the  colonies. 
Neither  is  the  expression  to  be  found  in  the  articles  of 
confederation  reported  July  12,  1776,  i.  e.  after  the  united 
colonies  had  become  a  political  community,  by  the  commit 
tee  appointed  on  June  11.  The  third  article  only  declares 
that  "  each  colony  shall  retain  as  much  of  its  present  laws, 
right  and  customs  as  it  may  think  fit,"  and  may  "  reserve" 
to  itself  the  regulation  of  its  internal  affairs  so  far  as  they 
do  not  conflict  with  the  articles  of  confederation.2 


1  Several  of  the  states  declared  themselves  in  their  constitutions  as  com 
pletely  sovereign.    Thus  the  constitution  of  New  York  recites   that  all 
power  in  the  state  has  again  reverted  to  the  people.     Declarations  to 
the  same  effect  are  to  be  found  in  the  constitutions  of  Maryland,  North 
Carolina,  Massachusetts  and  New  Hampshire.    Farrar's  Manual  of  the 
Constitution,  pp.  101-103.    From  what  has  been  said  hitherto  and  from 
what  follows  in  the  text,  it  is  evident  that  these  declarations  are  a  con 
tradiction  of  facts,  at  the  same  time  that  they  are  destitute  of  all  legal 
foundation.    But  even  if  the  states  were  actually  and  legally  completely 
sovereign,  the  legislatures  were  guilty  of  usurpation.    "  If  the  state  in  its 
political  capacity  had  it  [the  right],  it  would  not  follow  that  the  legis 
lature  possessed  it.    That  must  depend  upon  the  powers  confided  to  the 
state  legislature  by  its  own  constitution.    A  state  and  the  legislature  of  a 
state  are  quite  different  political  beings."  Story,  Comm.,  I.,  §  628. 

2  "  Each  colony  shall  retain  as  much  of  its  present  laws,  rights  and 
customs  as  it  may  think  fit,  and  reserve  to  itself  the  sole  and  exclusive 


22  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

The  debates  on  this  proposition  continued  to  the  20th  of 
August,  1776.  Then  the  question  was  allowed  to  rest  en 
tirely  until  the  7th  of  April,  1777.  It  was  in  the  subsequent 
debates,  which  closed  on  the  15th  of  November,  1777,  that 
the  radical  change  which  gave  the  advocates  of  particular 
ism  the  legal  basis  from  which  they  carried  on  their  oper 
ations,  was  made.  In  the  three  previous  proposals,1  the 
article  relating  to  the  union  preceded  that  on  the  reserved 
rights  of  the  colonies  or  states.  Now,  on  the  contrary,  the 
order  was  reversed,  and  it  was  expressly  provided  that  each 
state  "  retains  its  sovereignty."2  John  Quincy  Adams  per 
tinently  inquired  how  each  state  could  retain  a  sovereignty 
which  it  never  possessed.3  "  The  independence  of  each 
separate  state  had  never  been  declared  of  right.  It  never 
existed  as  fact."4 


regulation  and  government  of  its  internal  police  in  all  matters  that  shall 
not  interfere  with  the  articles  of  this  confederation." 

1  That  of  Franklin  in  July,  1775;  that  of  the  select  committee  in  July, 
1776 ;  and  that  of  the  committee  of  the  whole  of  Aug.  20,  1776. 

2  "  Each  state  retains  its  sovereignty,  freedom  and  independence,  and 
every  power,  jurisdiction  and  right  which  is  not  by  this  confederation 
expressly  delegated  to  the  United  States  in  congress  assembled." 

8  "  Where  then  did  each  state  get  the  sovereignty,  freedom  and  inde 
pendence  which  the  articles  of  confederation  declare  it  retains? — not 
from  the  whole  people  of  the  whole  Union — not  from  the  Declaration  of 
Independence — not  from  the  people  of  the  state  itself.  It  was  assumed 
by  agreement  between  the  legislatures  of  the  several  states  and  their 
delegates  in  congress,  without  authority  from  or  consultation  with  the 
people  at  all."  J.  Q.  Adams,  Discourse  on  the  Constitution,  p.  19.  Cal- 
houn  characterizes  the  confederation  as  "strictly  a  union  of  the  state 
governments."  Calhoun's  Works,  VI.,  p.  159. 

4  J.  Q.  Adams,  1.  c  ,  p.  15.  See  also  Charles  C.  Piuckney  in  Elliot's 
Deb.,  IV.,  p.  301.  Washington  says  in  his  address  of  the  8th  of  June 
to  the  governors  of  the  several  states :  "  It  is  only  in  our  united  charac 
ter  that  we  are  known  as  an  empire,  that  our  independence  is  acknowl 
edged."  Marshall,  Life  of  Washington,  II.,  p.  84.  See  also  Farrar, 
Manual  of  the  Constitution,  p.  52 ;  The  Federalist,  No.  II. ;  Brownson, 
The  American  Republic,  p.  208;  Curtis,  History  of  the  Constitution,  I. 
p.  39,  etc.  Madison  also  declared,  on  the  29th  of  June,  1787,  in  the  con 
vention  at  Philadelphia:  "The  states  never  possessed  the  essential 


EARLY    INCONSISTENCIES.  23 

The  articles  of  confederation  start  out  with  the  assump 
tion  that  from  the  date  of  the  Declaration  of  Independence 
each  state  became  de  facto  and  de  jure  an  independent 
state,  competent  henceforth  to  form  a  confederacy  with  the 
other  states  whenever  it  saw  fit,  and  to  the  extent  that  it 
saw  fit.  How  this  assumption  was  to  be  reconciled  with 
the  fact  that  the  congress  had  been  in  existence  for  years, 
and  had  actually  exercised  sovereign  power  from  the  first, 
ft'hile  the  individual  states  had  assumed  no  sovereign  atti 
tude,  theoretically  or  practically,  towards  England  or  other 
foreign  countries,  does  not  appear.  The  contradiction  is, 
however,  easily  explained. 

The  place  that  congress  occupied  was  determined  en 
tirely  by  the  relations  of  the  colonies  to  England.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  principle  underlying  the  articles  of  confed 
eration  was  borrowed  exclusively  from  the  relations  of  the 
colonies  to  one  another.  Until  the  resolution  was  taken 
to  change  the  dependency  of  colonial  existence  for  the 
independence  of  a  political  organization,  the  consideration 
of  the  former  dictated  all  measures ;  now  the  latter  occu 
pied  the  foreground  because  the  war  with  England  created 
only  a  temporary  want,  while  the  regulation  of  internal 
relations  was  destined  to  be  lasting. 

Apparently  and  formally,  the  unity  which  this  want  and 
the  presumptive  future  relations  of  the  United  States  to 
foreign  powers  caused  to  seem  desirable,  was  preserved. 
The  individual  states  had  attributed  to  themselves,  in  the 
articles  of  confederation,  no  powers  which  could  place  them 
in  relation  to  foreign  nations  in  the  light  of  sovereign 
states.  They  felt  that  all  such  claims  would  be  considered 
ridiculous,  because  back  of  these  claims  there  was  no  real 
corresponding  power.  Congress  therefore  remained,  as 
heretofore,  the  sole  outward  representative  of  sovereignty 

rights  of  sovereignty."  Yates's  Minute's,  Elliott,  Deb.,  I.,  p.  461.  Com 
pare  with  this  the  view  advocated  by  him  in  1798  and  1799,  of  which  I 
shall  treat  more  fully  hereafter. 


24  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

But  the  power  to  exercise  the  prerogatives  was  taken  from 
it,  and  this  without  placing  it  in  any  other  hands. 

The  changes  effected  bj  the  articles  of  confederation  were 
rather  of  a  negative  than  of  a  positive  nature.  They  did 
not  give  the  state  which  was  just  coming  into  being  a 
definite  form,  but  they  began  the  work  of  its  dissolution. 
The  essential  prerogatives  which  necessarily  belong  to  a 
political  community  in  its  relations  with  other  powers, 
they  confided  by  law  to  confederate  authorities,  from  whom, 
in  practice,  they  withheld  all  power.  On  the  other  hand, 
they  confided  all  actual  power  to  the  component  parts  of 
the  whole,  but  did  not  and  could  not  for  themselves,  still 
less  for  the  whole,  give  them  the  right  to  assume  the  re 
sponsibilities  or  enforce  the  rights  which  regulate  the 
relations  of  sovereign  states. 

The  practical  result  of  this  was  that  the  United  States 
tended  more  and  more  to  split  up  into  thirteen  indepen 
dent  republics,  and  in  the  same  measure,  they  virtually 
ceased  to  be  a  member  of  the  family  of  nations  bound  to 
gether  by  the  jus  gentium.  The  European  powers  rightly 
saw  in  the  Union  only  a  shadow  without  substance,1  and 
besides  they  had  no  occasion  and  no  desire  to  have  any  re 
lations  with  the  individual  states  as  sovereign  bodies.2 

1  Washington  wrote  in  October,  1785 :  "  In  a  word,  the  confederation 
seems  to  me  to  be  little  more  than  a  shadow  without  the  substance;  and 
congress  a  nugatory  body."  Marshall's  Life  of  Wash.,  II.,  p.  92,  See 
also  the  Federalist,  Nos.  15-22. 

*  "The  states  were  not '  sovereigns'  in  the  sense  contended  for  b}r  some. 
They  did  not  possess  the  peculiar  features  of  sovereignty — they  could 
cot  make  war,  nor  alliances  nor  treaties.  Considering  them  as  political 
beings,  they  were  dumb,  for  they  could  not  speak  to  any  foreign  sov 
ereign  whatever.  They  were  deaf,  for  they  could  not  hear  any  proposi 
tions  irom  such  sovereign.  They  had  not  even  the  organs  of  defense  or 
oflense,  for  they  could  not  of  themselves  raise  troops,  or  equip  vessels,  for 
war."  King,  on  the  19th  of  June,  in  the  Philadelphia  convention,  Madison 
Papers;  Elliott,  Deb.,  V.,  p. 212.  Baffin  called  attention  in  the  debates 
of  the  peace  convention  at  Washington,  February,  1861,  to  the  fact  that 
during  the  revolutionary  war  North  Carolina  had  laid  the  foundation  of 


CHARACTER   OF   THE    UNION.  25 

Every  existing  circumstance,  and  in  some  respects  even 
the  war  with  England,  tended  to  give  affairs  this  peculiar 
development. 

A  new  government  not  founded  on  force  will  never  im 
mediately  obtain  strength  and  stability,  for,  on  the  one 
hand,  it  generally  itself  originates  in  a  violent  revolution 
which  is  always  to  a  certain  extent  attended  by  a  tendency 
to  anarchy,  and  on  the  other  hand,  is  wanting  in  the  pow 
erful  aids  of  custom  and  inherited  respect.  The  new  gov 
ernment  of  the  United  States  had  much  to  suffer  from  the 
absence  of  both  these  elements.  The  sovereignty  of  the 
Union  was  an  abstraction,  an  artificial  idea  which  could  be 
made  a  reality,  only  inasmuch  as  the  circumstances  which 
had  made  this  idea  a  necessity  should  imperatively  demand 
*t.  The  sovereignty  of  the  states,  on  the  other  hand,  was, 
in  the  minds  of  the  whole  people,  the  first  and  most  natu 
ral  of  all  circumstances.  Each  colony  had  had  from  its 
beginning  a  government  of  its  own,  which  in  great  part 
was  the  production  of  the  colonists  themselves.  The  Rev 
olution  had  now  put  into  their  hands  that  portion  of  power 
which  previously  had  been  exercised  by  English  officials. 
The  further  alterations  made  in  the  machinery  of  govern 
ment  were  not  of  so  essential  a  nature  that  the  people 
would  be  apt  to  feel  themselves  complete  strangers  to  its 
operation.  The  entire  transformation  was  rapidly  accom 
plished,  without  any  of  the  violent  commotions  which 
might  have  produced  prolonged  reaction.  Eight  states1 
had  already  completed  their  new  constitutions  in  1776.  In 
the  relations  of  individuals  to  the  government,  there  was 
nothing  to  show  how  wide  a  breach  divided  the  past  from 

a  fleet,  to  which  Orth  of  Indiana  replied :  "  There,  then,  we  have  a  single 
instance  of  one  of  the  states  taking  a  step  towards  sovereignty."  None  of 
the  delegates  from  the  southern  states  could  adduce  another  instance. 
Chittenden,  Debates  of  the  Peace  Convention,  p.  262. 

1  New  Jersey,  Delaware,  Maryland,  North  Carolina,  New  Hampshire, 
South  Carolina,  Virginia,  and  Pennsylvania. 


26  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND   8LAVERY- 

the  present.  The  courts  administered  justice  in  accordance 
with  the  same  legal  principles  and  precedents,  and  the  leg 
islatures,  elected  by  the  vote  of  the  people,  made  laws  and 
levied  taxes  as  they  had  done  before,  but  without  being  sub 
jected  to  the  control  or  caprice  of  a  royal  governor.  In  a 
word,  long  before  the  close  of  the  war,  it  was  difficult  to 
realize  from  the  whole  mode  of  civil  life  and  action  that  a 
violent  revolution  was  being  accomplished. 

It  was  not  an  easy  task  for  the  colonists  to  resort  to  the 
sword.  But  stanch  and  sincere  as  was  their  loyalty,  their 
love  and  veneration  for  the  mother  country  had  by  no 
means  been  rooted  as  firmly  in  the  real  condition  of  things 
as  they  themselves  supposed.  The  greater  number  were 
acquainted  with  England  only  through  the  accounts  of  their 
fathers  and  grandfathers.  But  with  their  own  colonial 
government,  so  far  as  it  had  sprung  from  themselves  and 
been  established  by  themselves,  their  affections  were  inti 
mately  entwined,  for  they  had  grown  up  with  it.  It  was 
flesh  of  their  flesh  and  bone  of  their  bone,  and  it  was 
always  considered  by  them  as  their  only  real  representative. 
There  was  no  need  of  prior  reflection  to  convince  the  citi 
zens  of  the  significance  and  importance  of  colonial  govern- 
ment.  Having  grown  up  in  constant  and  immediate  de 
pendence  upon  it,  they  were  permeated  by  the  feeling  of  its 
necessity  and  legality.  Love  and  interest  conspired  to  at 
tach  them  to  it,  for  they  knew  full  well  that  their  votes 
had  a  share  in  its  formation.  They  looked  upon  it  as  the 
natural  bulwark  of  their  rights  and  liberties. 

If  that  was  the  case  in  the  past,  it  must  be  much  more 
so  now,  for  all  these  bonds  could  only  be  strengthened  by 
the  amplification  of  the  power  of  the  colonial  governments 
produced  by  the  Revolution. 

To  counterbalance  all  this,  the  federal  government  had 
only  the  war  with  England  to  place  in  the  scales.  The  love 
and  respect  generally  accorded  by  a  people  to  their  gov 
ernment  it  could  certainly  not  have,  for  it  was  a  child  of 


THE    STATUS    OF    CONGRESS.  27 

yesterday  and  no  one  had  as  yet  cast  its  horoscope.  It 
was  a  product  of  the  Revolution,  and  as  such  the  practical 
good  sense  of  the  American  people  did  not  permit  them  to 
refuse  it  the  completest  recognition.  But  what  should  be 
come  of  it  later  was  an  open  question,  which  was  by  de 
grees  submitted  to  serious  and  sober  consideration.  No 
umbrage  was  taken  that  the  federal  government  had  ex 
isted  already  nearly  five  years,  with  the  revolutionary 
character  it  had  assumed  after  the  Declaration  of  Indepen 
dence,  and  all  attempts  authentically  to  establish  its  legiti 
macy  were  vain.  Respect  for  it  was  neither  increased  nor 
diminished  by  this  means. 

Congress,  up  to  the  1st  of  March,  1781,  did  not  look  up 
on  the  articles  of  confederation  as  the  rule  by  which  it 
was  to  be  guided,  any  more  than  it  did  afterwards,  and  the 
states  gave  no  more  consideration  to  the  wishes,  requests, 
and  commands  of  congress  after  the  1st  of  March,  1781, 
than  they  had  before.  The  people,  during  these  five  years, 
took  to  looking  upon  congress  more  and  more  as  a  creation 
of  the  Revolution,  which  had  its  raison  d'etre  and  was 
necessary  only  on  account  of  the  war  with  England. 
Hence  they  thought  every  good  citizen  bound  to  yield  it 
just  so  much  obedience  as  the  legitimate  power,  the  state 
government,  commanded  him  to  give  it. 

The  state  governments  had,  in  five  years,  completely 
lost1  the  little  revolutionary  savor  which  at  first  might 
have  been  observable  in  civil  life.  The  government  of  the 
Onion,  on  the  other  hand,  suggested  no  immediate  idea 
whatever  to'the  people.  It  was  a  means  which  the  states 
employed  to  secure  a  definite  object;  it  was  not,  like  the 
state  governments,  the  incorporation  of  a  moral  idea  pos 
sessed  of  independent  life  in  the  minds  of  the  people. 

1  Webster  says :  "  The  Revolution  of  1776  did  not  subvert  government 
in  all  its  forms.  It  did  not  subvert  local  laws  and  local  administrations." 
Webster's  Works,  III.,  p.  460. 


28  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVEBY. 

And  if,  in  the  first  stages  of  the  Re  volution,  it  sometimes 
appeared  that  there  was  a  conscious  struggle  gradually  to 
endow  this  abstraction  of  one  American  people  with  reality, 
not  only  all  efforts  to  that  effect,  but  all  desires  having  such 
a  tendency,  were  nipped  in  the  bud.1 

If  it  had  been  possible  immediately  to  elaborate  a  con 
stitution  which  in  some  essential  points  should  have  had 
a  national  basis,  and  to  secure  its  instant  adoption  by 
the  states,  the  people  might  have  gradually  adapted 
themselves  to  it.  The  disorders  of  war,  which  frequently 
made  extraordinary  measures  necessary,  might  have  contrib 
uted  a  great  deal  to  bring  about,  in  a  short  time,  the  union 
of  the  various  elements.  But  with  the  single  exception  of 
the  Declaration  of  Independence,  everything  that  took  a 
fixed  and  legal  shape  and  was  destined  to  be  of  a  perma 
nent  nature,  was  so  framed  that  the  view  that  thirteen  sov 
ereign  and  independent  powers,  without  any  obligation  on 
their  part  so  to  do,  had  found  it  advisable  to  send  dele 
gates  to  a  common  congress — a  congress  which,  by  virtue 
01  an  agreement  made,  had  cognizance  of  certain  matters 
of  interest  to  the  thirteen  nations — took  deeper  roots  among 
the  people.  The  articles  of  confederation  expressly  stated 
that  the  states  had  entered  into  "  a  firm  league  of  friend 
ship."  It  was  indeed  provided  at  the  same  time  that  the 
compact  should  be  "perpetual;"  but  what  foundation  was 
there  for  the  assumption  that  this  word  "perpetual"  should 
receive  a  more  literal  construction  than  the  "  perpetual " 
of  the  numberless  alliances,  offensive  and  defensive,  of 
other  powers,  which  all  experience  had  shown  to  be  mean 
ingless  phrases,  whenever  the  interest  of  either  party  dic 
tated  that  they  should  be  broken? 

There  certainly  was  a  foundation  for  this  assumption; 

1  Fisher  Ames  wrote,  as  late  as  1782:  "  Instead  of  feeling  as  a  nation, 
a  state  'is  our  country.  We  look  with  indifference,  often  with  hatred, 
fear,  and  aversion,  to  the  other  states."  Works,  I.,  p.  113. 


DISTRUST    OF    POWER.  29 

out  it  was  not  understood  at  the  time,  and  until  it  was 
understood,  congress  could  not  be  looked  upon  as  the  head 
of  the  American  people,  but  must  remain  a  foreign  power,1 
and  a  congress  of  delegates,  who  received  instructions  from 
their  sovereigns,  and  whose  enactments  could  be  enforced 
only  to  the  extent  that  they  met  with  the  approval  of  these 
same  sovereigns. 

The  cause  which  could  induce  the  United  States  to  make 
their  "firm  league  of  friendship"  really  "perpetual"  and 
gradually  more  indissoluble  and  could  produce  a  corres 
ponding  weakening  of  the  state  governments,  was  the  per 
manent  and  ever-increasing  interest  therein  of  the  people 
of  all  the  states.  This  interest,  except  in  so  far  as  secur 
ing  independence  of  England  was  concerned,  was  entirely 
ignored.  It  could  come  to  be  understood  only  through  ex 
perience.  Besides,  leaving  out  of  consideration  mere  wishes 
and  inclinations,  the  American  people  were  entirely  de 
pendent,  in  this  matter,  on  speculation,2  and  such  was 
the  prevailing  feeling  at  the  time,  that  this  led  naturally 
to  a  conclusion  the  very  opposite  of  that  which  experience, 
in  the  course  of  time,  proved  to  be  the  right  one. 

"  The  Revolution  under  which  they3  were  gasping  for 
life;  the  war  which  was  carrying  desolation  into  all  their 
dwellings  and  mourning  into  every  family,  had  been 
kindled  by  the  abuse  of  power — the  power  of  government. 
An  invincible  repugnance  to  the  delegation  of  power  had 
been  generated  by  the  very  course  of  events  which  had 


1  "  It  is  obvious  that  the  continental  government  was  considered  in 
the  light  of  a  foreign  one.  Indeed,  the  epithet  was  applied  to  it  by  one 
of  the  leaders  of  tlie  Massachusetts  councils.  It  was  submitted  to  as  a 
matter  of  necessity,  and  because  such  submission  was  the  only  practi 
cable  way  of  concentrating  the  energies  of  the  other  states."  Austin's 
Life  of  Gerry.  See  Rives,  The  Life  and  Times  of  J.  Madison,  II., 
p.  177. 

1  Story,  Cornm.,  I.,  §  244. 

1  The  colonists. 


30  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

rendered  it  necessary,  and  the  more  indispensable  it  be 
came,  the  more  awakened  was  the  jealousy  and  the  more 
intense  was  the  distrust  by  which  it  was  to  be  circum 
scribed."1 

The  colonies  had  for  years  struggled  against  the  guardian 
ship  of  the  mother  country  ,which  had  so  needlessly  oppressed 
and  wronged  them,  because  parliament  was  not  suffi 
ciently  conversant  with  the  condition  of  affairs  in  America.2 
The  consequence  was  a  deep-rooted  antipathy  to  all  ex 
ternal  power.  But  congress,  as  already  remarked,  was 
viewed  in  the  light  of  a  foreign  power,  spite  of  the  fact 
that  it  was  composed  of  delegates  from  the  body  of  the 
people.  Hence  the  people  thought  they  must  see  in  con 
gress  what  a  people  is  always  apt  to  expect  from  a  power 
foreign  to  the  government  of  the  state  — unpleasantness, 
annoyance,  and  usurpation. 

This  distrust  steadily  increased  and  gradually  assumed 
a  different  character.  The  period  was  big  with  a  peculiarly 
bold  fancy.  It  recklessly  shook  off  the  antiquated  preju 
dices  which  it  had  inherited  from  former  generations ;  but  it 
soon  lost  the  solid  ground  under  its  feet  and  aimed  at  some 
thing  far  transcending  its  original  object.  It  received  the 
first  rude  shock  from  the  pressure  of  actual  unbearable 
events;  but  it  soon  lost  itself  in  wild  abstractions  and  be 
came  ridiculous,  for  it  ventured  to  make  a  reality  of  these 
abstractions  and  to  carve  the  actual  world  in  every  respect 
in  accordance  with  the  rules  and  measures  of  logic,  as 
despots  have  attempted  to  trim  man  and  the  forms  of  na 
ture  in  accordance  with  their  own  fancy. 

It  were  folly  to  say  that  Rousseau's  writings  exercised 
any  influence  on  the  development  of  things  in  America. 
But  the  same  spirit  which  gave  birth  to  Rousseau's  phil 
osophy  and  made  it  of  such  importance  to  Europe,  was, 


1  J.  Q.  Adams,  Disc,  on  the  Constitution,  p.  10. 
*  I  refer  principally  to  the  stamp  acts. 


CRUDE    THEORIES.  31 

long  before  Jefferson  grew  intoxicated  even  to  madness  with 
it  in  Paris,  rampant  in  America.1  It,  indeed,  received 
its  full  development  here  only  through  the  French  Revolu 
tion,  but  a  series  of  fortunate  circumstances  prevented  its 
development  to  its  ultimate  consequences.  It  appeared  in 
the  new  world  in  a  modified  form,  but  was  not  wanting 
there.  And  here  for  the  first  time  it  became  clearly  evi 
dent  that  the  civilized  new  world  was  not  separated  from 
the  old  one  by  any  broad  unbridged  gulf.  They  are  not 
only  governed  by  the  same  historic  laws,  but  the  great 
intellectual  revolutions  which  take  place  in  the  one  act 
simultaneously  in  the  other,  although,  in  accordance  with 
the  existing  natural  conditions,  they  never  manifest  them 
selves  in  precisely  the  same  manner  or  make  their  influence 
felt  to  exactly  the  same  extent.2  One  only  needs  to  read 
the  Declaration  of  Independence  to  be  convinced,  that  but 
one  more  impulse  was  needed,  even  in  America,  to  permit 
these  crude  theories3  to  be  openly  advocated,  which,  disre 
garding  that  which  had  prescriptive  right  on  its  side,  in 
virtue  of  its  history,  would  endeavor  to  sap  the  founda 
tions  of  all  things,  to  lay  down  their  arbitrary  premises  as 
unquestionable  truths,  and  which  would  have  willingly,  in 
a  night,  overturned  the  state  and  the  established  order  of 


1  See  Kapp,  Geschichte  der  Sklaverei,  p.  7. 

8  This  truth  is  a  priori  so  evident  that,  to  say  the  least,  it  would  be  su 
perfluous  to  mention  it,  were  it  not  that  Americans  frequently  fall  into 
the  dangerous  error,  and  flatter  themselves,  that  heaven  governs  them 
by  laws  altogether  peculiar  to  themselves  and  their  country.  In  strange 
contrast  to  this  is  the  disposition  to  overload  their  political  reasoning 
with  analogies,  for  the  most  part  not  pertinent,  from  Greek  and  Roman 
history.  The  tendency  here  referred  to  has  already  perceptibly  de 
creased.  This  is  to  be  attributed  in  part  to  a  clarification  of  political 
thought ;  but  in  part  also  to  the  fact  that  the  majority  of  members  of 
legislatures  and  of  congress  know  too  little  of  Greek  and  Roman  his 
tory. 

3  Calhoun,  with  an  acuteness  very  wounding  to  Americans,  calls  the 
declarations  of  these  as  universal  principles,  "  glittering  generalities," 


32  STA.TE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY 

society,  to  make  them  accord  with  the  ideas  which  they 
were  wont  to  call  "natural  rights." 

The  interchange  of  the  signification  of  the  words  privi 
lege  and  power  was  the  first  disastrous  confusion  of 
ideas  in  which  the  American  people  were  involved  by  the 
combined  influence  of  their  experience  in  the  struggle  with 
England  and  the  tendency  to  raise  obscure  philosophical 
abstractions  to  the  dignity  of  political  laws.1  From  this 
confusion  of  ideas  there  was  but  one  step  to  the  maxim 
that  no  power  should  be  delegated  which  might  be  abused; 
that  is,  that  no  power  whatever  should  be  delegated,  be 
cause  there  is  no  power  which  may  not  be  abused.2  ''Con 
gress  was  to  declare  everything,  but  to  do  nothing."8  Had 
there  been  the  slightest  idea  of  wrhat  evil  effects  this  must 
inevitably  draw  after  it,  things  certainly  would  not  have 
gone  so  far.  The  dread  of  seeing  the  power,  bestowed  in 
the  interest  of  all,  turned  against  the  people  was  not  from 
the  first  so  great,  that  a  few  rational  concessions  might  not 
have  been  obtained  from  envy  and  mistrust,  while  the  people 
continued  to  act  under  the  impulse  of  excitement  and  the 
fear  of  England's  supremacy.  But  here  the  American  people 
were,  from  want  of  experience,  left  completely  to  their  own 
resources.  They  could  judge  only  from  their  present  feel 
ing  and  from  analogy:  and  both  of  these  might  easily,  in 
the  case  before  us,  have  misled  them. 

It  was  said  that  government  always  sought  to  increase 
its  power  at  the  expense  of  liberty.  But  it  was  complete- 

1  "  It  -was  a  thing  hardly  to  be  expected,  that  in  a  popular  revolution  the 
minds  of  men  should  stop  at  the  happy  mean  which  marks  the  salutary 
boundary  between  power  and  privilege,  and  combine  the  energy  of  govern, 
ment  with  the  security  of  private  rights.    A  failure  in  this  delicate  and 
important  point  is  the  great  .source  of  the  inconveniences  we  experience." 
Hamilton,  hi  No.  XXVI.  of  the  Federalist. 

2  "That  power  might  be  abused  was  [to  persons  of  this  opinion]  a 
conclusive  argument  against  its  being  bestowed."     Marshall,  Life  01 
Wash.,  II,  p.  127. 

»  Story,  Comm.,  II.,  §246. 


RELIANCE    ON    SELF-INTEREST.  33 

ly  overlooked  that  this  was  the  case  only  when  power  had 
"attained  a  certain  degree  of  energy  and  independence," 
while  it  as  surely  languishes  and  decays  when  it  does  not 
possess  this  certain  degree  of  energy  and  independence.1 
The  people  therefore  lived  in  the  honest  conviction  that, 
no  matter  how  little  power  might  be  given  to  congress,  it 
should  be  the  first  care  of  all  patriots  and  friends  of  lib 
erty  to  keep  a  watchful  eye  upon  it  and  to  sound  the  alarm 
at  the  first  attempt  it  should  make  to  exceed  its  powers. 
That  the  time  might  come  when  the  states  or  the  state 
governments  should  not  be  willing  to  accede  to  the  equit 
able  demands  of  congress,  made  evidently  in  the  interest 
of  all, — such  a  fear  at  the  beginning  of  the  Revolution 
would  have  been  readily  disposed  of  as  foolish  and  inju 
rious.  De  Tocqueville  says  of  American  legislators  that 
they  rely  largely  on  the  intelligence  of  men;  that  is,  that 
they  leave  it  to  the  personal  interest  of  all  to  live  accord 
ing  to  the  laws.2  That  there  is  some  truth  in  this  asser 
tion,  cannot  be  denied.  But  at  this  precise  time  it  was  not 
only  the  "  existing  European  sentimentality"  that  was  in 
search  of  a  "  Dulcinea,  most  beautiful  of  women,  in  the 
primeval  forests  of  America,  under  the  names  of  Nature, 
Liberty,  the  Rights  of  Man,  and  Humanity."3 

1  Madison  wrote  to  Jefferson,  October  17, 1788 :  "It  has  been  remarked 
that  there  is  a  tendency  in  all  governments  to  an  augmentation  of  power 
at  the  expense  of  liberty.  But  the  remark,  as  usually  understood,  does 
not  seem  to  me  well  founded.  Power,  when  it  has  attained  a  certain 
degree  of  energy  and  independence,  goes  on  generally  to  farther  degrees. 
But  when  below  that  degree,  the  direct  tendency  is  to  farther  degrees 
of  relaxation,  until  the  abuses  of  liberty  beget  a  sudden  transition  to  an 
undue  degree  of  power."  Rives,  The  Life  and  Times  of  Madison,  II., 
p.  641.  Hamilton  gives  expression  to  the  same  idea.  See  also  Farrar, 
Manual  of  the  Const,  p.  106 ;  Story,  Com.,  I.,  §  220. 

a  "  Les  legislateurs  americains  ne  rnontrent  que  peu  de  conflance  dans 
I'honnetete"  humaine,  mais  ils  supposent  toujours  1'homme  intelligent. 
Us  se  reposent  done  le  plus  souvent  sur  Pinte'rSt  personnel  pour  1'execu- 
tion  des  lois."  La  Democratic  en  Ame'rique,  I.,  p.  94. 

1  Kapp,  Leben  des  americanischen  Generals,  Joh.  Kalb,  p.  243. 
3 


34  STATE   SOVEKEIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

Randall  was  doubtless  right  when  he  said  that  the 
Americans  had  not  drawn  the  sword  in  the  defense  of 
"  natural  rights,"  but  as  English  subjects,  in  every  sense 
of  the  word,  to  redress  the  wrongs  which  they  were  made 
to  endure  by  a  legitimate  but  unjust  government.1  But 
once  the  sword  was  drawn,  the  American  people,  spite  ot 
all  the  realism  and  sobriety  of  their  character,  began  to 
indulge  in  these  same  idealistic,  philosophizing  reveries; 
and  the  more  they  were  in  accord,  or  seemed  to  be  in  ac 
cord,  with  the  practical  wants  of  the  time  and  with  the 
inclinations  produced  in  individuals  by  actual  events,  the 
more  completely  did  they  yield  themselves  up  to  their  in 
fluence.  The  ingenuous  admiration  of  one's  own  ex 
cellence,2  which  was  considered  the  natural  result  of  dem 
ocratic  institutions,  or  of  the  principle  that  the  people  are 
the  source  or  origin  of  power,  now  began,  but  it  was  some 
time  before  it  grew,  as  it  eventually  did,  through  the  in 
fluence  of  demagogues,  into  that  pharisaical  self-right 
eousness,  which  is  one  of  the  most  characteristic  traits  of 
the  political  thought  of  the  masses  of  the  American  peo 
ple.  At  this  time  American  legislators  forgot  that  self- 
interest  is  the  best  guaranty  for  the  observance  of  the  laws. 

True  it  is,  they  yet  supposed  that  a  rational  sell- interest 
would  induce  both  the  state  governments  a^d  individuals 
to  support  the  reasonable  measures  of  congress  a^d  to  yield 


1  Randall,  Life  of  Jefferson,  I., p.  117.  See  also  the  Life  and  Writings 
of  John  Jay,  II.,  p.  410.  Edmund  Burke  writes :  "  They  [the  colonists] 
are  therefore  not  only  devoted  to  liberty,  but  to  liberty  according  to 
English  ideas,  and  on  English  principles.  Abstract  liberty,  like  other 
mere  abstractions,  is  not  to  be  found.  Liberty  inheres  in  some  sensible 
object;  and  every  nation  has  formed  to  itself  some  favorite  point  which, 
by  way  of  eminence,  becomes  the  criterion  of  their  happiness."  Works, 
II.,  pp.  38, 39.  See  also  Brownson,  The  Arner,  Kep.,  pp.  208,  209.  Gibbs, 
Memoirs  of  the  Administrations  of  Washington  and  J.  Adams,  edited 
from,  the  papers  of  O.  Wolcott,  I.,  pp.  2,  3. 

1  See  the  Works  of  Jefferson,  I.,  p.  444;  II.,  pp.  97,  221,  350.  Works 
of  Fisher  Ames,  I.,  p.  324;  II.,  pp.  347,  359,  etc. 


THE    AWAKENING.  35 

to  its  equitable  demands,  in  case  pure  patriotism  and  un 
selfish  republican  virtue  might  not  here  and  there  be  quite 
as  great  and  lasting  as  there  was  reason  to  expect.  But 
the  foundation  on  which  they  built  was,  consciously  or  un 
consciously  to  themselves,  the  highest  ethical  elements  of 
human  nature.  These,  in  their  opinion,  were  destined  to 
be  the  compass  by  which,  certainly  during  the  great  and 
holy  conflict,  and  probably  also  in  the  future,  congress,  the 
state  governments  and  individual  citizens  would  with  the 
utmost  harmony  and  unanimity  guide  the  ship  of  state 
into  the  harbor  of  the  golden  age  which  was  dawning.1 
They  overestimated  themselves  and  the  people,  and  this 
both  as  to  their  intelligence,  their  moral  purity  and  moral 
greatness.2  "  We  imagined,"  wrote  general  Knox,  during 
the  troubles  in  Massachusetts,  "  that  the  mildness  of  the 
government  and  the  virtue  of  the  people  were  so  corres 
pondent,  that  we  were  not  as  other  nations,  requiring  bru 
tal  force  to  support  the  laws.  But  we  find  that  we  are 
men,  actual  men,  possessing  all  the  turbulent  passions  be 
longing  to  that  animal, -and  that  we  must  have  a  govern 
ment  proper  and  adequate  for  him."8 

1  "Have  ire  D3t  already  seei  enough  of  the  fallacy  and  extravagance  of 
the  se  idle  theories  -which  have  amused  us  with  promised  of  sn  exemp 
tion  from  fhe  imperfections,  weaknesses  and  evils  incident  to  society  *& 
ev?ry  shar>e?  Is  '.t  n  Jt  t'.me  to  awako  from  the  deceitful  dieam  of  a 
golden  age,  and  to  adopt  as  a  practical  maxim  ibr  tht,  direction  of  oui 
political  conduct,  that  we,  as  well  as  the  other  inhabitants  of  the  globe, 
*r*  yet  remote  from  the  happy  empire  of  perfect  wisdom  and  perfect 
vi  tue?"  Hamilton  in  No  VI.  of  the  Federalist.  See  also  Life  of  J.  Q. 
A/lams,  II.,  p.  129. 

a  Washington  writes,  the  8th  of  August,  1786,  to  Jay:  "  We  have  er 
rors  to  correct.  We  have  probably  had  too  good  an  opinion  of  human 
«Hture  in  forming  our  confederation.  Experience  has  taught  us  that 
men  will  not  adopt  and  carry  into  execution  measures  the  best  calcula- 
i  i.d  for  their  own  good  without  the  intervention  of  a  coercive  power." 
Washington's  Writings,  IX.,  p.  187. 

1  Marshall,  Life  of  Washington,  II.,  p.  118.    Fisher  Ames  says :  "  Our 

ilstake,  and  in  which  we   choose   to   persevere  because  our  vanity 


36  STATE  SOVEREIGNTY  AND  SLAVERY. 

But  this  self-complacent  illusion  had  cast  roots  too  deep 
to  be  eradicated  the  moment  that  its  evil  fruits  were  be 
ginning  to  be  reaped.  The  country  suffered  from  this 
folly  so  long  and  to  such  an  extent  that  the  fathers  of  the 
republic  had  often  well  nigh  despaired  of  its  future.  True, 
there  were  a  few  who  were  clear  as  to  the  real  cause  of  the 
evil.  JSTot  only  the  state,  but  even  society,  had  actually  en 
tered  on  the  process  of  dissolution,  and  many  there  were 
who  knew  no  other  way  of  arresting  the  evil  than  by  ap 
pealing  to  the  influence  of  "Washington.  Washington  him 
self  saw  farther,  and  pertinently  replied:  "Influence  is 
not  government."1 

The  war  could  scarcely  have  been  brought  to  a  happy 
termination,  had  the  mistrust  in  all  strong  government, 
especially  in  all  power  external  to  the  state  governments, 
and  this  fantastic  confidence  in  the  virtue  of  the  people 
been  then  developed  to  the  extent  that  it  was  later.  Jus 
tice  Story  says:  "They  [the  colonies]  found  themselves, 
after  having  assembled  a  general  congress  for  mutual 
advice  and  encouragement,  compelled  by  the  course  oi 
events  to  clothe  that  body  with  sovereign  powers  in  the 
most  irregular  and  summary  manner,  and  to  permit  them 
to  assert  the  general  prerogatives  of  peace  and  war,  with 
out  any  previous  compact,  and  sanctioned  only  by  the  silent 
acquiescence  of  the  people."2 

But  the  same  reasons  that  made  such  an  "  irregular  and 
summary"  proceeding  necessary  in  the  first  instance,  must 

shrinks  from  the  detection,  is,  that  in  political  affairs,  by  only  determin 
ing  what  men  ought  to  think,  we  are  sure  how  they  will  act ;  and  when 
we  know  the  facts  and  are  assiduous  to  collect  and  present  the  evidence, 
we  dupe  ourselves  with  the  expectation  that,  as  there  is  but  one  result 
which  wise  men  can  believe,  there  is  but  one  course  of  conduct  deduced 
from  it,  which  honest  men  can  approve  or  pursue.  "We  forget  that  in 
framing  the  judgment  every  passion  is  both  an  advocate  and  a  witness." 
Works,  II.,  p.  358. 

1  Marshall,  Life  of  Wash.,  II.,  p.  120. 

1  Coinm.,  I.,  §  344. 


IMPOTENCE   OF   CONGRESS.  37 

in  the  very  nature  of  things  have  continued  to  operate 
to  some  extent  during  the  whole  course  of  the  war.  And 
these  causes  produced  like  effects.  True,  there  now  existed 
a  formal  "  contract."  But  the  existence  of  the  republic 
was  of  greater  importance  than  the  minute  observance  of 
the  provisions  of  this  contract.  When,  therefore,  an  una 
voidable  conflict  between  duties  arose,  congress  partly  con 
sciously,  unconsciously  in  part,  violated  the  contract. 

The  interests  of  the  Union  came  in  conflict  at  every  step 
with  the  provisions  of  the  compact;  for,  as  we  have  seen, 
congress  was  not  possessed,  in  any  sense,  of  the  power  nec 
essary  to  carry  out  its  resolutions.  But  the  situation  of 
the  country  demanded  above  all  things  a  single,  strong, 
prompt  and  energetic  executive  power.  How  greatly  every 
operation  was  hindered  by  the  impotence  of  congress;  what 
frightful  distress  its  powerlessness  produced  on  every  hand, 
and  especially  in  the  army;  how  often  it  brought  the  coun 
try  to  the  very  verge  of  the  abyss; — to  all  this  Washington's 
correspondence  bears  eloquent  testimony,  which  will  always 
redound  to  his  fame  as  it  will  to  the  confusion  of  the  jeal 
ous  and  self-seeking  particularism  of  the  state  legislatures. 
But  congress  was  neither  willing  nor  able  to  exceed  its 
authority  except  in  the  most  urgent  cases.  These  indeed 
were  not  few.  The  Federalist  says:  u  A  list  of  the  cases 
in  which  congress  have  been  betrayed,  or  forced  by  the 
defects  of  the  confederation,  into  violations  of  their  char 
tered  authorities,  would  not  a  little  surprise  those  who 
have  paid  no  attention  to  the  subject."1  No  blame  attached 
to  it  in  most  cases,  partly,  because,  as  in  the  case  of  the 
ordinance  of  1T87,2  it  was  not  seen  that  it  had  been  guilty 
of  usurpation,  and  partly  because  it  was  tacitly  acknowl 
edged  that  the  usurpation  was  absolutely  necessary.  The 
contemptible  impotence  of  congress  was  too  patent  to  per- 

1  No.  XLIL 

8  See  the  Federalist,  No.  XXXVIII. 


38  STATE  SOVEREIGNTY  AND  SLAVEKY. 

mit  the  people  to  declaim  with  any  great  vehemence 
against  an  occasional  act  of  trespass  on  its  part. 

Hence  there  was  obviously  no  necessity  for  the  general 
cry  against  the  dangers  which  might  attend  too  powerful 
a  government  and  a  "  consolidation"  of  the  Union.  And 
yet  these  were  still  harped  upon  on  every  occasion,  and  not 
merely  from  impure  personal  motives,  but  in  great  park 
also  from  full  and  honest  conviction.  The  more  insufficient 
the  powers  of  government  were  proved  to  be,  the  stronger 
was  the  opposition  to  any  extension  of  them.  The  disincli 
nation  to  trust  congress  with  power  at  all  in  keeping  with 
its  duties,  became  at  last  so  great  that  it  began  to  show 
itself  even  in  the  debates  in  congress.1 

These  views,  however,  were  not  carried  to  an  extreme 
during  the  war.  The  governmental  machinery  of  the  con 
federation  was  as  clumsy  and  imperfect  as  it  could  well  be. 
It  not  unfrequently  seemed  as  if  it  would  cease  working 
altogether.  But  at  every  critical  moment  it  received  a  new 
impulse.2  As  long  as  the  war  had  not  yet  been  happily 
terminated,  there  stood  out  in  bold  relief  a  definite  object 
which  made  the  Union  absolutely  necessary;  for  even  the 
most  zealous  visionary  recognized  that  independence  could 
be  obtained  only  by  united  effort.3  But  the  moment  all 

1  Story,  Comm.,  I.,  §  264. 

9  u  The  necessary  unanimity  of  action  and  opinion  was  preserved  by 
the  individual  influence  of  the  great  men  who  appeared  together  in  the 
different  colonies."  Trescot,  The  Diplomatic  History  of  the  Admin  istra- 
tion  of  Washington  and  Adams,  p.  10.  G.  W.  Greene  is  a  decided  advo 
cate  of  the  same  view.  See  the  Life  of  Nath.  Greene,  passim. 

8  J.  Jay  wrote  on  the  27th  of  June,  1786,  to  Washington:  "  I  am  un 
easy  and  apprehensive,  more  so  than  during  the  war.  Then  we  had  a 
fixed  object,  and  though  the  means  and  time  of  obtaining  it  were  often 
problematical,  yet  I  did  firmly  believe  that  we  should  ultimately  suc 
ceed,  because  I  did  firmly  believe  that  justice  was  with  us."  Marshall, 
Life  of  Wash.,  II.,  p.  107.  Trescot,  1.  c.,  p.  9,  says,  and  doubtless  rightly  : 
"  For  it  must  not  be  supposed  that  the  treaty  of  peace  secured  the  na- 
tion'al  life.  Indeed,  it  would  be  more  correct  to  say,  that  the  most  criti 
cal  period  of  the  country's  history  embraced  the  time  between  1783  and 


GROWTH    OF    CORRUPTION.  39 

external  pressure  was  removed,1  the  crazy  structure  be 
gan  to  fall  to  pieces  with  a  rapidity  which  astonished  even 
those  who  had  had  during  the  struggle  the  best  opportuni 
ty  to  learn  its  weaknesses. 

If  the  states  were  at  first  satisfied  with  simply  ignoring 
the  requisitions  of  congress,  or  of  complying  with  them 
just  as  far  as  seemed  good  to  them,  they  now  began  to 
scoff  at  its  impotence  and  to  boast  of  their  neglect  of 
duty.2 

The  demoralizing  influences  which  every  protracted  war 
produces  began  now  to  manifest  themselves  to  an  alarm 
ing  extent.  Impure  motives  of  every  description  governed 
the  action  of  the  legislatures,  and  this  evil  became  grad 
ually  more  frequent  and  less  disguised.  Even  during  the 
war  the  most  distinguished  men  gradually  left  congress, 
because  they  found  in  their  several  states  a  field  of  action 
in  which  they  could  accomplish  more,  and  one  in  most  in 
stances  much  more  congenial  to  their  tastes.3  Now  they 
either  sought  to  retire  entirely  to  private  life,  or  they  were 
condemned  to  see  their  influence  in  the  legislatures  grad 
ually  wane.  Less  remarkable  men,  who  knew  little  of 
the  meaning  of  the  real  patriotism  which  had  actuated  the 
leaders  of  the  Revolution,  by  degrees  assumed  command 
of  the  helm.  Confidence  in  the  virtue  of  the  people  and 
denunciation  of  the  slightest  attempts  to  strengthen  the 
power  of  the  confederacy  were  the  masks  behind  which 
the  most  egotistic  ends  were  concealed.  But  it  was  soon 

the  adoption  of  the  constitution  of  1788."    See  also  Story,  Cornm.,  I., 


1  Story,  Comm.,  I.,  §  254. 

*  Washington  writes  to  Jay:  "Requisitions  are  actually  little  better 
than  a  jest  or  a  by-word  throughout  the  land.    If  you  tell  the  legisla 
tures  they  have  violated  the  treaty  of  peace  and  invaded  the  prerogatives 
of  the  confederacy,  they  will  laugh  in  your  face."    Marshall,  Life  of 
Wash.,  II., p.  108.    Justice  Story  also  says:    "The  requisitions  of  con 
gress  were  openly  derided." 

*  Trescot,  Dipl.  Hist.,  p.  12. 


40  STATE  SOVEREIGNTY  AND  SLAVERY. 

considered  scarcely  worth  while  to  make  use  of  any  mask, 
no  matter  how  transparent.  The  acquisitions  of  the  war 
were  looked  upon  as  so  much  booty,  of  which  each  state 
endeavored  to  secure  the  lion's  share,  without  the  least  re 
gard  for  the  well-being  or  honor  of  the  whole.  In  several 
instances,  those  who  were  willing  to  sell  even  the  honor  of 
their  own  state  showed  a  bolder  front  and  grew  noisier  in 
the  hope  of  increasing  their  own  personal  share  of  the 
booty  and  of  seeing  it  turned  as  soon  as  possible  into 
jingling  gold.1 

Congress  was  destitute  of  even  the  necessary  pecuniary 
means  of  meeting  its  most  urgent  obligations.2  The 
English  forces  were  still  in  New  York  when  congress  was 
compelled,  by  a  handful  of  mutinous  recruits,  to  remove 
from  Philadelphia  to  Princeton,  because  it  was  not  able  to 
keep  the  repeated  promises  it  had  made  to  the  troops.  It 
was  due  to  "Washington's  influence  alone  that  the  whole 
army  did  not  refuse  to  lay  down  their  arms  and  dissolve,  un 
til  j  ustice  was  done  them.  The  distress  grew  greater  every 
year,  and  threatened  daily  to  induce  more  serious  com 
plications.  The  foreign  debt  was  maturing,  and  congress 
was  unable  to  meet  the  interest  upon  it,  to  say  nothing  of 
the  payment  of  the  principal.  All  efforts  to  prevail  on 
the  states  to  guarantee  the  general  government  a  secure 
and  adequate  source  of  income  were  without  effect.  They 

1  '*  Public  faith  and  public  force  were  equally  out  of  the  question,  for 
as  it  respected  either  authority  or  resources,  the  corporation  of  a  col- 
lege  or  a  missionary  society  were  greater  potentates  than  congress. 
Our  federal  government  had  not  merely  fallen  into  imbecility  and  of 
course  into  contempt,  but  the  oligarchical  factions  in  the  large  states  had 
actually  made  great  advances  in  the  usurpation  of  its  powers.  The 
king  of  New  York  levied  imposts  on  Jersey  and  Conned  icut ;  and  the 
nobles  of  Virginia  bore  with  impatience  their  tributary  dependence  on 
Baltimore  and  Philadelphia."  Fisher  Ames,  Works,  II.,  p.  370. 

a  "  The  government  of  a  great  nation  had  barely  revenue  enough  to 
buy  stationery  for  its  clerks  or  to  pay  the  salary  of  the  doorkeeper." 
Fisher  Ames,  1.  c. 


AGITATION  FOR   REPUDIATION.  41 

held  fast  to  the  policy  of  requisitions,  and  even  considered 
it  a  favor  when  they  paid  the  least  attention  to  such  as 
were  made  upon  them.1  The  evidences  of  indebtedness 
of  the  home  loan  sank,  in  consequence,  to  about  one-tenth 
of  their  nominal  value.2 

The  pecuniary  condition  of  the  individual  states  was  still 
worse,  for  here  there  was  not  only  no  possibility  of  pay 
ment,  but  the  disposition  to  pay  became  weaker  every  day. 
And  even  when  existing  legislatures  could  be  reproached 
with  nothing  on  this  score,  it  was  so  uncertain  what  might 
be  expected  from  future  ones  that  the  state  scrip  could  be 
negotiated  only  at  an  oppressive  premium.  And  this  be 
came  continually  worse ;  for  the  number  of  those  who  aimed 
at  liquidating  their  debts  by  a  dishonorable  exercise  of 
the  legislative  power  constantly  increased,3  and  in  many  of 
the  states  it  became  more  uncertain  every  day  whether 
they  would  not  find  a  majority  in  the  legislature. 

"  Public  confidence  was  shaken  to  such  an  extent  in  con 
sequence,  that  even  private  individuals  of  undoubted  credit 
were  obliged  to  pay  a  discount  of  from  thirty  to  fifty  per 

J  Hamilton  remarked  in  February,  1787,  in  the  New  York  legislature, 
that  in  the  preceding  five  years  New  Hampshire,  North  Carolina,  South 
Carolina,  and  Georgia  had  contributed  nothing;  Connecticut  and  Dela 
ware  about  a  third  of  their  levy;  Massachusetts,  Rhode  Island,  and  Mary- 
laud  about  one-half;  Viginia,  three-fifths ;  Pennsylvania,  almost  her  entire 
quota ;  and  New  York  more  than  her  quota.  But  it  was  New  York's 
headstrong  opposition  that  defeated  the  effort  made  to  give  congress,  for 
twenty-five  years,  the  right  to  levy  a  tax  of  five  per  cent,  on  all  spirit 
uous  liquors  and  some  other  articles,  and  to  increase  the  tax  on  all 
other  imported  goods.  Marshall  says  in  relation  to  this:  "New  York 
had  given  her  final  veto  to  the  impost  system,  and  in  doing  so  had  vir 
tually  decreed  the  dissolution  of  the  existing  government."  Life  of 
Wash.,  II.,  p.  123. 

a  It  should  not  be  forgotten,  however,  that  congress  had,  some  years 
before,  fixed  the  relation  of  the  continental  paper  money  to  specie  at 
40 : 1.  See  an  interesting  account  of  the  depreciation  of  the  continental 
money  in  1779  and  1780  in  Kapp's  Leben  Kalb's,  pp.  169,  170. 

•  Life  of  J.  Adams,  II.,  p.  131. 


4:2  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

cent,  on  their  notes."  Business  was  completely  prostrated. 
"  There  was  no  market,  especially  for  real  estate,  and  sales 
for  cash  could  be  made,  when  at  all,  only  at  a  great  sacri 
fice."  A  sullen  resignation  began  to  take  possession  of 
the  public  mind.  People  despaired  of  bringing  about  a  bet 
ter  state  of  things  through  economy  and  labor.  Wild  fancies 
in  the  garb  of  radical  reform  theories,  tending  to  the  over 
throw  of  all  law  and  order,  gradually  usurped  the  place  of 
the  sober  business  habits  which  at  all  other  periods  have 
distinguished  the  American  people. 

Under  such  circumstances,  it  can  excite  no  surprise  that 
the  exclusive  and  particularistic  tendencies  of  the  time  be 
gan  to  assume  a  coarser  form  of  development  When  the 
confidence  of  man  in  man  was  undermined,  and  the  sense 
of  justice  of  whole  classes  of  society  so  dimmed  that  they 
openly  sought  to  escape  their  own  embarrassments  by  the 
violent  ruin  of  their  neighbors,  it  could  not  be  expected 
that  the  policy  of  the  states  in  their  relation  with  one 
another  should  be  guided  by  healthy  politico-economical 
ideas,  by  great  unselfishness,  or  by  high  moral  principle. 
Each  state  had  the  exclusive  right  to  regulate  its  com 
merce,  and  each  state,  most  ungenerously  and  most  selfish 
ly,  availed  itself,  to  the  utmost  limit,  of  this  right.  In  the 
regulation  of  commerce,  regard  was  had  only  to  self  inter 
est,  and  a  policy  was  frequently  followed,  the  aim  of  which 
was  to  obtain  an  advantage  directly  opposed  to  the  welfare 
of  the  neighboring  states.  This  gave  occasion  to  continual 
vexations  and  petty  jealousies.  The  number  and  magni 
tude  of  real  and  imagined  grievances  grew  on  every  side, 
so  that  the  mutual  prejudices  of  the  states  shot  deeper  roots 
and  their  animosity  became  yet  more  embittered,  while 
as  a  consequence  the  ruin  of  their  commerce  was  com 
pleted. 

The  reaction  which  this  internal  dissension  had  on  the 
relations  of  the  Union  to  the  European  powers  was  very 
perceptible.  The  political  emancipation  of  the  United 


IMPOTENCE   OF   CONGEESS.  4:3 

States  was  established  by  the  war;  their  economic  emanci 
pation  was  only  a  formal  one.  In  this  respect  they  re 
mained,  for  a  great  many  years  more,  in  colonial  depen 
dence.  The  only  essential  change  made  in  the  situation 
served  merely  to  confirm  anew  Franklin >s  saying,  that  "not 
England,  but  Europe"  was  the  mother  country  of  America. 
The  advantage,  however,  which  might  have  been  reaped 
from  this  change  was  scarcely  turned  to  account.  The 
United  States  had  of  course  the  right  to  enter  into  com 
mercial  relations  with  such  of  the  European  powers  as 
might  offer  them  the  best  terms;  but  this  right  was  des 
tined  to  remain  completely  unproductive  of  profit  as  long 
as  these  powers  did  not  consider  it  their  interest  to  enter 
into  commercial  treaties  with  them.  And  as,  by  reason  of 
the  poweiiessness  of  congress  and  the  little  reliance  that 
could  be  placed  on  the  state  legislatures,  there  could  be  no 
guaranty  that  the  terms  of  any  treaty  would  be  observed, 
trans- Atlantic  nations  were  little  inclined  to  bind  them 
selves  to  anything.1  England  had  already  experienced  how 
little  reliance  was  to  be  placed  on  the  promises  of  congress. 
The  terms  of  the  treaty  of  peace  were  frequently  violated 
by  the  Americans,  as  Jay,  the  then  secretary  of  foreign  af 
fairs,  frankly  avowed.  But  they  were  satisfied  with  making 
this  avowal,  for  the  urgent  recommendations  of  congress  to 

1  The  Duke  of  Dorset  writes  on  the  26th  of  March,  1785,  to  the  Amer 
ican  commissioners  who  were  endeavoring  to  negotiate  a  treaty  of  com 
merce:  "...  I  have  been  .  .  .  instructed  to  learn  from  you, 
gentlemen,  what  is  the  real  nature  of  the  powers  with  which  you  are 
invested,  whether  you  are  merely  commissioned  by  congress,  or  whether 
you  have  received  separate  powers  from  the  respective  states.  •  •  • 
The  apparent  determination  of  the  respective  states  to  regulate  their  own 
separate  interests  renders  it  absolutely  necessary,  towards  forming  a 
permanent  system  of  commerce,  that  my  court  should  be  informed  how 
far  the  commissioners  can  be  duly  authorized  to  enter  into  any  engage 
ments  with  Great  Britain,  which  it  may  not  be  in  the  power  of  any  one 
of  the  states  to  render  totally  useless  and  inefficient."  Diplomatic  Cor- 
respondence,  1783-1789,  II.,  p.  297.  Compare  Marshall,  Life  of  Wash., 
II.,  pp.,  96, 97.  Pitkin,  History  of  the  U.  S.,  II.,  pp.  189, 190. 


44  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

tlie  states  to  henceforth  make  the  observance  of  the  treaty  an 
object  of  their  earnest  solicitude,  were  words  spoken  to  the 
wind.  England,  therefore,  thought  herself  justified  in  not 
performing  her  part  of  the  contract.  She  refused  to  vacate  the 
western  posts;  and  the  Indians,  under  the  protection  of  her 
troops,  and  partly  because  urged  to  it  by  England,  carried 
on  an  atrocious  border  warfare  against  American  settlers.1 

The  complaints  consequent  upon  the  distress  and  misery 
growing  out  of  this  lamentable  absence  of  government 
continued  to  become  louder  and  more  general.  Congress 
had  to  use  all  its  remaining  resources  and  energy  in  order 
to  meet  the  daily  demands  upon  it.  Complete  ruin  had 
been  once  avoided  only  because  Holland  happened  to  be  in 
a  condition  to  make  another  small  loan.  But  this  could 
afford  a  respite  of  only  a  few  months  more. 

Colonel  Humphries  wrote  to  Washington  that  the  wheels 
of  the  political  machine  could  with  difficulty  continue  to 
move.  And,  indeed,  a  short  time  after  they  came  to  "  an 
awful  stand."2  The  United  States,  which  had  already 

1  Most  American  writers  consider  it  a  settled  fact  that  England  was 
the  first  to  break  the  terms  of  the  treaty.  It  must  be  granted,  also,  that 
Jefferson  could  claim  with  a  certain  degree  of  truth,  in  his  communica 
tion  of  the  29th  of  May,  1792,  to  the  English  ambassador,  Hammond, 
that  congress  was  bound  only  to  recommend  the  states  to  deport  them- 
selves  towards  their  English  creditors  and  towards  the  loyalists  in  the 
manner  desired  by  England.  But  the  absolute  want  of  power  of  the 
government  of  the  Union  had  given  so  good  a  pretext  to  England  to  fail 
in  its  engagements,  and  congress  was  so  directly  compelled  to  acknowl 
edge  its  powerlessness  over  the  "sovereign"  states,  that  neither  England 
nor  any  other  country  would  be  likely  to  be  induced  to  undertake  any 
new  engagement  and  receive  as  an  equivalent  new  recommendations  of 
congress  to  the  states. 

a  "The  delinquencies  of  the  states  have,  step  by  step,  matured  them 
selves  to  an  extreme  which  has  at  length  arrested  all  the  wheels  of  the 
national  government  and  brought  them  to  an  awful  stand.  Congress  at 
this  time  scarcely  possesses  the  means  of  keeping  up  the  forms  of  ad- 
ministration  till  the  states  can  have  time  to  agree  upon  a  more  substantial 
substitute  for  the  present  shadow  of  a  federal  government."  Federalist, 
No.  XV. 


SHAYS'    REBELLION.  45 

dreamed  themselves  to  be  the  redeemers  of  the  world  from 
political  slavery,  were,  both  at  home  and  abroad,  an  object  of 
compassion,  of  scorn  and  contempt.1  This  was  known  to 
all ;  no  one  ventured  to  deny  it ;  but  the  legislatures  re- 
mained  obdurate.  They  have  a  fatal  disinclination  to  de 
spoil  themselves  of  the  smallest  attribute  of  independent 
or  sovereign  states,  wrote  Colonel  Humphries,  in  substance, 
to  Washington  on  the  20th  of  January,  1787.  It  was 
necessary  that  their  own  existence  should  be  in  jeopardy, 
before  they  would  even  reluctantly  acknowledge  that  there 
was  no  salvation  for  them  except  in  strengthening  the 
government  of  the  Union. 

In  Massachusetts  were  witnessed  the  first  commotions 
which  showed  beyond  a  doubt  that  society  itself  was  al 
ready  completely  undermined,  and  that  a  radical  political 
reform  and  the  preservation  of  social  order  were  well-nigh 
identical  questions.  The  malcontents  who  either  openly 
or  secretly  sided  with  Shays  were  equal  in  number  to  the 
friends  of  the  state  government,  and  their  ultimate  object 
was  none  other  than  the  repudiation  of  public  and  private 
debts  and  a  re-distribution  of  property.2  The  greatest 
evil  of  all  was  that  it  was  long  doubtful  whether  the  legis 
lature  would  rouse  itself  to  energetic  action,  or  whether 
that  part  of  it  which  was  in  secret  sympathy  with  the 
rebels  would  obtain  the  upper  hand. 

The  news  of  the  outbreak  of  these  disorders  created  a 
very  profound  impression  everywhere.  The  old  leaders  of 
the  Revolution  felt  that  the  time  had  at  last  come  when 
the  question  of  the  "  to  be"  or  the  "  not  to  be"  of  the 
nation  must  be  decided.  The  spectre  of  civil  war  rose  up 

1  Washington  writes  to  Colonel  Lee :  "To  be  more  exposed  in  the  eyes 
of  the  world  and  more  contemptible  than  we  already  are,  is  hardly 
possible."  See  also  Works  of  Jefferson,  I.,  pp.  500,  518,  532 ;  II.,  pp. 
193, 194. 

*  Compare  Curtis,  Hist,  of  the  Const.,  I.,  p.  269;  Sparks,  Wash:,  IX., 
p.  207;  Marshall,  Wash.,  II.,  p.  107;  Rives,  Madison,  II.,  p.  175. 


4:6  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

in  a  threatening  attitude  before  every  eye.1  Colonel 
Humphries  implored  "Washington  not  to  remain  neutral  if 
it  should  break  out.  And  "Washington  himself  was  far 
from  considering  these  fears  as  mere  phantoms.  He  wrote 
to  General  Knox:  "  There  are  combustibles  in  every  state 
to  which  a  spark  might  set  fire."2  And  this  was  the  view 
that  obtained  everywhere.  "  It  is,  indeed,  difficult  to  over 
charge  any  picture  of  the  gloom  and  apprehensions  which 
then  pervaded  the  public  councils  as  well  as  the  private 
meditations  of  the  ablest  men  of  the  country."3 

'"Our  discontents  were  fermenting  into  civil  war."  Fisher  Ames, 
Works,  II.,  p.  370. 

3  Marshall,  Life  of  Wash.,  II.,  p.  U9. 

*  Story,  Comm.,  I.,  §  271.  A  certain  Smith,  who  said  of  himself:  "  1 
am  a  plain  man  and  get  my  living  by  the  plow,"  described  the  rebellion 
in  the  following  words,  in  the  Massachusetts  convention:  "  There  was 
a  black  cloud  that  arose  in  the  East  last  winter,  and  spread  over  the 

West I  mean,  sir,  the  county  of  Bristol;  the  cloud  rose 

there,  and  burst  upon  us,  and  produced  a  dreadful  effect.  It  brought  on 
a  state  of  anarchy,  and  that  led  to  tyranny.  I  say  it  brought  anarchy. 
People  that  used  to  live  peaceably  and  were  before  good  neighbors,  got 
distracted  and  took  up  arms  against  government.  .  .  .  I  am  going,  Mr. 
President,  to  show  you  and  my  brother  farmers  what  were  the  effects 
of  anarchy,  that  you  may  see  the  reasons  why  I  wisl>  fo^  good  govern 
ment.  People,  I  say,  *ook  up  arms ;  ?nd  Lben  if  you  wont  to  opeak 
to  them,  you  had  the  musket  of  deatk  presented  to  your  braist  They 
world  rob  you  of  vrur  properly,  thr oaten  to  bu:n  yoar  hodisec'-  oblige 
you  to  be  on  your  guard  night  and  day ;  alarm  spread  from  town  to  town; 
families  were  broken  up;  the  tender  mother  would  cry:  *  Oh,  my  son 
is  among  them,  what  shall  I  do  for  my  child  T  Some  were  taken  captive ; 
children  taken  out  of  their  schools  and  carried  away.  Then  we  should 
hear  of  an  action,  and  the  poor  prisoners  were  set  in  front  to  be  killed 
by  their  own  friends.  How  dreadful,  how  distressing,  was  this !  Our 
distress  was  so  great  that  we  should  have  been  glad  to  snatch  at  any- 
thing  that  looked  like  a  government.  Had  any  one  that  was  able  to  pro 
tect  us  come  and  set  up  his  standard,  we  should  all  have  flocked  to  it, 
even  if  it  had  been  a  monarch,  and  that  monarch  might  have  proved  a 
tyrant.  So  that  you  see  that  anarchy  leads  to  tyranny;  and  better  to 
have- one  tyrant  than  so  many  at  once."  Elliott,  Deb.,  II.,  pp.  102,  103. 
Jameson,  The  Constitutional  Convention,  p. 41,  says:  "If  they  did  not 
desire,  within  the  borders  of  each  state,  to  see  a  repetition  of  the  rebel- 


THE    ANNAPOLIS    CONVENTION.  47 

It  was  owing  to  this  general  feeling  that  a  desperate 
crisis  had  been  reached,  that  the  report  of  the  convention 
at  Annapolis  did  not  fall  on  deaf  ears.  This  convention 
met  in  September,  1786,  at  the  invitation  of  the  legisla 
ture  of  Virginia,  "  to  consider  how  far  a  uniform  system 
in  their  commercial  relations"  might  "  be  necessary  to 
their  common  interests."  But  as  only  five  states1  were 
represented,  and  the  commissioners  were  soon  satisfied 
that  their  powers  were  not  such  as  the  critical  condition  of 
the  country  demanded,  they  contented  themselves  with 
drawing  up  a  report  which  was  laid  before  congress  and 
the  legislatures  of  the  several  states.  The  commissioners 
therein  recommended  the  calling  of  a  general  convention 
"  to  meet  at  Philadelphia,  on  the  second  day  in  May  next, 
to  take  into  consideration  the  situation  of  the  United 
States;  to  devise  such  further  provisions  as  shall  to  them 
seem  necessary  to  render  the  constitution  of  the  federal 
government  adequate  to  the  exigencies  of  the  Union ;  and 
to  report  such  an  act  for  that  purpose  to  the  United  States 
in  congress  assembled,  as,  when  agreed  to  by  them,  and 
afterwards  confirmed  by  the  legislatures  of  every  state, 
will  effectually  provide  for  the  same." 

This  report  induced  ]S"ew  York  t.o  instruct  its  delegates 
to  make  a  formal  proposition  that  coagress  should  recom 
mend  to  che  scates  the  ealliugof  a  general  convention.2  On 
the  21st  of  February,  1787,  this  proposition  was  accepted 
and  the  recommendation  made  which  had  been  advised  by 
the  Annapolis  convention.  . 

The  supporters  of  a  strong  government  now  acted  with 

lion  kindled  by  Shay  in  Massachusetts,  ending,  perhaps,  in  a  general 
civil  war,  they  must  substitute  for  the  rotten  structure  of  the  confedera 
tion  a  constitution  which  would  confirm,  and  not  undermine  and  break 
up,  their  actual  union."  See  Life  of  J.  Adams,  II.,  p.  131. 

1  New  York,  New  Jersey,  Pennsylvania,  Delaware  and  Virginia. 

*  The  proposition  referred  to  received  a  majority  of  only  one  vote  in 
the  New  York  senate.  Marshall,  Life  of  Wash.,  II.,  p.  123. 


48  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVEEY. 

redoubled  energy,  for  it  was  necessary  not  only  to  induce 
all  the  legislatures  to  send  representatives  to  the  conven 
tion,  but  to  cause  the  choice  of  delegates  to  fall  upon  the 
most  distinguished  men  in  the  country,  that  their  very 
names  might  suffice  to  keep  the  party  of  anarchy  within 
bounds. 

In  the  first  place,  it  was  necessary  to  secure  Washington; 
for  he  held  a  place  in  the  hearts  of  the  people,  such  as  no 
other  of  his  great  co-laborers  in  the  work  of  independence 
occupied,  and  such  as  no  other  can  occupy  again.     To  seek 
in  Washington's  breast  any  thought  but  that  of  the  wel 
fare  of  his  country  would  have  been,  at  the  time,  a  species 
of  high  treason  and  an  unpardonable  offense  against  faith 
in  human  nature.     It  was  reserved  for  the  demagogues  of 
the  succeeding  decade  to  defile  even  his  name  with   the 
most  disgusting  drivel.     Washington  yet  invested  every 
thing  he  touched  with  a  kind  of  sacredness.     If  Washing, 
ton  was  wanting,  the  best  man,  the  people's  man,  was  want 
ing  also;  but  on  the  other  hand,  if  even   his  co-operation 
turned  out  to  be  fruitless,  the  best  card  in  the  game  was 
played  in  vain,  and  the  game  itself  must  be  given  up  as 
lost.     Washington  knew  this,  as  did  also  all  those  who  un 
derstood  the  significance  of  the  moment.     It  is  therefore 
necessary  to  a  correct  understanding  of  the  condition  of 
affairs  to  remember  that  Washington  at  first  absolutely 
declined  the  nomination,  and  accepted  it  at  last,  although 
in  so  doing  he  was  compelled  not  only  to  do  the  greatest 
violence  to  his  personal  wishes,  but  to  disregard  the  counsel 
which  came  to  him  from  persons  whose  advice  was  worth 
considering  and  which  was   based  on  important  political 
grounds.     Colonel  Humphries  and  general   Knox  stremi- 
ously   opposed  it,  because  they   feared,  as  they  said,  that 
things  must  grow  worse  before  they  could  grow  better. 
Washington  would  doubtless  have  followed  their  advice 
were  he  not  fully  convinced,  after  mature  consideration, 


THE   PHILADELPHIA    CONVENTION.  49 

that  this  was  indeed  "  the  last  dying  essay"1  to  make  the 
continued  existence  of  the  Union  possible.2 

The  delegates  began  to  meet  at  Philadelphia  on  the  ap 
pointed  day;  but  it  was  the  25th  of  May  before  a  majority 
of  the  states  were  represented.  But  although  there  reigned 
here  again  the  careless  spirit  which  prevailed  as  to  all  mat 
ters  pertaining  to  the  government  of  the  confederation,  it 
must  not  be  inferred  therefrom  that  the  impending  trans 
actions  were  looked  upon  with  indifference. 

One  needs  only  to  read  the  list  of  names  of  the  delegates, 
to  be  convinced  that  people  everywhere  were  penetrated 
with  the  gravity  of  the  occasion  and  the  times.  If  there 
was  any  exit  from  the  labyrinth  of  conflicting  interests  and 
views,  this  meeting  must  certainly  find  it;  for  it  was  un 
questionably  made  up  of  the  best  men  in  the  Union,  of  the 
most  experienced,  patriotic  and  intelligent. 

The  effect  on  the  one  hand  was  to  inspire  courage  and 
hope  in  the  breasts  of  even  the  most  disheartened,  but  on 
the  other,  this  very  circumstance  served  painfully  to  in 
tensify  the  alarming  doubts  for  the  country's  future ;  for 
if  this  convention  should  dissolve  without  having  accom 
plished  any  result,  it  seemed  as  if  nothing  remained  but  to 
face  the  approaching  chaos  with  the  gloom  of  resignation.3 
It  was  fortunate  that  this  feeling  was  strongest  among  the 
members  of  the  convention;  for  it  caused  them  to  realize 
the  immense  responsibility  which  weighed  upon  their 
shoulders  and  brought  it  home  to  their  consciousness  with 
such  force,  that  a  majority  of  them  saw  clearly  that  their 
only  alternative  was  mutual  concession  or  general  ruin.4 


1  See  the  letter  in  Marshall,  Life  of  Wash.,  II.,  p.  114. 

*  "  The  idea  of  dismemberment  had  recently  made  its  appearance  m 
the  newspapers."    Madison's  Introduction  to  the  Debates  in  the  Federal 
Convention  of  1787,  Elliott,  V.,  p.  120. 

8  See  Elliott,  Deb.,  V.,  pp.  553,  557. 

*  Mason  gave  strong  expression  to  this  conviction  on  the  5th  of  July : 
"  It  could  not  be  more  inconvenient  for  any  gentleman  to  remain  absent 

4 


50  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY/. 

It  was  resolved,  therefore,  that  its  transactions  should  be 
carried  on  with  closed  doors  and  that  the  delegates  should 
be  required  to  preserve  the  strictest  silence  concerning 
what  transpired,  in  order  that  the  questions  in  controversy 
might  not  be  dragged  immediately  before  the  forum  of  an 
excited  and  angry  people  and  all  prospect  of  an  under 
standing  thus  destroyed  from  the  very  beginning.  This 
resolution  was  soon  justified  by  the  course  which  the  pro 
ceedings  took. 

It  was  plain  from  the  first  days  of  the  convention  that 
a  goodly  number  of  the  delegates — and  among  them  many 
of  the  most  distinguished  men — would  not  limit 
themselves  to  a  literal  interpretation  of  their  powers. 
Their  instructions  authorized  them  only  to  propose  amend 
ments  to  the  existing  articles  of  confederation;  but  they 
were  satisfied  that  all  such  attempts  could,  at  most,  .only 
postpone  the  day  of  ruin  and  that  the  source  of  the  evil 
could  be  destroyed  only  by  giving  the  constitution  a  na 
tional  basis. 

Well  grounded  as  these  convictions  might  be,  justified 
as  the  representatives  were  in  not  hesitating  in  their  choice 
between  exceeding  their  powers  and  the  salvation  of  their 
country,  the  people's  veto  would  doubtless  have  frustrated 
their  designs,  if  at  that  moment  an  opportunity  had  been 
afforded  to  demagogues  and  the  honest  advocates  of  partic 
ularism  to  denounce  them.  "When  the  constitution  was 
afterwards  proposed  to  the  people  for  adoption,  the  decision 
hung  upon  a  single  hair.  There  can  be  no  question  to 
which  side  the  balance  would  have  inclined  if  the  calm  ar 
guments  of  Dickinson  and  Luther  Martin's  fiery  declama 
tion  had  reached  the  public  ear  at  a  time  when  the  outline 
of  the  constitution  was  not  yet  complete  and  the  only  al- 

from  his  private  affairs;  but  he  would  bury  his  bones  in  this  city  rather 
than  expose  his  country  to  the  consequences  of  a  dissolution  of  the  con 
vention  without  anything  being  done."  Elliott,  Deb.,  V,,  p.  287.  See 
also  Ibid,  V.,  p.  552. 


DISPUTE   AND    DISSENSION.  51 

ternative  did  not  yet  lie  between  its  unconditional  accep 
tance  and  total  rejection ;  but  as  the  convention  was  yet  in 
session  and  so  greatly  divided,  the  worst  was  to  be  feared 
at  any  moment.  Two  of  the  three  Kew  York  delegates, 
Lansing  and  Yates,  left  the  convention  while  it  was  in  the 
midst  of  its  labors  and  declared  that  their  constituents 
would  never  have  sent  delegates  there,  if  they  had  dreamed 
that  any  such  projects  were  on  foot.1  And  it  repeatedly 
seemed  as  if  half  of  the  deputies  would  follow  their  exam 
ple,  and  the  convention  dissolve  without  having  accom 
plished  its  task.  On  two  of  the  most  important  questions 
the  views  of  the  delegates  were  diametrically  opposed 
and  it  was  apparently  impossible  to  mediate  between 
them.  Complete  helplessness  threatened  them,  for  every 
attempt  at  compromise  served  only  to  make  the  gap 
between  them  wider;  and  the  supporters  of  the  oppos 
ing  views  were  always  forced  by  the  discussion  into  yet 
more  extreme  positions,  so  that  at  last  the  signs  of  per 
sonal  bitterness  began  to  show  themselves. 

"When  finally,  every  prospect  of  an  understanding  seemed 
to  have  disappeared,  the  white-haired  Franklin  arose  and 
proposed  that  henceforth  the  sessions  should  be  opened 
with  prayer,  for  now  there  was  no  hope  of  help  except 
from  heaven;  the  wit  of  man  was  exhausted!2  The  hope 
of  ultimate  success  must  have  been  small,  indeed,  when 
such  a  proposition  could  be  made  by  Franklin,  strongly 
inclined  as  he  was  to  rationalism,  a  man  who  at  heart  was 
averse  to  all  religious  demonstration  and  who,  even  in  the 
darkest  hours  of  the  war,  had  carried  his  head  very  high. 

1  Lansing  declared  on  the  16th  of  June :  "  Had  the  legislature  of  the 
state  of  New  York  apprehended  that  their  powers  would  have  been  con 
strued  to  extend  to  the  formation  of  a  national  government,  to  the  ex 
tinguishment  of  their  independency,  no  delegates  would  have  appeared 
here  on  the  part  of  that  state."  Yates's  Minutes, Elliott,  DebM  I.,  p.  141. 
See  also  letter  from  the  Hon.  Rob.  Yates  and  the  Hon.  John  Lansing, 
Jun.,  to  the  governor  of  New  York.  Elliott,  Deb.,  I.,  p.  480 

a  Elliott,  Deb.,  V.,  p.  251 


52  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY  AND   SLAVERY. 

Pinckney,  with  passionate  emphasis,  declared  that  South 
Carolina  would  never  accept  a  constitution  which  did 
not  afford  proper  protection  to  the  interests  of  the  slave 
holders;1  and  Gouverneur  Morris,  speaking  of  the  demand 
of  the  smaller  states  to  have  equal  representation  in  con 
gress,  exclaimed  in  a  prophetic  spirit:  "  This  country 
must  be  united.  If  persuasion  does  not  unite  it,  the  sword 
will."2  The  probable  solution  of  these  two  controverted 
questions  seemed,  through  long  weary  weeks,  to  be  given  in 
the  ominous  words  of  Gerry :  "  A  secession  would  take 
place  .  .  .  for  some  gentlemen  seemed  decided  upon  it."3 
At  last,  Edmund  Randolph,  who  had  been  one  of  the  most 
decided  advocates  of  a  thorough  reform  of  the  constitution 
in  the  national  sense,  refused  to  sign  the  one  which  had 
been  drafted,  because  its  adoption  "  would  end  in  tyranny."4 

Nearly  four  months  elapsed  before  the  delegates  could 
agree  upon  a  plan,  of  which  they  said  to  themselves,  with 
Hamilton,  that  it  was  not  possible  to  hesitate  between  the 
prospect  of  seeing  good  come  from  it  and  anarchy  and 
convulsion.  On  the  17th  of  September  it  was  unanimous 
ly  resolved  that  the  plan  should  be  adopted  by  the  states 
represented  at  the  time,  which  was  done.  When  the  last 
delegates  were  signing  their  names  to  the  document,  Frank 
lin  remarked  that  he  had  frequently  asked  himself  in  the 
course  of  the  proceedings  whether  the  sun  pictured  on  the 
back  of  the  president's  chair  was  an  ascending  or  declin 
ing  one;  but  now  he  had  the  satisfaction  of  knowing  that 
it  was  a  rising,  not  a  setting,  sun. 

This  conviction  proved  ultimately  to  be  correct;  but  for 
the  moment  a  firm  confidence  that  success  was  certain 

1  Elliott,  Deb.,  V.,  p.  457. 
3  Ibid,  V.,  p.  276. 

3  Ibid,  V.,  p.  278. 

4  Ibid,  V.,  pp.  434,  491,  502,  552,  556.    See  also  Edmund  Randolph's 
Letter  to  the  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Delegates,  Virginia,  Ibid,  I.,  pp 
482-491. 


ADJOURNMENT.  53 

bordered  almost  on  temerity.  Mucli  was  indeed  gained 
when  the  convention,  with  something  approaching  una 
nimity,  could  recommend  the  proposed  constitution  to  the 
people;  but  there  yet  remained  difficulties  to  be  overcome 
equal  at  least  to  those  which  the  convention  had  sur 
mounted. 

The  convention  had,  it  is  true, — unlike  the  articles  of 
confederation,  which  on  all  the  more  important  questions 
demanded  unanimity, — declared  that  the  consent  of  nine 
states  should  give  force  to  the  new  constitution,  so  far  as 
these  nine  states  were  concerned;  but  it  was  extremely 
doubtful  whether  even  this  number  could  be  won  over  to 
it.  In  the  convention  itself,  and  up  to  the  very  last  mo 
ment,  it  had  been  impossible  to  effect  a  reconciliation  of 
the  opposing  views.  Franklin  had  purposely  given  his 
motion  an  ambiguous  meaning,  in  order  that  the  final  bal 
lot  might  have  the  semblance  of  entire  harmony.  This 
might,  for  the  first  moment,  have  the  advantage  of 
making  a  good  impression  upon  the  people.  The  next  in 
stant,  however,  every  one  must  have  known  that  Mason, 
Randolph,  Gerry,  and  others  had  decidedly  opposed  the 
project  and  refused  it  their  signature;  and  then  the  ruse 
might  have  an  effect  directly  opposed  to  that  which  Frank 
lin  had  contemplated.  There  could  be  no  doubt  that  the 
dissenting  delegates  would  endeavor  to  justify  themselves 
before  the  public  and  seek  to  win  public  opinion  in  their 
favor.  Besides,  the  little  phalanx  on  whom  the  weight  of 
the  battle  with  the  prejudices  of  the  people  and  with 
theorizing  fanatics  and  demagogues  was  to  rest,  was 
hopelessly  divided.  The  best  names  were,  it  is  true, 
subscribed  to  the  constitution;  but  there  was  a  good 
ly  number  of  names  which  were  not  there  and  which  stood 
second  only  to  the  best.  The  consequence  was  that  the 
prestige  which  would  have  been  gained  for  the  proposed 
constitution  by  actual  unanimity,  was  lost.  The  success 
of  its  advocates  in  the  several  states  depended  mainly  on 


54  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

the  grounds  which  could  be  advanced  in  its  favor ;  but  the 
disinclination  to  follow  the  exposition  and  development  of 
these  grounds  attentively  and  calmly  and  to  weigh  the 
arguments  for  it  against  the  actual  state  of  affairs,  was 
greater  than  even  the  most  pusillanimous  had  feared.1 

The  reason  of  this  was  not  a  change  for  the  better  in 
the  situation  which  had  occurred  in  the  meantime.  Noth 
ing,  indeed,  had  happened  to  make  internal  discord  and  dis 
tress  greater  than  they  had  been  or  to  demonstrate  how  well 
justified  was  the  vexatious  and  suspicious  contempt  with 
which  European  powers  regarded  the  republic.  Every 
thing  remained  very  nearly  in  statu  quo.  But  this  very 
fact  caused  a  radical  change  in  the  constitution  to  appear 
so  urgent,  that  the  one  proposed  met  with  ardent  support 
at  the  eleventh  hour  from  parties  whom  one  might  have 
expected  to  see  in  the  front  rank  of  its  opponents.  For 
instance,  Randolph,  who  could  not  be  induced  on  any  ac 
count  to  subscribe  to  it  in  Philadelphia,  was  one  of  its 
most  powerful  defendants  in  the  Virginia  convention,  al 
though  even  there  he  frankly  and  energetically  gave  ex 
pression  to  his  objections  to  it.2 

The  mass  of  the  particularists  combined  to  wage  a  most 
acrimonious  opposition,the  moment  the  proposed  constitu- 

1  The  reproof  given  by  Lee,  of  Westmoreland,  to  Patrick  Henry,  and 
the  warning  he  addressed  him,  might  have  applied  equally  to  all  the 
speeches  of  the  Anti-Federalists;  "Instead  of  proceeding  to  invest 
igate  the  merits  of  the  new  plan  of  government,  the  worthy  charac 
ter  informed  us  of  horrors  which  he  felt,  of  apprehensions  to  his 
mind,  which  made  him  tremblingly  fearful  of  the  fate  of  the  common 
wealth.  Mr.  Chairman,  was  it  proper  to  appeal  to  the  fears  of  this  house  ? 
The  question  before  us  belongs  to  the  judgment  of  this  house.  I  trust 
he  is  come  to  judge  and  not  to  alarm."  Elliott,  Deb.,  III.,  p.  42. 

8  "As  with  me  the  only  question  has  ever  been  between  previous  and 
subsequent  amendments  [to  the  constitution],  so  I  will  express  my 
apprehensions  that  the  postponement  of  this  convention  to  so  late  a  day 
has  extinguished  the  probability  of  the  former  without  inevitable  ruin 
to  the  Union,  and  the  Union  is  the  anchor  of  our  political  salvation." 
Elliott,  Deb.,  III.,  p.  25. 


FIGHT    OF   THE    PARTICULARISTS.  55 

tion  was  made  public.  All  moderation,  we  might  almost 
say  all  reason,  seemed  to  forsake  them  the  instant  they 
saw  that  the  strengthening  of  the  central  government  and 
the  proportionate  consolidation  of  the  states  were  no  long 
er  a  theme  of  stimulating  discussion,  but  that  the  machin 
ery  was  already  at  work  to  effect  the  one  and  the  other. 
The  most  fanatical  assumed  the  lead;  men  for  whom  no 
weapon  was  too  blunt  or  brutal  so  long  as  they  could  use 
it.  Their  arguments  bordered  on  the  extremest  absurdity 
and  their  assumptions  might  have  excited  the  loudest 
merriment,  were  it  not  that  the  question  was  one  of  life  or 
death  to  the  nation.  All  the  bitter  experience  of  the  war, 
and  all  that  followed  on  its  close,  was  denied  and  ridiculed 
as  an  idle  phantom.  Out  of  the  proposed  constitution,  on 
the  other  hand,  its  most  harmless  provisions  not  excepted, 
the  same  phantom  was  conjured  up  day  after  day;  a  vague, 
indefinable  something,  to  which  a  name  understood  by 
everybody  was  applied,  that  of  "consolidated  government," 
which  meant  something  horrible  and  to  which  all  that 
had  hitherto  been  dear  to  Americans  must  fall  a  prey. 
The  same  Patrick  Henry  who,  at  the  outbreak  of  the 
Revolution,  declared  with  so  much  emphasis  that  he  was 
no  longer  a  Virginian,  but  an  American,  asserted  now 
with  equal  emphasis  that  under  the  articles  of  confedera 
tion  the  people  had  enjoyed  the  greatest  amount  of  secu 
rity  and  contentment,  and  that  by  the  resolution  to  alter 
the  constitution  this  happy  state  of  affairs  had  been  dis 
turbed  and  the  continuance  of  the  union  endangered.1 


1  "  I  consider  myself  as  the  servant  of  the  people  of  this  commonwealth, 
as  a  sentinel  over  their  rights,  liberty  and  happiness.  I  represent  their 
feelings  when  I  say  that  they  are  exceedingly  uneasy  at  being  brought 
from  that  state  of  full  security,  which  they  enjoyed,  to  the  present  delu 
sive  appearance  of  things.  A  year  ago,  the  minds  of  our  citizens  were 
at  perfect  repose.  Before  the  meeting  of  the  late  federal  convention  at 
Philadelphia,  a  general  peace  and  universal  tranquillity  prevailed  in  this 
country,  but  since  that  period  they  are  exceedingly  uneasy  and  disqui- 


56  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

To  obtain  a  victory  over  such  opponents,  was  no  easy 
matter.  In  several  of  the  states,  and  in  the  most  import 
ant,  the  particularists  constituted  a  majority  in  the  conven 
tions  which  eventually  had  to  decide  on  the  adoption  or 
rejection  of  the  constitution.  The  prospects  of  the  Feder 
alists  were,  therefore,  gloomy  in  the  highest  degree.  It  is 
impossible,  in  fact,  to  discover  more  than  one  reason  why 
the  latter  did  not  in  these  states,  immediately  after  the  re 
sults  of  the  elections  were  known  or  after  the  first  debates 
on  the  subject,  give  up  all  farther  struggle  as  useless.  The 
nature  of  their  weapons  was  not  such  as  to  inspire  them 
with  the  hope  of  overcoming  the  opposing  majority.  They 
fought  with  the  understanding  and  the  negative  results  of 
experience.  Under  ordinary  circumstances,  these  are  cer 
tainly  the  strongest  of  all  weapons.  But  the  edge  was 
taken  off  them  here,  for  the  particularists  had  not  come  to 
weigh,  to  examine  and  to  judge,  but  to  declaim  and  spread 
alarm.1  There  was  no  desire  to  be  governed  by  the  dictates 

eted.  When  I  wished  for  an  appointment  of  this  convention,  my  mind 
was  extremely  agitated  for  the  situation  of  public  affairs.  I  conceived 
the  republic  to  be  in  extreme  danger.  If  our  situation  be  thus  uneasy, 
whence  has  arisen  this  federal  jeopardy  ?  It  arises  from  this  fatal  sys 
tem;  it  arises  from  a  proposal  to  change  our  government — a  proposal 
that  goes  to  the  utter  annihilation  of  the  most  solemn  engagements  of  the 
states — a  proposal  of  establishing  nine  states  into  a  confederacy,  to  the 
eventual  exclusion  of  four  states.  It  goes  to  the  annihilation  of  those 
solemn  treaties  we  have  formed  with  other  nations."  Elliott,  Deb.,  III., 
p.  21.  Pendleton  sharply  replied:  "  If  the  public  mind  was  then  [be 
fore  the  meeting  of  the  federal  convention]  at  ease,  it  did  not  result  from 
a  conviction  of  being  in  a  happy  and  easy  situation;  it  must  have  been 
an  inactive,  unaccountable  stupor."  Ibid.,  III.,  p.  36. 

1  One  instance  will  illustrate  the  degree  of  insipidity  which  declama 
tion  had  reached  at  the  time.  In  the  Massachusetts  convention  a  cer 
tain  Nason  thus  gave  vent  to  his  feelings:  "And  here,  sir,  I  beg  the 
indulgence  of  this  honorable  body  to  permit  me  to  make  an  apostrophe 
to  liberty.  O  Liberty!  thou  greatest  good!  thou  fairest  property!  with 
thee  I  wish  to  live,  with  thee  I  wish  to  die !  Pardon  me  if  I  drop  a  tear 
on  the  peril  to  which  she  is  exposed ;  I  cannot,  sir,  see  the  brightest  of 
jewels  tarnished — a  jewel  worth  ten  thousand  worlds;  and  shall  we  part 
with  it  so  soon  ?  Oh,  no !"  Elliott,  Deb.,  II.,  p.  133. 


FEDERALIST    TKIUMPH.  57 

of  reason,  no  desire  to  learn  from  experience  at  the  expense 
of  the  complete  sovereignty  of  the  states  and  of  the  theories 
which  people  had  become  accustomed  to  invest  with  the 
character  of  unimpeachable  dogmas. 

This  assertion  seems  to  be  in  conflict  with  the  fact  that, 
the  constitution  was  finally  adopted,  although  in  several  of 
the  conventions  the  particularists  were  in  a  majority.  But 
the  question  was  not  one  of  will:  necessity  it  was  that  de 
cided  it.  It  was  this  which  prevented  the  Federalists  from 
ever  losing  courage  entirely,  and  which  ultimately  won 
over  a  sufficient  number  of  the  opposing  majority.  Madi 
son  and  several  other  members  of  the  Virginia  convention 
say  repeatedly,  in  their  letters,  that  they  were  in  the  mi 
nority  and  they  complain  yet  more  frequently  that  the  ma 
jority  would  not  be  persuaded.  And  yet  they  constantly 
returned  to  the  attack,  because  they  were  rightly1  convinced 
that  necessity  would  in  the  end  compel  even  Patrick  Hen 
ry  to  acknowledge  that  some  change  in  the  constitution 
was  inevitable.  But  when  this  much  was  gained,  it  was  to  be 
expected  that  at  least  some  of  the  particularists  would  further 
agree  that,  at  that  moment,  there  was  no  alternative  but 
to  renounce  the  idea  of  making  any  change  whatever  and 
leave  things  to  take  care  of  themselves,  or  to  accept  this 
constitution  unconditionally,  good  or  bad  as  it  might  be. 

This  calculation  of  the  Federalists  turned  out,  on  the 
whole,  to  be  right.  Rhode  Island,  indeed,  refused  to  call 
a  convention,  and  the  convention  of  North  Carolina  dis 
solved  without  giving  its  assent  to  the  constitution,2  al- 

1  Elliott,  Deb.,  III.,  p.  399  and  passim. 

8  By  184  to  84  votes.  Elliott,  Deb.,  IV.,  p.  251.  The  constitution  was 
not  adopted  by  North  Carolina  until  the  end  of  1789,  or  by  Rhode  Is 
land  until  the  middle  of  1790.  As  an  interesting  instance  of  the  length 
to  which  American  political  doctrinarians  of  the  period  extending  from 
the  time  of  the  Missouri  compromise  to  the  outbreak  of  the  civil  war, 
have  gone,  we  may  quote  the  assertion  of  Brownson  (The  American  Rep., 
p.  288) :  "  Hence,  if  nine  states  had  ratified  the  constitution,  and  the 
other  four  had  stood  out  and  refused  to  do  it,  which  was  within  their 


58  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

though  it  had  already  been  adopted  by  ten  states,  and  the 
confederation  was  in  the  meantime  dissolved.  In  Massa 
chusetts,  Virginia  and  New  York,  however,  the  reasons 
adduced  above  decided  the  issue  in  favor  of  the  Federalists, 
spite  of  the  fact  that  the  scales  wavered  to  the  very  last.1 
The  struggle  was  severest  in  New  York.2  But  fortunate 
ly  for  the  Federalist  party,  it  had  here  its  most  distin 
guished  advocate,  Alexander  Hamilton.3  For  a  time,  how 
ever,  it  seemed  as  if  the  obstinacy  of  the  anti-Federalists 
would  bid  defiance  to  everything.  Even  when  the  news 
came  that  the  ninth  state  had  ratified  the  constitution  and 
that  the  confederation  was  therefore  dead,  Smith  and  Lans 
ing  declared  that  their  counsels  should  by  no  means  be 
influenced  by  that  fact.4  They  felt  that  on  account  of  the 
geographical  situation  of  the  state,  it  was  scarcely  less  im- 

competency,  they  would  not  have  been  independent  sovereign  states, 
outside  of  the  Union,  but  territories  under  the  Union."  The  facts  that 
the  resolution  of  the  convention  made  the  constitution  binding  only 
on  those  states  that  would  ratify  it,  and  that  it  never  occurred  to  any 
one  to  look  upon  North  Carolina  and  Rhode  Island  as  territories  until 
they  should  adopt  the  constitution,  are  of  no  consequence  to  him.  The 
proposition  seems  to  him  a  logical  conclusion  of  his  general  theory  of 
the  relations  of  the  states  to  the  Union,  and  that  is  sufficient  for  him. 

1  The  constitution  was  adopted  in  Massachusetts  by  187  against  168 
votes,  in  Virginia  by  89  against  79,  and  in  New  York  by  30  against  27. 

3  When  Hamilton  was  asked  what  the  probable  decision  of  the  con- 
•  vention  would  be,  he  answered :  *'  God  only  knows:  several  votes  have 
been  taken  by  which  it  appears  that  there  are  two  to  one  against  it 
[the  constitution]. "  After  a  pause  he  added :  "  Tell  them  the  conven 
tion  shall  never  rise  until  the  constitution  is  adopted."  J.  C.  Hamilton, 
Hist,  of  the  American  Republic,  III.,  pp.  522,  523.  This  work  should  be 
read  with  great  caution ;  but  there  is  no  internal  evidence  in  the  case 
before  us  against  the  authenticity  of  this  anecdote. 

3  Jefferson,   Hamilton's  most  determined  opponent,  bears  him  this 
testimony :     "  Hamilton  is  really  a  colossus  to  the  anti-Republican  party; 
without,  numbers  he  is  a  host  in  himself.    In  truth  when  he  comes  for 
ward  there  is  nobody  but  yourself  [Madison]  that  can  meet  him."    Van 
Buren,  Political  Parties,  p.  124. 

4  Elliott,  Deb.,  II.,  pp.  324,  325. 


POSITION    OF    NEW    YORK.  5£ 

portant  to  the  Union  that  New  York  should  be  a  part  of  it 
than  it  was  to  New  York  that  she  should  be  a  part  of  the 
Union.  This  redoubled  their  efforts  to  push  the  opposi 
tion  to  the  extreme.1  The  territory  of  the  Union  would 
be  divided  into  two  unequal  parts  without  any  geographi 
cal  connection,  unless  New  York  became  a  part  of  it.  And 
the  broad,  as  yet  unsettled,  land  behind  it,  reaching  to  the 
St.  Lawrence  and  to  the  shores  of  Lake  Ontario  and  Lake 
Erie,  as  well  as  the  great  commercial  artery  of  the  Hudson, 
inspired  the  state  with  a  confidence  in  its  importance  and 
its  strength — elements  of  power  in  the  great  future  as  well 
as  in  the  present.  True,- people  were  always  somewhat  afraid 
of  a  disruption  of  the  Union,  it  mattered  not  how  loud  the 
rodomontades  that  freedom  should  be  sacrificed  at  no  price. 
But  they  considered  themselves  in  duty  bound  to  annex 
their  own  conditions  to  their  concurrence,  and  imagined 
for  a  long  time  that  they  would  be  not  only  justified  in 
forcing  them  upon  the  Union,  but  that  they  would  have 
the  power  to  do  so. 

The  idea  of  calling  another  general  convention  was  much 
discussed,  both  in  the  Philadelphia  convention  and  later  in 
all  the  states.  But  even  the  more  thoughtful  particular- 
ists  did  not  attempt  to  bring  this  about,  as  it  was  plain 
what  effect  such  a  step  would  produce.  As  all  the  more 
important  provisions  of  the  constitution  had  been  attacked 
in  the  Philadelphia  convention,  and  from  the  most  oppo- ' 
site  points  of  view,  it  was  certain  that  the  same  would 
have  been  the  case,  though  to  a  greater  extent,  in  a  general 
convention,  as  it  was  now  in  the  conventions  of  the  several 
states.  The  confusion  would  have  been  far  worse,  and  the 
discouraging  feeling  that  the  convention  had  proposed 
to  itself  an  impossible  task  in  the  highest  sense  of  the 
word,  would  soon  have  absorbed  all  minds,  because  the 
constituents  of  every  fraction  would  have  expected  or  de- 

1  Elliott,  Deb.,  II.,  p.  211. 


60  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

manded  the  complete  adoption  of  their  own  views  and 
principles.1  The  only  effect  would  have  been  to  increase 
the  evil  which  they  were  seeking  to  remove,  perhaps  to 
render  it  incurable  by  familiarizing  themselves  gradually 
with  the  thought  that  it  was  incurable. 

These  truths  were  so  obvious  that  the  idea  of  a  second 
general  convention  was  soon  surrendered,  and,  as  already 
mentioned,  another  means  of  escape  proposed.  In  Yir- 
ginia  the  particularists  had  already  declared  themselves 
ready  to  accept  the  constitution,  provided  certain  amend 
ments  to  it  were  adopted  beforehand.  This  had  called 
forth  a  very  exhaustive  debate.  As  the  Federalists  in- 
controvertibly  proved,  nothing  would  have  been  gained 
thereby,  so  that  a  rejection  of  the  constitution  was, 
under  such  circumstances,  to  be  preferred  to  its  adoption.2 
In  New  York  the  same  views  obtained.  The  proposition 
was  altered,  and  it  was  provided  that  the  constitution 
should  be  ratified  with  the  reservation  that,  in  case  the 
other  states  could  not  afterwards  be  won  over  to  the  amend 
ments  to  be  proposed,  those  which  had  approved  it  might 
leave  the  Union.  It  seemed  that  this  was  as  far  as  the 
particularists  could  be  induced  to  go.  Hamilton's  powers 
were  almost  exhausted.  In  a  moment  of  despondency  he 
wrote  to  Madison  and  asked  him  whether,  at  last,  it  was 
not  best  they  should  agree  to  the  hard  conditions.  Madi 
son  answered  that  such  a  ratification  would,  in  reality,  not 
make  New  York  a  member  of  the  Union,  and  that  the 
state  therefore  could  not  be  admitted  on  such  conditions.3 

1  South  Carolina  proposed  5  amendments  to  the  constitution,  Massa 
chusetts  9,  New  Hampshire  12,  Virginia  20,  Rhode  Island  21,  North 
Carolina  26,  New  York  33.  Madison  to  Stevenson,  Nov.  27,  1830. 
Elliott,  Deb.,  IV.,  p.  614.  These  figures  show  what  a  second  general 
convention  might  have  expected.  See  also  Washington's  Writings, 
IX.,  p.  319. 

a  Elliott,  Deb.,  III.,  pp.  25,  33,  93,  174,  194,  303,  304,  587,  591,  627- 
629,  830,  632,  643,  647,  649. 

*  "  I  am  sorry  that  your  situation  obliges  you  to  listen  to  propositions 


61 

Hamilton  then  bestirred  himself  once  more,  and  return 
ed  to  the  conflict  resolved  to  be  satisfied,  with  nothing 
short  of  a  complete  victory.  He  recognized  even  more 
than  Madison  the  whole  significance  of  a  conditional  rati 
fication.  The  constitution  would  have  lost  thereby  the 
character  of  a  fundamental  law  under  which  the  states 
placed  themselves.  But  the  leading  idea  of  the  Federalists 
in  Philadelphia  had  been  to  make  a  binding  law.  To  yield 
to  the  demands  of  the  particularists  would  have  been  to 
concede  that  they  considered  the  constitution  a  mere 
protocol,  an  agreement  dependent  upon  certain  definite 
conditions.  This  confession  involved  a  principle  by  which 
the  particularists  could  demonstrate  at  any  time  that  they 
had  the  right  to  dissolve  the  contract,  if  those  things  were 
not  done  which  they  might  afterwards  consider  to  be  further 
tacit  conditions  or  provisions,  arising  out  of  given  circum 
stances.  Had  they  succeeded  in  this,  they  would  have  won 
a  complete  victory.  Nothing  remained  to  the  Federalists 
but  to  allow  them  to  choose  between  unconditional  adoption 
and  unconditional  rejection.  This  was  the  alternative  pre 
sented  to  the  particularists.  And  when  it  became  clear 
that  this  was  the  only  alternative,  it  was  found  that  there 
was  enough  discretion  and  patriotism  left  to  cause  a  suffi 
cient  number  to  prefer  the  possible  evils  of  the  con- 

of  the  nature  you  describe.  My  opinion  is  that  a  reservation  of  the 
right  to  withdraw  if  amendments  be  not  decided  upon,  under  the 
forms  of  the  constitution,  within  a  certain  time,  is  a  conditional  ratifi 
cation  ;  that  it  does  not  make  New  York  a  member  of  the  new  Union, 
and  consequently  that  she  could  not  be  received  on  that  plan.  Compacts 
must  be  reciprocal ;  this  principle  would  not  in  such  a  case  be  preserved. 
The  constitution  requires  an  adoption  in  toto  and  forever.  It  has  been 
so  adopted  by  the  other  states.  An  adoption  for  a  limited  time  would 
be  as  defective  as  an  adoption  of  some  articles  only.  In  short,  any 
condition  whatever  must  vitiate  the  ratification.  .  .  .  The  idea  of 
reserving  a  right  to  withdraw  was  started  at  Richmond,  and  considered 
a»  a  conditional  ratification,  which  was  itself  abandoned  as  worse  than  a 
rejection."  Hamilton's  Works,  I.,  p.  465. 


62  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

stitution  to  leaving  the  Union,  as  there  was  found  in  the 
other  states  a  sufficient  number  who  preferred  these  same 
possible  evils  to  the  certain  dangers  attendant  on  a  second 
general  convention,  or  the  certain  ruin  consequent  upon  a 
continuation  of  the  old  confederation. 

When  we  consider  the  situation  of  the  thirteen  colonies. 
and  their  relations  to  one  another;  when  we  follow  the  de 
velopment  which,  in  consequence  of  this  situation  and 
these  relations,  their  political  affairs  and  political  theories 
received  during  the  revolutionary  war  and  the  following 
years;  and  endeavor  to  express  the  result  in  a  few  words,  we 
are  compelled  to  say  with  Justice  Story,  that  we  ought  to 
wonder,  not  at  the  obstinacy  of  the  struggle  of  1787  and 
1788,  but  at  the  fact  that,  despite  everything,  the  constitu 
tion  was  finally  adopted.1  The  simple  explanation  of  this 
is  that  it  was  a  struggle  for  existence,  a  struggle  for  the 
existence  of  the  United  States;2  and  that  after  the  dissolu 
tion  of  the  Philadelphia  convention  it  could  be  saved3  only 
by  the  adoption  of  the  proposed  constitution,  no  matter 
how  well  grounded  the  objections  that  might  be  made  to  it. 

The  masses  of  the  American  people  in  their  vanity  and 
too  great  self- appreciation  are  fond  of  forgetting  the  dread 
ful  struggle  of  1787  and  1788,  or  of  employing  it  only  as  a 
name  for  the  "  divine  inspiration"  which  guided  and  en- 

1  Comm.,  I.,  §  287. 

8  Washington  writes  to  Colonel  Lee :  "  In  our  endeavors  to  establish 
a  new  general  government,  the  contest,  nationally  considered,  seems  not 
to  have  been  so  much  for  glory  as  existence.  It  was  for  a  long  time 
'doubtful  whether  we  were  to  survive  as  an  independent  republic,  or  de 
cline  from  our  federal  dignity  into  insignificant  and  wretched  fragments 
of  empire."  Marshall,  Life  of  Wash.,  II.,  p.  130. 

8  "  I  will  only  say  as  a  further  opinion,  founded  on  the  maturest  de 
liberation,  that  there  is  no  alternative,  no  hope  of  alteration,  no  inter 
mediate  resting  place,  between  the  adoption  of  this  [constitution],  and  a 
recurrence  to  an  unqualified  state  of  anarchy  with  all  its  deplorable 
consequences."  Washington,  Feb.  7, 1788.  Writings,  IX.,  p.  319. 


THE   INSPIRATION    THEORY.  63 

'ightened  the  "  fathers"  at  Philadelphia.1  In  Europe  this 
view  of  the  case  has  been  generally  accepted  as  correct. 
Much  eloquence  has  been  lavished  in  laudation  of  the  "  is 
olated  fact  in  history,"  that  thirteen  states,  loosely  bound 
together  as  one  confederate  body,  did  not  see  in  the  sword 
the  only  engine  to  weld  together  their  political  machinery, 
which  was  falling  to  pieces,  but  met  in  peaceful  consulta 
tion  and  agreed  to  transform  a  confederacy  of  states  into  a 
federal  state  of  masterly  construction.  In  America  this  is 
an  inexhaustible  theme  for  Fourth-of- July  orations,  and  in 
Europe  it  is  only  too  frequently  used  as  a  text  for  doctrin 
arian  politico-moral  discussions.  With  history,  however, 
it  has  nothing  to  do.  The  historical  fact  is  that  "  the 
constitution  had  been  extorted  from  the  grinding  necessity 
of  a  reluctant  people." 

1  This  is  not  a  mere  idle  phrase ;  it  is  one  of  the  standing  formulas  in 
which  the  self-complacency  and  pride  of  a  people  who  esteem  themselves 
special  objects  of  the  care  of  the  Ruler  of  the  Universe,  find  expression 
We  reproduce  one  illustration  of  this,  out  of  a  whole  multitude:  In  the 
North  American  Review  (1862,  I.,  p.  160)  we  read :  "  Such  a  govern- 
ment  we  regard  as  more  than  the  expression  of  calm  wisdom  and  lofty 
patriotism.  It  has  its  distinctively  providential  element.  It  was  God's 
saving  gift  to  a  distracted  and  imperiled  people.  It  was  his  creative 
fiat  over  a  weltering  chaos :  '  Let  a  nation  be  born  in  a  day.'  " 


64  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND   SLAVERY. 


CHAPTEK  II. 

THE  WORSHIP  OF  THE  CONSTITUTION,  AND  ITS  REAL  CHAR 

ACTER. 

"Mr.  Cobb  the  other  night  said  it  [the  government  of  the 
Union]  had  proven  a  failure.  A  failure  in  what?  .  '../  . 
Why,  we  are  the  admiration  of  the  civilized  world,  and 
present  the  brightest  hopes  of  mankind.1  !Nb,  there  is  no 
failure  of  this  government  yet."2  In  these  words  Alexan 
der  H.  Stephens  expressed  his  judgment  concerning  the 
constitution  and  the  political  history  of  the  Union,  on  the 
eve  of  the  four  years'  civil  war.  Four  weeks  later  he  accept 
ed  the  position  of  vice-president  of  the  Confederate  States, 
a  position  which  he  retained  until  the  close  of  the  war.  A 
few  years  after  the  restoration  of  the  Union,  he  published 
a  comprehensive  treatise,3  which  is  at  once  an  emphatic 
reiteration  and  explication  of  that  declaration,  and  a  justi 
fication  of  the  rebellion,  as  well  as  of  his  personal  parti 
cipation  in  it. 

1  By  "  government"  is  not  here  meant  the  administration  of  the  time, 
but  the  whole  system  of  government  created  and  established  by  the 
constitution. 

3  Governor  Hamilton,  of  South  Carolina,  one  of  the  most  distinguished 
incitors  *  of  the  nullification  movement,  said,  after  his  nomination  as 
president  of  the  convention  of  1832,  which  issued  the  celebrated  nulli 
fication  ordinance :  "  Our  present  circumstances  are  a  commentary  on 
the  safety  and  beauty  of  our  constitution.  In  other  countries  we  should 
render  ourselves  obnoxious  to  the  charge  of  an  attempt  to  disturb  and 
change  the  very  elements  of  government.  Here  all  goes  on  with  tran 
quillity,  and  with  the  harmony  of  the  spheres  themselves."  Niles'  Reg 
ister,  XLIIL,  p.  219. 

*  A  Constitutional  View  of  the  late  War  between  the  States.    2  vols. 


CHANGE   IN    PARTY   TACTICS.  65 

Only  a  thorough  study  of  American  history  can  solve 
the  enigma  how  a  man  of  so  much  acuteness  as  a  thinker, 
and  of  so  much  intelligence,  one  who  has  spent  his  whole 
life  in  the  study  of  political  questions,  could  honestly  say 
that  his  views  and  his  actions  were  in  complete  harmony. 

Stephens  is  not  an  isolated  example  of  this  phenomenon. 
The  whole  American  people,  until  late  in  the  civil  war, 
were  entangled  in  the  error  which  lies  in  this  contradiction, 
and  according  to  all  appearances  it  will  be  a  long  time  be 
fore  they  will  free  themselves  from  it  entirely. 

It  devolved  upon  the  Federalists,  to  whose  efforts  it  is 
due  that  a  constitution  with  the  capacity  to  live  was  sub 
stituted  for  the  articles  of  confederation,  to  put  this  consti 
tution  in  operation.  Scarcely  had  they  so  far  accomplished 
this  as  to  make  the  people  fully  conscious  of  the  good  re 
sults  of  the  change,  when  the  government  passed  out  of  their 
hands  into  those  of  their  opponents,  to  continue  in  them 
unchallenged  for  many  years.  The  anti-Federalists  had 
changed  their  mode  of  warfare  in  a  degree  proportionate  to 
the  change  for  the  better  which  had  taken  place  in  every 
department  of  practical  life.  With  increasing  vehemence 
they  accused  the  Federalists  of  having  done  violence  to 
the  constitution  in  order  to  accomplish  their  own  ruinous 
designs.  But  their  unmeasured  denunciation  of  the  consti 
tution  itself  became  gradually  less  frequent  and  less  severe. 
It  was  not  long  before  they  directly  accused  the  Federal 
ists  of  traitorous  attacks  upon  it.  On  the  other  hand,  all 
the  horrible  shapes  which  they  had  conjured  up  during  the 
debates  of  1787  and  1788  had  now  disappeared.  And 
even  before  they  came  into  power  they  had  ceased  to  find 
fault  with  the  constitution.  It  became  their  chosen  stand 
ard  in  the  battle  they  were  waging  with  all  the  energy  of 
fanaticism  against  their  opponents. 

It  is  possible  for  us  to  trace  the  earliest  beginnings  of 
the  worship  of  the  constitution.  At  first  it  was  looked 
upon  as  the  best  possible  constitution  for  the  United  States. 
5 


i 

b6  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND   SLAVERY. 

By  degrees  it  came  to  be  universally  considered  as  a  mas 
terpiece,  applicable  to  every  country.  This  was  preached 
with  so  much  unanimity  and  honest  conviction,  although 
internal  quarrels  were  raging  all  the  time,  that  the  prop- 
agandism  of  the  new  faith  reached  even  to  Europe.  In 
the  United  States  this  conviction  grows  steadily  stronger, 
although  parties  not  only  differ  concerning  the  advisability 
of  certain  practical  provisions  of  the  constitution,  but 
have  been  from  the  first  diametrical^  opposed  to  one  an 
other  in  their  understanding  of  the  principles  on  which  it 
is  founded.  From  the  close  of  the  century,  that  is,  from 
the  time  when  the  opposing  principles  assumed  a  fixed 
form,  the  constitution  has  been  the  political  Bible  of  the 
people.  The  child  sucked  in  with  his  mother's  milk  the 
conviction  that  this  was  the  light  in  which  he  should  re 
gard  it.  The  paternal  sic  credo,  stat  fides  mea  pro  ratione, 
was  a  guaranty  for  the  rightfulness  of  this  conviction. 
What  should  be  deduced  from  the  constitution,  in  the  fu 
ture,  was  quite  another  matter.  The  wilder  the  war  ol 
tongues,  the  louder  the  cry  of  the  constitution  was  raised  on 
every  side,  and  the  more  energetically  did  every  one  swear 
not  to  deviate  from  it,  even  by  a  hair's  breadth.  For  four 
years  the  people  of  the  United  States  tore  one  another  to 
pieces  in  the  most  frightful  civil  war  recorded  in  history, 
each  camp  thinking,  in  the  best  of  faith,  that  it  was  fol 
lowing  the  standard  of  the  constitution.  The  time  will 
come  when  it  will  be  difficult  to  conceive  how  even  Europe, 
which  it  did  not  concern,  could,  in  view  of  the  seventy- 
five  years  of  contest  over  it,  have  so  universally  and  so  em 
phatically  united  in  the  non-critical  laudations  the  consti 
tution  has  received. 

To  rightly  estimate  the  degree  of  unconditional  admira 
tion  of  which  it  was  the  object,  and  to  what  an  extent  this 
admiration  influenced  the  political  thought  of  the  country, 
it  must  be  remembered  that  it  was  by  no  means  confined  to 
the  great  masses  of  the  people.  The  constitution  has  found 


LACK   OF   CRITICISM.  67 

many  learned  and  intelligent  commentators;  but  they  have 
all  considered  its  excellence  to  be  an  undoubted  and  univer 
sally  admitted  fact.  What  should  have  been  only  the  re 
sult  of  their  investigation,  they  made  the  premises  of  their 
arguments.  And  these  arguments  have  been  confined  to  the 
interpretation  and  to  the  bearings  of  the  separate  provisions 
of  the  constitution.  Much  ingenuity  has  been  spent  in  show 
ing  how  its  several  provisions  might  be  harmonized  with 
one  another  and  with  the  peculiar  ideas  of  their  authors  on 
the  nature  and  purpose  of  the  general  government.  There 
has  been  no  attempt  as  yet  to  consider  the  several  provi 
sions  as  parts  of  a  whole,  or  to  subject  the  whole  to  an  objec 
tive  critical  examination  in  the  light  of  history.  The  abler 
commentators,  like  Story,  have  now  and  then  been  forced 
upon  conclusions  from  which  it  is  but  one  step  to  such  a 
course  of  treatment.  But  they  have  never  carried  out 
their  chain  of  thought  to  that  extent.  They  always  break 
off  at  the  decisive  point,  and  proceed  to  the  next  question.1 

1  Still  less  has  been  accomplished  in  this  direction  by  the  strikingly 
small  number  of  European  writers  who  have  treated  of  the  United  States. 
They  content  themselves  as  a  rule  with  showing  the  excellence  of  the 
several  constitutional  provisions  in  an  intelligent  manner,  and  in  a  gen- 
eral  way.  Even  De  Tocqueville's  much-esteemed  book  is  of  this  char- 
acter,  so  far  as  it  treats  of  the  constitution  at  all.  Through  the  whole 
work  there  runs  a  vein  of  doctrinarianism  and  vagueness  which  is  ex 
ceedingly  misleading  to  superficial  minds.  The  whole  treatise  proves 
that  De  Tocqueville  had  never  thoroughly  studied  American  history; 
and  hence  it  is  that  it  bears  so  very  different  a  character  from  his  mas 
terly  works  on  French  history.  It  is  apparent  from  every  chapter  of  his 
book,  that  he  built  essentially  upon  what  he  saw,  or  thought  he  saw, 
during  his  comparatively  short  stay  in  America,  and  especially  upon 
what  Americans  told  him.  Spite  of  this,  however,  his  extraordinary 
endowments  permitted  him  to  cast  many  a  profound  glance  into  Amer 
ican  affairs  and  into  the  spirit  of  the  people.  But  history  has  shown 
that  many  of  the  most  important  points  escaped  him  altogether,  and 
that  in  others  his  judgment  was  exceedingly  erroneous.  His  work 
should  therefore  be  perused  with  great  caution.  It  is  of  no  importance 
that  the  Americans  are  lavish  in  praise  of  it.  It  is  cleverly  written,  and 
his  judgment  is  on  the  whole  so  favorable,  that  it  must  seduce  Ameri- 


68  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

This  is  not  the  place  to  go  into  a  thorough  investigation 
of  the  causes  which  led  all  classes  of  the  people  to  a  ven 
eration  for  the  constitution,  that  bore  at  once  the  character 
of  an  esteem  which  did  much  good  and  of  a  most  ruinous 
idolatry  in  which  the  idol  worshiped  was  themselves.  "We 
must  confine  ourselves  here  to  two  points  which  contributed 
largely  to  this  effect,  for  the  reason  that  they  seem  necessa 
ry  to  the  understanding  of  what  follows. 

The  origin  of  the  constitution  and  the  first  years  in  which 
it  did  so  much  for  the  good  of  the  people  by  producing  a 
radical  change  in  the  unhappy  situation  of  affairs  after  the 
war,  were  contemporaneous  with  the  adoption  or  invention 
of  political  or  party  principles.  The  political  reasoning 
of  the  school  which  gave  tone  to  the  time  started  out  with 
the  assumption  that  the  individual  was  a  monad  floating 
through  the  universe  and  governed  by  independent  laws 
inherent  in  himself,  not  a  member  of  a  given  society  into 
which  he  was  born.  The  consequence  was,  that  certain 
principles  resulting  from  this  mode  of  reasoning  were  sub 
stituted  for  actual  facts,  as  a  foundation  for  the  social  and 
economic  condition  which  it  was  sought  to  bring  about.  As 
the  basis  of  these  principles  was  discovered  in  human  na 
ture,  they  were  necessarily  declared  to  be  unchangeable  and 
applicable  to  all  times  and  to  every  people.  Their  tendency 
therefore  was,  on  the  one  hand,  to  destroy  the  existing  state 
of  things;  for  any  title  not  in  harmony  with  these  principles 
was  a  fraud  and  a  usurpation  and  was  denounced  as  a  weak 
and  damnable  species  of  commerce  with  the  injustice  of  a 
thousand  years.  But  on  the  other  hand,  to  adopt  this  phi 
losophy  would  be  to  declare  stagnation  the  natural  condi- 

cans  so  long  as  they  have  so  little  of  objectivity  in  judging  themselves. 
But  even  among  them  other  and  different  views  are  sometimes  heard. 
Thus  The  Nation,  a  very  ably  edited  weekly  journal,  says,  Oct.  17,  1872, 
p.  251,  in  an  article  on  Francis  Lieber:  "  He  could  not,  and  would  not 
if  tie  could,  write  a  brilliant,  superficial  [!j  and  attractive  work  like  De 
Tocqueville's  *  Democracy  in  America.'  " 


CANONIZING    THE    CONSTITUTION.  69 

tion  of  all  social  and  political  order.  If  the  principles  were 
to  be  unchangeable,  incapable  of  refinement  and  progress, 
there  would  be  no  possibility  of  development,  for  principles 
are  only  the  quintessence  of  the  aggregate  intellectual  and 
moral  knowledge  of  a  people  or  of  the  age,  reduced  to  the 
simplest  formula. 

We  have  already  seen  that  even  in  America,  at  the  out 
break  of  the  Revolution,  the  soil  was  prepared  for  a  sys 
tem  of  politics  based  on  absolute  principles.  The  French 
Revolution  caused  the  seed  to  germinate  here  more  rapidly 
and  luxuriantly  than  in  any  other  part  of  the  western  civil 
ized  world.  Men  played  now  with  systems  as  they  had 
formerly  with  foot  balls,  said  Chauncey  Goodrich.1  The 
desire  to  carry  out  these  principles  immediately  with 
all  their  practical  consequences — so  far  as  such  a  desire 
was  observable  in  the  United  States  at  all — was  soon  given 
up  in  many  respects.  But  for  this  very  reason  the  prin 
ciples  became  more  universal  and  assumed  the  shape  of 
theoretical  truths.  They  became  the  creed  of  the  public 
which  every  lover  of  freedom,  and  especially  every  repub 
lican,  was  obliged  to  profess.  Hence  it  was  obvious  that 
the  "  fathers"  must  have  been  either  their  earliest  advocates 
or  their  originators.  That  a  great  many  of  the  founders 
of  the  republic,  partly  through  their  own  experience  and 
partly  in  consequence  of  the  excesses  of  the  French  Revo 
lution,  recognized  the  deceptive  and  dangerous  vagueness 
of  these  political  dogmas,  had  no  effect  on  the  a  priori  con 
victions  of  the  masses  of  the  people.  Even  the  small  mi 
nority  of  the  more  intelligent  could  not  completely  free 
themselves  from  them. 

But  it  did  not  stop  here.  The  more  the  war  of  the  Rev 
olution  and  the  struggle  to  transform  the  Union  so  that  it 
might  live,  became  things  of  the  past,  the  thinner  the  long 
line  of  able  combatants  in  the  internal  and  external  strug- 

1  Gibbs,  Wolcott,  I.,  p.  130. 


70  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

gle  for  national  existence  grew,  the  more  dazzling  became 
the  light  in  which  the  people  viewed  that  whole  epoch  arid 
its  representatives.  It  mattered  not  how  many  or  how 
great  the  short-comings  which  sober  criticism  or  blind  par 
ty-spirit  had  discovered  in  all  these  personages — "Washing 
ton  to  a  certain  extent  excepted — the  "  fathers"  of  the 
republic  were  considered  as  an  isolated  historical  phenom 
enon  of  purity  of  motive  and  political  wisdom.  But  they 
had  embodied  the  sum  total  of  their  political  thought  arid 
political  experience  in  the  constitution.  The  latter  was, 
therefore,  the  culmination  of  the  "  storm  and  stress"  period 
of  the  young  republic,  and  these  absolute  political  princi 
ples  were  to  be  considered  as  its  firmest  foundation.  Both 
causes  co-operated  to  engrave  the  constitution  on  the  minds 
of  the  people,  and  it  gradually  assumed  there  the  character 
of  perfection.1 

The  second  element  which  contributed  to  lift  the  consti 
tution  as  a  whole  above  the  level  of  criticism  is  based  on 
deeper  causes.  Their  effects  have  been  farther  reaching 
and  of  longer  duration. 

It  is  impossible  to  even  hastily  turn  over  the  pages  of  the 
debates  of  congress  without  being  struck  by  a  very  impor 
tant  circumstance,  to  be  found  in  the  history  of  no  other 
constitutional  state.  Up  to  the  year  1861,  there  were  but 
few  important  laws  of  a  general  character  proposed  which, 
while  under  discussion,  were  not  attacked  as  unconstitu 
tional  by  the  minority.  The  arguments  are  scarcely  ever 
confined  to  the  worth  or  worthlessness  of  the  law  itself.  The 
opposition  in  an  extraordinarily  large  number  of  instances 
starts  out  with  the  question  of  constitutionality.  The  ex 
pediency  or  inexpediency  of  the  law  is  a  secondary  ques 
tion,  and  is  touched  upon  only  as  a  confirmation  of  that 
first  decisive  objection. 

1  Pomeroy  (An  Introduction  to  the  Constitutional  Law  of  the  United 
States,  p.  102)  writes,  in  1870:  "Our  fathers,  by  an  almost  divine  pro- 
science,  struck  the  golden  mean." 


CONSTITUTIONAL    CONTRADICTIONS.  71 

We  need  not  here  examine  how  honest  these  chronic 
constitutional  scruples  of  the  minority  for  the  time  being 
were.  It  is  sufficient  to  mention  the  fact  that  for  over 
seventy  years  all  parties  have  followed  these  tactics  when 
they  found  themselves  on  the  side  of  the  opposition.1  The 
bearing,  therefore,  of  all  the  general  provisions  of  the  con 
stitution,  and  even  of  its  separate  terms,  was,  in  the  course 
of  time,  determined  in  the  most  opposite  senses.  There 
were  a  number  of  persons  in  every  congress  observant 
enough  to  notice  this  fact.  But  they  never  followed  up 
the  question  far  enough  to  ascertain  whether  this  phenom 
enon  was  not  to  be  accounted  for  in  part  by  a  fundamental 
defect  in  the  constitution  itself.  This  would  not  have  been 
the  case,  were  it  not  that  their  thought  on  the  matter  was 
under  some  heavy  pressure  from  without. 

As  the  country  became  more  democratic,  men  distin 
guished  in  politics  became  less  and  less  the  political  lead 
ers  of  the  people.  They,  indeed,  apparently  claimed  that 
position,  but  in  fact  they  went  along  with  the  stream, 
concerned  only  to  swim  at  the  head.  Men  really  inde 
pendent  in  thought  or  action  by  degrees  appeared  more 
rarely  in  congress  and  among  politicians  outside  of  it.2 

The   idea  of  representation  lost  its   original  and   only 

1  We  read  in  an  article  in  the  Nation,  Nov.  7th,  1872,  (No.  384,  p.  300) : 
"  In  spite  of  its  supposed  [ !]  precision,  and  its  subjection  to  judicial 
construction,  our  constitution  has  always  been  indirectly  made  to  serve 
the  turn  of  that  sort  of  legislation  which  its  friends  call  progressive 
and  its  enemies  call  revolutionary,  quite  as  effectively  as  though  congress 
had  the  omnipotence  of  parliament.  The  theory  of  latent  powers  to 
carry  out  those  granted  has  been  found  elastic  enough  to  satisfy  almost 
any  party  demands  in  time  of  peace,  to  say  nothing  of  its  enormous  ex- 
tensions  in  time  of  war."  Since  the  end  of  the  civil  war  admissions 
of  this  nature  are  found  more  frequently,  a  happy  sign  of  progress  to 
wards  a  clearer  judgment  among  thinking  people. 

3  Hamilton,  as  early  as  1800,  writes  to  King :  "  In  the  two  houses  ot 
congress  we  have  a  decided  majority.  But  the  dread  of  unpopularity 
is  likely  to  paralyze  it."  Hamilton,  Works,  VI.,  p.  416. 


72  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY    AND    SLAVERY. 

justifiable  character,  and  was  prostituted  to  this,  that  rep 
resentatives  should  be  the  mere  mouthpieces  of  their  im 
mediate  constituents.1  In  particulars  it  was  necessary  to 
leave  them  sufficient  room,  but  the  unripe  political  notions, 
the  preconceived  opinions,  the  vague  instincts,  the  arbi 
trary  sympathies  and  antipathies  of  the  majority  of  these 
constituents,  became  the  sub-structure  of  their  labors.  From 
the  beginning  of  "Washington's  administration,  Jefferson's 
adherents  preached  that  the  maxim  vox  populi,  vox  del 
was  a  theoretical  truth  applicable  under  all  circumstances. 
By  degrees  it  became  the  actual  rule  of  politicians,  until 
finally  it  would  have  been  considered  not  only  folly,  but  a 
crime  against  the  spirit  of  republican  institutions,  to  de 
fend  one's  own  dissenting  opinion  against  the  vox  populi, 
once  it  had  pronounced  with  any  degree  of  definiteness  on 
a  given  proposition.  Idealistic  doctrinarianism  and  dem- 
agogism  had  begun  the  work;  the  moral  cowardice  and 
pusillanimous  self-interest  of  politicians  continued  it,  until 
finally  it  seldom  occurred  that  even  morally  strong  and 
independent  thinkers  approached  questions  of  the  nature 
mentioned  above  in  a  skeptical  spirit,  or  that  they  consid 
ered  them  as  questions  at  all.  The  tendency  to  the  crea 
tion  of  political  dogmas  kept  pace  with  the  development 
of  democracy. 

At  the  head  of  all  these  dogmas — those  of  natural 
rights  and  the  social  contract  in  part  excepted — stood  the 
supremacy  of  the  constitution.  Only  a  few,  like  Macon  of 
North  Carolina,  whose  independence  savored  of  affectation, 
ventured  to  preserve  the  tone  in  which  they  had  spoken  in 

1  This  tendency  was  very  evident,  even  in  the  debates  of  !N"ov.,  1791, 
when  the  proportion  of  representatives  was  fixed.  See  especially  the 
speech  of  Page,  of  Virginia.  Benton's  Abridgment  of  the  Debates  of 
Congress,  I.,  p.  325.  The  same  may  be  said  of  the  debate  on  the  as 
sumption  by  the  Union  of  the  debts  contracted  by  the  states  during  the 
revolutionary  war.  Benton,  I.,  passim. 


CHANGE    IN   FEDERALIST    FEELING.  73 

1787  and  1788.1  The  opposition  of  the  anti-Federalists,  as 
already  remarked,  now  took  the  form  of  a  pretended  strug 
gle  for  the  constitution.2  Experience  soon  taught  the 
leaders  that  these  tactics  would  insure  them  the  readier 
and  more  energetic  support  of  the  masses  of  the  people. 
When  the  opposition  had  assumed  this  tone  it  was  difficult 
for  the  Federalists  not  to  assume  it  also.  At  first,  part  of 
them  took  the  position  which  Hamilton  had  taken,  and 
saw  in  the  constitution  the  best  that  could  he  accomplished 
under  the  circumstances  of  the  time;  and  others  professed 
themselves  satisfied  because  it  was  free  from  the  essential 
defects  of  the  articles  of  confederation.  They  were  far  re 
moved  from  unconditional  admiration.  Their  entire  strug 
gle  for  its  ratification  bore  the  mark  of  a  defense  against 
unjust  attacks.  They  lavished  relatively  little  direct  praise  on 
the  constitution;  and  when  they  did,  it  was  most  frequently 
in  the  shape  of  a  comparison  with  the  articles  of  confeder 
ation.3  Only  with  reluctance  did  the  Federalists  surrender 
this  reserved  attitude.  But  they  could  not  entirely  resist 
the  pressure.  Their  adherents  among  the  masses  of  the 
people  were  not  able  to  understand  how  they  could  continue 
cool  critics  of  the  constitution  they  had  planned,  the 
adoption  of  which  was  due  solely  to  their  efforts,  while 

1  Fisher  Ames  writes  to  Wolcott,  Sept.  2,  1795 :  "  Some  opinions  are 
general  and  well  established:  admiration  of  our  constitution  and  gov 
ernment,"  etc.  Gibbs,  Mem.  of  Wolcott,  I.,  p.  229. 

3  The  Virginia  and  Kentucky  resolutions  were  the  first  official  decla 
ration  of  principles  on  which  the  doctrine  of  state  rights  was  built.  We 
quote  from  the  Virginia  resolutions:  "Resolved,  That  the  general  as- 
sembly  of  Virginia  doth  unequivocally  express  a  firm  resolution  to 
maintain  and  defend  the  constitution  of  the  United  States."  And  later: 
"  That  the  good  people  of  the  commonwealth,  having  ever  felt  and  con 
tinuing  to  feel  .  .  .  the  most  scrupulous  fidelity  to  that  constitution, 
which  is  a  pledge  of  mutual  friendship  and  the  instrument  of  mutual 
happiness."  In  like  manner,  the  Kentucky  resolutions  declare  that  the 
state  "  is  sincerely  anxious  for  its  [the  constitution's]  preservation." 

1  Wash's.  Writ.,  IX.,  pp.  318,  319. 


74  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

the  anti-Federalists  were  preparing  a  shrine  for  it  on  the 
high  altar  of  the  temple  of  freedom. 

A  problem  of  this  kind  was  then,  and  would  be  to-day, 
of  much  greater  practical  significance  in  the  United  States 
than,  for  instance,  in  England  or  in  Germany ;  because  in 
some  respects  the  political  thought  of  Americans  is  much 
more  superficial  and  immature.  In  political  questions  of 
a  concrete  nature,  the  Americans  are  on  an  average  more 
competent  judges  than  any  people  on  the  continent  of 
Europe.1  The  political  institutions  of  the  country,  its 
social  and  especially  its  economic  relations,  educate  them 
from  the  cradle  to  independent  thought  on  all  questions 
involving  material  interests,  and  encourage  them  to  sum 
mon  their  whole  intellectual  strength  lor  their  solution. 
But  in  the  wearing  struggles  of  daily  life  new  problems 
of  this  character  continually  arise,  and  almost  exhaust  their 
intellectual  strength.  Their  energy  of  mind  is  not  in 
consequence  great  enough  to  give  much  depth  to  their 
thoughts  on  political  problems  of  a  general  nature.  The 
disposition  towards  generalization  is  sufficiently  developed, 
but  their  observations  are  neither  various,  nor  long,  nor  re 
liable  enough  to  warrant  inductions  of  any  real  value.  Half- 
true  and  vague  ideas  are  therefore  raised  by  them  to  the 
dignity  of  unimpeachable  principles.  These  are  appealed  to 
on  every  occasion,  so  that  they  rapidly  rise  to  the  dignity 
of  sovereign  laws.  And  the  more  they  assume  this  charac 
ter,  the  stronger  does  the  conviction  become  rooted  that 
they  are  the  stars  by  which  the  ship  of  state  should  be 
steered.  The  further  the  idea  of  democracy  was  push 
ed,  first  in  theory  and  then  in  practice,  the  more  did 
the  doctrine  of  the  equality  of  all  men  become  perverted 

1  The  masses  of  the  population  in  the  southern  states  are  here  excepted. 
Slavery  has  in  this,  as  in  all  other  respects,  produced  an  abnormal  state 
of  affairs.  Neither  do  we  here  include  adopted  citizens,  although  in 
the  upper  strata  they  very  soon  become  assimilated,  so  far  as  this  mat 
ter  is  concerned,  to  the  native  Americans. 


A   NATIONAL    FETISH.  75 

in  the  minds  of  the  masses  into  the  equal  capacity  of 
all  men  to  decide  on  political  questions  of  every  kind. 
The  principle  of  mere  numbers  steadily  gained  ground. 

The  political  philosophy  of  the  masses  was  comprised  in 
these  vague  maxim?.  They  clung  to  them  with  all  the 
self-complacent  obstinacy  of  the  lowest  and  most  numerous 
body  of  the  working  classes.  They  were  nowhere  more 
sensitive  than  here.  Whoever  desired  their  favor  dared 
not  touch  this  idol  of  theirs,  and  could  scarcely  ignore 
it  unpunished.  The  fetish  had  been  raised  up  for  the 
worship  of  the  masses  by  their  leaders,  and  the  masses  in 
turn  compelled  their  leaders  to  fall  down  and  adore  it. 
Under  no  form  of  government  is  it  so  dangerous  to  erect  a 
political  idol  as  in  a  democratic  republic;  for  once  erected, 
it  is  the  political  sin  against  the  Holy  Spirit  to  lay  hands 
upon  it. 

The  history  of  the  United  States  affords  the  strongest 
and  most  varied  proof  of  these  assertions.  Not  only  the 
quarrels  of  1787  and  1788,  but  also  the  circumstances  un 
der  which  the  constitution  originated,  would  have  inclined 
one  to  believe  anything  rather  than  that  the  constitution 
would  be  chosen  as  the  chief  idol  of  the  people. 

The  brilliant  contrast  it  presents  to  the  articles  of  con 
federation  is  not  a  sufficient  explanation  of  this,  not  even 
if  it  were  granted  that  the  extraordinary  economic  pros 
perity  of  the  country  was  due  to  it  to  the  unmeasured 
extent  claimed  by  Americans  themselves.1 

The  current  view  places  the  labors  of  the  Philadelphia 
convention  in  a  totally  false  light,  but  the  difficulties  that 
convention  had  to  surmount  were  so  great  that  they  can 
scarcely  be  exaggerated.  The  conflict  of  views  and  of  real  or 

"  It  is  to  be  feared  we  have  grown  giddy  with  good  fortune ;  attrib 
uting  the  greatness  of  our  prosperity  to  our  wisdom  rather  than  to  a 
course  of  events  and  a  guidance  over  which  we  had  no  influence." 
Quincy  in  the  house  of  representatives,  April  19,  1808.  Benton's  Deb, 
of  Congress,  III.,  p.  700. 


76  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY    AND    SLAVERY. 

supposed  interests  was  too  great  to  permit  of  even  an  appar 
ent  reconciliation  between  them  by  any  formula  consistent 
with  the  theories  of  the  time.  A  reconciliation  was,  on 
the  other  hand,  a  question  of  life  or  death  to  all  sections  of 
the  people.  It  therefore  became  imperative  that  mutual 
sacrifices  should  be  made  at  every  step,  and  this  not  only 
in  principles,  but  also  in  theories;  that  is,  both  sides 
were  compelled,  by  making  concessions  at  variance  with 
their  principles,  to  be  untrue  to  their  ideal.  The  final 
result  could  not  in  consequence  be_a  harmonious  whole, 
complete  in  itself.  The  most  that  could  be  accomplished 
was  a  certain  amount  of  reconciliation,  the  eifect  of  which 
was  the  prevention  of  the  dissolution  of  the  Union  and 
the  creation  of  a  federal  power  with  the  character  of  a  fed 
eral  government  to  such  an  extent  that  by  it  the  possibil 
ity  of  the  growth  of  the  members  of  the  federation  into 
one  consistent  whole  was  secured.1 

A  model  constitution — so  far  as  it  is  allowable  at  all  to 
speak  of  such  a  one — would  have  done  poor  service  for 
the  United  States.  Besides  it  is  very  probable  that  it 
would  not  have  been  ratified.  .But  if  it  had  been  adopted, 
it  would  not  have  lasted  long,  for  the  reason  that  it  was  not 
at  all  in  harmony  with  the  actual  condition  of  affairs. 

It  was  necessary  that  the  constitution  should  be  highly 
elastic  in  its  nature.  Its  terms  must  be  susceptible  of 

1  The  originators  of  the  constitution  were  conscious  at  the  completion 
of  their  work  that  they  had  accomplished  no  more.  They  say  in  their 
communication  to  congress,  which  accompanied  the  constitution :  "In  all 
our  deliberations  on  this  subject  we  kept  steadily  in  our  view  that  which 
appeared  to  us  the  greatest  interest  of  every  true  American — in  which  is 
involved  our  prosperity,  felicity,  safety,  perhaps  our  national  existence. 
This  important  consideration,  seriously  and  deeply  impressed  on  our 
minds,  led  each  state  in  the  convention  to  be  less  rigid  in  points  of  in 
ferior  magnitude  [?  !]  than  might  have  been  otherwise  expected,  and 
thus  the  constitution  which  we  now  present  is  the  result  of  amity  and  of 
that  mutual  deference  and  concession  which  the  peculiarity  of  our 
political  situation  rendered  indispensable."  Elliot,  Deb.,  I.,  p.  305. 


POSSIBLE    DISSOLUTION.  77 

great  extension  or  contraction  of  meaning,  according  to 
the  want  of  the  moment.  A  more  brittle  bond  would  in 
fallibly  be  broken.  This  is  not  a  matter  of  speculation. 
The  whole  history  of  the  United  States,  from  1789  to  1861, 
demonstrates  it. 

Almost  from  the  very  day  on  which  the  new  order  of 
things  was  inaugurated,  the  conflict  between  the  opposing 
tendencies  broke  out  anew,  and  before  the  close  of  the 
century  it  attained  a  degree  of  violence  which  suggested 
very  serious  fears.  The  thought  of  the  dissolution  of  the 
Union  was  current  among  both  parties.  In  accordance 
with  their  whole  political  tendency  the  anti-Federalists 
permitted  themselves  to  be  urged  on  more  frequently  and 
more  easily  to  conceive  of  taking  such  extreme  steps.  But 
even  in  the  speculations  of  the  Federalists  on  the  future, 
this  constituted  an  element  which  was  taken  into  consid 
eration  with  other  contingencies.  It  is  indeed  true  that 
it  was  frequently  only  by  vain  threats  that  the  minority 
sought  to  exert  a  pressure  on  the  majority.  The  view 
which  afterwards  became  gradually  more  general,  that 
during  the  first  years  of  the  existence  of  the  republic 
the  thought  of  separation  was  never  seriously  entertained, 
is  a  historical  misrepresentation  made  in  the  interests  of 
party.  Until  the  first  part  of  the  nineteenth  century,  the 
dissolution  of  the  Union  was  a  standing  element  in  politi 
cal  speculation;  and  both  previous  to  and  after  that  pe 
riod,  it  was  repeatedly  considered  possible  and  even  prob 
able  in  moments  of  excitement,  by  either  party,  that  it 
would  be  necessary  to  resort  to  this  radical  remedy. 

Were  it  not  that  the  letter  of  the  constitution  permitted 
all  parties  to  verge  upon  the  actual  dissolution  of  the 
Union,  without  feeling  themselves  responsible  for  a  breach 
of  the  constitution,  it  is  likely  that  long  before  1861,  a 
serious  attempt  in  that  direction  would  have  been  made. 
Thanks  to  this  circumstance,  however,  the  danger  of  ruin- 


78  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND   SLAVERY. 

ous  liaste  was  considerably  lessened.  Time  was  given  to 
passion  to  abate  its  intensity,  and  with  every  day's  delay 
the  probability  increased  that  all  parties  would  become  con 
scious  of  the  preponderance  of  their  common  interests  over 
those  which  were  divergent.  When  the  opposing  party 
yielded  in  the  slightest  particular,  there  was  always  offered 
the  possibility  of  a  return  to  the  right  path  before  the  de 
cisive  step  was  taken.  In  the  meantime,  the  prejudices 
and  customs,  the  diversity  of  which  Nathan  Strong  had 
designated  as  the  greatest  obstacle  in  the  way  of  a  rational 
regulation  of  national  affairs,1  became  assimilated  to  one 
another,  at  least  in  some  respects.  Commerce,  social  in 
tercourse  and  custom  created  hew  material,  intellectual 
and  moral  bonds,  which  gradually  rendered  a  breach  more 
difficult. 

But  contemporaneously  with  this,  and  from  the  very 
first,  the  material  and  irreconcilable  differences  that  existed 
grew  more  marked.  Yet  the  constitution  afforded  such  a 
field  for  a  war  of  words,  and  the  field  was  so  readily 
taken,  that  in  the  northern  states,  which  were  rapidly  be 
coming  united  in  all  their  interests,  the  erroneous  view 
began  to  obtain  currency  in  the  third  decade  of  this  cen 
tury  that  all  difficulty  would  end  in  a  war  of  tongues. 
There  was  something  of  a  correct  instinct  at  the  founda 
tion  of  this  disastrous  and  foolish  notion.  While  the  "  ir- 
repressibleness"  of  the  conflict  became  clearer  year  after 
year,  the  ambiguous  nature  of  the  constitution  became 
apparent  in  an  equal  degree.  The  field  became  gradually 
broader  and  more  inviting  to  a  tournament  of  words; 
and  the  extraordinary  dilatability  of  the  boundaries  post 
poned  the  moment  of  the  breach.  It  became  possible  in 
the  more  populous  and  wealthy  half  of  the  Union,  which 
was,  morally  and  intellectually,  the  more  highly  developed, 
to  build  up  such  a  solidarity  of  interests  and  for  the  people 

1  Gibbs,  Memoirs  of  Wolcott,  I.,  p.  40. 


ORIGIN    OF    NULLIFICATION.  79 

to  realize  the  existence  of  this  solidarity  of  interests  to  such 
an  extent  that  they  were  enabled,  by  an  appeal  to  the 
sword,  to  decide  the  one  great  question  as  to  the  nature  of 
the  Union, — a  question  to  which,  from  the  terms  of  the 
constitution,  no  certain  answer  had  ever  before  been  given, — 
and  to  find  a  solution  of  it  in  harmony  with  the  progres? 
of  civilization  and  the  best  good  of  the  whole  country. 

These  views  are,  to  a  great  extent,  very  different  from 
those  prevalent  on  the  subject;  but  they  must  accord  with 
historical  truth,  for  only  in  such  case  is  the  political  his 
tory  of  the  United  States  at  all  rational  or  intelligible. 

Calhoun  and  his  disciples  were  not  the  authors  of  the 
doctrine  of  nullification  and  secession.  That  question  is 
as  old  as  the  constitution  itself,  and  has  always  been  a 
living  one,  even  when  it  has  not  been  one  of  life  and  death. 
Its  roots  lay  in  the  actual  circumstances  of  the  time,  and 
the  constitution  was  the  living  expression  of  these  actual 
circumstances. 


80  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY    AND    SLAVERY. 


CHAPTEE  III. 
THE  INTERNAL  STRUGGLES  DURING  WASHINGTON'S  Two  AP~ 

MINISTRATIONS.     ALEXANDER    HAMILTON.     THE  FlRST  Dff- 

BATE  ON  THE  SLAVERY  QUESTION.  INFLUENCE  OF  THE 
FRENCH  REVOLUTION.  CONSOLIDATION  OF  PARTIES  AND 
GRADUAL  INTENSIFICATION  OF  GEOGRAPHICAL  DIFFER 
ENCES. 

The  constitution  had  gone  into  operation  in  1789,  and 
as  early  as  1790  the  consolidating  influences  of  the  firmer 
government  seemed  so  bnrthensome  and  dangerous  a  load, 
that  the  anti-Federalists  began  to  grow  restless  under  the 
yoke,  and  to  long  for  the  loose  mariagement  of  affairs 
that  had  existed  under  the  confederation.  The  more  nearly 
the  measures  of  the  administration  and  of  the  majority  of 
congress  became  parts  of  a  system  planned  with  a  really 
statesmanlike  mind,  the  firmer  the  organization  of  the 
opposition  became  and  the  more  did  its  resistance  assume 
the  character  of  one  based  on  principle. 

The  Federalists  had  not  expected  this,  although  they  must 
have  been  prepared  for  it  after  the  struggle  over  the  ratifi 
cation  of  the  constitution. 

"Washington  fell  a  victim  to  the  illusion  that  it  was  pos 
sible  to  bring  about  the  harmonious  co-operation  of  all  the 
forces  of  the  country.  All  that  was  needed,  he  thought, 
was  to  convince  the  opposition  that  the  administration  had 
nothing  but  the  best  interests  of  the  country  at  heart  and 
the  desire  to  do  full  justice  to  them.  This  illusion  caused 
him  to  take  a  step  which  was  accompanied  at  first  by 
good  results,  but  which,  in  the  course  of  time,  contributed 


JEFFEKSON    AND    HAMILTON.  81 

a  great  deal  to  intensify  the  internal  conflicts  during  his 
administration. 

The  construction  of  the  Union  had  undergone  so  radical 
a  transformation  that  when  the  new  order  of  things  first 
went  into  operation,  there  were  no  organized  opposing  par 
ties  in  the  field.  As  a  matter  of  course,  future  parties 
were  necessarily  divided  on  the  same  questions  which  in 
the  struggle  for  the  constitution  had  been  looked  upon  as 
the  principles  at  issue  between  its  advocates  and  oppo 
nents.  By  the  adoption  of  the  constitution  the  theoretical 
struggle  was  temporarily  ended,  but  before  it  attained  a 
fixed  concrete  form  in  practical  politics,  it  was  necessary 
that  some  time  should  elapse.  In  the  first  place,  there  were 
in  congress  and  among  the  people  only  divergent  political 
tendencies.  How,  when,  and  to  what  extent,  these  should 
grow  into  differences  or  become  consolidated  in  party 
platforms  was  a  matter  necessarily  dependent  upon  cir 
cumstances. 

"Washington's  endeavor  was  not  only  to  look  upon  the 
nation  as  the  sole  party,  but  also  to  exercise  his  influence, 
wherever  he  legitimately  could,  to  cause  the  same  feeling 
to  prevail  over  the  agitations  of  incipient  party  spirit. 
Whether  he  was  guided  by  this  desire,  and  to  what  extent, 
in  the  selection  of  the  members  of  his  cabinet,  cannot  be 
certainly  determined.  Jefferson  had  been  in  Paris  when 
the  question  of  the  adoption  or  rejection  of  the  constitu 
tion  was  pending,  and  if  he  expressed  any  doubt  concern 
ing  its  value,  he  took  no  decided  stand  in  reference  to  it 
when  he  entered  the  cabinet  as  secretary  of  state.  This 
much,  however,  was  certain,  that  he  was  a  great  deal  more 
inclined  to  the  views  of  the  opponents  of  the  constitution 
than  to  those  of  Hamilton,  who  was  assigned  to  the 
secretaryship  of  the  treasury.  If,  therefore,  it  cannot 
be  claimed  that  Washington  purposely  confided  the  two 
most  important  positions  in  his  cabinet  to  men  who 
were  the  political  antipodes  of  one  another,  it  is  most 
6 


82  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY    AND    SLAVERY. 

probable  that  it  occurred  to  him,  from  the  very  first,  that 
they  would  not  be  representatives  of  the  same  political 
views  when  the  diverging  tendencies  should  begin  to  de 
velop  themselves  into  definite  party  programmes.  That 
this  was  not  a  reason  in  his  mind  against,  but  rather  in 
favor  of,  their  choice,  is  obvious  frOm  his  almost  anxious 
efforts  to  prevent  the  collapse  of  the  cabinet  when  the  gen 
esis  of  parties  was  complete  and  the  two  secretaries  had 
become  political  antipodes.  The  result  of  these  efforts  only 
proved  that  the  hope  with  which  he  entered  on  his  presi 
dential  career  was  an  idealistic  dream.  In  certain  cases, 
Washington  could,  indeed,  effect  a  compromise,  but  to 
reconcile  contradictions  by  his  own  independence  of  party 
was  as  much  beyond  the  domain  of  possibility  as  the  pre 
vention  of  parties  themselves. 

"Washington  was  extraordinarily  well  fitted  to  play  the 
part  of  a  mediator.  It  is  a  matter  of  wonder  that  he  was 
able  to  hold  his  heterogeneous  cabinet  together  so  long. 
But  even  he  was  able  to  do  so  only  for  a  time  and 
apparently.  He  himself  was  compelled  more  and  more 
to  surrender  his  position  in  relation  to  parties.  In  a 
democratic  state,  the  executive  cannot  long  preserve  sys 
tematically  and  on,  principle  the  character  of  a  mediator, 
when  there  is  not  at  the  same  time  a  compromise  party 
among  the  people.  Washington  was  convinced  of  the 
necessity  of  prosecuting  a  systematic  policy,  and  the  heads 
of  his  council  were  the  chief  representatives  of  different 
systems,  whose  differences  events  were  daily  making 
stronger  and  more  marked.  The  anti-Federalists  be 
came  the  declared  opponents  of  the  internal  and  external 
policy  of  the  president,  and  Jefferson  their  recognized 
leader.  The  attempts  at  mediation  had  no  effect  but  to  post 
pone  the  formal  declaration  of  the  war  which,  as  a  matter 
of  fact  had  been  waged  since  1791  between  the  two  secre 
taries  as  openly  as  in  congress.  The  prize  was  not  worth 
the  breaking  of  the  staff  which  ought  to  be  the  most  im- 


83 

mediate  and  the  absolutely  reliable  support  of  every 
president. 

The  anti-Federalists  did  not  permit  the  administration  to 
remain  a  moment  in  doubt  that  they  held  fast  to  the  maxim 
which  declared  mistrust  of  the  government  to  be  the  cor 
ner-stone  of  freedom.  "Wherever  they  found  the  least 
positive  ground  of  mistrust,  there  they,  too,  were  to  be 
found  holding  up  the  most  sombre  picture  which  their  ex 
cited  imaginations  could  suggest,  precisely  as  they  had 
done  in  their  efforts  against  the  ratification  of  the  consti 
tution.  The  burthen  of  their  speeches  was  no  longer  the 
danger  to  the  liberty  of  the  individual,  but  to  the  rights 
of  the  states,  which  were  threatened  on  every  side. 
Every  question  was  treated  with  direct  reference  to  state 
sovereignty.  The  more  the  legal  consolidation  of  the 
Union  became  an  accomplished  fact,  the  greater  was  the 
reaction  of  particularistic  tendencies  against  the  increased 
pressure.  The  mere  fact  of  the  adoption  of  the  constitu 
tion  could  not  at  once  change  the  real  state  of  affairs  or 
the  modes  of  thought  of  the  people.  Nothing  but  time 
could  operate  any  change  in  these  two  most  essential  fac 
tors.  To  begin  with,  the  preponderance  of  particularistic 
tendencies  was  still  great  enough  to  afford,  from  the  very 
first,  the  strongest  proof  of  Hamilton's  assertion  that  this 
constitution  was  the  least  which,  spite  of  the  actual  condi 
tion  of  things  and  the  mode  of  thought  of  the  people, 
could  hold  the  Union  together.1 

Hamilton  had  recognized,  and  rightly,  that  the  govern 
ment  should,  first  of  all,  direct  its  attention  to  the  question 
of  finance.  The  Federalists  shared  his  conviction  that  noth 
ing  would  have  so  much  influence  in  confirming  the  new 
order  of  things  as  his  financial  projects.  There  were  some 
even  who  believed  that  the  continued  existence  of  the 

1 "  I  propose  ....  to  discuss  the  necessity  of  a  government  at 
least  equally  energetic  with  the  one  proposed,  to  the  attainment  of  this 
project  [the  preservation  of  the  Union]."  The  Federalist,  No.  I. 


84:  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND   SLAVERY. 

Union  depended  upon  their  adoption.1  This  may  have  been 
going  too  far;  but  it  is  certain  that  no  other  measure  of 
the  federal  government  contributed  in  even  an  approximate 
degree  to  the  actual  consolidation  of  the  Union. 

The  unconcealed  contempt  with  which  the  European 
powers  looked  down  upon  the  United  States  was  keenly 
felt  by  the  American  people.  But  the  good  opinion  of 
foreign  countries  could  be  regained  only  on  condition 
tnat  the  credit  of  the  Union  was  restored.  The  only  means  by 
which  the  advantages  of  the  new  over  the  old  constitution 
could  be  shown  to  any  great  extent,  and  in  a  tangible  man 
ner,  was  to  take  the  comparison  between  them,  in  one  most 
important  matter,  out  of  the  domain  of  speculation.  Trade 
and  commerce,  the  depressed  condition  of  which  had  most 
effectually  opened  the  way  for  a  recognition  of  the  insuffi 
ciency  of  the  articles  of  confederation,  would  necessarily  be 
greatly  and  favorably  influenced  thereby.  By  this  means 
there  would  be  created  a  real  bond  of  interest  between  the 
government  and  the  people  which  could  not  easily  be  dis 
solved.  All  attempts  to  dissolve  it  must  be  in  vain,  so 
far  as  the  creditors  of  the  state  were  concerned,  since  their 
interests  demanded  still  more  unconditionally  the  greatest 
possible  strengthening  of  the  federal  government.  In  case 
the  creditors  of  the  individual  states  were  taught  to  look  to 
the  general  government  too,  these  reasons  would  apply 

1  The  elder  Wolcott  writes,  April  23,  1790 :  "  Your  observations  re 
specting  the  public  debts  as  essential  to  the  existence  of  the  national 
government  are  undoubtedly  just — there  certainly  cannot  at  present 
exist  any  other  cement.  The  assumption  of  the  state  debts  is  as  neces 
sary,  and  indeed  more  so,  for  the  existence  of  the  national  government 
than  those  of  any  other  description ;  if  the  state  governments  are  to  pro 
vide  for  their  payment,  these  creditors  will  forever  oppose  all  national 
provisions  as  being  inconsistent  with  their  interest;  which  circum 
stances,  together  with  the  habits  and  pride  of  local  jurisdictions,  will 
render  the  states  very  refractory.  A  refusal  to  provide  for  the  state 
debts,  which  it  seems  has  been  done  by  a  committee  of  congress,  if  per 
sisted  in,  I  consider  as  an  overthrow  of  the  national  government."  Gibbs, 
Mem.  of  Wolcott,  I.,  p.  45. 


ASSUMPTION    OF    STATE   DEBTS.  85 

equally  to  them.  The  funding  of  the  debt  of  the  Union  and 
the  assumption  by  the  Union  of  the  debts  of  the  states 
were,  therefore,  the  two  principal  pillars  on  which  the  new 
political  structure  'could  be  made  to  rest.  If  the  govern 
ment  could  point  to  a  steady  and  rapidly-increasing  pros 
perity,  instead  of  the  almost  universal  bankruptcy  under 
the  confederation;  if  the  creditors  of  the  Union  and  of 
the  states  alike  would  support  it;  it  could  stand  even  greater 
storms  than  the  pusillanimous  men  of  1789  had  prophesied. 
Violent  storms  did  assail  it,  but  it  withstood  them. 

The  anti-Federalists  did  not  ignore  the  bearing  of  the 
so-called  Funding  Act  and  Assumption  Bill.  The  Assump 
tion  Bill  was  very  unpopular  in  several  of  the  states,  be 
cause  the  sordid  designs  which,  during  the  last  years  of  the 
confederation,  had  been  asserted  with  so  much  shameless 
boldness  were  still  pursued  by  many.  The  main  cause, 
however,  of  the  obstinate  opposition  to  both  bills  was  their 
political  significance.  Only  when  the  material  interests 
affected  were  very  considerable,  did  political  considerations 
have  little  weight.1 

Even  a  part  of  those  who,  from  1785  to  1787,  had  been, 
because  of  impending  anarchy,  the  warmest  advocates  ot 
a  stronger  general  government,  allowed  themselves,  at  the 
first  attempt  to  instil  life  into  the  letter  of  the  constitution, 
the  fruit  of  so  much  labor,  to  be  carried  off  in  a  contrary 
direction  by  the  particularistic  instincts  which  had  become 
a  part  of  their  very  flesh  and  blood.  Madison  now  took  the 
first  step  on  the  path  which  soon  completely  separated  him 
from  his  old  associate  Hamilton,  and  even  from  his  own 
past.  True,  Jefferson  brought  about  a  compromise  and 
effected  the  adoption  of  Hamilton's  resolutions.2  But  he 

1  South  Carolina  agreed  with  Massachusetts  on  the  question  of  the 
assumption  of  the  state  debts,  because  her  debt  was  over  five  millions  ot 
dollars.  In  New  Hampshire  and  Pennsylvania,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
opposition  to  the  bill  was  great,  and  with  many  convincing. 

« July  16,  1790. 


86  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY    AND    SLAVERY. 

declared  later  that  lie  had  been  misled  by  Hamilton  and 
that  he  regretted  this  mistake  more  than  any  other  of  his 
political  life.1 

Hamilton  had,  however,  to  pay  a  price  for  this  service,  a 
fact  which  afterwards  proved  to  be  of  the  highest  impor- 
.  tance.  He  saw  himself  compelled  to  do  so  because  the 
Assumption  Bill  was  rejected  by  the  house,  in  committee 
of  the  whole,  and  because  party  feeling  had  reached  such  a 
height  that  the  action  of  congress  had  come  to  a  complete 
standstill.  White  and  Lee  of  Virginia  finally  concluded 
to  change  their  votes. 

The  consideration  paid  by  Hamilton  was  that  he  induced 
certain  of  his  friends  to  vote  for  the  establishment  of  the 
new  capital  on  the  Potomac  instead  of  on  the  Susquehanna. 

The  whole  compromise  was  a  bargain  between  the  north 
and  the  south.  True,  there  were  decided  Federalists  in  the 
south,  and  some  of  the  members  of  congress  from  the 
northern  states  emulated  the  hot-headed  anti-Federalists 
of  the  south.  But  the  friends  of  Hamilton's  finan 
cial  policy  were  so  preponderantly  from  the  northern  states, 
and  its  opponents  from  the  southern,  that  the  "  geographi 
cal"  and  "  sectional"  character  of  the  parties  was  a  matter 
of  frequent  mention  and  lament.2  It  is  well  to  call  special 
attention  to  this,  because  the  erroneous  view  largely  pre 
vailed  afterwards  that  the  mischievous  political  division 

1  Jefferson  writes  to  Washington,  September  9,  1792 :  "  The  first  and 
only  instance  of  variance  with  the  former  part  of  my  resolution  (to  in 
termeddle  not  at  all  with  the  legislature)  I  was  duped  into  by  the  secre 
tary  of  the  treagury  and  made  a  tool  for  forwarding  his  schemes,  not 
then  sufficiently  understood  by  me;  and  of  all  the  errors  of  my  politi 
cal  life,  this  has  occasioned  me  the  deepest  regret."  Jefferson,  Works, 
Vol.  III.,  p.  460. 

8  Debates  of  Congress,  I.,  pp.  287,  292,  296.  (When  mention  is  made 
in  this  work  of  the  Debates  of  Congress,  Benton's  Abridgment  is  always 
meant,  unless  express  reference  is  made  to  some  other.  I  prefer  as  a 
rule  to  refer  to  it,  as  it  is  more  readily  accessible  to  readers.)  Gibbs, 
Mem.  of  Wolcott,  I.,  p.  46. 


SECTIONAL    SEPARATION.  87 

of  the  country  by  a  geographical  line  dates  back  only  to 
the  Missouri  compromise.1  In  the  case  before  us,  the 
geographical  separation  of  parties  was  determined  to  some 
extent  by  the  differences  in  the  economic  situation  of  the 
two  sections,2  and  more  especially  by  the  purely  financial 
side  of  the  question.3  Yet  the  principal  reason  was  the 
difference  of  political  thought  in  general,  and  the  different 
interpretation  of  the  nature  and  object  of  the  Union.4  In 
debate  it  was  attempted  not  to  permit  this  side  to  appear 

1  Certain  letters  of  Jefferson  especially  are  frequently  adduced  in  sup- 
port  of  this  view.    Jefferson  himself,  however,  writes  to  Washington, 
May  23,  1792 :    "But  the  division  of  sentiment  and  interest  happens  un 
fortunately  to  be  so  geographical  that  no  mortal  can  say  that  what  is 
most  wise  and  temperate  would  prevail  against  what  is  most  easy  and 
obvious."    Jefferson,  Works,  III.,  p.  363.    The  view  referred  to  in  the 
text,  however,  is  well  founded  to  this  extent  that  by  the  Missouri  com- 
promise  a  new  and  important  element  was  introduced  into  the  geograph 
ical  division,  an  element  of  which  more  will  be  said  hereafter. 

2  The  memorial  of  the  Virginia  legislature  mentioned  in  the  next  par 
agraph  designates  "  the  prostration  of  agriculture  at  the  feet  of  com 
merce,"  as  one  of  the  two  consequences  of  Hamilton's  financial  policy. 
The  "  anti-Federalists    .    .    .    fearful  that  the  interests  of  agriculture 
might  be  sacrificed  to  the  protection  of  commerce  and  manufactures, 
etc."    Hildreth,  Hist,  of  the  U.  S.,  IV.,  p.  119. 

3  "  The  owers  of  the  debt  are  in  the  southern  and  the  holders  of  it  in 
the  northern  division."    Jefferson,  Works,  III.,  p.  363.  Hildreth  (Hist, 
of  the  U.  S.,  IV.,  pp.  137, 138)  shows  that  this  assertion  was  not  wholly 
without  foundation,  although  it  was  greatly  exaggerated. 

4  Hildreth,  Hist,  of  the  U.  S.,  IV.,  p.  119,  says:    "It  may  hence  be 
concluded    ...    that  no  question  of  fundamental  principles  as  to  the 
theory  of  government  was  really  in  debate  between  the  Federalists  and 
anti-Federalists,  and  that  the  different  views  they  took  of  the  new  con 
stitution  grew  much  more  out  of  difference  of  position  and  of  local  and 
personal  interest  than  out  of  any  differences  of  opinion  as  to  what  ought 
to  be  the  ends  and  functions  of  government  or  the  method  of  its  admin 
istration."    This  is  not  a  wrong  view,  but  it  is  easy  to  misunderstand  it. 
In  the  application  of  the  theory  parties  diverged  from  one  another  so 
widely  that  their  agreement  on  the  theory  of  "government"  had  only 
a  negative  practical  value:  both  parties  made  use  of  that  theory  for 
their  own  justification  when  their  interests  impelled  them  to  a  change 
of  position  with  their  opponents. 


88  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY    AND    SLAVERY. 

to  an  exasperating  degree;  but  it  was  clearly  in  the  back 
ground  of  all  the  speeches  that  were  made.  When  the  con 
solidation  of  parties  had  been  carried  far  enough,  and  they 
stood  arrayed  more  determinedly  against  each  other,  they 
dropped  the  veil.  Even  Jefferson,  who  was  by  no  means  a 
friend  of  unmasked  warfare,  declared  after  two  years  that 
Hamilton's  system  had  its  origin  in  principles  inimical  to 
liberty  and  would  undermine  the  constitution.1  The  accu 
sation  was  carried  before  "Washington's  tribunal,  but  indi 
rectly  it  was  aimed  at  himself  also,  as  he  had  given  the  sys 
tem  his  approbation.  Inasmuch  as  Jefferson  did  not  clothe 
it  in  milder  words,  he  must  have  been  urged  very  far;  for  he 
was  always  careful  to  appear  to  preserve  the  most  respect 
ful  bearing  towards  Washington.2 

Outside  of  congress  and  administration  circles,  the  op 
position  immediately  gave  full  rein  to  their  anger.  In 
North  Carolina  and  Georgia  the  malcontents  declaimed 
with  special  emphasis.  In  Maryland  the  question  was 
agitated  in  the  legislature.  A  resolution  declaring  the  in 
dependence  of  the  state  governments  to  be  jeopardized  by 
the  assumption  of  the  state  debts  by  the  Union  was  reject 
ed  only  by  the  casting  vote  of  the  speaker.  In  Virginia 
the  two  houses  of  the  legislature  sent  a  joint  memorial  to 
congress.  They  expressed  the  hope  that  the  Funding  Act 

1  "  His  [Hamilton's]  system  flowed  from  principles  adverse  to  liberty, 
and  was  calculated  to  undermine  and  demolish  the  republic.  .  %  . 
Thus  the  object  of  these  plans,  taken  together,  is  to  draw  all  the  powers 
of  government  into  the  hands  of  the  general  legislature,  to  establish 
means  for  corrupting  a  sufficient  corps  in  that  legislature  to  divide  the 
honest  votes,  and  preponderate  by  their  own  the  scale  which  suited,  and 
to  have  the  corps  under  the  command  of  the  secretary  of  the  treasury,  for 
the  purpose  of  subverting,  step  by  step,  the  principles  of  the  constitution, 
which  he  has  so  often  declared  to  be  a  thing  of  nothing,  which  must  be 
changed."  Jefferson,  Works,  III.,  pp.  461,  462. 

8  The  expression  here  used  is  selected  with  deliberation.  When  Jeffer 
son  Relieved  there  was  no  danger  that  his  words  would  be  whispered  in 
wider  circles,  he  gave  full  vent  to  his  secret  animosity  against  Washing 
ton.  I  need  only  refer  to  his  notorious  letter  to  Mazzei 


ANTI-SLAVERY   PETITIONS.  89 

would  be  reconsidered  and  that  the  law  providing  for  the 
assumption  of  the  state  debts  would  be  repealed.  A  change 
in  the  present  form  of  the  government  of  the  Union,  preg 
nant  with  disaster,  would,  it  was  said,  be  the  presumptive 
consequence  of  the  last  act  named,  which  the  house 
of  delegates  had  formally  declared  to  be  in  violation  of 
the  constitution  of  the  United  States. 

These  resolutions  of  the  house  of  representatives  of 
Virginia  drew  from  Hamilton  the  prophetic  utterance: 
"This  is  the  first  symptom  of  a  spirit  which  must  either 
be  killed  or  which  will  kill  the  constitution  of  the  United 
States."1  The  spirit  was  not  destroyed,  and  the  symptoms 
rapidly  increased  in  number,  and  soon  became  alarmingly 
noticeable. 

It  was  not  mere  chance  that  this  spirit  revealed  itself  in 
combination  with  the  question  which  afterwards  imparted 
such  magnitude  to  it,  that  the  two  halves  of  the  Union 
finally  waged  a  four  years'  war  on  the  two  sides  of  the 
alternative  prophesied  by  Hamilton.  Considered  in  it 
self  it  was  a  very  insignificant  incident,  and  one  easily 
forgotten ;  but  the  smouldering  flame  into  which  the  small 
spark  was  fanned  at  the  moment  showed  what  a  conflagra 
tion  might  be  kindled. 

In  February,  1790,  the  Quaker  meeting  in  Philadelphia, 
and  the  Quakers  in  !New  York,  sent  addresses  to  congress, 
requesting  it  to  abolish  the  African  slave  trade.  In  the 
same  month  a  Pennsylvania  society  for  the  furtherance 
of  the  abolition  of  slavery  asked  congress  to  go  to  the  full 
extent  of  its  power  to  put  an  end  to  the  traffic  in  human 
beings.  The  constitution  did  not  leave  the  slightest  doubt 
that  congress  had  no  authority  whatever  in  the  matter, 
except  that  it  might  impose  a  tax  of  not  more  than  ten 
dollars  per  head  on  imported  negroes.2  Not  a  word,  there- 

1  W.  Jay,  Life  of  J.  Jay,  II.,  p.  202. 
8  Art.  I,  Sec.  9,  §1. 


90  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

fore,  was  said  to  urge  congress  to  go  beyond  the  letter  of 
this  provision.  The  only  question  was  whether,  and  when, 
the  petitions  should  be  referred  to  a  committee  to  report 
upon.  This  was  sufficient,  however,  to  excite  many  of 
the  southern  delegates  to  the  most  violent  declamation, 
and  to  dra'«r  from  them  the  most  violent  threats.  The 
noli  me  tangere  was  thrown  back  at  the  north  in  tones  as 
emphatic  and  haughty  as  it  was  subsequently  by  Cal- 
houn  or  Toombs.  Here  we  have  the  whole  struggle  of 
seventy  years  in  a  nutshell.  All  subsequent  events  were 
only  the  variations  of  the  themes  of  these  debates,  the 
logical  development  of  the  principles  here  laid  down,  and 
their  practical  application  to  concrete  questions. 

The  complete  independence  of  the  states  was  the  basis  of 
argument  in  this  question.  Disputants  spoke  only  of  the 
general  government  under  the  constitution  as  it  actually 
existed.  But  for  certain  contingencies  a  mode  of  action 
was  kept  in  view,  and  assumed  to  be  legal,  although  it 
would  not  be  revolution  only  in  case  that  the  assumption 
of  the  complete  independence  of  the  states  and  the 
impossibility  of  a  constitutional  change  in  the  provisions 
relating  to  the  powers  of  the  federal  government  on  that 
question  were  proven  and  recognized.  In  other  words,  the 
actual  sovereignty  of  the  states  was  assumed,  although  it 
was  not  recognized  as  the  premise  from  which  every  de 
mand  could  be  justified  with  inexorable  logic. 

There  was  no  inducement  to  subject  the  nature  of  the 
struggle  to  the  profound  examination  which  the  full  rec 
ognition  of  the  bearing  of  these  premises  demanded.  The 
representatives  of  the  slave  states  did  not  endeavor  to 
secure  anything  practical  and  definite  under  the  name  of 
a  constitutional  right.  They  touched  the  concrete  question 
with  wtyich  the  debates  were  formally  concerned  only 
lightly,  and  lost  themselves  in  abstract  reasoning  on  slavery. 
On  this  first  occasion  they  adopted  a  course  of  procedure 
to  which  they  ever  afterwards  adhered.  Partly  on  account 


PEG-SLAVERY    SENSITIVENESS.  91 

of  the  natural  warmth  of  their  temperament,  and  partly 
because  excited  bj  the  fears  which  their  evil  consciences 
always  kept  awake,  they  widely  overshot  the  mark.  The 
dangers  with  which  they  saw  the  future  pregnant  became 
first  the  declared  views  of  their  opponents,  whose 
wishes  soon  changed  into  demands  and  resolves.  They 
were  then  attacked  with  such  passionate  argument,  con 
cluded  with  threats  of  such  a  nature,  that  one  might  im 
agine  that  the  possible  consequences  of  the  alleged  hostile 
plans  of  the  north  were  already  unbearable  facts.  All 
that  had  been  done  was  to  move  a  reference  of  the  pe 
titions  to  a  committee.  The  representatives  of  the  slave 
states  immediately  clothed  their  opposition  in  such  a 
form  as  might  have  been  expected  if  the  motion  meant 
that  the  petitions  should  be  granted.  All  their  arguments 
were  directed  against  this  assumed  view.  Tucker,  of 
South  Carolina,  began  with  the  declaration  that  "the  com 
mitment  of  it  would  be  a  very  alarming  circumstance  to 
the  southern  states,"  because  the  request  was  unconsti 
tutional.1  Burke,  of  South  Carolina,  was  certain  that 
"the  commitment  would  sound  an  alarm  and  blow  the 
trumpet  of  sedition  in  the  southern  states."2  Tucker  for 
got  after  a  few  moments  that  the  only  question  before  the 
house  was  the  reference  of  the  petition  to  a  committee, 
and  expatiated  at  length  on  the  consequences  of  universal 
emancipation.  He  did  not  speak  of  rebellion,  but  declared 
that  emancipation  by  law  would  infallibly  lead  to  civil 
war.3  Jackson,  of  Georgia,  was  decidedly  of  the  same 
mind. 

Madison  had  rightly  remarked   that  earnest  opposition 
was   the  best  means  to  excite  alarm.4    His  warning  re- 

1  Debates  of  Congress,  I.,  p.  208. 
*  Ibid. 

3  li  Do  these  men  expect  a  general  emancipation  by  law  ?    This  would 
never  be  submitted  to  by  the  southern  states  without  a  civil  war."  Ibid. 

4  Ibid,  I.,  p.  202. 


92  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

mained  unheeded.  Once  the  debates  had  digressed  to  the 
question  of  emancipation,  that  question  alone  was  dis 
cussed,  and  Madison's  warning  was  examined  from  that 
standpoint  only.  The  slaveholders,  and  afterwards  their 
partisans  in  the  northern  states,  endeavored  to  make  the 
world  believe — and  for  a  long  time  not  without  success — 
that  up  to  the  time  of  the  Missouri  compromise,  and  even 
for  half  a  generation  after,  slavery  was  so  unanimously 
and  sincerely  condemned  in  the  slave-holding  states,  that 
ways  and  means  would  infallibly  have  been  found  to  get 
rid  of  the  system  were  it  not  that  the  uncalled-for  inter 
meddling  of  the  abolitionists  had  produced  a  revolution  in 
public  opinion  throughout  the  south.  The  expressions  to 
which  utterance  was  given  in  these  debates  are  of  great 
interest,  for  the  reason  that  they  aiford  a  complete  refuta 
tion  of  this  assertion.  Smith  of  South  Carolina  demon 
strated  "  the  absurdity  of  liberating  the  post  nati  without 
extending  it  to  all  the  slaves  old  and  young,  and  the  great 
absurdity  and  even  impossibility  of  extending  it  to  all."  In 
his  opinion  "nothing  but  evil  would  result  from  emanci 
pation  under  the  existing  circumstances  of  the  country."1 
He  did  not,  however,  limit  his  assertion  to  the  existing 
state  of  the  country  and  left  it  at  least  undecided  whether 
slavery  was  an  evil  at  all.2  Great  prominence  was  given 
by  him  to  the  assertion  repeated  over  and  over  again  until 
after  the  close  of  the  civil  war,  that  the  southern  states 
could  be  cultivated  only  by  slaves.  He  based  his  argu 
ment  not  only  on  "climate  and  the  nature  of  the  soil,"  but 
referred  also  to  the  curse  that  rested  upon  slavery,  to  "  the 

1  Deb.  of  Congress,  I.,  p.  223. 

* "  The  truth  was,  that  the  best-informed  part  of  the  citizens  of  the 
northern  states  knew  that  slavery  was  so  ingrafted  into  the  policy  of  the 
southern  states,  that  it  could  not  be  eradicated  without  tearing  up  by  the 
roots  their  happiness,  tranquillity  and  prosperity;  that  if  it  were  an  evil, 
it  was  one  for  which  there  was  no  remedy."  Ibid,  L,  p.  232. 


THREAT    OF    CIVIL    WAR.  93 

old  habits  which  forbid  the  whites  from  performing  the 
labor."1 

When  the  debates  turned  on  a  matter  so  remote  from 
the  subject  under  discussion,  it  was  impossible  not  to  pass 
judgment  on  the  whole  question  of  slavery  from  the  stand 
point  of  general  ethics.  The  first  impulse  to  this  was 
given  by  the  representatives  from  the  north,  who  urged 
that  the  petitions  of  so  respectable  a  body  as  that  of  the 
Quakers  in  relation  to  so  great  a  moral  evil,  were  deserving 
of  special  consideration.  The  representatives  of  the  south 
ern  states  replied  to  this  with  provoking  irony.  The  Qua 
kers  were  mercilessly  lacerated,  and  many  a  thrust  was 
aimed  at  the  whole  north,  which  had  suddenly  conceived  so 
much  horror  for  slavery  and  pretended  to  monopolize  all 
morality  and  virtue.  The  sting  was  keenly  felt,  and  in 
returning  the  attack  no  forbearance  was  shown.  Bondinot 
of  I^ew  Jersey  complained  that  Paley  had  been  "  branded 
with  the  charge  of  countenancing  slavery."  The  Bible 
was  drawn  into  the  controversy  on  both  sides;  and  the 
debate  was  made  to  turn  from  the  standpoint  of  general 
morals  to  the  basis  of  positive  religion. 

In  bold  contrast  to  this  was  Jackson's  declaration  that 
the  south  would  not  stop  short  at  anything  if  this  question 
was  seriously  touched.  He  was  not  satisfied  with  prophe 
sying  discord  and  "civil  war";  but  distinctly  enough  held 
up  to  the  zealots  of  emancipation,  who  should  dare  to  beard 
the  lion  in  his  den,  the  picture  of  a  court  in  which  only 
lynch  law  was  administered.2 

This  wrestling  of  minds  on  the  question  of  slavery — the 
first  since  the  adoption  of  the  constitution — had  no  imme- 

1  Deb.  of  Congress,  I.,  p.  233. 

5  "  The  gentleman  [Scott  of  Pennsylvania]  says,  if  he  was  a  federal 
judge,  he  does  not  know  to  what  length  he  might  go  in  emancipating 
these  people ;  but  I  believe  his  judgment  would  be  of  short  duration  hi 
Georgia ;  perhaps  even  the  existence  of  such  a  judge  might  be  in  danger." 
Ibid,  I.,  p.  209. 


94:  STATE  SOVEREIGNTY  AND  SLAVERY. 

diate  practical  results.  In  the  light  of  later  events,  it  ap 
pears  already  in  these  debates  with  remarkable  clearness, 
that  the  difference  was  in  its  nature  one  which  conld  not 
be  smoothed  over.  But  it  was  not  yet  recognized  as  the 
rock  on  which  the  Union  was  to  be  broken  to  pieces. 
Threatening  and  sudden  as  was  its  appearance  on  the  ho 
rizon,  it  attracted  men's  eyes  only  for  an  instant.  It  re 
mained  yet  to  be  seen  whether  the  ship  was  even  seaworthy. 
The  waves  which  tossed  at  that  moment  so  violently  about 
her  and  began  to  break  over  her  deck,  claimed  the  entire  at 
tention  of  statesmen. 

Hamilton's  financial  policy,  which  had  led  to  the  organ 
ization  of  the  opposition  to  the  administration  and  to  the 
Federal  majority  in  congress,  was  also  the  first  actual  in 
ducement  to  a  revolt  against  the  authority  of  the  general 
government. 

The  colonists  had  brought  with  them  from  England  a 
deep  aversion  to  excise  taxes,  which  perpetuated  itself,  un 
abated,  from  generation  to  generation.  The  first  congress, 
in  its  address  of  October,  1774,  to  the  inhabitants  of  Canada, 
laid  particular  stress  on  the  imposition  of  excise  as  one  of 
the  evils  accompanying  subjection  to  England.1  In  the 
nullification  convention  of  New  York,  it  was  proposed  by 
Williams,  and  later  by  Smith  with  something  more  of  re 
striction,  that  the  power  to  impose  excise  duties  on  any 
article  which  grew  or  was  manufactured  in  America, 
should  be  expressly  denied  to  congress.2  Neither  motion 
was,  however,  adopted,  and  the  amendments  to  the  constitu 
tion  afterwards  made  contained  no  provision  to  that  effect. 

1  "You  are  subjected  .  .  .  to  tlie  imposition  of  excise,  the  horror  of 
all  free  states  ;  thus  wresting  your  property  from  you  by  the  most  odious 
of  taxes,  and  laying  open  to  tax-gatherers,  houses,  the  scenes  of  domestic 
peace  and  comfort,  and  called  castles  of  English  subjects  in  the  books 
of  their  law."  The  Western  Insurrection.  Contributions  to  American 
History,  1858,  p.  127. 

3  Elliot,  Deb.,  II.,  pp.  331,  411. 


THE    FIRST    EXCISE.  95 

Nevertheless,  excise  impositions  and  arbitrary  tyrannical 
government  remained  in  the  minds  of  the  people  as  kin 
dred  ideas.  Hence  the  first  excise  bill  which  was  intro 
duced  into  congress  was  rejected,  on  the  21st  of  June,  1790.1 
Yet  Hamilton  caused  another  bill  to  be  introduced,  and  by 
the  act  of  March  3,  1791,  a  tax  was  imposed  on  spirituous 
liquors  distilled  within  the  United  States. 

The  dissatisfaction  produced  by  this  measure  was  very 
widespread,  and  from  the  first  found  strongest  expression 
in  the  western  counties  of  Pennsylvania,  at  that  time  the 
least  thickly  settled.  The  -first  indignation  meeting  in 
western  Pennsylvania  was  held  July  27,  1791,  at  Red  Stone 
Old  Fort.2  Much  plain  talk  was  indulged  in  concerning 
the  law ;  but  its  constitutionality  was  not  then  attacked. 
Passion  had  not  yet  reached  such  a  state  of  violence  as  to 
permit, this  in  face  of  the  express  provision  of  the  constitu 
tion,3  But  it  was  not  long  before  it  came  to  this.  On  the 
23d  of  August,  the  agitation  committee  of  Washington 
county  declared  all  who  should  accept  any  position  under 
the  law,  or  help  to  carry  it  out,  enemies  of  the  interests  of 
the  country,  and  put  them  under  the  ban  of  society.  Four 
teen  days  later  the  tax  collector  Robert  Johnson  was  tarred 
and  feathered,  and  robbed  of  his  horse.  It  was  not  long 
before  similar  acts  of  violence  were  practiced  upon  other 
officials. 

At  first  the  administration  was  powerless  against  the 
disturbers  of  the  peace,  for  it  had  not  yet  the  means  to 
oppose  force  by  force.  Congress  now  made  haste  to 
remedy  this  state  of  things,  and  to  prepare  itself  in  time 
for  every  contingency.  The  act  to  provide  for  calling 
forth  the  militia  to  execute  the  laws  of  the  Union,  sup 
press  insurrections,  and  repel  invasions,  became  law  on 

1  Gale  and  Seaton's  Annals  of  Congress,  I.,  p.  1644. 
9  Now  Brownsville. 

*  "The  congress  shall  have  power  to  lay  and  collect    .    .        excises." 
Art  I.,  Sec.8,§l. 


96  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

the  2nd  of  May,  1T82.1  But  while  congress  on  the  one 
hand  placed  the  administration  in  a  condition  to  ensure 
the  enforcement  of  the  law,  it  on  the  other  made  con 
cessions  to  the  malcontents,  so  that  as  far  as  possible  the 
employment  of  force  might  be  avoided.  The  act  of  May 
8,  1792,  lightened  the  tax  a  great  deal,  and  guaranteed  to 
the  distillers  alterations  in  other  essential  respects.2  The 
administration,  too,  considered  the  right  policy  to  be  not 
to  resort  to  force  as  long  as  it  did  not  seem  absolutely 
necessary.  But  its  forbearance  served  only  to  make  the 
malcontents  bolder.  The  rough  backwoodsmen  and  Irish 
who  would  not  be  persuaded  that  they  had  to  contribute3 
to  the  support  of  the  government  and  who  considered  un 
restricted  distillation  to  be  a  "  natural  right,"4  had  be 
gun  the  movement.  But  in  accordance  with  a  resolve 
which  was  immediately  made  public,  persons  of  a  very 
different  kind,  some  openly  and  others  in  secret,  undertook 
to  guide  it.  The  measures  of  the  patriots  during  the  Rev 
olution  were  copied,  and  corresponding  committees  es 
tablished  to  communicate  with  the  malcontents  in  all  the 
other  states  of  the  Union.  At  their  meetings  resolutions 
were  passed  which  extended  the  opposition  far  beyond  the 
limits  of  this  unpalatable  law.  Even  secession  from  the 
Union  was  discussed.5 


1  Statutes  at  Large,  I.,  pp.  264,  265. 
3  Statutes  at  Large,  I.,  pp.  267-271. 


8 "  Every  circumstance  indicates  that  we  must  contest  with  these 
madmen  ....  The  people  absolutely  refuse  to  pay  one  shil 
ling  towards  the  public  service These  men  are  so  licentious 

and  vain  of  their  consequence  that  they  consider  the  blood  and  treasure 
of  the  United  States  as  their  property.  They  arrogantly  demand  the 
public  protection,  and  at  the  same  time  refuse  to  perform  any  of  their 
duties  to  society."  O.  Wolcott  to  F.  Wolcott,  Gibbs,  Mem.,  I.,  p.  156. 

4  Petition  of  Inhabitants  of  Westmoreland,  1790.  Contributions  to 
American  History,  1858,  p.  126. 

ft  ((  There  was  indeed  a  meeting  to  consult  about  a  separation."  JeTer. 
son  to  Madison,  Dec.  28, 1794.  Jeff.,  Works,  IV.,  p.  111.  See  also  J.  C. 
Hamilton,  Hist.  Rep.  U.  S.,  VI.,  p.  96. 


DEFIANCE   OF   LAW.  97 

As  usual,  men  talked  in  an  exaggerated  way,  but  there 
was  enough  that  was  serious  in  these  things.  The  simple 
fact  that  a  few  counties  could  successfully  evade  the  enforce 
ment  of  a  law  of  congress  for  three  years  must  have  excited 
great  solicitude  for  the  future  of  the  Union  in  the  minds 
of  those  statesmen  who  were  a  little  more  far-seeing  than 
the  rest.  But  there  was  another  and  more  important  side 
to  the  question.  The  crowd  who  carried  on  this  disturbance 
on  the  stage  thought  of  nothing  except  drinking  their 
whiskey  without  paying  any  taxes  on  it;  but  the  directors 
of  the  play  were  pursuing  very  different  aims. 

Hamilton's  immediate  object  in  the  excise  law  was  at 
first  a  purely  financial  one.  But  now  he  united  another 
object  to  this.  He  recognized  that  the  exercise  of  the 
powers  expressly  conferred  by  the  constitution  would  meet 
with  great  opposition  under  all  circumstances.  He  desired, 
therefore,  to  bring  the  struggle  to  a  decision  before  the 
opposing  elements  should  find  time  to  consolidate  their 
forces.  The  longer  it  was  postponed  the  more  difficult 
would  be  the  victory;  and  the  very  non-exercise  of  these 
powers  would  be  considered  a  tacit  renunciation  of  them. 
Internal  revenue  (so-called)  should  not  be  monopolized  by 
the  states;  for  it  was  the  element  by  which  every  individ 
ual  citizen  could  be  soonest  brought  to  a  consciousness  of 
the  national  character  of  the  Union,  even  in  internal  af 
fairs,  since  it  immediately  affected  the  every-day  life  of 
every  citizen.1 

1  "  Other  reasons  co-operated  in  the  minds  of  some  able  men  to  render 
an  excise  at  an  early  period  desirable.  They  thought  it  well  to  lay 
nold  of  so  valuable  a  resource  of  revenue  before  it  was  generally  pre 
occupied  by  the  state  governments.  They  supposed  it  not  amiss  that 
the  authority  of  the  national  government  should  be  visible  in  some 
branch  of  internal  revenue,  lest  a  total  non-exercise  of  it  should  beget 
an  impression  that  it  was  never  to  be  exercised,  and  next  that  a  thing 
of  the  kind  could  not  be  introduced  with  a  greater  prospect  of  easy  suc 
cess  than  at  a  period  when  the  government  enjoyed  the  advantage  of 
first  impressions,  when  state  factions  to  resist  its  authority  were  not  yet 

y 


98  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

These  points  did  not  escape  the  opposition.  It  was  not 
to  be  ascribed  to  dissatisfaction  with  the  excise  imposition 
that  a  majority  of  the  southern  and  western  members  of 
congress  announced,  even  before  the  passage  of  the  bill, 
an  organized  agitation  to  procure  its  repeal.1  It  was  un 
derstood  in  both  sections  of  the  country  that  the  contest 
really  centered  in  the  great  constitutional  question  which, 
up  to  the  time  of  the  civil  war,  constituted  the  legal  basis 
of  every  important  internal  struggle.  In  the  debates  bear 
ing  immediately  on  the  question  of  excise,  little  was  said 
of  state  rights  and  state  sovereignty,  for  the  reason  that  it 
was  impossible  to  escape  the  express  provision  of  the  con 
stitution.  The  struggle  centered,  however,  with  full  con 
sciousness  on  the  part  of  the  contestants,  on  the  actual 
possession  of  a  position,  the  great  importance  of  which,  for 
the  conflict  which  followed  between  the  sovereignty  of 
the  Union  and  the  independence  of  the  several  states,  was 
fully  recognized.  This  was  so  obvious  that  it  did  not  es 
cape  the  observation  even  of  foreigners.2 

It  was  the  profound  significance  of  the  struggle,  as 
much  as  the  ever-increasing  boldness  of  the  insurgents, 
which  determined  Hamilton,  in  the  summer  of  1794,  to 
cause  the  administration  to  proceed  at  last  with  all  the 
energy  it  could  command.  He  considered  that  the  time 

matured,  when  so  much  aid  was  to  be  derived  from  the  popularity  and 
firmness  of  the  actual  chief  magistrate."  Hamilton,  Works,  IV.,  p.  231. 

1  Wharton's  State  Trials,  p.  102.  Contributions  to  American  Histoiy, 
1858,  p.  127. 

3  The  French  ambassador,  Fauchet,  said  in  his  celebrated  dispatch 
No.  10,  dated  Oct.  31,  1794,  which  cost  secretary  Randolph  his 
place  and  good  name,  that  the  whiskey  rebellion  was  "  indubitably  con- 
nected  with  a  general  explosion  for  some  time  prepared  in  the  public 
mind;  but  which  this  local  and  precipitate  eruption  would  cause  to 
miscarry,  or  at  least  check  for  a  long  time."  The  elements  of  the  ex- 
plosion  he  described  as  "  the  primitive  divisions  of  opinion  as  to  the 
political  form  of  the  state,  and  the  limits  of  the  sovereignty  of  the  whole 
over  each  state  individually  sovereign."  (I  am  acquainted  with  the  dis 
patch  only  in  the  English  translation.)  Randolph's  Vindication,  p.  41. 


ENFORCING    THE    EXCISE    BY    BAYONETS.  99 

had  come  to  try  whether  the  new  constitution  had  really 
created  a  government.1  Only  a  few  counties  openly  defied 
the  officers  of  the  general  government.  If  force  were 
used  against  them  they  would  either  be  left  to  themselves, 
and  then  it  would  be  easy  to  overcome  them ;  or  the  rest 
of  the  malcontents  would  make  common  cause  with  them, 
in  which  case  the  alternative  of  accepting  anarchy  or  of 
giving  immediate  support  to  the  government,  would  be 
placed  before  the  people  in  such  a  manner  that  they  could 
not  fail  to  recognize  it.  If  left  to  themselves  much  would 
be  accomplished  with  little  effort,  and  both  the  insurgents 
and  their  secret  abettors  would  be  struck  at  the  same  time. 
In  any  case  the  slow  but  deadly  drifting  towards  anarchy 
would  be  brought  to  an  end. 

Hamilton  was  certain  that  the  opposition  might  be 
quickly  broken  if  the  government  should  take  a  decided 
attitude  towards  the  insurgents.  He  advised,  therefore, 
that  so  large  a  force  should  be  put  on  foot  as  would  compel 
the  insurgent  counties  to  give  up  all  thought  of  a  contest, 
unless  they  received  support  from  without.  In  this  way, 
the  authority  of  the  government  might  be  re-established 
without  burthening  it  with  the  odium  which  always  attends 
the  shedding  of  citizen  blood.2  Washington  followed  Ham 
ilton's  advice,  which  proved  to  be  right.  Thirteen  thous 
and  militia  were  called  for  on  the  7th  of  August,  and  their 
appearance  sufficed  to  restore  the  insurgent  districts  to 
obedience. 

The  vials  of  gall  which  were  now  poured  out  on  Hamil 
ton's  head  demonstrated  how  heavily  the  blow  was  felt  by 
those  who  in  secret  had  fanned  the  fire.  In  their  wrath, 

1  In  his  letter  of  Aug.  2, 1794,  he  says:  "The  very  existence  of  gov 
ernment  demands  this  course  [calling  out  the  militia  to  suppress  the 
insurrection]." 

8  In  the  letter  referred  to  above  we  read :  "  The  force  ought,  if  attain 
able,  to  be  imposing,  to  deter  from  opposition,  save  the  effusion  of  the 
blood  of  citizens,  and  secure  the  object  to  be  accomplished." 


100          STATE  SOVEREIGNTY  AND  SLAVERY. 

they  lodged  against  him  the  most  contradictory  charges. 
At  first,  they  prophesied  that  the  militia  would  refuse  to 
obey  orders.  Then  they  foretold  a  civil  war,  the  end  of 
which  would  be  the  annihilation  of  the  usurpers  who  had 
grasped  at  power.  Now  they  said  that  the  secretary  of 
the  treasury  had  magnified  a  mouse  into  an  elephant  in 
order  to  subserve  his  despotic  aims.  Next  they  ridiculed 
the  foolish  stupidity  which  imagined  that  obedience  could 
be  forced.  And  in  the  same  breath  they  declared  that  the 
brutal  compulsion  of  the  insurgent  counties  had  made 
their  secession  from  the  Union  a  certainty.1 

Neither  these  prophecies  nor  charges  would  have  been  of 
any  consequence,  had  they  not  contained  a  certain  amount 
of  truth.  Washington  did  not  ignore  this  any  more  than 
he  allowed  himself  to  be  deceived  as  to  the  motives  of  their 
originators,  or  to  be  hoodwinked  by  their  unbounded  ex 
aggeration.  This,  as  well  as  the  position  of  the  parties  who 
endeavored  to  persuade  him  to  choose  a  policy  of  inactive 
delay  and  even  of  concession,  explains  why  he  hesitated  so 
long  to  adopt  a  course  which  the  government  of  any  well- 
regulated  state  would  have  recognized  three  years  earlier 
as  the  only  right  one.  And  this  it  is,  too,  which  gave  this 
tempest  in  a  tea-pot  so  great  a  significance. 

There  was  this  much  truth  in  the  charges  against  Ham- 

1  "  A  separation  which  was  perhaps  a  very  distant  and  problematical 
event  is  now  near  and  certain,  and  determined  in  the  mind  of  every 
man."  Jeff.'s  Works,  IV.,  p.  112.  Jefferson  himself  feared  that  a  vio 
lent  disruption  of  the  Union  might  follow.  In  the  same  letter  to 
Madison  we  read :  "  The  third  and  last  [error]  will  be,  to  make  it  [the 
excise  law]  the  instrument  of  dismembering  the  Union,  and  setting  us 
all  afloat  to  choose  what  part  of  it  we  will  adhere  to."  It  is  very  sig 
nificant  that  simultaneously,  among  the  adherents  of  the  opposite 
party,  it  was  said  that  the  strife  might  end  with  the  expulsion  of  the 
insurgent  districts.  Wolcott  writes,  July  26,  1794 :  "  I  trust,  however, 
that  they  will  be  chastised  or  rejected  from  the  Union.  The  latter 
will  not,  however,  be  allowed  without  a  vigorous  contest."  Gibbs,  Mem. 
of  Wolcott,  I.,  p.  156. 


OUTCRY   AGAINST   HAMILTON.  101 

ilton,  that  judging  from  the  number  of  the  insurgents,  a 
call  for  4,000  or  5,000  militia-men,  instead  of  for  15,000, 
would  have  sufficed.1  But  Hamilton  was  not  so  short-sight 
ed  as  to  base  his  calculation  on  these  elements  alone.  It  is 
all  the  more  singular  that  this  should  have  been  supposed 
of  him,  because  the  suspicions  entertained  by  his  accusers, 
and  shared  in  part  by  himself,  as  to  the  reliability  of  the 
militia,  were  not  entirely  groundless.2  A  portion  of  the  mili 
tia  of  Pennsylvania  had  from  the  beginning  taken  part  in 
the  movement.  When  governor  Mifflin  was  requested  to 
call  them  out  to  suppress  the  insurrection,  he  refused  to  do 
so,  on  the  ground  that  it  was  too  bold  a  step.  He  expected 
that  such  a  course  would  only  strengthen  the  revolt,  and 
questioned  whether  the  militia  would  yield  passive  obedi 
ence  to  the  orders  of  the  government.  And  when  the  mili 
tia  were  in  fact  called  out  by  the  president,  they  obeyed 
the  order  in  Pennsylvania  with  reluctance  and  hesitation. 
Mifflin  himself  was  obliged  to  travel  through  the  state  and 
use  his  eloquence  to  secure  its  quota. 

Moreover,  Hamilton's  accusers  had  lost  all  right  to  com 
plain  of  the  number  of  militia  called  for,  since  from  the 
very  beginning  of  the  disturbances  they  had  preached  the 
impossibility  of  suppressing  them.  Their  charges  against 
the  secretary  of  the  treasury  recoiled,  therefore,  upon  them 
selves.  Yet  Hamilton's  army  was,  according  to  them,  the 
butt  of  the  insurgents  as  well  as  the  instrument  of  an  in 
supportable  despotism.3 

1  The  number  of  13,000  men  called  for  was  afterwards  increased  to 
15,000.  The  number  of  men  able  to  bear  arms  in  the  insurgent  counties 
was  estimated  at  16,000. 

a  Hamilton  writes  to  Sedgwick,  February  2,  1799 :  "In  the  expedi 
tion  against  the  western  insurgents,  I  trembled  every  moment  lest  a 
great  part  of  the  militia  should  take  it  into  their  heads  to  return  home 
rather  than  go  forward."  J.  C.  Hamilton,  History  of  the  Republic  of 
the  United  States  of  America,  VII.,  p.  278. 

'  "The  information  of  our  militia  returned  from  the  westward  is  uni 
form,  that  though  the  people  there  let  them  pass  quietly,  they  were  ob- 


102  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

This  mode  of  argumentation  against  the  distasteful 
measures  of  a  government  is  very  usual  among  excited 
masses.  What  was  most  remarkable  in  the  instance  before 
us  is  that  it  was  not  used  by  the  masses  or  by  common 
demagogues  and  pot-house  politicians,  but  by  members  of 
the  government.  Jefferson  did  not  first  avail  himself  of 
contradicting  arguments  after  he  had  retired  to  private  life. 
And  Randolph,  his  successor  in  office,  followed  his  exam 
ple  in  this  respect.  Both  were  in  part  actuated  by  impure 
motives,  and  Jefferson  at  least  was  conscious  that  he  had 
painted  in  colors  altogether  too  dark — a  mistake  into 
which  the  advocates  of  a  bad  cause  almost  always  fall. 
But  on  the  other  hand,  both  were  in  great  part  really 
convinced  that  their  fears  were  well-founded.  And  this 
is  as  characteristic  of  these  two  personages,  as  of  the 
circumstances  of  the  time.  How  far  the  bond  which 
knit  together  the  different  parts  of  the  Union  was  from  be 
ing  an  organic,  that  is,  a  really  national  bond  is  evident  from 
the  fact  that  two  secretaries  of  state  could  doubt  the  ability 
of  the  general  government  to  enforce  a  constitutional  tax, 
although  it  was  opposed  by  force  only  in  a  part  of  a  single 
state.1 

These  doubts  were  honest  ones;  but  Jefferson  and  his 
associates  were  again  guilty  of  self-contradiction  in  the 
manner  in  which  they  turned  them  to  account.  They  had 
systematically  labored  to  educate  the  people  in  the  faith 

jects  of  their  laughter,  not  of  their  fear;  that  one  thousand  men  could 
have  cut  off  their  whole  force  in  a  thousand  places  of  the  Alleghany." 
Jeff.,  Works,  IV.,  p.  112. 

1  In  Randolph's  opinion  on  Hamilton's  resolution  to  call  out  the 
militia  we  read :  "  The  moment  is  big  with  a  crisis  which  would  con- 
vulse  the  eldest  government,  and  if  it  should  burst  on  ours,  ifs  extent  and 
dominion  can  be  but  faintly  conjectured."  He  comes  to  the  conclusion 
that  the  situation  of  the  United  States  "  banishes  every  idea  of  calling 
the  militia  into  immediate  action,"  He  even  went  so  far  as  to  express 
a  fear  that  the  insurgents  might  call  the  English  to  their  aid,  and  that 
a  war  with  England  and  the  disruption  of  the  Union  might  be  the  result 
of  an  attempt  at  coercion. 


AUTI-FEDERALIST   FEELING.  103 

» 

that  an  impotent  general  government  was  a  condition 
precedent  of  liberty.  In  so  far  as  they  succeeded  in  this, 
they  had  contributed  to  make  the  government  of  the  Union 
impotent.  If  their  apprehensions  were  well  grounded,  this 
was  a  fact  which  should  have  afforded  them  nothing  but 
satisfaction.  And  to  some  extent  they  experienced  this 
satisfaction  and  made  no  secret  of  it.  But,  at  the  same 
time,  they  made  the  weakness  of  the  government  their  ex 
cuse  and  justification  for  the  counsel  they  had  given,  that 
it  should  declare  itself  powerless  against  a  handful  of  in 
surgents. 

And  here  also  honest  conviction,  self-deception,  and  un 
worthy  motives  were  strangely  intermixed.  As  partisans 
they  rejoiced  over  the  predicament  in  which  the  govern 
ment  was  placed;  as  fanatical  doctrinarians,  they  endeav 
ored  to  argue  away  from  their  own  minds  and  those  of  the 
world,  the  bitterness  of  these  fruits  of  their  teachings, 
while  with  conscious  sophistry  they  attributed  to  those 
teachings  a  brilliant  excellence ;  and  as  Americans  they 
were  ashamed  of  the  contemptible  spectacle  exhibited  by 
this  three  years'  struggle  of  the  federal  government  with 
the  four  western  counties  of  Pennsylvania. 

With  some,  as  with  governor  Mifflin,  the  last  feeling 
conquered,  and  all  finally  accommodated  themselves  to  the 
accomplished  fact  of  the  suppression  of  the  insurrection. 
It  would  not  have  been  so  easy  for  them  to  do  this  if  they 
had  not  for  some  time  experienced,  to  their  terror,  that  it 
is  a  much  easier  thing  to  provoke  a  storm  than  to  control 
it.  Yet  this  can  be  said  only  of  Gallatin,  Findley,  and  a 
few  others,  who  had  participated  directly  in  the  movement, 
although  they  belonged  to  the  upper  classes  of  society. 
The  rest  of  the  leaders  of  the  anti-Federalists  denied  with 
undisguised  provocation  the  accusation  that  they  had  con 
jured  up  the  storm  and  were  responsible  for  having  raised 
the  question  whether  the  government  was  able  to  cope  with  it. 
Hence  they  learned  nothing  from  experience.  They  con- 


104  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY  AND  SLAVERY. 

tinued  to  justify  and  to  defend  the  very  thing  which  Hamil 
ton  regarded  as  the  soul  of  the  evil.  The  insurrection  in  it 
self  was  only  of  small  significance.  The  real  danger  lay  in 
the  attitude  of  the  rest  of  the  people  towards  the  question. 
If  the  remainder  of  the  people  were  permeated  with  a  sense 
of  the  necessity  of  the  absolute  sovereignty  of  the  law,  it 
not  only  would  have  been  absurd  to  consider  the  success  of 
the  insurrection  possible,  but  the  government  would  have 
been  compelled  to  take  immediate  and  energetic  steps  to  sup 
press  it,  even  if  it  should  itself  have  preferred  a  different 
course.  This  conviction,  however,  was  not  shared  by  more 
than  half  the  people,  and  with  a  great  portion  of  them  it 
was  altogether  wanting,  so  far  as  the  laws  of  the  Union 
were  concerned.  This  was  the  chain  which  bound  the 
hands  of  the  government  so  long,  and  the  an ti- Feder 
alists  forged  it.  In  a  state  in  which  the  people  rule, 
the  sovereignty  of  law  is  possible  only  as  long  as  the 
people  wills  it.  And  the  will  of  the  people  in  the  United 
States,  in  its  relation  to  the  general  government,  must 
necessarily  have  been  just  as  strong  or  as  weak  as  the  na 
tional  feeling  and  the  recognition  of  the  interest  which 
the  individual  members  of  the  Union  had  in  national  de 
velopment.  But  the  anti-Federalists  had  from  the  be 
ginning  striven  against  these  two  forces  on  principle  and 
with  all  their  power.  Their  way  and  Hamilton's,  there 
fore,  necessarily  took  from  the  first  a  divergent  course; 
for  the  leading  thought  of  Hamilton's  policy  was  the 
creation  of  national  interests. 

Hamilton's  proposition  to  establish  a  national  bank  had 
its  source  in  the  same  great  statesmanlike  thought  as  the 
Assumption  Bill,  the  Funding  Act,  and  his  tax  laws,  and 
met  therefore  with  the  same  opposition.1 

The  opposition  in  this  case,  too,  was  based  on  the  ques 
tion  of  constitutionality.  The  Federalists  argued  from  the 

>  1791. 


THF    FIRST   BANK   BILL.  105 

point  of  view  of  the  statesman,  and  touched  on  the  con 
stitutional  question  only  so  far  as  it  was  necessary  to  re 
fute  theh*  opponents.  The  anti-Federalists,  on  the  other 
hand,  touched  the  essential  arguments  in  the  case  only 
lightly,  and  where  they  did  they  allowed  themselves  fre 
quently  to  be  involved  in  absurdities  by  their  doctrinar- 
ianism.1  The  whole  debate  was  conducted  by  them  in  a 
pettifogging  manner.  Even  Madison,  who  delivered  the 
most  important  opposition  speech,  scarcely  rose  to  a  high 
er  plane.  It  was  not  indeed  an  easy  matter,  under  the  cir 
cumstances,  to  raise  strong,  statesmanlike  objections; 
and  the  constitutional  considerations  had  little  weight,  as 

O         / 

they  were  of  an  exclusively  negative  character.  The  con 
stitution  did  not  expressly  authorize  the  establishment  of 
a  bank;  and  the  anti-Federalists  now  endeavored  to  prove 
that  it  was  not  "  necessary"  to  the  exercise  of  any  of  the 
powers  expressly  given.2 

1  Thus,  for  instance,  Jackson,  of  Georgia,  opposed  the  establishment 
of  a  bank  because  it  would  facilitate  the  borrowing  of  money  by  the 
government.  Deb.  of  Congress,  I.,  p.  287.  But  Jackson  had  not  by  any 
means  reached  the  height  attained  by  Jefferson.  The  latter  was  of 
opinion  that  by  a  single  amendment  to  the  constitution  "the  administra 
tion  of  the  government"  might  be  reduced  "  to  the  genuine  principles 
of  the  constitution;"  that  is,  by  an  amendment  withdrawing  from  the 
general  government  the  power  to  make  loans.  Jefferson  to  Taylor, 
Nov.  26,  1798.  Jeff.,  Works,  IV.,  p.  260.  Another  objection  of  Jack- 
son's  was  that  the  bank  would  be  of  advantage  only  to  the  mercantile 
interests ;  he  had  never  seen  a  bank-note  in  Georgia.  (Deb.  of  Congress, 
I.,  p.  272).  It  is  worthy  of  mention  that  he,  as  well  as  Madison,  called 
attention  on  this  occasion  to  the  geographical  separation  of  parties. 
Jackson  closed  his  argument  with  the  words :  "  Not  a  gentleman  scarcely 
to  the  eastward  of  a  certain  line  is  opposed  to  the  bank,  and  where  is  the 
gentleman  to  the  southward  that  is  for  it?"  Ibid.,  I.,  p.  287. 

*  In  Art.  1'.,  Sec.  8,  §  18,  of  the  constitution,  it  is  provided  that  congress 
shall  have  power  "  to  make  all  laws  which  shall  be  necessary  and 
proper  for  carrying  into  execution  the  foregoing  powers,"  etc'.  Com 
pare  Gerry's  speech  on  the  bank  question,  Deb.  of  Congress,  I.,  p.  300; 
and  Marshall,  in  McCulloch  v.  Maryland,  Wheaton's  Rep.,  IV.,  pp. 
414-422. 


106  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

The  anti-Federalists  felt  the  weakness  of  this  position, 
and  they  anxiously  tried  to  find  other  grounds.  This  only 
made  their  cause  worse.  The  states,  they  said,  had  author 
ity  to  establish  and  to  prohibit  the  establishment  of  banks. 
But  they  could  not  maintain  state  banks  in  opposition  to 
a  United  States  bank;  hence  the  latter  was  unconstitution 
al,  as  the  rights  of'the  states  could  not  be  curtailed  except 
where  the  constitution  expressly  allowed  it.1  Moreover  the 
constitution  prohibited  the  favoring  of  any  particular  place2 
but  the  place  where  the  bank  was  located  would  undoubt 
edly  have  an  advantage  over  all  others! 

These  and  similar  objections  bordered  on  the  ridiculous. 
But  no  reasoning  was  too  absurd  not  to  find  credulous 
hearers,  when  the  rights  of  the  states  were  alleged  to  be  in 
danger,  and  the  services  of  the  old  phantom  "  consolidation" 
were  required.  The  politicians  would  not,  in  a  matter  of 
such  importance,  have  dared  to  wage  so  strong  a  war  of 
opposition,  and  could  not  have  carried  it  on  for  ten  years  and 
have  finally  conquered  if  they  had  not  had  as  a  broad  and 
firm  foundation  to  work  upon,  the  anti-national  tenden 
cies  which  prevailed  among  the  people.3 

It  has  already  been  frequently  intimated  that  the  pre 
ponderance  of  anti-national  tendencies  in  the  Union  had 
its  origin  in  the  political  and  social  development  of  the 
states,  in  their  want  of  political  connection  before  the  Rev 
olution,  in  the  little  intercourse,  commercial  and  other, 
between  them,  and  lastly  in  various  differences  in  their  nat 
ural  situation.  A  rapid  intergrowth  of  the  several  states 

1  Deb.  of  Congress,  I.,  pp.  275,  285. 

•Art. I., Sec.  9,  §  6. 

*  Care  must  be  taken  not  to  be  misled  by  the  apparent  conflict  between 
what  is  here  said  and  the  Federalist  programme.  The  anti-national  ten 
dencies  of  the  Federalists  were  much  weaker  than  those  of  the  anti-Fed 
eralists.  But  if  the  Federalists  supported  Hamilton's  measures,  it  by  no 
means  follows  that  the  masses  of  them,  or  even  all  their  leaders,  adhered 
to  his  policy  for  the  same  reasons,  or  that  they  had  fully  understood  his 
motives  or  his  objects. 


THE    FEENCH    REVOLUTION.  107 

could  not  therefore  take  place,  and  continued  violent  col 
lisions  were  unavoidable.  But  the  purely  American  ques 
tions  of  this  period  were  not  yet  of  such  a  nature,  that 
they  suffice  to  explain  the  morbid  passion  characteris 
tic  of  its  internal  conflicts.  The  French  Revolution  intro 
duced  from  abroad  an  element  which,  independent  of  the 
actual  condition  of  affairs  and  partly  in  conflict  with  it, 
kept  excitement  during  many  years  at  the  boiling  point. 

The  Revolution  was  at  first  hailed  with  delight  by  all 
parties  in  the  (Jnited  States.  When,  however,  after  Mi- 
rabeau's  death,  the  impossibility  of  control  and  the  mistakes 
of  the  helpless  court  transferred  the  preponderance  of 
power  to  the  radicals,  and  when  the  anarchical  elements 
grew  bolder  daily,  the  Federalists  began  to  turn  away.  The 
anti-Federalists,  on  the  other  hand,  clung  inure  closely  to 
it  than  ever.  The  farther  France  proceeded,  by  the  adop 
tion  of  brutal  measures,  on  the  way  of  political  idealism, 
the  more  rank  was  the  growth  in  the  United  States  of  the 
most  radical  doctrinarianism ;  the  more  attentively  the 
legislators  of  France  listened  to  Danton's  voice  of  thunder 
and  to  Marat's  fierce  cry  for  blood,  the  more  boldly  did  dem- 
agogism  in  its  most  repulsive  form  rage  in  the  United 
States. 

In  the  autumn  of  1791,  Freneau  established  the  National 
Gazette  l  in  Philadelphia  with  the  intention  of  neutraliz 
ing  the  influence  of  Fenno's  Federalist  United  States 
Gazette.  In  the  beginning  it  was  content  with  denouncing 
Hamilton's  financial  policy  and  scourging  John  Adams 
because  he  was  the  presumptive  successor  of  Washington. 
But  in  course  of  time  it  attacked  the  president  himself.2 

1  The  first  number  appeared  Oct.  31. 

9  Washington  writes,  July  21, 1793,  to  Henry  Lee:  "But  in  what  will 
this  abuse  terminate  ?  For  the  result,  as  it  respects  myself,  I  care  not. 

.  .  The  arrows  of  malevolence  .  .  .  however  barbed  and  well 
pointed,  never  can  reach  the  moat  vulnerable  part  of  me,  though  while  I 
am  up  as  a  mark,  they  will  be  continually  aimed.  The  publications  in 


108  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

Its  wit  degenerated  into  malice,  and  in  lieu  of  a  sharp 
polemic  against  the  expediency  of  certain  measures,  it 
made  the  most  malignant  charges  as  to  the  motives  and 
objects  of  its  opponents.  The  most  distinguished  Fed 
eralists,  it  said,  had  always  been  a  "corrupt  squadron." 
Now  the  old  calumny  as  to  their  "  monarchical"  tendencies 
was  revived  with  increasing  passion.1  The  "monarchical 
faction"  became  a  shibboleth.  The  course  of  events  in 
France  lent  the  anti-Federalists  special  strength.  The 
more  undoubted  the  overthrow  of  the  monarchy  there  be 
came,  the  more  was  the  party  here  upbraided  to  whom  the 
sacred  word  "  republic"  was  assumed  to  be  a  thorn  in  the 
flesh. 

It  was  not  demagogism  only  that  moved  the  anti-Federal 
ists  to  grasp  these  near  and  efficient  weapons.  Their  in 
tellectual  and  moral  drunkenness  was  not  merely  feigned. 
They  had  grown  more  intoxicated  over  the  French  Revo 
lution  than  over  their  own  struggle  for  freedom.  Therefore 
it  was  not  only  poet-politicians,  like  Freneau,  and  ambitious 
crosses  between  statesmen  and  demagogues,  like  Jefferson, 
who  never  tired  of  holding  up  to  the  eyes  of  the  people  the 
frightful  spectre  of  a  crown.  Even  men  like  Madison  scent 
ed  monarchy  everywhere.2  !N  evertheless  these  fears  were 
entirely  ungrounded. 

Freneau's  and  Bache's  papers  are  outrages  on  common  decency ;  and 
they  progress  in  that  style,  in  proportion  as  their  pieces  are  treated  with 
contempt,  and  are  passed  by  in  silence,  by  those  at  whom  they  are 
aimed."  Wash.,  Works,  X.,  p.  359.  Compare  Jeff.,  Works,  IX.,  p. 
164. 

1  The  anti-Federalists,  and  Jefferson  more  than  any  of  them,  treated  it 
always  as  a  demonstrated  fact,  that  Hamilton  was  enabled  to  carry  his 
financial  measures  only  by  the  purchase  of  several  representatives.  But 
the  only  evidence  of  the  truth  of  this  accusation  is  the  boldness  with 
which  it  was  advanced.  The  demands  which  were  made  to  point  out 
who  had  been  bribed,  or  to  establish  the  general  accusations  in  any 
manner,  were  never  met. 

9  In  a  letter  dated  August  3, 1792,  he  writes  to  Randolph  of  the  "doc 
trines  and  discourses  circulated  in  favor  of  monarchy  and  aristocracy." 


REPUBLICAN    SENTIMENT.  109 

Friedrich  Kapp  rightly  remarks  that  the  colonists  at  the 
outbreak  of  the  Revolution  were  by  no  means  opposed,  on 
principle,  to  a  monarchical  form  of  government.1  Spite  of 
this,  however,  they  were  even  then  republican  to  the  core. 
The  question  of  monarchy  or  republic  was  not  here  one 
which  could  be  decided  at  pleasure.  The  republic  was  the 
only  form  of  government  that  could  be  adopted  under  the 
circumstances,  and  it  alone,  therefore,  could  subsist.  A 
form  of  government  out  of  harmony  with  the  manners  and 
customs  of  a  people  cannot  be  lasting,  and  the  manners 
and  customs  of  the  Americans  were  eminently  and  thor 
oughly  republican.  Their  attachment  to  the  royal  house 
of  England  and  to  the  English  form  of  government,  had 
become  a  habit  the  strength  of  which  was  in  its  age,  and 
which,  mistaking  the  real  condition  ot  things,  had  its  sup 
port  rather  in  the  fancy  than  in  the  heart.  It  could  pre 
vail  under  the  actual  condition  of  things  so  long,  only  be 
cause  monarchy  in  England  was  already  little  more  than  a 
form,  since  the  real  government  was  that  of  an  aristocratic 
republic;  and  because  all  that  was  especially  monarchical 
in  the  colonies  was  of  even  less  account  there  than  in  Eng 
land.  Once  the  passive  monarchy  to  which  they  had  been 
accustomed  was  rejected  by  the  colonists,  it  was  impossible 
to  reinstate  it.  The  foundation  on  which  it  had  rested  was 
utterly  destroyed,  and  hence  all  monarchical  tendencies 
necessarily  floated  in  the  air. 

The   blind  doctrinarianisjn  of  the  an ti -Federalists  pre- 

Rives,  Life  and  Times  of  Madison,  III.,  p.  196.  In  the  Virginia  resolu 
tions  drawn  up  by  him  in  1798,  it  is  objected  to  the  government  of  the 
Union  that  its  policy  tended  "  to  consolidate  the  states  by  degrees  into 
one  sovereignty,  the  obvious  tendency  and  inevitable  result  of  which 
would  be  to  transform  the  present  republican  system  of  the  United  States 
into  an  absolute,  or  at  best  a  mixed,  monarchy."  Elliot,  Deb.,  IV.,  p. 
528.  Again  in  May,  1824,  he  spoke  of  the  "  monarchical  spirit  and  par- 
tisanship  of  the  British  government  which  characterized  Fenno's  paper." 
Randall,  Life  of  Thos.  Jefferson,  II.,  pp.  74,  75. 
1  Preussische  Jahrbuecher,  1871. 


110  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND   SLAVERY. 

vented  their  recognizing  tins.  They  ransacked  the  whole 
of  history  for  analogies  to  prove  the  existence  and  the 
magnitude  of  the  danger.  The  so-called  monarchists,  on 
the  other  hand,  were  satisfied  that  the  examples  adduced 
had  no  application  to  the  given  case.  Their  rational  com 
plaint  was  that  the  history  of  other  peoples  contained  very 
little  that  could  be  used  as  an  analogy  at  all.1  And  of  all 
the  analogies  adduced,  that  seemed  to  them  the  most  dis 
torted  which  could  see  in  monarchy  the  sword  of  Damocles 
that  threatened  the  life  of  the  republic.2  This  view  was 
not  only  brought  forward  in  the  tribune  and  in  the  press 
as  a  defense  against  the  charges  of  their  opponents,  but  it 
finds  frequent  and  emphatic  expression  in  the  confidential 
correspondence  of  the  leading  Federalists.  Their  crime 
was  that  they  did  not  see  the  root  of  all  political  evil  in 
the  monarchical  idea,  and  that  they  were  convinced  that, 
even  under  a  republican  form  of  government,  a  people 
might  be  politically,  intellectually,  and  morally  ruined. 
They,  in  many  instances,  painted  things  in  too  dark  colors; 
but  their  speculations  were  based  on  the  actual  condition 
of  affairs,  not  on  abstractions,  and  they  well  knew  that  men 
could  not  be  treated  like  dead  figures  or  logical  formulae. 
If,  therefore,  they  did  not  join  in  the  thoughtless  howl 
against  monarchy  in  general,  they  recognized  more  clearly 
than  did  the  anti-Federalists  that  a  monarchy  was  impos 
sible  in  the  United  States,  and  that  if  one  were  established 
it  would  only  increase  the  evils  which  inspired  them  with 
so  much  serious  alarm  for  the  future  of  the  republic.3 

1UA  case  so  anomalous  as  ours,  so  unlike  everything  European 
in  its  ingredients,  its  action,  and  thus  far  in  its  operation  will  baffle,  for 
a  long  time,  all  the  conjectures  and  prognostics  that  are  drawn  from 
other  scenes."  Fisher  Ames,  Works,  I.,  p.  324. 

a  "  I  do  not  know  of  one  man  of  sense  and  information  who  seriously 
apprehends  any  danger  from  monarchical  opinions."  Wolcott  to  Jed. 
Morse,  Gibbs,  Mem.  of  Wolcott,  I.,  p.  190. 

8  "Monarchy  is  no  path  to  liberty;  offers  no  hopes.  It  could  not 
stand;  and  would,  if  tried,  lead  to  more  agitation  and  revolution  than 


HAMILTON   AS   A    MONARCHIST.  Ill 

And  even  if  they  in  theory  preferred  a  constitutional 
monarchy  to  the  republic,  this  unquestionable  fact  was  so 
ever  present  to  their  minds  that  their  acts  and  efforts  were 
never  in  conflict  with  it. 

If  any  one  could  rightly  be  called  a  monarchist  in  theory, 
it  was  Hamilton.  In  the  Philadelphia  convention  he  ex 
pressed  himself  convinced  "  that  the  British  government 
was  the  best  in  the  world,"  and  that  he  almost  doubted 
whether  a  republican  government  could  be  established  over 
so  extended  a  territory  as  that  of  the  United  States.  He 
added,  however,  that  he  was  sensible  "  it  would  be  unwise 
to  propose  any  other  form  of  government."1  This  last 
conviction  was  not  weakened  by  time,  but  grew  stronger 
every  day  until  the  '*  unwise"  became  the  unconditionally 
impossible.2  His  bitterest  friend  and  most  reckless  ac 
cuser,  Jefferson,  at  length  bore  witness  to  this,  long  after 
he  (Jefferson)  had  left  the  political  arena,  and  after  Ham 
ilton  had  been  twenty  years  in  his  grave.3 

anything  else."  Fisher  Ames,  Works,  I.,  p.  324.  Compare  Quincy, 
Life  of  J.  Quincy,  p.  88. 

1  Elliot,  Deb.,  V..  p.  202. 

3  "  It  is  past  all  doubt  that  he  [Burr]  has  blamed  me  for  not  having 
improved  the  situation  I  once  was  in  [as  quartermaster-general  of  the 
army],  to  change  the  government.  That  when  answered  that  this  could 
not  have  been  done  without  guilt,  he  replied :  'Les  grandes  ames  se  souci- 
ent  peu  des  petits  moraux ;'  that  when  told  the  thing  was  never  practic 
able  from  the  genius  and  situation  of  the  country,  he  answered :  '  That 
depends  on  the  estimate  we  form  of  the  human  passions,  and  of  the 
means  of  influencing  them.'  "  Hamilton  to  Bayard.  See  the  whole 
letter  in  Ham.,  Works,  VI.,  pp.  419-424.  By  an  oversight  it  is  dated 
a  year  too  early.  In  a  letter  of  Sept.  18,  1803,  on  the  plan  of  a 
constitution  which  he  had  laid  before  the  Philadelphia  convention,  he 
says:  "This  plan  was  predicated  upon  these  bases:  1.  That  the  political 
principles  of  the  people  of  this  country  would  endure  nothing  but  repub 
lican  government."  Hani.,  Works,  VI.,  p.  558. 

8  Jefierson  writes  to  Van  Buren,  June  29,  1824:  "For  Hamilton  frank 
ly  avowed  that  he  considered  the  British  constitution,  with  all  the  cor 
ruptions  of  its  administration,  as  the  most  perfect  model  of  government 
that  had  ever  been  devised  by  the  wit  of  man ;  professing,  however,  at 


112  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND   SLAVERY. 

The  fact  that  no  thought  was  farther  removed  from  the 
minds  of  the  Federalists  than  to  engage  in  monarchical  in 
trigues  was  of  no  practical  value,  inasmuch  as  th£  anti- 
Federalists  would  have  recognized  no  proof  of  it  as 
sufficient.  They  appreciated  too  highly  the  importance  of 
the  charges  to  withdraw  them  under  any  circumstance. 
This  is  evident  from  the  name  of  Republicans,  which  they 
gradually  assumed,  thus  claiming  to  represent  the  prin 
ciples  of  republicanism  with  their  whole  heart.  Besides, 
not  feeling  at  home  under  the  constitution,  it  was  impos 
sible  to  reason  with  them;  and  they  became  gradually 
more  and  more  the  victims  of  a  morbid  fancy.  Carried 
away  at  first  by  the  intoxication  and  the  idealism  of  the 
French  Revolution,  then  dropped,  after  the  over-excite 
ment,  into  a  state  in  which  apodictic  impatience  was  mis 
taken  for  Catonian  severity  of  principle,  they  fell  after  the 
spring  of  1793  into  the  infinite  depths  of  furious  fanaticism. 
The  arrival  of  the  French  ambassador,  Genet,  on  the  9th 
of  April,  1T93,1  at  Charleston,  was  the  signal  for  the  out 
break  of  the  commotion  which  for  four  years  had  been 
progressing  secretly,  only  .because  an  opportunity  waa 
wanting  for  a  violent  outburst. 

Genet  was  an  experienced  diplomat,  not  destitute  oi 
talent,  filled  even  to  fanaticism  with  the  radical  doctrines 
of  the  Revolution,  his  whole  thought  and  being  satiated 
with  the  characteristically  ingenuous  pride  of  his  nation 
ality.  He  acted  with  the  address  and  careless  assurance 
which,  in  view  of  the  feeling  he  found  prevailing 
among  the  people,  guaranteed  him  at  first  the  greatest 
success.  He  was  received  with  enthusiasm  in  Charleston, 

the  same  time,  that  the  spirit  of  this  country  was  so  fundamentally  re 
publican  that  it  would  be  visionary  to  think  of  introducing  monarchy 
here,  and  that  therefore  it  was  the  duty  of  its  administrators  to  conduct 
it  upon  the  principles  their  constituents  had  elected."  Van  Buren, 
Political  Parties,  p.  434. 
1  De  Witt,  Th.  Jefferson,  p.  218,  gives  April  8  as  the  date. 


ARRIVAL   OF   GENET.  113 

and  his  journey  to  Philadelphia  resembled  a  triumphal 
march.  The  Republicans  fell  victims  with  astonishing 
rapidity  to  the  power  of  high-sounding  phrases.  The  il 
lusion  that  they  were  called  to  be  the  apostles  of  liberty 
stole  away  their  senses.  The  ocean  which  lay-  between 
them  and  the  old  world  did  not  permit  the  thought  of 
preaching  the  gospel  of  equality  and  fraternity  from  the 
cannon's  mouth,  hand  in  hand  with  the  French,  to  the 
oppressed  and  enslaved  in  Europe,  to  occur  to  them,1  and 
propitious  fortune  had  given  them  no  neighbors  who  were 
in  need  of  it.  But  the  French  nation's  bloody  work  of 
redemption  at  home  and  abroad  was  destined  to  find  the 
greatest  moral  support  in  the  United  States.  And  could  it 
have  been  done,  France  would  have  received  help  from  them 
without  any  scrupulous  questionings  concerning  the  duties 
which  treaties  and  the  law  of  nations  had  imposed  on  them 
towards  other  powers.  This  was  precisely  what  Genet 
desired.  The  United  States  were  to  be  an  ally  of  France, 
and  follow  her  directions.  From  the  first,  Genet  assumed 
the  character  of  a  master  and  treated  every  impediment 
placed  in  his  way  as  treason  to  the  cause  of  liberty,  in  op 
position  to  which  there  were  no  rights  and  no  duties. 

Washington  had  feared  that  sympathy  for  France  might 
find  expression  in  a  dangerous  manner,  and  had  endeavored 
to  prevent  it  by  his  celebrated  proclamation  of  neutrality,2 

1  We  read  in  the  decree  of  the  convention  of  Nov.  15, 1792 :  "  The 
French  nation  declares  that  it  will  consider  that  people  an  enemy  which 
refuses  or  abandons  liberty  and  equality  or  which  desires  to  preserve 
its  princes  or  privileged  classes,  or  to  effect  any  composition  with  them." 
And  in  the  decree  of  Nov.  19, 1792,  it  declared  that  it  would  lend  its  aid 
to  any  people  who  desired,  to  regain  their  freedom. 

8  All  the  members  of  the  cabinet  agreed  that  a  proclamation  should  be 
issued  "  for  the  purpose  of  preventing  interferences  of  the  citizens  of 
the  United  States  in  the  war  between  France  and  Great  Britain."  Jeff,, 
Works,  III.,  p.  591;  Wash.,  Works,  X.,  p.  534;  Ham.,  Works,  IV.,  p. 
360.  The  word  "neutrality,"  however,  was  not  used,  on  account  of  the  ob 
jection  that  a  declaration  of  neutrality  was  beyond  the  powers  of  the  ex- 
8 


114  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

dated  April  22,  1T93.1  The  greater  publicity  was  given  to 
this  measure  because  Genet's  course  threatened  to  involve 
the  United  States  in  the  most  serious  complications  with 
England.  The  Republicans,  however,  continued  to  treat  the 
proclamation  as  ill-timed  and  unnecessary,2  and  as  if  there 
were  not  the  slightest  doubt  on  the  matter.  An  acrimonious 
contest  was  thus  begun — a  contest  in  which  there  would 
have  been  no  need  of  an  express  declaration  of  hostilities, 
if  a  large  portion  of  the  people  had  not  been  affected  by  a 
political  vertigo.  It  would  have  been  more  than  foolish  to 
look  idly  on,  expecting  a  return  of  sobriety  in  due  time. 
The  blind  violence  against  the  administration  was  the  best 
evidence  how  necessary  it  had  been  to  take  precautionary 
measures  without  delay.3  The  republican  press  raged  so 
wildly  and  withal  so  successfully,  that  Hamilton  himself 
considered  it  his  duty  to  enter  the  lists  for  the  administra 
tion.  The  weight  of  his  blows  was  always  so  heavily  felt 
by  the  republicans  that  they  allowed  only  their  best  com 
batants  to  oppose  him.  And  now  Madison,  under  the 

ecutive,  and  that  it  was  better  to  avoid  a  declaration  of  neutrality  in  order 
to  obtain  in  exchange  the  "  broadest  privileges"  of  neutral  powers.  Jeff., 
Works,  III.,  p.  591;  IV.,  pp.  18,  29,  30.  Jefferson,  however,  rightly  re 
marks  :  "  The  public,  however,  soon  took  it  up  as  a  declaration  of  neu 
trality,  and  it  came  to  be  considered  at  length  as  such."  Washington 
himself  uses  the  word  repeatedly  in  his  answers  to  the  addresses  which 
were  directed  to  him  on  the  question. 

1  Statesman's  Manual,  I.,  p.  46.  Genet  had  not  yet  arrived  in  Phila 
delphia.  His  arrival  in  Charleston  was  first  known  in  Washington,  on 
the  day  on  which  the  proclamation  was  issued.  The  news  of  his  intrigues 
followed  close  upon  this  announcement. 

8  Letters  of  Pacificus,  No.  VII. 

3  Madison  writes  to  Jefferson,  June  19,  1793:  "Every  gazette  I  see 
(except  that  of  the  United  States)  exhibits  the  spirit  of  criticism  on  the 
Anglified  complexion  charged  on  the  executive  politics.  .  .  .  The 
proclamation  was  in  truth  a  most  unfortunate  error.  It  wounds  the 
national  honor,  by  seeming  to  disregard  the  stipulated  duties  to  France. 
It  wounds  the  popular  feelings  by  a  seeming  indifference  to  the  cause  of 
liberty."  Rives,  Life  and  Times  of  J.  Madison,  III.,  pp.  334,  335. 


JEFFERSON   AND    GENET.  115 

name  of  Helvidius,  endeavored  to  neutralize  the  effects  of 
Pacificus's  seven  letters.1 

Jefferson,  with  the  ingenuousness  of  a  child,  was  caught  in 
the  clumsy  snares  of  the  French  ambassador.  The  mag 
nificent  and  high-sounding  phrases  in  which  Genet  had 
tendered  the  hand  of  disinterested  friendship  to  the  sister 
republic  in  the  name  of  the  French  nation,  were  wonder 
fully  seductive  to  Jefferson's  ears.  In  a  single  sentence: 
"  In  short,  he  offers  everything  and  asks  nothing,"  Jeffer 
son  rapturously  and  correctly  condensed  the  whole  of 
Genet's  declaration.2  It  is  characteristic  of  Jefferson's 
statesmanship,  that  he  could  accept  such  declarations  as  of 
any  real  value.  There  were  reasons  enough  why  France, 
at  that  time,  should  have  been  very  anxious  to  make  use 
of  the  United  States  to  the  utmost  extent,  in  her  own  inter 
est.  Men  like  Jefferson  even  could  adduce  only  one  reason 
for  the  assumption  that  France  was  actuated  by  a  disinter 
estedness  never  yet  heard  of  in  the  history  of  diplomacy, 
namely,  that  she  was  a  republic,  and  that  so  large-hearted  a 
feeling  was  eminently  becoming  a  republic.  It  was  not  to 
be  assumed  of  a  republic  that  it  used  only  a  meaningless 
phrase,  insulting  to  the  intelligence  of  those  addressed, 
when  it  said :  "  "We  see  in  you  the  only  person  on  earth 
who  can  love  us  sincerely  and  merit  to  be  so  loved."3  Jef 
ferson  added,  with  a  mixture  of  acrimony  and  proud  pity 
for  the  shortsightedness  and  perversity  of  his  opponents: 
"  Yet  I  know  the  offers  will  be  opposed,  and  suspect  they 
will  not  be  accepted." 

1  In  Gideon's  edition  of  the  Federalist,  1818,  the  letters  of  Paciflcus 
and  Helvidius  are  given  entire.  The  beginning  of  Madison's  first  let 
ter  is  very  characteristic :  "  Several  pieces  with  the  signature  of  Paci- 
ficus  were  lately  published,  which  have  been  read  with  singular  pleas 
ure  and  applause  by  the  foreigners  and  degenerate  citizens  among  us, 
who  hate  our  republican  government  and  the  French  revolution." 

1  Jeff.,  Works,  III.,  p.  563. 

'  Jeff.,  Works,  L  c. 


116  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY  .AND    SLAVERY. 

Genet  illustrated  the  friendship  of  France  in  a  manner 
which  soon  opened  the  eyes  of  even  the  unwilling  Jeffer 
son  to  the  character  of  her  ambassador,  if  not  of  the  sister 
republic  herself.  He  wrote  to  Monroe  on  the  14th  of  July: 
"  His  conduct  is  indefensible  by  the  most  furious  Jaco 
bin."1  But  he  had  himself  too  long  occupied  an  ambigu 
ous  position  in  regard  to  this  conduct  of  Genet  to  per 
mit  him  to  repel  as  an  absurd  calumny  that  he  was  him 
self  a  Jacobin.  Genet  informed  the  ministry  of  foreign 
affairs  that  at  first  Jefferson  had  given  him  certain  very  use 
ful  hints,  hints  which,  coming  to  the  ambassador  of  a  foreign 
power  from  the  secretary  of  state,  were  evidence  of  more 
than  a  want  of  tact.2  In  more  than  one  instance  in  which 
Genet  threatened  most  dangerously  to  compromise  the 
United  States,  Jefferson  hindered  the  action  of  the  gov 
ernment  to  an  extent  that  justified  the  charge  that  he 
played  a  masked  part,  and  valued  the  friendship  of  France 
more  than  the  honor  of  his  own  country.3  On  the  5th  of 
July,  that  is,  only  nine  days  before  the  letter  to 
Monroe  above  referred  to,  he  indirectly,  but  with  a  knowl 
edge  of  Genet's  plan,  advocated  that  an  uprising  against 
Spanish  rule  in  Louisiana  with  the  aid  of  the  Kentuckians 
should  be  provoked.4 

1  Jeff.,  Works,  IV.,  p.  20. 

3  "  Dans  les  commencements,  Jefferson,  secretaire  d'Etat,  m'a  donnc" 
des  notions  utiles  sur  les  liommes  en  place  et  ne  m'a  point  cache*  que  le 
eenateur  Morris,  et  le  secretaire  de  le  tre*sorerie  Hamilton,  attache's  aux 
intents  de  1'Angleterre,  avaient  la  plus  grande  influence  sur  1'esprit  du 
president,  et  que  ce  n'etait  qu'avec  peine  qu'il  contrebalan9ait  leurs 
efforts."  Dispatch  of  Oct.  7,  1793.  Documents  historiques,  No.  VII., 
quoted  by  DeWitt,  Th.  Jefferson,  p.  221. 

8  The  most  notable  case  was  that  of  the  Little  Democrat.  Compare 
Marshall,  Life  of  Wash.,  II ,  pp.  270-273.  Randall's  exhaustive  defense 
of  Jefferson's  mode  of  action  on  this  occasion  (Life  of  Jefferson,  II., 
pp.  157-172,)  is,  like  the  whole  book,  written  in  too  partisan  a  spirit.  It 
is,  however,  true  that  the  condensed  account  m  Marshall  is  not  alto 
gether  correct. 

*  Genet's  dispatch  of  July  25,  to  be  found  in  De  Witt,  Th.  Jefferson, 


GENET'S  INSOLENCE.  117 

If  Jefferson  and  the  greater  part  of  the  Republicans  had 
their  eyes  opened  it  was  due  simply  to  Genet's  folly. 

What  Chauncey  Goodrich  said  a  few  years  later  was  true 
even  now:  The  French  did  not  rest  until  they  had  cured 
the  Americans  of  their  "  love-sickness."1  "When  the  au 
thorities  were  getting  ready  to  take  energetic  measures  in 
the  matter  of  the  "  Little  Democrat,"  Genet  threatened 
to  appeal  to  the  people,  and  soon  carried  out  his  threat. 
This  was  going  too  far.  Even  the  Republicans,  with  few 
exceptions,  had  not  yet  fallen  so  low  as  to  permit  the  French 
charge-d'affaires  to  go  unpunished,  for  formally  calling  on 
them  to  oppose  the  administration  under  his  leadership, 
especially  while  Washington  was  at  the  head  of  it.  The 
steps  which  his  own  government  characterized  as  "punish 
able"  and  "criminal"2  they  would  willingly  have  connived 

p.  221.  We  there  read:  "M.  Jefferson  me  parut  sentir  vivement  1'utilite* 
de  ce  projet;  mais  il  me  ddclara  que  les  Etats-Unis  avaient  entame*  les 
ne'gociations  avec  1'Espagne  a  ce  sujet,  qu'on  lui  demandait  de  donner 
aux  Ame*ricains  un  entrepot  andessus  de  la  Nouvelle-Orle'ans,  et  que  tant 
que  cette  ne"gociation  ne  serait  pas  rompue,  la  de*licatesse  des  Etats-Unis 
ne  leur  permettrait  pas  de  prendre  part  &  nos  operations ;  cependant  il  me 
fit  entendre  quil  pensait  qu'une  petite  irruption  spontane6  des  habitans  de 
Kentucky  dans  la  Nouvelle-Orle'ans  pouvait  avancer  les  choses ;  il  me  mit 
en  relation  avec  plusieurs  de"pute*s  du  Kentucky,  et  notainment  avec  M. 
Brown."  According  to  Jefferson's  own  account  he  warned  Genet  not  to 
make  formal  enlistments  in  Kentucky  or  to  issue  commissions  to  officers, 
because  by  so  doing  he  would  be  placing  a  rope  about  the  people's  necks. 
After  which  he  continues :  "  That  leaving  out  that  article  [in  Genet's 
proposed  address]  I  did  not  care  what  insurrections  should  be  excited 
in  Louisiana."  He  gave  a  letter  of  recommendation  to  Genet's  agent, 
one  Michaud — DeWitt  gives  the  name  Michaux — to  governor  Shelby. 
In  this  letter  he  spoke  of  him  simply  as  "  a  person  of  botanical  and 
natural  pursuits;"  but  at  Genet's  request  he  changed  the  letter  so  that 
the  governor  would  see  something  more  in  him.  Ana.,  Jeff,  Works, 
IX.,  pp.  150,  151. 

1  Goodrich  writes  to  the  elder  Wolcott,  Jan.  18,  1797 :  "  Our  country 
must  get  over  its  love-sickness  for  France,  and  if  one  degree  of  suffering 
and  insult  won't  answer  that  valuable  purpose,  they  will  have  madness 
enough  to  administer  sufficiency."  Gibbs,  Mem.  of  Wolcott,  I.,  p.  436. 

1 "        .    .    la  conduite  puinissable    ....    les  demarches  et  les 


118  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY    AND   SLAVERY. 

at.  But  they  could  not  quietly  consent  that  a  foreigner 
should  dare  to  menace,  in  the  name  of  the  people,  a  gov 
ernment  established  by  the  free  choice  of  the  people.  That 
was  not  only  to  oppose  the  policy  of  the  administration 
which  they  did  not  like,  but  to  deride  republicanism  it 
self,  and  offer  an  insult  to  the  whole  country.  The  Re 
publicans  did  not  dare  to  blame  the  administration  for  de 
manding  Genet's  recall,  and  did  not  desire  to  blame 
it,1  although  the  reaction  in  public  opinion  in  favor  of  the 
government,  once  begun,  was  not  confined  to  this  special 
point.  They  might,  indeed,  easily  yield  here;  because 
from  the  first  they  entertained  the  right  view,  that  the 
masses  of  their  adherents  would  soon  plunge  again  into 
the  same  old  stream.2 

In  the  new  congress  which  met  on  the  2nd  of  December, 
the  Republicans  had  a  majority  in  the  house  of  representa 
tives.  Their  candidate  Muhlenberg  was  chosen  speaker  by 
a  majority  of  ten  votes.  The  administration  therefore 
found  itself  from  the  start  in  a.  precarious  position,  the  dif- 

manoeuvres  criminelles  du  citoyen  Genet."  Defargues,  the  then  minis 
ter  of  French  foreign  affairs,  to  G.  Morris.  Sparks,  Life  of  Washington, 
II.,  p.  358.  France's  answer  to  the  expostulation  of  the  United  States 
would  certainly  have  been  very  different  if  the  Girondists  had  been 
still  at  the  helm,  and  had  persevered  in  their  policy.  It  is  established 
by  documentary  evidence  that  Genet  received  express  instructions  to 
involve  the  United  States  in  the  war.  The  whole  plan  on  which  he 
operated  was  prescribed  to  him  in  detail,  and  the  responsibility,  there 
fore,  does  not  rest  mainly  on  himself.  Me"moire  pour  servir  d'instruc- 
tion  au  citoyen  Genet ;  the  advice  of  the  conseil  exe"cutif  of  Jan.  17, 
1793;  the  dispatches  of  the  minister  of  foreign  affairs  to  Genet,  of  Feb, 
24  and  March  10, 1793.  De  Witt,  p.  218. 

1  Genet,  however,  still  found  some  defenders.  Jefferson  writes  to 
Madison,  SepL  1, 1793 :  "  He  has  still  some  defenders  in  Freneau  and 
Greenleafs  paper,  and  who  they  are  I  know  not;  for  even  Hutcheson 
and  Dallas  give  him  up."  Jeff.,  Works,  IV.,  p.  53. 

3  "Hutcheson  says  that  Genet  has  totally  overturned  the  republican  in 
terest  in  Philadelphia.  However,  the  people  going  right  themselves,  if 
they  always  see  th^ir  Republican  advocates  with  them,  an  accidental 
meeting  with  the  monocrats  will  not  be  a  coalescence."  Jeff.,  "Works,  1.  c. 


MEETING    OF   CONGRESS.  119 

faculties  of  which  were  greatly  increased  by  the  tactics  of 
the  opposition,  which  were  as  subtle  as  they  were  unpat 
riotic.  The  principle  which  Jefferson  wished  to  see  made 
the  leading  one  of  the  opposition :  "  to  do  nothing  and  to 
gain  time,"1  had  been  already,  to  a  great  extent,  adopted 
by  them.  The  resolutions  of  the  administration  were  met 
by  counter-resolutions  which  it  was  known  the  administra 
tion  could  not  accept.  When  it  was  necessary  that  some 
thing  should  be  done,  a  compromise  was  effected — often  only 
after  a  long  debate — and  then  the  government  was  held 
responsible  for  the  half-measures  adopted.  Moreover,  the 
dangerous  necessity  of  adopting  themselves  clear  and  de 
cisive  measures  was  avoided  with  great  skill.  In  short, 
the  opposition  was  in  the  highest  sense  of  the  word  an  op 
position  and  nothing  more.  Wolcott  describes  the  action 
of  congress  during  this  session  in  the  following  words: 
"Nothing  very  wrong  has  yet  been  done,  though  much  has 
been  attempted;  on  the  whole,  the  session  has  reflected  no 
honor  upon  the  government  of  the  country.  Weakness, 
passion,  and  suspicion  have  been  leading  characteristics  in 
the  public  proceedings."2 

Jefferson's  exit  from  the  cabinet3  was  not  a  full  compen 
sation  for  this  attitude  of  the  house  of  representatives. 
Washington  did  not  again  try  to  realize  an  independent 

1  Jeff.,  Works,  IV.,  p.  222. 

8  Gibbs,  Mem.  of  Wol.,  I.,  134. 

1  Jan.  1, 1794.  Ch.  FT.  Adams  gives  the  reasons  of  Jefferson's  retire- 
ment  in  the  following  words:  "For  Mr.  Jefferson  to  continue  longer 
in  the  cabinet  in  which  his  influence  was  sinking,  was  not  only  distaste 
ful  to  himself,  but  was  putting  a  restraint  on  the  ardor  of  opposition 
and  impairing  the  energies  of  his.  friends  without  any  compensating 
prospect  of  good.  He  determined  to  withdraw;  and  his  act  became 
the  signal  for  the  consolidation  of  the  party,  which  looked  to  him  as  its 
chief.  Broad  and  general  ground  was  now  taken  against  the  whole  pol 
icy  of  the  administration,  and  the  arrows,  shut  up  within  the  quiver,  so 
long  as  he  remained  liable  to  be  hit,  were  now  drawn  forth  and  sharp 
ened  for  use  even  against  Washington  himself."  Life  of  J.  Adams,  II , 
p.  152. 


120  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY   AND   SLAVERY. 

administration  by  taking  the  leaders  of  both  parties  into 
his  counsel.  But  the  attorney  -  general,  Randolph,  who 
succeeded  Jefferson,  was  by  no  means  a  change  for  the  bet 
ter.  His  position  from  the  very  first  had  been  wavering 
and  uncertain,  although  as  a  general  rule  he  sided  with 
Jefferson.  The  Republicans  therefore  did  not  look  upon 
him  as  unconditionally  theirs,  much  less  their  leader. 
Washington  could  no  longer  claim  with  the  same  force  as 
before,  that  so  far  as  the  constitution  of  his  cabinet  was 
concerned,  he  had  done  equal  justice  to  both  parties,  and 
still  he  had  by  no  means  strengthened  his  cabinet.  He 
had  in  fact  jumped  out  of  the  frying  pan  into  the  fire.  The 
greatest  reproach  that  could  be  made  against  Jefferson  du 
ring  his  course  as  secretary  of  state  was  his  coquetry  with 
France,  a  coquetry  which  bordered  on  intrigue.  Randolph 
overstepped  these  limits.  But  before  it  came  to  light,  a 
great  revolution  had  taken  place  in  public  opinion. 

The  French  government  had  completely  disavowed 
Genet,  and  the  new  embassador  Fauchet  began  his  admin 
istration  with  moderation  and  tact.1  Everybody  was,  there 
fore,  soon  ready  to  excuse  France  entirely,  and  to .  hold 
Genet  personally  responsible  for  the  wrong  that  had  been 
done. 

England  lent  great  aid  to  this  revival  of  sympathy  for 
France.  Instead  of  furthering  the  change  in  the  opinion 
of  the  American  people  by  reciprocating  it,  and  thus  util 
izing  it  for  her  own  ends,  she  allowed  herself  to  proceed 
still  more  recklessly  in  her  mad  and  excited  policy.  The 
English  order  in  council  of  the  6th  of  November,  1793, 
which  forbade  the  commerce  of  foreign  nations  with  the 
French  colonies,  was  looked  upon  in  the  United  States  as  a 
token  of  an  unfriendly  disposition,  to  such  an  extent  that 
serious  thoughts  of  the  possibility  of  a  war  began  to  be 
entertained.  On  the  26th  of  March,  1794,  congress 

'Wash.,  Works, X.,  p.  401. 


THE    FIRST    EMBARGO  121 

an  embargo  of  thirty  days,  which  was  afterwards  prolonged 
for  thirty  days  more.  Other  measures,  partly  to  place  the 
country  in  a  state  of  defense,  and  partly  to  provide  for  suf 
ficient  reprisals  for  any  damage  which  might  accrue  to 
American  citizens,  were  taken  under  consideration.1  The 
news  of  the  modification  which  the  order  in  council  of  No 
vember  6  had  received  by  the  new  one  of  January  8, 
1794:,  allayed  the  excitement  to  some  small  extent.  Clark 
of  New  Jersey  proposed  on  the  7th  of  April,  1794,  in  the 
house  of  representatives,  that  the  purchase  of  British  man 
ufactured  goods  and  raw  material  should  be  forbidden 
until  the  western  posts  were  surrendered  and  full  com 
pensation  made  for  the  losses  which  the  Americans  had 
sustained  in  consequence  of  the  violation  of  their  neutral 
rights.  The  house  adopted2  the  resolution  on  the  21st 
of  April  in  an  amended  form,  and  it  seemed  not  improb 
able  that  it  would  be  adopted  by  the  senate  also.3  War 
would  thus  have  been  almost  inevitable.  Washington, 
therefore,  resolved  to  send  a  minister  extraordinary  to  Eng 
land  to  make  a  last  effort  to  bring  about  a  peaceable  solu 
tion  of  the  differences  between  the  two  countries.4  His 


1  Even  here  motives  not  the  best  came  into  play.  John  Adams  writes 
to  his  wife  on  the  10th  of  May :  "  The  senators  from  Virginia  moved, 
in  consequence  of  an  instruction  from  their  constituents,  that  the  execu 
tion  of  the  fourth  article  of  the  treaty  of  peace,  relative  to  bona  fide  debts, 
should  be  suspended  until  Britain  should  fulfill  the  seventh  article.  When 
the  question  was  put,  fourteen  voted  against  it,  two  only,  the  Virginia 
delegates,  for  it;  and  all  the  rest  but  one  ran  out  of  the  room  to  avoid 
voting  at  all,  and  that  one  excused  himself.  This  is  the  first  instance 
of  the  kind.  The  motion  disclosed  all  the  real  object  of  the  wild  pro 
jects  and  mad  motions  which  have  been  made  during  the  whole  session." 
Life  of  J.  Adams,  II.,  p.  177.  It  is  well  known  how  since  then  the  prac 
tice  has  increased  of  avoiding  the  responsibility  of  a  vote  by  absence. 

3  By  58  against  38  votes.  See  the  resolution,  Deb.  of  Congress,  I.,  p.  498. 
'The  vote  in  the  senate  at  the  third  reading  stood  13  to  13;  the  vote 

of  the   vice-president  decided  it  in  the  negative.    Life  of  J.  Adams, 
II.,  p.  154. 

4  Wash.,  Works,  X.,  pp.  403,  404.    Life  of  J.  Adams,  II.,  p.  153. 


122         STATE  SOVEBEIGNTY  AND  SLAVERY. 

choice  fell  upon  chief-justice  Jay,  whose  nomination  was 
after  some  opposition,  confirmed  by  the  senate.1 

Thanks  to  the  statesmanlike  moderation  with  which  Jay 
went  to  work,  his  mission  was  successful.  On  the  19th  of 
November,  1794,  he  drew  up  the  treaty2  of  reconciliation, 
and  on  the  9th  of  March  it  reached  Washington's  hands. 
The  senate  ratified  it  by  the  constitutional  majority  of  two- 
thirds,  except  Art.  12,  which  related  to  the  commerce 
with  the  "West  Indies.3  Washington,  however,  delayed  to 
sign  it  because  some  of  the  provisions  did  not  meet  his 
approbation.  This  was  highly  acceptable  to  the  extreme 
Republicans.  They  had  begun  their  agitations  against  it 
even  before  its  contents  were  known.4  They  were  indis 
posed  to  come  to  any  understanding  whatsoever  with  Eng 
land,  because  they  thought  it  would  have  the  effect  of  cur 
tailing  the  moral  and  other  support  which  they  desired  to 
see  guaranteed  to  France.  When,  therefore,  the  indiscre 
tion  of  a  senator5  had  made  the  contents  of  the  treaty  pub 
lic,  a  storm  of  opposition  was  immediately  raised  against 
it. 

The  American  democracy  here  exhibited  a  phase  of  its 
character  which  has  since  been  frequently  observed.  Fisher 
Ames  rebuked  the  people  for  allowing  themselves  to  be 
too  much  commanded.6  The  position  which  they  had 
hitherto  assumed  in  relation  to  France  justified  the  re 
proach.  But  in  proportion  as  they  yielded  too  much  to 
France  they  paid  too  little  attention  to  England.  In  the 
case  of  the  former  their  fancies  led  them  to  adopt  an  un- 

1  Three  days  before  the  adoption  of  Clark's  resolution  by  the  house, 
but  after  it  had  been  adopted  in  committee  of  the  whole. 

9  Statutes  at  Large,  VIII.,  pp.  116-129. 

'  June  24,  1795. 

*  Wash.,  Writings,  XI.,  p.  513. 

6  Stevens  Thompson  Mason  of  Virginia. 

.'""We  the  people,  are  in  truth  more  kickable  than  I  could  have  con- 
ceived."  To  Wolcott,  April  24,  1797.  Gibbs,  Mem.  of  Wolcott,  I., 
p.  49S. 


PREJUDICE   AGAINST   ENGLAND.  123 

wise  policy,  which  blunted  their  feelings  for  the  honor  and 
dignity  of  the  state;  in  the  case  of  the  latter  they  yielded  to 
their  caprice  even  to  the  point  of  total  forgetfulness  of  every 
political  consideration.  The  question  what  kind  of  treaty 
the  United  States  ought  to  have  expected  under  the  cir 
cumstances  was  one  which  the  Republicans  did  not  at  all 
propose  to  themselves.  While  in  internal  affairs  political 
wisdom  had,  in  the  course  of  years,  degenerated  into  moral 
cowardice,  here,  where  a  treaty  could,  in  the  nature  of 
things,  be  only  a  compromise  between  opposing  claims, 
the  very  thought  of  a  compromise  was  branded  as  a  shame 
ful  barter  of  the  national  honor.  The  possibilities,  with 
their  various  probabilities,  were  not  weighed  against  one 
another,  and  no  effort  was  made  to  ascertain  whether  the 
enforcement  of  the  claims  made  by  the  United  States 
was,  under  the  circumstances,  to  be  reckoned  among  the 
possibilities.  The  feeling  of  national  honor,  and  the 
calm  confidence  in  the  national  power,  were  distorted  into 
sensitive  haughtiness  and  presumptuous  declaration. 
Where  there  should  have  been  only  sober  examination,  the 
irritated  feelings  of  the  people  were  artfully  excited,  even 
to  the  blindness  of  passion,  and  the  dignity  of  statesman 
like  judgment  was  claimed  for  the  vague  feelings  of  the 
masses,  now  degenerated  to  the  level  of  mere  instincts. 
Assemblies  of  the  people  without  any  legal  existence 
spoke  as  the  "  people,"  and  deduced  from  the  principle 
of  the  people's  sovereignty  their  right  to  make  recom 
mendations1  to  the  lawful  authorities  in  the  form  of  ex 
pressions  of  opinion,  which  often  assumed  a  mandatory 
and  even  threatening  tone.  Moreover,  the  people  delighted 
in  demonstrations,  which,  besides  being  indecorous  and  out 


1  "  Such  errors  are  unavoidable  where  the  people,  in  crowds  out  of  doors, 
undertake  to  receive  ambassadors,  and  to  dictate  to  their  supreme  execu 
tive."  J.  Adams,  on  the  19th  of  December,  1793,  to  his  wife.  Life  of 
J.  Adams,  II.,  p.  158. 


124          STATE  SOVEREIGNTY  AND  SLAVERY. 

of  taste,  must  have  been  the  occasion  of  great  offense  to 
England.1 

The  storm  first  broke  out  in  Boston,  New  York  and 
Philadelphia.  From  the  time  that  the  blessings  of  the 
constitution  began  to  be  felt,  the  lower  strata  of  the  popu 
lation  of  the  larger  cities  commenced  to  swell  the  ranks  of 
the  anti-Federalists.  Sounding  phrases  and  all  the  arts  of  the 
demagogue  could  here  be  made  use  of  with  greatest  suc 
cess.  The  plebs  of  the  large  cities  have  always  furnished 
the  best  field  for  doctrinarianism.  "We  find,  therefore,  that 
in  the  United  States  as  elsewhere  they  had  formed  a  coali 
tion  with  the  aristocratic  south,  before  it  had  become  pecu 
liarly  a  slavocracy  and  before  the  masses,  sunk  in  a  degree 
to  the  level  of  the  proletariat,  had  made  themselves  over  to 
it  entirely.  The  south  was  from  the  start  the  leading 
spirit  of  this  alliance,  and  the  only  party  that  reaped  any 
advantage  from  it. 

The  south  also,  was  now  the  real  home  of  the  movement, 
although  it  first  broke  out  in  the  large  cities  of  the  north, 
and  was  there  apparently  most  violent.2 

The  reception  given  to  the  treaty  cannot  be  fully  ex 
plained  by  the  existing  relations  between  the  United  States 
and  England.  It  was  only  in  consequence  of  its  Franco- 
mania  that  the  opposition  assumed  the  character  of  blind 
rage.  This  Francomania,  however,  was  not  so  much  one  of 
the  grounds  of  the  separation  of  parties  as  one  of  the 
elements  which  caused  that  separation  to  find  expres 
sion  in  a  manner  pregnant  with  great  consequences.  Such 


1  The  treaty  was  burned  in  Philadelphia  in  front  of  the  house  of  the 
English  ambassador,  Hammond,  and  in  Charleston  the  people  dragged 
the  English  flag  through  the  mud  in  the  streets.  Gibbs,  Mem.  cf  Wol- 
cott,  I.,  pp.  218,  220. 

8  "  The  treaty  has  received  a  most  violent  opposition  from  a  certain 
party  in  most  of  the  great  towns,  but  in  the  southern  states  the  opposi 
tion  is  pretty  general."  Wolcott,  to  his  father,  Aug.  10, 1795.  Gibbs, 
Mem.  of  Wolcott,  I.,  p.  224 


THE  ALMIGHTY  DOLLAE.  125 

was  their  antipathy  against  England  that  the  majority  of 
even  the  Federalists  would,  spite  of  the  excesses  of  the 
French  Revolution,  have  continued  to  lean  more  towards 
France,  if  their  material  interests  had  not  bound  them 
more  firmly  to  England.  In  the  southern  states,  either 
this  was  not  the  case,  or  they  ignored  that  it  was.  Their 
policy  in  this  question  they  looked  upon,  therefore,  simply 
as  a  matter  of  sympathy  or  antipathy.  In  the  commercial 
north,  the  dollar  turned  the  wavering  scales.  Its  interest 
saved  it  from  swallowing  the  poison  of  the  doctrinarians 
in  quantities  large  enough  to  affect  its  vision  where  the 
national  honor  was  concerned.  When  during  the  presi 
dency  of  John  Adams,  the  disagreement  between  France 
and  the  United  States  led  to  an  interruption  of  diplomatic 
relations,  a  small  part  of  the  Federalists  were  in  favor  of 
war.  From  a  war  with  France  they  expected,  and  not 
without  some  reason,  that  there  would  be  no  great  injury 
to  American  commerce.  By  an  increase  of  difficulty  with 
England,  on  the  other  hand,  the  United  States  would  gain 
very  little  at  the  best,  while  the  eastern  states  would  nec 
essarily  suffer  a  great  deal  therefrom.1  There  was  little 
more  needed  to  carry  the  struggle  to  the  extent  of  a  war;2 
and  a  war  with  England  meant  the  ruin  of  the  commerce 
of  the  eastern  states.  As  early  as  1793,  when  peace  with 
England  was  endangered  by  Genet's  machinations  and 
their  consequences,  there  were  those  in  the  New  England 
states  who,  in  no  covert  language,  urged  that  a  dissolution 


1  The  exports  to  France  and  her  colonies  amounted  in  1797  to  $12,449,- 
076;  in  1798,  to  $6,968,996;  in  1799,  to  $2,780,504;  in  1800,  to  $5,163,- 
833.  The  exports  to  Great  Britain  and  her  colonies  in  1797  amounted  to 
$9,212,235;  in  1798,  to  $17,184,347;  in  1799,  to  $26,546,987  and  in  1800  to 
$27,310,289.  Pitkin,  A  Statistical  View  of  the  Commerce  of  the  United 
States  of  America,  p.  216. 

8  Washington  writes  to  Hamilton,  Aug.  31, 1795 :  "  It  would  seem  next 
to  impossible  to  keep  peace  between  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain." 
Ham.,  Works,  VI.,  p.  33. 


126  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

of  the  Union  was  preferable  to  a  war  with  England.1 
Hence  the  geographical  grouping  of  the  friends  and  ene 
mies  of  the  treaty  did  not  escape  them,  spite  of  appearan 
ces,  which  were  at  first  deceptive.  Stepping  beyond  the 
limits  of  the  question  immediately  before  them,  they 
pointed  to  the  division  of  the  republic  into  two  "  great 
sections"  and  declared  an  understanding  between  them  to 
be  a  condition  precedent  of  the  continuance  of  the  Union.2 
In  the  north  the  reaction  soon  set  in.  The  mercantile 
community,  which  had  been  induced  to  join  the  opposition, 
had  been  either  duped  or  terrorized.  The  farmers  did  not 
change  their  mind.  "When  they  finally  gave  expression  to 
it,  after  all  the  questions  pertaining  to  the  treaty  had  been 
examined,  they  were  decidedly  in  favor  of  it.  In  the 
south,  on  the  contrary,  there  was  little  change  of  opinion, 
except  among  the  merchants,  and  only  among  a  part  of 
them.  Among  the  masses  of  the  people  the  intense  ex 
citement  was  followed  by  a  kind  of  lassitude,  while  the 
leaders  became  daily  more  violent  in  their  attacks  on  the 
treaty  and  its  supporters.  Madison  branded  the  Federal- 

1  "A  war  with  Great  Britain,  we,  at  least  in  New  England,  will  not 
enter  into.  Sooner  would  ninety-nine  out  of  a  hundred  of  our  inhabit 
ants  separate  from  the  Union  than  plunge  themselves  into  an  abyss  of 
misery."  Th.  Dwight  to  Wolcott.  Gibbs,  Mem.  of  Wol.,  I.,  p.  107. 

a  Wolcott  writes  to  Noah  Webster,  Aug.  1st,  1795  :  "  We  have  every 
thing  to  hope  from  the  virtue  and  reason  of  one  part  of  the  community, 
and  everything  to  fear  from  the  vice  and  turbulence  of  another.  It  is, 
however,  certain  that  the  great  sections  of  the  United  States  will  not  long 
continue  to  be  agitated  as  they  have  been.  We  must  and  shall  come  to 
some  explanation  with  each  other."  Gibbs,  Mem.  of  Wolcott,  I.,  p.  222. 
It  is  evidence  of  the  keenness  of  his  insight  that  on  this  occasion  he 
characterized  slavery  as  the  essential  cause  of  the  division,  although  it 
had  no  direct  connection  with  the  treaty.  He  writes  on  the  10th  of 
August,  1795,  to  his  father:  "I  am,  however,  almost  discouraged  with 
respect  to  the  southern  states ;  the  effect  of  the  slave  system  has  been 
such  that  I  fear  our  government  will  never  operate  with  efficacy.  »"  . 
Indeed  we  must  of  necessity  soon  come  to  a  sober  explanation  with  that 
people  and  know  upon  what  we  are  to  depend.  It  is  impossible  to 
continue  long  in  our  present  state."  Ibid,  I.,  p.  224. 


"OAMILLTJS."  127 

ists  as  the  "British  party,"  and  charged  them  with  having 
sacrificed  "  the  most  sacred  dictates  of  national  honor."1 
Jefferson  was  not  ashamed  to  reproach  Jay,  the  well-tried 
patriot  and  chief -justice  of  the  United  States,  with  being 
a  "  rogue."2 

The  contest  in  the  press  was  conducted  with  an  acrimony 
and  an  expenditure  of  energy  such  as  has  not  been  wit 
nessed  a  second  time  since  the  adoption  of  the  constitu 
tion.  Hamilton  again  entered  the  lists  with  all  the  weight 
of  his  superior  mind,  and  once  more  it  was  seen  that  no 
one  could  withstand  his  blows.  The  thirty-eight  numbers 
of  "  Camillus"3  were  so  forcible  that  even  his  bitterest 
enemy  and  his  most  jealous  rival  bore  the  highest  testi 
mony  which  he  ever  received  to  his  intellectual  greatness. 
Jefferson  entreated  Madison  in  the  most  imploring  man 
ner  to  accept  the  contest  against  the  "  colossus"  of  the 

1  Madison,  Aug.  10, 1795,  to  Chancellor  Livingston,  of  New  York : 
"  Indeed,  the  treaty  from  one  end  to  the  other,  must  be  regarded  as  a 
demonstration  that  the  party  to  which  the  envoy  belongs,  and  of  which 
he  has  been  more  the  organ  than  the  United  States,  is  a  British  party, 
systematically  aiming  at  an  exclusive  connection  with  the  British  gov 
ernment,  and  ready  to  sacrifice  to  that  object  as  well  the  dearest  inter 
ests  of  our  commerce  as  the  most  sacred  dictates  of  national  honor." 
Rives,  Life  and  Times  of  J.  Madison,  III.,  p.  511. 

a  Jeff.,  "Works,  IV.,  p.  120.  In  his  own  cautious  way  he  uses  the  word 
only  in  a  figure  of  rhetoric.  His  blindly-attached  biographer  therefore 
questions  whether  he  really  desired  to  apply  the  epithet  to  Jay  in 
"any  personal  sense."  Randall,  Life  of  Jeff.,  II.,  p.  267. 

8  Hamilton,  Works,  VII.,  pp.  172-528.  "  The  defense  by  Camillus 
was  written  in  concert  between  Hamilton,  King,- and  Jay.  The  writ 
ings  on  the  first  ten  articles  of  the  treaty  were  written  by  Hamilton, 
the  rest  by  King,  till  they  come  to  the  question  of  the  constitutionality 
of  the  treaty,  which  was  discussed  by  Hamilton.  .  .  .  This  I  have 
from  King's  own  mouth.  It  is  to  pass,  however,  for  Hamilton's."  J. 
Adams  to  his  wife,  Jan.  31, 1796.  Life  of  J.  Adams,  II.,  p.  195.  Ac 
cording  to  J.  C.  Hamilton,  however,  Hist,  of  the  Rep.  of  the  U.  8.  of 
Am.,  VI.,  p.  273,  the  original  outline  of  the  first  twenty-two  articles, 
and  six  others,  are  in  Hamilton's  handwriting ;  numbers  23  to  30,  and 
34  and  35  are  by  another  hand,  "  with  frequent  alterations,  interlinea 
tions,  and  additions  by  Hamilton." 


128         STATE  SOVEREIGNTY  AND  SLAVERY. 

Federalists,  because  all  the  written  attacks  of  the  Bepubli- 
cans  fell  to  the  ground  before  Hamilton's  defense.1  This 
concession  was  a  three-fold  compliment  to  Hamilton,  since 
he,2  as  well  as  Washington3  and  the  other  most  prominent 
Federalists,  Jay  himself  included,4  were  by  no  means  sat 
isfied  with  the  treaty,  but  only  thought  that,  considering 
every  thing,  and  spite  of  its  many  unpalatable  provisions 
and  its  many  defects,  its  adoption  was  less  of  an  evil  than 
its  rejection. 

The  Federalists  were  the  victors,  but  the  struggle  was  a 
hard  one.  Washington  considered  it  the  most  difficult  and 
serious  crisis  of  his  administration.5 

The  crisis  was  at  an  end  the  moment  this  decision  was 
made,  so  far,  at  least,  as  the  principal  question — the  rela 
tions  of  the  United  States  to  Great  Britain— was  concern 
ed.  The  questions  not  immediately  involved  continued 
still  for  a  long  time  to  keep  the  country  in  a  state  of  ex 
citement,  and  exercised  no  small  influence  on  the  internal 
political  contests  of  the  succeeding  years. 

It  was  France  which  again  appeared  as  an  evil  spirit  be 
tween  the  parties,  and  was  the  cause,  first  of  their  greater 

1  Jefferson,  Works,  IV.  pp.  121, 122. 

8  Hamilton,  Works,  V.,  p.  106 ;  VI.,  pp.  35,  etc.  Compare  Gibbs.,  Mem. 
of  Wolcott,  I.,  pp.  223,  224. 

*  Washington  writes  to  Randolph,  July  22,  1795 :  "  My  opinion  re 
specting  the  treaty  is  the  same  now  that  it  was,  namely,  not  favorable 
to  it,  but  that  it  is  better  to  ratify  it  in  the  manner  the  senate  have  ad 
vised,  and  with  the  reservation  already  mentioned,  than  to  suffer  mat 
ters  to  remain  as  they  are,  unsettled."  Washington,  Writings,  XL, 
p.  36. 

4  Washington,  Writings,  XI.,  pp.  481,  482,  App. ;  Life  and  Writings 
of  J.  Jay,  IV.,  pp.  257-259. 

6  "  To  sum  the  whole  up  in  a  few  words :  I  have  never,  since  I  have 
been  in  the  administration  of  the  government,  seen  a  crisis  which,  in 
my  judgment,  has  been  so  pregnant  with  interesting  events,  nor  one 
from  which  more  is  to  be  apprehended,  whether  viewed  on  the  one  side 
or  on  the  other."  Washington,  Writings,  XI.,  p.  48.  Compare  Gibbs, 
Mem.  of  Wolcott,  I.  p.  327. 


THE    POLICY    OF    NEUTRALITY.  129 

mutual  opposition,  and  then  of  the  permanent  supremacy 
of  the  Republicans. 

"Washington  remained  true  to  his  broad  and  conciliatory 
policy  towards  France,  and  looked  upon  the  preservation 
or  re-establishment  of  amicable  relations  as  the  main  object 
to  be  secured,  so  far  as  other  and  higher  considerations 
permitted  it.  When  Gouverneur  Morris  gave  offense  to 
the  committee  of  safety  by  the  tenacity  with  which  he 
adhered  to  Washington's  policy  of  neutrality,  and  his  re 
call  was  demanded,  Washington  yielded  to  the  demand, 
although  he  was  completely  satisfied  with  the  conduct  ot 
his  ambassador.  James  Monroe  was  nominated  as  his 
successor,  in  order  that  not  even  the  slightest  doubt  might 
be  left  that  the  administration  still  remembered  the  ser 
vices  of  France  during  the  Revolution,  and  would  be 
ready  to  respect  the  lively  sympathy  which  the  people  still 
entertained  for  it. 

The  convention  announced  its  approval  of  these  efforts 
towards  conciliation  by  voting  a  public  reception  to  Mon 
roe,  at.  which  the  latter  and  the  president,  Merlin  deDouai, 
expatiated  in  extravagant  and  high-soundiug  phrases  on 
the  alliance  of  friendship  and  freedom  between  the  two 
countries.  Washington  was,  however,  by  no  means  satis 
fied  with  these  proceedings.  The  answer  of  the  secre 
tary  of  state  to  the  report  of  the  ambassador  was  couched 
in  reproving  terms,  because  he  had  exceeded  his  instruc 
tions  and  made  use  of  language  not  at  all  in  keeping  with 
the  neutral  attitude  of  the  United  States.1 

The  French  authorities  took  the  reserved  conduct  of  the 
administration  all  the  harder  because  Monroe's  subsequent 
course  was  in  complete  harmony  with  the  expectations 
awakened  by  his  first  appearance.  He  acted  as  if  the  ad 
ministration  had  made  him  complete  master  of  its  discre- 


1  Washington,  Works,  XI.,  p.  110;  Monroe,  View  of  the  Conduct  of 
the  Executive,  p.  23. 


130  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND   SLAVERY. 

tion,  and  recklessly  used  it  to  support  the  position  as 
sumed  by  the  Republicans  towards  France  and  England. 
His  want  of  tact  at  length  assumed  so  serious  a  character 
that  Washington  was  forced  to  recall  him.1  Although 
Monroe,  at  the  time  that  his  successor,  Ch.  C.  Pinckney, 
reached  France,  was  no  longer  in  favor  to  the  same  extent 
as  at  first,  the  Directory  invested  the  ceremonies  attending 
his  departure  with  a  character  very  flattering  to  him  per 
sonally.  But  the  president's  answer  to  Monroe's  notice 
of  his  recall  was  only  formally  addressed  to  the  ambassa 
dor.  It  was  really  directed  partly  to  the  administration 
and  partly  to  the  American  people.  Presumption,  inso 
lence,  and  sound  were  carried  in  the  address  to  an  extreme.2 
Nor  did  the  matter  stop  with  insulting  words.  Pinckney 
was  advised  that  France  would  not  receive  another  Ameri 
can  ambassador  until  her  grievances  were  removed.8 

1  Sept.,  1796. 

8  We  may  here  quote  a  passage  to  show  what  insults  the  anti-Federal 
ists  quietly  permitted  to  be  offered  to  them.  Although  the  Americana 
are  certainly  republican  in  more  than  the  name,  they  have  always  been, 
as  much  as  the  French,  and  more  than  any  other  European  people,  sub 
ject  to  the  vertigo  of  republicanism.  They  would  never  have  accepted 
such  language  from  France  if  she  had  not  been  a  republic.  We  give  here 
the  passage  from  the  English  translation,  as  the  French  original  is  not 
at  hand :  "  France,  rich  in  her  liberty,  surrounded  by  a  train  of  vic 
tories,  strong  in  the  esteem  of  her  allies,  will  not  abase  herself  by  calcu 
lating  the  consequences  of  the  condescension  of  the  American  govern 
ment  to  the  suggestions  of  her  former  tyrant.  Moreover,  the  French 
republic  hopes  that  the  successors  of  Columbus,  Raleigh,  and  of  Penn, 
proud  of  their  liberty,  will  never  forget  that  they  owe  it  to  France. 
They  will  weigh,  in  their  wisdom,  the  magnanimous  benevolence  OL  the 
French  people  with  the  crafty  caresses  of  certain  perfidious  persons 
who  meditate  bringing  them  back  to  their  former  slavery.  Assure  the 
good  American  people,  sir,  that  like  them,  we  adore  liberty;  that  they 
will  always  have  our  esteem ;  and  that  they  will  find  in  the  French 
people  republican  generosity  which  knows  how  to  grant  peace  as  it 
does  to  cause  its  sovereignty  to  be  protected."  Elliot,  Diplomatic  Code, 
II.,  p.  518. 

*  President's  message  to  congress,  May  16,  1797.    Statesman's  Man- 


FKENCH    INTRIGUES.  131 

Among  the  grievances  of  France,  Jay's  treaty  played  the 
principal  part.  Monroe  had  done  all  in  his  power,  but  in 
vain,  to  procure  a  copy  of  it  for  the  French  government, 
before  its  fate  was  yet  decided.1  The  manner  in  which 
France  would  have  used  so  early  a  knowledge  of  the  treaty 
may  be  inferred  from  the  violence  with  which  it  was  de 
nounced,  after  its  publication  in  Paris,  both  by  her  and  by 
her  ambassador  in  Washington. 

Adet,  who  was  made  acquainted  with  the  treaty  before  it 
had  been  made  public,  would  perhaps  have  effected  more 
by  his  remonstrances,  had  not  the  reports  of  the  former 
French  ambassador,  Fauchet,  which  so  gravely  compro 
mised  Randolph,  come  to  light.2  But  Adet  was  not  dis 
couraged  by  his  first  failure.  If  the  ratification  of  the 
treaty  which  had  taken  place  in  the  meantime  could  not 
be  recalled,  it  might  be  used  to  influence  the  people  in 
a  manner  favorable  to  the  French.  Adet,  however,  took 
Genet  as  his  pattern,  and  like  him,  overshot  the  mark. 
It  was  now  accepted  with  no  better  grace  than  formerly, 
that  the  ambassador  published  his  official  communications 
to  the  administration  in  the  Republican  newspapers  at  the 
same  time  that  he  made  them,3  for  now  as  then  it  was 
looked  upon  as  an  appeal  from  the  administration  to  the 
people.  If,  when  the  democratic  societies  were  still  in  their 
bloom,  and  the  blind  enthusiasm  for  French  license  was 
little  past  its  culminating  point,  the  people  were  unwilling 

ual,  I.,  p.  108;  State  Papers,  II.,  pp.  388-390,  397;  Elliot,  Diplomatic 
Code,  II.,  p.  523. 

1  Wash.,  "Writings,  XL,  pp.  508,  511;  Monroe,  p.  28;  Monroe's  letter 
to  Jay,  Jan.  17,  1795.  Life  of  Jay,  L,  pp.  335,  336. 

3  The  plan  of  this  work  does  not  permit  us  to  enter  more  fully  into 
this  interesting  question.  The  extent  of  Randolph's  faults  and  the 
main  motives  of  his  action  have  never  been  fully  ascertained.  Gibbs, 
in  his  Memoirs  of  Wolcott,  treats  the  question  exhaustively,  but  with 
partiality.  Randolph's  written  defense  is  a  weak  document  and  throws 
little  light  on  the  subject. 

«  Hildreth,  Hist.,  of  the  U.  S.,  IV.,  pp.  681-685. 


132  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY  AND   SLAVERY. 

to  suffer  such  interference  on  the  part  of  foreigners,  they 
were  naturally  still  less  disposed  to  do  so  now.1 

The  principal  reason  for  this  unwise  proceeding  on  the 
part  of  Adet,  a  proceeding  which  his  former  course  gave 
no  reason  to  expect,  was  evidently  the  desire  to  influence 
the  impending  presidential  election. 

How  deep  the  roots  of  the  differences  between  parties 
were,  is  evident  from  the  fact  that  "Washington  was  com 
pelled  to  remain  the  chief  target  of  the  republican  press  so 
long  as  it  was  not  yet  known  to  the  public  at  large  whether 
he  would  decide  to  appear  as  a  candidate  for  a  third  time 
or  not.  When  by  his  farewell  address2  all  doubt  on  this 
point  was  removed,  the  prospect  was  immediately  changed. 
The  result  of  the  election  was  now  exceedingly  doubtful. 
There  was  no  second  man  to  whom  the  whole  of  the  nation 
could  be  won  over.  The  Federalists,  in  whose  hands  the 
guidance  of  the  state  had  hitherto  remained,  although  they 
had  repeatedly  had  a  minority  in  the  house  of  represen 
tatives,  could  not  bring  forward  a  single  candidate  who 
could  calculate  on  the  unanimous  and  cheerful  support  of, 
the  entire  party. 

There  still  prevailed  at  the  time  a  feeling  among  the 
people  that  the  vice-president  had  a  sort  of  claim  to  the 
succession  to  the  presidency.  But  even  apart  from  this, 
Adams  would  have  been  one  of  the  most  prominent  candi 
dates  of  the  Federalists.  The  great  majority  of  them  soon 
gave  him  a  decided  preference  over  all  other  possible  can 
didates.  On  the  other  hand,  some  of  the  most  distin 
guished  and  influential  of  the  Federalists  feared  serious 
consequences  to  the  party  and  the  country  from  the  vanity 
and  violence  as  well  as  from  the  egotism  and  irresolution 

1  John  Adams  writes  Dec.  12,  1796 :  "  Adet's  note  has  had  some 
effect  in  Pennsylvania  and  proved  a  terror  to  some  Quakers,  and  that  is 
all  the  ill  effect  it  has  had.  Even  the  southern  states  seem  to  resent  it." 
Life  of  J.  Adams,  II.,  p.  208. 

1  Sept.  17, 1796. 


ELECTION    OF   JOHN    ADAMS.  133 

with  wliich  he  was  charged.  But  to  put  him  aside  entirely 
was  not  possible,  nor  was  it  their  wish.  They  thought, 
however,  to  secure  a  greater  number  of  electoral  votes  for 
Th.  Pinckney,  the  Federal  candidate  for  the  vice-presiden 
cy,  which,  as  the  constitution  then  stood,  would  have  made 
him  president  and  Adams  vice-president.  Although  this 
plan  was  anxiously  concealed  from  the  people,  it  caused 
the  campaign  to  be  conducted  by  the  party  with  less  en 
ergy  than  if  the  leaders  has  been  entirely  unanimous. 

France  was  naturally  desirous  of  Jefferson's  success. 
This  desire  had  its  origin  to  a  great  extent  in  Adet's  altered 
attitude  since  October.  "Wolcott  asserted  that  Adet  had 
publicly  declared  that  France's  future  policy  towards  the 
United  States  would  depend  on  the  result  of  the  election.1 
Some  did  not  hesitate  to  say  that,  on  this  account,  Jeffer 
son  should  have  the  preference,2  but  on  the  more  thoughtful 
Federalists  it  exerted  the  very  opposite  influence.3 

There  is  no  reason  for  the  assumption  that  the  issue  of 
the  election  would  have  been  different,  had  Adet  behaved 
more  discreetly.  But  his  indiscretion  certainly  contributed 
to  make  the  small  majority  expected  for  Adams  completely 
certain,  while  Hamilton's  flank  movement  in  favor  of  Pinck 
ney  helped  Jefferson  to  the  vice-presidency. 

The  possibility  that  the    president  and  vice-president 

1  "  I  have  been  informed  in  a  most  direct,  and  as  I  conceive  authen 
tic,  manner,  that  M.  Adet  lias  said  that  the  future  conduct  of  France  to 
wards  this  country  would  be  influenced  by  the  result  of  our  election." 
Wolcott  to  his  father,  Nov.  27,  1796.  Gibbs,  Mem.  of  Wolcott,  I.,  p.  401. 

3  G.  Cabot  informs  Wolcott  of  a  conversation  with  Cutting  in  which 
the  latter  said  that  the  Federalists  had  come  to  the  conviction  that  "we 
must  soothe  France  by  making  their  favorite  Jefferson  president,  or  we 
must  take  a  war  with  them."  Gibbs,  Ibid,  I.,  p.  492. 

*  The  elder  Wolcott,  one  of  the  extremest  and  most  influential  of  the 
New  England  Federalists,  declared  that  if  Jefferson  was  elected,  which 
could  be  brought  about  only  by  French  intrigue,  the  northern  states 
would  separate  from  the  southern,  and  never  again  form  a  union  with 
them,  unless  for  military  purposes.  Gibbs,  Ibid,  I.,  p.  409. 


134:  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

might  be  found  in  "  opposite  boxes"  had  inspired  Adams 
with  serious  alarms.1  Whether  these  were  well-founded,  the 
future  alone  could  tell.  The  result  of  the  election,  how 
ever,  left  the  country  in  a  very  serious  condition.  Wash 
ington's  withdrawal  removed  the  last  restraint  from  party 
passion.  Party  lines  were  now  closely  drawn,  and  while 
the  air  was  thick  with  events,  it  seemed  as  if  a  hair  were 
sufficient,  on  the  very  first  occasion,  to  turn  the  scales  on 
the  other  side. 

The  Federalists  had  separated  farther  from  the  Republi 
cans,  but  had  not  formed  themselves  into  a  sufficiently 
consolidated  body.  The  more  moderate  and  the  extremists 
diverged  from  one  another  more  and  more.  The  former 
constituted  the  great  majority  of  the  party,  but  the  latter 
numbered  the  men  of  the  best  talent  among  their  members. 
Considering  the  small  majority  by  which  they  had  gained 
the  election2  it  could  not  seem  doubtful  to  them  that  the 
control  of  the  country  would  be  snatched  from  them  if 
their  internal  differences  were  to  grow  in  strength.  And 
it  was  by  no  means  improbable  that  this  would  take  place. 

Hamilton,  who,  spite  of  his  retirement,  had  remained 
the  leading  spirit  of  Washington's  cabinet,  was  uncondi 
tionally  recognized  by  the  extremists  as  their  leader,  and 
his  character  was  not  such  as  made  compromise  easy.  He 
was  enough  of  a  statesman  not  to  seek  blindly  after  the 
desirable.  He  was  content  to  endeavor  to  obtain  the  at 
tainable.  What  the  attainable  was,  however,  he  did  not 
wish  any  one  to  inform  him.  Like  all  statesmen  of  the 
first  rank,  he  could,  once  he  had  accepted  the  leadership, 
do  nothing  but  lead;  and  could  never  in  matters  of  impor 
tance  be  governed  by  a  majority.  But  his  genius  alone 

1  Adams  to  his  wife,  Jan.  7, 1796:  "  It  will  be  a  dangerous  crisis  in 
public  affairs,  if  the  president  and  vice-president  should  be  in  opposite 
boxes."  Life  of  ,T.  Adams,  II.,  p.  192. 

*  Adams  received  71  electoral  votes,  one  more  than  was  necessary  to 
a  choice. 


FEDERALIST   FEUDS.  135 

could  no  longer  assure  him  the  leadership.  It  was  neces 
sary  that  a  favorable  revolution  should  take  place  in  the 
condition  of  things  to  continue  him  in  it.  He  had  now 
to  struggle  not  only  against  the  hate  of  the  Republicans 
and  the  little  popularity  he  enjoyed  among  the  masses  of 
his  own  party.  The  official  head  of  the  party,  with  whom 
it  was  necessary  to  reckon  on  every  question,  was  by  no 
means  well  disposed  towards  him.  Adams  was  jealous  of 
Hamilton's  influence,  and  owed  him  a  grudge  not  entirely 
without  reason,  on  account  of  the  Pinckney  intrigue.  He 
was,  besides,  an  uncertain  character,  strongly  inclined  to 
act  according  to  the  impulse  of  the  moment,  one  whose 
natural  firmness  was  excited  by  his  vanity,  arising  from 
his  power  over  other  minds,  to  an  almost  stubborn  egotism. 
Besides,  the  danger  that,  on  this  account,  the  dissensions 
in  the  party  might  produce  an  open  rupture  was  greatly 
increased  by  the  fact  that  Adams  retained  Washington's 
cabinet,  which  had  been  used  to  consider  Hamilton  their 
leader. 

The  feuds  of  the  leaders  were  not,  however,  the  only 
thing  that  seriously  endangered  the  rule  of  the  Federalists. 
Party  changes  had  taken  place  among  the  masses  which 
were  not  favorable  to  them,  and  which  threatened  to  be  of 
a  lasting  nature.  New  York,  where  anti-Federalist  ten 
dencies  had  hitherto  predominated,  was  indeed  won  over 
to  the  Federalists;  but  this  victory  was  due  only  to  acci 
dental  and  temporary  causes.  The  number  of  their  ad 
herents  in  the  southern  states  had  been,  on  the  other  hand, 
noticeably  diminished,  and  a  great  part  of  those  who  had 
thus  far  followed  them  began  to  waver.  The  two  votes  in 
Virginia  and  Xorth  Carolina  which  determined  the  result 
ultimately  in  Adams's  favor  were  due  only  to  the  high 
esteem  in  which  he  was  personally  held,  and  to  the  mem 
ory  of  his  services  during  the  war  of  the  Revolution. 
South  Carolina  had,  it  is  true,  given  all  her  electoral  votes 
to  Pinckney,  but  had  with  equal  unanimity  voted  for 


136  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND   SLAVERY. 

Jefferson.  Yet  it  was  in  Pennsylvania,  which  had  always 
gone  with  ]N"ew  England,  but  which  now,  with  one  excep 
tion,  voted  for  Jefferson  and  Burr,  that  the  Federalists  re 
ceived  the  hardest  blow.  It  could  not  be  claimed  here,  as 
in  New  York,  that  it  was  only  momentary  and  accidental 
causes  which  had  produced  this  result.  A  great  revolu 
tion  in  opinion  had  begun  among  the  rural  population  of 
the  northern  states,  and  in  Pennsylvania  the  change  was 
completed,  in  consequence  of  various  local  causes,  sooner 
than  anywhere  else.  The  impression  produced  by  the  meet 
ing  of  the  Philadelphia  convention  had  disappeared  by 
degrees,  while  the  angry  hate  excited  against  England,  and 
the  opposition  to  commercial  interests,  had  for  a  consider 
able  time  been  preparing  the  way  for  the  approximation 
of  the  small  land-owners  of  the  northern  to  the  planters 
of  the  southern  states. 

All  these  elements  combined  suggested  the  thought  that 
the  victory  of  the  Federalists  was  only  a  victory  like  that  of 
Pyrrhus.  The  Kepublicans  had  good  reason  to  congratu 
late  themselves,  and  to  look  upon  their  partial  success  as  a 
happy  omen  of  an  early  and  complete  triumph.  In  pro 
portion  as  they  worked  out  of  the  position  of  a  party  of 
opposition  to  the  policy  of  the  Federalists  and  lost  their 
excessive  and  ignorant  enthusiasm  for  the  French  Revolu 
tion,  they  became  a  consolidated  organization.  The  rhet 
oric  of  the  doctrinarians  did  not  exert  over  them  any 
longer  the  same  charm  as  in  former  years;  but  simultane 
ously  with  the  abatement  of  their  aimless  enthusiasm,  their 
reveries  and  vague  theories  began  to  assume  a  positive 
form.1  Both  their  relative  moderation  and  the  gradual 

1  "We  may  here  cite  one  example  to  illustrate  the  strange  manner  in 
which  it  was  sometimes  attempted  to  apply  the  theories  of  the  doctrina 
rians  to  practical  politics.  Tennessee  had  of  her  own  accord  separated 
herself  from  the  territorial  government,projected  a  state  constitution  with- 
out  the  authority  of  congress,  and  then  pretended  to  be  ipso  facto  a  state. 
Chauncey  Goodrich  writes,  in  relation  thereto,  to.  the  elder  Wolcott : 


EI8E   OF   THE   REPUBLICANS.  137 

transition  from  mere  negation  to  a  positive  policy,  had 
strengthened  them  internally  and  made  proselytes  to  them. 
The  instincts  of  the  great  body  of  the  people  had  been  in 
sympathy  with  them  from  the  first,  and  they  remained  in 
the  minority  only  because  by  their  fervor  of  denial  they 
recklessly  abandoned  all  restraint,  in  consequence  of  which 
the  conflict  between  the  material  interests  of  the  country 
and  the  negative  ends  of  their  ideal  policy  appeared  in  too 
bold  a  light. 

It  may  be  that  the  Republicans  would  have  even  now 
obtained  the  upper  hand  if  they  had  not  been  so  unwise  as 
to  allow  the  questions  of  external  politics  to  occupy  the 
foreground  to  such  an  extent  that  they  might  be  considered 
the  main  point  of  their  policy.  It  did  not  escape  the  ob 
servation  of  those  who  saw  deeper,  that  these  questions 
were  in  reality  but  the  points  of  support  accidentally  af 
forded  for  the  gradual  evolution  of  the  essential  differences, 
founded  in  the  internal  state  of  affairs.  It  has  been  already 
frequently  remarked  with  what  energy,  even  now  and  on 
the  most  various  occasions,  it  was  pointed  out,  that 
these  differences  divided  the  country  into  two  geographi 
cal  sections.  It  was  reserved,  however,  for  questions  of 
foreign  politics,  to  give  rise  to  the  occasion  which  should 
bring  this  fact  out  in  such  bold  relief,  that  the  abyss  which 
yawned  under  the  Union  might  be  discerned  for  a  moment. 

"  One  of  their  spurious  senators  has  arrived,  and  a  few  days  since  went 
into  the  senate  and  claimed  his  seat  by  virtue  of  his  credentials  from  our 
new  sister  Tennessee,  as  she  is  called,  and  the  rights  of  man."  Gibbs, 
Mem.  of  Wol.,  I.,  p.  338. 


138  STATE   SOVEKEIGNTY   AND   SLAVERY. 


CHAPTEE  IY. 

NULLIFICATION.     THE  VIRGINIA   AND  KENTUCKY   RESOLU 
TIONS. 

Washington's  presence  made  Adams's  inauguration  a 
moving  spectacle.  Adams  remarked  that  it  was  difficult 
to  say  why  tears  flowed  so  abundantly.1  An  ill-defined 
feeling  filled  all  minds  that  severer  storms  would  have  to 
be  met,  now  that  the  one  man  was  no  longer  at  the  head  of 
the  state,  who,  spite  of  all  oppositions,  was  known  to  hold  a 
place  in  the  hearts  of  the  entire  people.  The  Federalists 
of  the  Hamilton  faction  gave  very  decided  expression  to 
these  fears,2  and  Adams  himself  was  fully  conscious  that 
his  lot  had  fallen  on  evil  days.3 

It  was  natural  that  the  complications  with  France  should 
for  the  moment  inspire  the  greatest  concern.  The  suspi 
cion  that  France  was  the  quarter  from  which  the  new  ad 
ministration  was  threatened  with  greatest  danger  was  soon 
verified  by  events. 

1  Gibbs,  Mem.  of  Wolcott,  I.,  pp.  461,  463. 

8  The  elder  Wolcott  writes:  "  Mr.  Adams  will  judge  right  if  he  con- 
siders  the  present  calm  no  other  than  what  precedes  an  earthquake. 
He  can  only  contemplate,  as  far  as  respects  himself,  whether  he  will 
meet  a  storm  which  will  blow  strong  from  one  point  or  be  involved  in  a 
tornado,  which  will  throw  him  into  the  limbo  of  vanity.  That  he  has 
to  oppose  more  severe  strokes  than  as  yet  it  has  been  attempted  to  in 
flict  on  any  one,  I  am  very  sure  of,  in  case  our  affairs  continue  in  their 
present  situation,  or  shall  progress  to  a  greater  extreme."  ibid,  I.,  p. 
476. 

3  Adams  writes  in  the  account  of  the  inauguration  which  he  sent  his. 
•wife:  "He  [Washington]  seemed  to  me  to  enjoy  a  triumph  over  me. 
Methought  I  heard  him  say:  'Ay!  I  am  fairly  out,  and  you  fairly  in; 
see  which  of  us  will  be  the  happiest.'"  Life  of  J.  Adams,  II.,  p.  223 


BUPTUBE   WITH   FRANCE.  139 

The  inaugural  address  touched  on  the  relations  between 
France  and  the  United  States  only  lightly.  Adams  had 
contented  himself  with  speaking  of  his  high  esteem  for 
the  French  people,  and  with  wishing  that  the  friend 
ship  of  the  two  nations  might  continue.  The  message  of 
May  1C,  1797,  on  the  other  hand,  addressed  to  an  extraor 
dinary  session  of  congress,  treated  of  this  question  exclu 
sively.1  The  president  informed  congress  that  the  Direc 
tory  had  not  only  refused  to  receive  Pinckney,  but  had 
even  ordered  him  to  leave  France,  and  that  diplomatic  re 
lations  between  the  two  powers  had  entirely  ceased.  In 
strong  but  temperate  language  he  counseled  them  to  una 
nimity,  and  recommended  that  "  effectual  measures  of  de 
fense"  should  be  adopted  without  delay.  It  is  necessary 
"  to  convince  France  and  the  world  that  we  are  not  a  de 
graded  people,  humiliated  under  a  colonial  spirit  of  fear 
and  sense  of  inferiority,  fitted  to  be  miserable  instruments 
of  foreign  influence,  and  regardless  of  national  honor, 
character  and  interest."  At  the  same  time,  however,  he 
promised  to  make  another  effort  at  negotiation. 

Pinckney,  Marshall,  and  Gerry  were  chosen  to  make  an 
effort  to  bring  about  the  resumption  of  diplomatic  rela 
tions,  and  the  friendly  settlement  of  the  pending  difficul 
ties.  Their  efforts  were  completely  fruitless.  The  direc 
tory  did  not  indeed  treat  them  with  open  discourtesy,  but 
met  them  in  such  a  manner  that  only  new  and  greater  in 
sults  were  added  to  the  older.  Gerry,  for  whom  Adams 
entertained  a  feeling  of  personal  friendship,  was  most  ac 
ceptable  to  the  Directory,  because  he  was  an  anti-Federal 
ist.  Talleyrand  endeavored  to  persuade  him  to  act  alone. 
There  can  be  no  doubt  whatever  that  Gerry  had  no  author 
ity  to  do  so.  Partly  from  vanity,  and  partly  from  fear  of 
the  consequences  of  a  complete  breach,  he  went  just  far 

1  American  State  Papers,  II.,  p.  387,  etc. ;  Statesman's  Mail.,  I.,  p. 
107,  etc. 


140  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

enough  into  the  adroitly-laid  snares  of  Talleyrand  to  great 
ly  compromise  himself,  his  fellow-ambassadors,  and  the 
administration.1  The  want  of  tact  was  so  much  the  great 
er,  as  Talleyrand,  by  three  different  mediators,*  gave  the 
ambassador  to  understand  that  the  payment  of  a  large 
sum  of  money  was  a  condition  precedent  of  a  settlement. 

In  the  early  part  of  April,  1798,  the  president  laid  be 
fore  the  house  of  representatives  all  the  documents  bear 
ing  on  this  procedure.3  If,  even  before  his  administration 
had  begun,  the  general  feeling  of  the  country  had  been 
constantly  turning  against  France,4  now  a  real  tornado  of 
ill-will  broke  forth. 

The  anti-Federalists  would  willingly  have  given  currency 
to  the  view  that  the  ambassadors  had  been  deceived  by 

1  Charles  F.  Adams  says  in  his  biography  of  his  grandfather :  "  Mr. 
Gerry,  though  he  permitted  the  directory  to  create  invidious  and  in 
sulting  distinctions,  gave  them  no  opening  for  advantage  over  himself." 
Life  of  J.  Adams,  II.,  p.  232.    The  facts  do  not  justify  this  assertion. 
The  president  was  himself  very  much  offended  by  Gerry's  conduct 
And  even  the  personal  explanations  afterwards  made  could  only  weaken, 
but  not  efface,  the  unfavorable  impression  which  the  president  had  re 
ceived.    It  was  not  until  Adams  had  begun  to  waver  in  his  position  on 
the  French  question,  and  had  thus  enlarged  the  differences  between 
himself  and  his  cabinet  into  a  breach,  that  he  found  nothing  to  reproach 
Gerry  with.    In  this  case,  as  in  many  others,  the  judgment  of  Charles 
Francis  Adams  has  been  influenced  by  the  desire  to  make  his  grand 
father  appear  in  the  most  favorable  light  possible.    As,  besides,  his 
sources  are  almost  never  given,  and  the  reader  must  be  satisfied  with 
the  general  assurance  that  they  have  been  used  conscientiously  and  ex 
haustively,  this  biography,  on  the  whole  a  most  excellent  one,  must  be 
read  with  great  care,  especially  in  what  relates  to   the  actions  and 
motives  of  Hamilton.    Gerry  appeal's  in  a  somewhat  too  unfavorable 
light  in  Gibbs,  Memoirs  of  Wolcott. 

2  The  secretary  of  state,  Pickering,  suppressed  their  names  in  his 
communication  to  congress,  and  designated  them  as  X.,  Y.,Z. ;  the  whole 
affair  was,  therefore,  called  the  "  X.  Y.  Z.  correspondence." 

3  Am.  State  Papers,  III.,  pp.  169-218. 

<  Gibbs,  Mem.  of  Wolcott,  I.,  pp.  493,  497,  499,  533,  542. 


PEEPABATIONS   FOR   WAR.  141 

common  cheats.1  But  their  ranks  grew  so  thin  that  they 
were  obliged  to  proceed  with  great  caution.2 

While  Jefferson  had  called  the  president's  message  of 
March  193  mad,  he  now  declared:  "  It  is  still  our  duty  to 
endeavor  to  avoid  war;  but  if  it  shall  actually  take  place, 
no  matter  by  whom  brought  on,  we  must  defend  ourselves. 
If  our  house  be  on  fire,  without  inquiring  if  it  was  fired 
from  within  or  from  without,  we  must  try  to  extinguish 
it.  In  that,  I  have  no  doubt,  we  shall  act  as  one  man."4 
That  such  would  have  been  the  case  will  be  scarcely  ques 
tioned  now.  But  although  the  anti-Federalists  did  not 
think  of  playing  the  part  of  traitors,  and  although  they 
gave  expression  to  their  sympathy  for  France  only  in  a 
suppressed  tone,  Jefferson  was  right  when  he  said  that 
"  party  passions  were  indeed  high."5  The  visionaries  be 
came  sober,  and  those  who  had  been  sober  intoxicated. 
Hence  the  discord  grew  worse  than  ever. 

A  small  number  of  the  Federalists  were  anxious  for  war, 
and  the  rest  of  them  considered  it  at  least  as  probable  as  the 

1  Even  Randall  acknowledges  that  there  could  be  scarcely  any  doubt 
that  "  X.,  Y.,  Z."  were  the  authorized  agents  of  Talleyrand.  Life  of 
Jeff.,  I.,  387.  Jefferson  acted  as  if  he  were  fully  convinced  of  Talleyrand's 
innocence.  Jeff.,  Works,  IX.,  pp.  265,  271,  274, 367, 436.  See  the  proof 
of  the  contrary,  Tucker,  History  of  the  U.  S.,  II.,  p.  71. 

*  "The  Republicans  were  instantly  reduced  to  a  more  feeble  minority 
throughout  the  nation  than  they  had  been  any  day  before  since  their 
first  organization  as  a  party.'*  Randall,  1.  c.  It  was  especially  the 
small  landed  proprietors  of  the  low  country  who  flocked  to  the  support 
of  the  administration.  Washington  writes  to  Lafayette,  Dec.  25, 1798: 
"No  sooner  did  the  yeomanry  of  this  country  come  to  a  right  under 
standing  of  the  nature  of  the  dispute,  than  they  rose  as  one  man, 
with  the  tender  of  their  services,  their  lives,  their  fortunes,  to  support 
the  government  of  their  choice,  and  to  defend  their  country."  Wash., 
Works,  XI.,  p.  380. 

1  Am.  State  Papers,  III.,  p.  168;  Statesman's  Manual,  I.,  p.  116. 

4  Jeff.,  Woi'ks,  IV.,  p.  241.  See  also  the  address  to  the  people  of 
Virginia  which  accompanied  the  resolutions  of  Dec.  24,  1798.  Elliot, 
Deb.,  IV.,  p.  532. 

•  Jeff.,  Works,  L  c. 


14:2  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND   SLAVERY. 

preservation  of  peace.  "Warlike  preparations  were  there 
fore  pushed  forward  with  energy.  But  it  was  not  consid 
ered  sufficient  to  get  ready  to  receive  the  foreign  enemy; 
it  was  necessary  to  fetter  the  enemy  at  home.  The  angry 
aliens  were  to  be  gotten  rid  of  while  it  was  not  yet  too  late, 
and  the  extreme  anti-Federalists  were  to  be  deterred  from 
throwing  too  great  obstacles,  at  this  serious  time,  in  the 
way  of  the  administration.  In  the  desire  to  effect  both  of 
these  things,  the  so-called  alien  and  sedition  laws,1  which 
sealed  the  fate  of  the  Federal  party  and  gave  rise  to  the 
doctrine  of  nullification,  had  their  origin. 

The  plan  of  this  work  does  not  permit  us  to  dwell  on 
the  contents  of  these  laws.  Suffice  it  to  say,  that,  for  along 
time,  they  have  been  considered  in  the  United  States  as 
unquestionably  unconstitutional.  At  the  time,  however, 
there  was  no  doubt  among  all  the  most  prominent  Federal 
ists  of  their  constitutionality.  Hamilton  even  questioned 
it  as  little  as  he  did  their  expediency.  But  he  did  not 
conceal  from  himself  that  their  adoption  was  the  establish 
ment  of  a  dangerous  precedent.  Lloyd  of  Maryland  had, 
on  June  26,  introduced  a  bill  more  accurately  to  define 
the  crime  of  treason  and  to  punish  the  crime  of  sedition, 
which  bill  was  intended  for  the  suppression  of  all  exhibi 
tions  of  friendship  for  France,  and  for  the  better  protec 
tion  of  the  government.  Hamilton  wrote  to  Wolcott  in 
relation  to  this  bill  that  it  endangered  the  internal  peace  of 
the  country,  and  would  "  give  to  faction  body  and  solid 
ity."2 

'Alien  laws,  June  25,  and  July  6,  1798;  sedition  law,  July  14,  1798. 
Stat.  at  Large,  I.,  pp.  570-572,  577,  578,  596,  597. 

9  "There  are  provisions  in  this  bill,  which,  according  to  a  cursory  view, 
appear  to  me  highly  exceptionable,  and  such  as  more  than  anything 
else  may  endanger  civil  war.  I  have  not  time  to  point  out  my  objec 
tions  by  this  post,  but  I  will  do  it  to-morrow.  I  hope  sincerely  the  thing 
may  not  be  hurried  through.  Let  us  not  establish  a  tyranny.  Energy 
is  a  very  different  thing  from  violence.  If  we  make  no  false  step,  we 
shall  be  essentially  united ;  but  if  we  push  things  to  an  extreme,  we 


ALIEN    AND    SEDITION   LAWS.  143 

Lloyd's  bill  did  not  come  up  to  be  voted  upon  in  its  orig 
inal  form;  but  the  alien  and  sedition  laws  were  of  them 
selves  sufficient  to  realize  Hamilton's  fears.  The  suprem 
acy  of  Massachusetts  and  Connecticut  had  become  so  un 
bearable  to  the  south,  that  the  idea  of  separation  arose 
again  in  May.  The  influential  John  Taylor  of  Yirginia 
thought  "  that  it  was  not  unwise  now  to  estimate  the  sep 
arate  mass  of  Yirginia  and  North  Carolina  with  a  view  to 
their  separate  existence."  Jefferson  wrote  him  in  relation 
to  this  advice  on  the  1st  of  June,  1T98,1  "  that  it  would 
not  be  wise  to  proceed  immediately  to  a  disruption  of  the 
Union  when  party  passion  was  at  such  a  height.  If  we 
now  reduce  our  Union  to  Yirginia  and  North  Carolina, 
immediately  the  conflict  will  be  established  between  those 
two  states,  and  they  will  end  by  breaking  into  their  simple 
units." 

As  it  was  necessary  that  there  should  be  some  party  to 
oppose,  it  was  best  to  keep  the  New  England  states  for  this 
purpose.  He  had  nothing  to  say  against  the  rightf ulness 
of  the  step.  He  contented  himself  with  dissuading  from 
it  on  grounds  of  expediency.  He  counseled  patience  until 
fortune  should  change,  and  the  "  lost  principles"  might  be 
regained,  "  for  this  is  a  game  in  which  principles  are  the 
stake." 

Considering  these  views,  it  is  not  to  be  wondered  at,  that 
in  consequence  of  the  alien  and  sedition  laws,  Jefferson 
began  to  see  the  question  in  a  different  light.  We  shall 
have  something  to  say  later  on  the  question  whether,  and 
to  what  extent,  he  considered  it  timely  to  discuss  the  se 
cession  of  Yirginia  from  the  Union.  But  he  was  soon 
satisfied  that  his  opponents  had  bent  the  bow  too  nearly  to 
the  point  of  breaking  to  permit  him  to  look  upon  further 


shall  then  give  to  faction  body  and  solidity.' 
Gibbs,  Mem.  of  Wolcott,  II.,  p.  68. 
1  Jeff.,  Works,  IV.,  pp.  245-248. 


144         STATE  SOVEREIGNTY  AND  SLAVERY. 

patient  waiting  for  better  fortune  as  the  right  policy.  It 
was  no  longer  time  to  stop  at  the  exchange  of  private  opin 
ion,  and  the  declarations  of  individuals.  The  moment  had 
now  come  when  the  "  principles"  should  be  distinctly  for 
mulated,  and  officially  proclaimed  and  recognized.  ]S"ot  to 
do  this,  would  be  to  run  the  risk  of  being  carried  away  by 
the  current  of  facts  to  such  a  distance  that  it  would  be  dif 
ficult  and  perhaps  impossible  to  get  hold  of  the  principles 
again.  But  if,  on  the  other  hand,  this  were  done,  every 
thing  further  might  be  calmly  waited  for,  and  the  policy  of 
expediency  again  brought  into  the  foreground.  The  pro 
test  was  officially  recorded,  and  so  long  as  it  was  not,  either 
willingly  or  under  compulsion,  as  officially  recalled,  or  at 
least  withdrawn,  it  was  to  be  considered  as  part  of  the  rec 
ord  which  might  be  taken  advantage  of  at  any  stage  of  the 
case.  Herein  lies  the  immense  significance  of  the  Vir 
ginia  and  Kentucky  resolutions. 

Their  importance  is  enhanced  by  the  fact  that  Madison, 
who  had  merited  well  of  the  country,  on  account  of  his 
share  in  the  drawing  up  and  adoption  of  the  constitution, 
and  whose  exposition  of  it  is  therefore  of  the  greatest 
weight,  was  the  author  of  the  Virginia  resolutions  ol 
December  24,  1798,1  and  by  the  further  fact  that  Jeffer 
son,  the  oracle  of  the  anti-Federalists,  had  written2  the  or- 


1  They  were  adopted  by  the  house  on  the  21st,  but  by  the  senate  not 
until  the  24th. 

2  It  throws  some  light  on  the  character  of  Jefferson  that  he  gave  G-. 
Nicholas,  who  was  to  introduce  the  resolutions  into  the  legislature  01 
Kentucky,  the  "  solemn  assurance"  that  "  it  should  not  be  known  from 
what  quarter  they  came."    He  himself  gives  this  further  information  on 
the  point:  "I  drew  and  delivered  them  to  him,  and  in  keeping  their 
origin  secret  he  fulfilled  his  pledge  of  honor.    Some  years  after  this 
Colonel  Nicholas  asked  me  if  I  would  have  any  objection  to  its  being 
known  that  I  had  drawn  them.    I  pointedly  enjoined  that  it  should  not." 
(Jeff.,  Works,  VII.,  p.  299.)    It  was  in  December,  1821,  that  in  answer 
to  a  question  confidentially  put  by  Nicholas's  son,  he  first  acknowledged 
that  they  originated  with  him. 


VIRGINIA   AND    KENTUCKY    RESOLUTIONS. 

iginal  draft  of  the  Kentucky  resolutions  of  November  10, 
1T98.1 

Although  not  in  accord  with  chronological  order,  it  is 
advisable  to  consider  the  Virginia  resolutions  first,  for  the 
reason  that  they  do  not  go  as  far  as  the  Kentucky  resolu 
tions.  According  to  the  testimony  of  their  authors,  the 
resolutions  of  both  legislatures  had  the  same  source,2  and 
there  were  special  reasons  why  it  was  necessary  to  make 
the  Virginia  resolutions  of  a  milder  character.3  Although 
a  violation  of  chronological  order,  it  seems,  therefore,  proper 

1  Randall,  Life  of  Jefferson,  II.,  p.  452,  erroneously  dates  them  Nov. 
14.  The  house  passed  them  on  Nov.  10;  the  senate  agreed  to  them  on 
the  13th,  and  the  Governor  approved  them  on  the  19th.  Elliot,  Deb., 
IV.,  p.  544.  Randall  relies  principally  on  the  erroneous  date  to  support 
the  assumption  that  Jefferson's  assent  to  the  modifying  provisions  of 
his  draft  was  obtained. 

a  Jefferson  says  that  the  conference  on  the  Kentucky  resolutions  took 
place  between  him  and  the  two  brothers  Nicholas ;  and  he  adds :  "  I 
think  Mr.  Madison  was  either  with  us  or  consulted,  but  my  memory  is 
uncertain  as  to  minute  details."  Jeff.,  Works,  VII.,  p.  230 ;  J.  C.  Ham- 
ilton,  Hist,  of  the  Rep.  of  the  U.  S.  of  America,  VII.,  p.  264. 

8  Madison  himself  had  well-founded  doubts  of  the  constitutionality 
of  the  contemplated  procedure,  and  remarked,  that  on  that  account  he 
had  been  induced  to  make  use  of  "  general  terms"  in  the  Virginia  reso 
lutions.  He  writes  to  Jefferson  on  Dec.  29 :  "  Have  you  ever  considered 
thoroughly  the  distinction  between  the  power  of  the  state  and  that  of 
the  legislature  on  questions  relating  to  the  federal  pact?  On  the  sup- 
position  that  the  former  is  clearly  the  ultimate  judge  of  infractions,  it 
does  not  follow  that  the  latter  is  the  legitimate  organ  by  which  the  com 
pact  was  made."  J.  C.  Hamilton,  Hist,  of  the  Rep.  of  the  U.  S.  of 
America,  VII.,  p.  275.  As  a  matter  of  course,  Madison's  constitutional 
doubts  should  have  been  applied  also  to  the  Kentucky  resolutions.  But 
Jefferson,  in  a  letter  to  J.  Taylor,  of  Nov.  26,  Works,  IV.,  p.  259,  men 
tions  a  very  important  ground  why  it  was  necessary,  especially  in  Vir 
ginia,  to  proceed  with  great  caution.  He  writes:  "There  are  many 
considerations  dehors  of  the  state  which  will  occur  to  you  without 
enumeration.  I  should  not  apprehend  them  if  all  was  sound  within. 
But  there  is  a  most  respectable  part  of  our  state  who  have  been  envel 
oped  in  the  X.  Y.  Z.  delusion,  and  who  destroy  our  unanimity  for  Uie 
present  moment." 

10 


146  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND   SLAVERY. 

to  consider  these  as  the  basis  of  the  Kentucky  resolutions, 
or  rather  as  a  lower  round  of  the  same  ladder. 

The  paragraph  of  the  Virginia  resolutions  of  most  im 
portance  for  the  history 'of  the  constitution,  is  the  follow 
ing: 

"  j&Molved)  That  this  assembly  doth  emphatically  and 
peremptorily  declare,  that  it  views  the  powers  of  the  fed 
eral  government  as  resulting  from  the  compact  to  which 
the  states  are  parties,  as  limited  by  the  plain  sense  and 
intention  of  the  instrument  constituting  that  compact,  as 
no  further  valid  than  they  are  authorized  by  the  grants 
enumerated  in  that  compact;  and  that  in  case  of  a  delib 
erate,  palpable,  and  dangerous  exercise  of  other  powers, 
not  granted  by  the  said  compact,  the  states  who  are  parties 
thereto,  have  the  right,  and  are  in  duty  bound,  to  inter 
pose  for  arresting  the  progress  of  the  evil  and  for  main 
taining  within  their  respective  limits  the  authorities,  rights 
and  liberties,  appertaining  to  them." 

The  legislature  of  Kentucky  disdained  to  use  a  mode  of 
expression  so  vague  and  feeble  or  to  employ  language  from 
which  much  or  little  might  be  gathered  as  x  occasion  de 
manded.  In  the  first  paragraph  of  the  resolutions  of  the 
10th  of  November,  1798,  we  read:  "  Resolved,  .  .  that 
whenever  the  general  government  assumes  undelegated 
powers,  its  acts  are  unauthoritative,  void,  and  of  no  force; 
that  to  this  compact  each  state  acceded  as  a  state,  and  is 
an  integral  party;  that  this  government,  created  by  this 
compact,  was  not  made  the  exclusive  or  final  judge  of  the 
extent  of  the  powers  delegated  to  itself,  since  that  would 
have  made  its  discretion,  and  not  the  constitution,  the 
measure  of  its  powers;  but  that,  as  in  all  other  cases  of 
compact  among  parties  having  no  common  judge,  each  par 
ty  has  an  equal  right  to  judge  for  itself,  as  well  of  infrac 
tions  as  of  the  mode  and  measure  of  redress." 

Thus  were  the  "  principles"  established.  But  in  order 
that  they  might  not  remain  a  thing  floating  in  the  air,  it 


THE  WORD  "NULLIFICATION."  147 

was  necessary  to  provide  another  formula,  by  which  the 
states  might  be  empowered  to  enforce  the  rights  claimed, 
or  at  least  to  find  a  word  which  would  presumably  embody 
that  formula;  and  which  was  sufficient  so  long  as  they  lim 
ited  themselves  to  the  theoretical  discussion  of  the  ques 
tion.  The  legislature  of  Kentucky,  in  its  resolutions  of 
November  14,  1799,  gave  the  advocates  of  state  rights  the 
term  demanded,  in  the  sentence: 

"  Itesolved,  That  .  .  .  the  several  states  who  formed 
that  instrument  being  sovereign  and  independent,  have  the 
unquestionable  right  to  judge  of  the  infraction;  and  that  a 
nullification  by  those  sovereignties,  of  all  unauthorized  acts 
done  under  color  of  that  instrument,  is  the  rightful  remedy." 

In  later  times  the  admirers  of  Madison  and  Jefferson 
who  were  true  to  the  Union  have  endeavored  to  confine 
the  meaning  of  these  resolutions  within  so  narrow  limits, 
that  every  rational  interpretation  of  their  contents  has  been 
represented  by  them  as  arbitrary  and  slanderous.  When 
about  the  end  of  the  third  and  the  beginning  of  the  fourth 
decade  of  this  century,  the  opposition  to  the  federal  gov 
ernment  in  Georgia,  and  especially  in  South  Carolina,  be 
gan  to  assume  an  alarming  form,  the  aged  Madison  ex 
pressly  protested  that  Virginia  did  not  wish  to  ascribe  to, 
a  single  state  the  constitutional  right  to  hinder  by  force 
the  execution  of  a  law  of  the  United  States.  "  The  resolu 
tion,"  he  wrote,  March  27,  1831,  "  was  expressly  declara 
tory,  and  proceeding  from  the  legislature  only,  which  was 
not  even  a  party  to  the  constitution,  could  be  declaratory 
of  opinion  only."  In  one  sense,  this  cannot  be  questioned. 
In  the  report  of  the  committee  of  the  Virginia  legislature 
on  the  answers  of  the  other  states  to  the  resolutions  of 
1798,  we  read  as  follows:  "  The  declarations  are  .  ;  . 
expressions  of  opinion  unaccompanied  by  any  other  effort 
than  what  they  may  produce  on  opinion,  by  exciting  re 
flection."1  But  to  concede  that  this  was  the  sole  intention 

1  Elliot,  Deb.,  IV.,  p.  578. 


14:8  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

of  tlie  resolutions  of  the  24th  of  December,  is  to  deprive 
the  words,  according  to  which  the  states  had  the  right  and 
were  in  duty  bound  to  "  interpose"  in  case  the  general 
government  had  in  their  opinion  permitted  itself  to  assume 
ungranted  power,  of  all  meaning. 

But  it  has  never  yet  been  denied  that  these  few  words 
express  the  pith  of  all  the  resolutions.  More  was  claimed 
than  the  right  to  express  opinions — a  right  which  had  never 
been  questioned.  If  expression  was  not  clearly  and  distinctly 
given  to  what  was  claimed,  it  was  to  leave  all  possible  ways 
open  to  the  other  states  to  come  to  an  agreement  in  all 
essential  matters.1 

Jefferson  was  in  this  instance  less  cautious  than  Madison, 
and  his  vision  was  more  acute.  He  thought  that  the  crisis 
of  the  constitution  had  come,2  and  therefore  assumed  a 
standpoint  from  which  he  could  not  be  forced  back  to  the 
worthless  position  adopted  by  Madison  in  his  celebrated  re 
port  of  1800.3  Jefferson  allowed  it  to  depend  on  the  further 
course  of  events  whether  force  should  be  used,  or  whether 
only  the  right  to  employ  force  should  be  expressly  and  for 
mally  claimed.  At  first  he  was  anxious  that  a  middle  posi 
tion  should  be  assumed,  but  a  middle  position  which  afforded 
a  secure  foothold.  The  legislature  of  Kentucky  had  done 
this,  inasmuch  as  it  had  adopted  that  passage  in  his 
draft  in  which  it  was  claimed  that  the  general  government 
and  the  states  were  equal  parties,  and  in  which  it  was 
recognized  that  the  latter  had  "  an  equal  right  to  judge" 
when  there  was  a  violation  of  the  constitution,  as  well  as 
to  determine  the  ways  and  means  of  redress. 

Madison,4  and  later,  Benton,5  as  well  as  all  the  other  ad- 

1  Madison  in  the  letter  to  Jefferson,  referred  to  above. 

a  Randall,  Life  of  Jefferson,  II.,  p.  451. 

1  Elliot,  Deb.,  IV.,  pp.  546-580. 

.*  Madison  to  Cabell,  May  31,  1830.  See  Jefferson's  Correspondence, 
III.,  p.  429,  Randolph's  Ed.,  and  Madison's  Correspondence,  edited  by 
Maguire,  p.  286. 

•  Thirty  Years'  View,  I.,  p.  148. 


RESPONSIBILITY   OF   JEFFERSON.  149 

mirers  of  the  "  sage  of  Monticello,"  who  were  opposed  to 
the  later  school  of  secessionists,  have  laid  great  weight  on 
the  fact  that  the  word  nullification,  or  anything  of  a  like 
import,  is  to  be  found  only  in  the  Kentucky  resolutions  of 
1799,  which  did  not  originate  with  Jefferson.  This  tech 
nical  plea  in  Jefferson's  behalf  has  been  answered  by  the 
publication  of  his  works.  Among  his  papers  two  copies, 
of  the  original  draft  of  the  Kentucky  resolutions  of  1798 
have  been  discovered  in  his  own  handwriting.  In  them 
we  find  the  following:  Resolved,  That  when  the  general 
government  assumes  powers  "  which  have  not  been  dele 
gated,  a  nullification  of  the  act  is  the  rightful  remedy: 
that  every  state  has  a  natural  right,  in  cases  not  within 
the  compact,  [casus  non  fcederis]  to  nullify  of  their  own 
authority  all  assumptions  of  power  by  others  within  their 
limits.5'1 

That  Jefferson  was  not  only  an  advocate,  but  the  father, 
of  the  doctrine  of  nullification  is  thus  well  established.  It 
may  be  that  Nicholas  secured  his  assent  to  the  striking  out 
of  these  sentences,  but  no  fact  has  as  yet  been  discovered 
in  support  of  this  assumption.  Still  less  is  there  any 
positive  ground  for  the  allegation  that  Jefferson  had  be 
gun  to  doubt  the  position  he  had  assumed.  Yarious  pas 
sages  in  his  later  letters  point  decidedly  to  the  very  oppo 
site  conclusion. 

But  all  this  is  of  interest  only  in  so  far  as  it  corrects 
a  misrepresentation  of  historical  facts.  It  has  no  impor 
tant  bearing  on  the  question  itself.  If,  in  fact,  Jefferson 
had  not  employed  the  term  nullification,  it  would  be  only 
a  negative  merit  of  the  same  significance  as  the  negative 
merit  of  Madison  that  he  used  the  indefinite  expression 
"  to  interpose,"  instead  of  the  definite  expressions  of  the 
Kentucky  resolutions.  It  was  not  the  part  of  Madison  to 
play  the  advocate  for  Jefferson  in  a  case  in  which  he  had 

1  Jeff.,  Works,  IX.,  p.  469. 


150  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY    AND    SLAVERY. 

to  speak  for  himself  as  well.  The  "principles"  presented 
and  established  by  the  three  resolutions  were  the  same  in 
every  respect;  they  differed  only  in  their  form,  and  each 
succeeding  one  was  more  in  keeping  with  the  nature  of  the 
matter  than  the  preceding.  The  stone  has  been  cast  roll 
ing  on  an  inclined  plane,  and  it  rolls  on. 

If  the  practical  measures  proposed  were  not  in  harmony 
with  the  principles  adopted,  that  fact  might  be,  for  the  time 
being,  of  the  greatest  importance.  But  what  assurance  was 
there  that  they  would  never  be  in  accord  with  them?  The 
button  on  the  sword's  point  is  a  protection  as  long  as  it 
covers  it;  but  it  maybe  removed  at  any  moment,  and  the 
sword  become  as  dangerous  as  if  it  had  never  been  there. 
Besides,  the  three  resolutions  were  also  completely  similar 
in  this,  that  the  proposed  practical  measures  were  in  no 
case  such  as  the  principles  advocated  suggested.  "While 
the  legislature  of  Kentucky  employed  the  ominous  word 
"  nullification,"  it  solemnly  protested  that  it  did  not  wish 
to  offer  resistance  except  in  a  "  constitutional  manner." 
The  year  before,  it  had  even  declared,  that  it  desired  only 
to  urge  the  other  states  to  "  unite  with  this  state  to  pro 
cure  at  the  next  session  of  congress  a  repeal  of  the  uncon 
stitutional  and  obnoxious  acts."1  Virginia,  which  had  been 
so  over-cautious,  or  rather  so  over-crafty,  in  the  language 
employed  in  her  resolutions,  did  not  permit  herself  to  make 
a  similar  declaration  until  1800,  and  after  the  other  states2 
had  unambiguously  condemned  her  course,  while  the  legis 
lature  of  Kentucky  declared  that  it  desired  to  request  con 
gress  to  repeal  these  laws,  it  "  resolved"  they  were  com 
pletely  void  and  without  force,  and  it  asked  the  other  states 

1  This  paragraph  is  wanting  in  Jeffersonls  draft.  It  was  substituted 
for  the  sentence  erased  in  the  8th  paragraph  of  the  draft.  The  rest  of  it 
is  the  9th  paragraph  of  the  resolutions  adopted  by  the  legislature. 

• 3  Delaware,  Khode  Island,  Massachusetts,  New  York,  Connecticut, 
New  Hampshire  and  Vermont.  Massachusetts  answered  the  resolu 
tions  with  an  exhaustive  refutation.  Elliot,  Deb.,  IV.,  pp.  533-537. 


EFFECT   OF    NULLIFICATION.  151 

to  pass  similar  resolutions.  And  did  not  the  legislature 
of  Virginia  make  essentially  the  same  demand  when  it 
declared  it  the  duty  of  the  states  "  to  interpose"  and  added: 
"  Resolved,  that  the  general  assembly  doth  solemnly  ap 
peal  to  the  like  dispositions  in  the  other  states,  in  confi 
dence  that  they  will  concur  with  this  commonwealth  in 
declaring  that  the  acts  aforesaid  are  unconstitutional,  and 
that  the  necessary  and  proper  measures  will  be  taken  by 
each  for  co-operating  with  this  state  in  maintaining,  unim 
paired,  the  authorities,  rights,  and  liberties  reserved  to  the 
states  respectively,  or  to  the  people"?  And  finally,  was 
not  nullification  expressly  declared  by  the  legislature  of 
Kentucky  to  be  a  constitutional  remedy  in  1799?  In  a 
word,  as  the  "  principles"  advanced  in  the  resolutions 
were  the  same,  they  led  to  the  same  logical  conclusions, 
which  were  clearly  expressed  in  the  Kentucky  resolutions, 
namely,  the  right  of  the  states,  through  the  organ  of  their 
legislatures,  to  "  resolve"  that  laws  of  congress  were  un 
constitutional,  and  therefore  void  and  of  no  effect. 

If  the  claim  to  this  right  were  well  founded,  the  consti 
tution  was,  indeed,  different  from  the  articles  of  con 
federation  in  particulars;  but  the  political  character  of  the 
Union  was  essentially  unchanged,  and  it  was  now,  as  then, 
a  confederation  of  the  loosest  structure.  If  the  right  were 
acknowledged,  the  people  were  placed  at  the  very  point  at 
which  they  had  stood  when  Washington  wrote:  ""We  are 
to-day  one  nation,  and  to-morrow  thirteen."1  To  the  ex- 

1  Washington  now  again  declared :  "  The  constitution  according  to 
their  [the  anti-Federalists']  interpretation  of  it,  would  be  a  mere  cipher." 
Washington,  Dec.  25,  1798,  to  Lafayette.  Works,  XI.,  p.  378.  Three 
weeks  later  he  wrote  to  P.  Henry :  u  Measures  are  systematically  and 
pertinaciously  pursued  which  must  eventually  dissolve  the  Union  or 
produce  coercion."  Works,  XI.,  p.  398.  Very  shortly  afterwards  the 
ultimate  consequences  of  this  interpretation  of  the  constitution  were 
boldly  drawn.  Tucker,  whose  edition  of  Blackstone's  Commentaries 
appeared  in  1803,  writes,  Vol.  I.,  App.,p.  175:  "  The  federal  government, 
then,  appears  to  be  the  organ  through  which  the  united  republics  com. 


152  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVEKX. 

tent  that  practice  was  in  accord  with  theory,  a  mere  mechan 
ical  motion  would  have  again  taken  the  place  of  organic 
life.  Sooner  or  later  even  that  must  have  ceased,  for  the 
state  is  an  organism,  not  a  machine. 

As  certainly  as  thistles  spring  from  the  seed  of  the 
thistle  when  it  falls  on  the  proper  soil,  so  certainly  must 
the  consequences  mentioned  above  follow  under  the  given 
circumstances,  from  Madison's  "  to  interpose."  It  is 
ridiculous  to  observe,  how,  in  the  United  States,  the  use  of 
this  expression  is  declared  to  have  been  harmless,  or  even 
meritorious,  while  the  word  "  nullification"  is  looked  up 
on  as  the  source  of  the  whole  evil.  The  apprentice  in 
magic  upbraids  the  spirits  that  they  do  not  change  their 
form  and  turn  back  into  brooms  when  he  pronounces 
the  wrong  charm.  Here  the  spirits  are  conjured  up,  but 
their  conjurers  turn  their  backs  upon  them,  after  the  airy 
beings  have  prepared  for  them  the  bath  they  prayed  for, 
and  reproach  heaven  and  earth,  but  not  themselves,  when 
the  flood  rushes  in  thick  volumes  from  their  homes  into 
the  highway.  As  if  the  spirits  ever,  of  their  own  accord, 
turn  into  brooms  again  when  they  have  performed  what 
they  have  been  commanded ! 

It  was  reserved  for  a  later  time  and  another  man  to 
elaborate  in  detail  the  doctrine  of  nullification.  John  C. 
Calhoun  solved  the  riddle  on  paper  in  such  a  way  that  the 
right  of  nullification  appeared  not  only  compatible  with 
the  existence  of  the  Union,  but  as  the  condition  of  its  free 
development,  and  of  its  strength.  There  was  no  time  as 


municate  with  foreign  nations  and  with  each  other.  Their  submission 
to  its  operation  is  voluntary;  its  councils,  its  engagements,  its  authority, 
are  theirs,  modified  and  united.  Its  sovereignty  is  an  emanation  from 
theirs,  not  a  flame  in  which  they  have  been  consumed,  nor  a  vortex  in 
which  they  have  been  swallowed  up.  Each  is  still  a  perfect  state,  still 
sovereign,  still  independent,  and  still  capable,  should  the  occasion  re- 
quire,  to  resume  the  exercise  of  its  functions,  in  the  most  unlimited 
extent."  See  also  Rawle,  p.  302,  etc. 


THEORY    OF    NULLIFICATION.  153 

yet  to  attempt  to  strangle  the  healthy  human  mind  in  a 
net  of  logical  deductions.  The  "X.  Y.  Z.  fever,"  as 
Jefferson  expressed  it,  had  made  the  anti-Federalists  fear 
that  the  vehicle  would  roll  over  them.  This  fear  drove 
them,  after  a  little  hesitation,  to  resolve  to  throw  them 
selves  between  the  spokes  of  the  wheels.  Perhaps  they 
might  succeed  in  bringing  it  to  a  stand,  and  might  even 
cause  it  to  move  backwards.  But  they  did  not  conceal  from 
themselves  that  they  might  be  prostrated  in  the  attempt, 
or  that  the  spokes  might  possibly  be  broken.  If  this  be 
came  probable,  and  the  choice  were  left  with  them,  they 
were  disposed  to  allow  the  vehicle  to  go  to  pieces.  In 
other  words,  they  had  yet  to  offer  an  exhaustive  constitu 
tional  defense  of  nullification;  but  they  conceived  its  last 
practical  result  as  one  of  various  contingencies. 

If  a  minority  of  the  states  should  insist  on  the  exercise 
of  the  alleged  right  of  nullification,  and  if  the  majority 
should  claim  with  equal  decision  the  unconstitutionally  of 
that  right,  the  minority  could  consider  secession  only  as  a 
question  of  expediency.  The  general  government  would 
either  be  obliged  to  concede  that  every  law  of  congress 
should  receive  the  tacit  approval  of  each  state  before  hav 
ing  any  force  there,  or  it  would  be  compelled  to  enforce  such 
laws  under  all  circumstances,  and  to  employ  force  for  that 
end  if  necessary.  But  if  the  general  government  should 
attempt  to  enforce  a  nullified  law,  such  action  on  its  part 
would,  according  to  the  doctrine  of  nullification,  be  a 
breach  of  the  pact  which  held  the  states  together.  The 
state  in  question  was  no  longer  legally  bound  by  the  pact. 
It  would  depend  entirely  on  its  judgment  in  any  given  case 
to  accept  the  breach  of  the  treaty  under  protest,  or  if  the 
general  government  was  willing,  to  agree  to  a  compromise 
with  a  reservation  as  to  the  ultimate  decision  of  the  legal 
question ,  or,  remaining  for  the  time  being  in  the  Union,  to 
repel  force  by  force,  or  finally,  to  announce  its  withdrawal 
from  the  Union,  dissolved  by  the  breach  of  the  contract. 


154:  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND   SLAVERY. 

A  part  of  the  anti-Federalists  were  of  the  opinion  that 
in  the  case  before  us,  it  might  well  be  expedient  to  employ 
force.  Of  this  there  is  ample  documentary  evidence.  But 
under  what  circumstances  they  intended  to  have  recourse 
to  force,  and  whether  in  such  a  contingency  they  thought 
of  immediate  secession,  cannot  be  determined  with  any 
certainty  on  account  of  the  vagueness  of  the  language  they 
employed. 

Jefferson,  as  was  his  wont,  wrote  in  terms  chosen  with 
the  greatest  caution.  But  they  are  unambiguous  enough 
to  establish  this  much,  that  he  considered  an  appeal  to  the 
sword  or  secession  justifiable  under  the  circumstances  men 
tioned  above;  and  that  he  thought  it  possible  that,  sooner 
or  later,  he  would  declare  the  one  or  the  other  of  these 
steps  to  be  advisable  or  necessary.  He  writes  to  Madison, 
November  17,  1798 :  "  I  enclose  you  a  draft  of  the  Ken 
tucky  resolutions.  I  think  we  shall  distinctly  affirm  all 
the  important  principles  they  contain,  so  as  to  hold  to  that 
ground  in  future,  and  leave  the  matter  in  such  a  train  as 
that  we  may  not  be  committed  absolutely  to  push  the  mat 
ter  to  extremities,  and  yet  may  be  free  to  push  as  far  as 
events  will  render  prudent.'31  Nine  days  later  he  writes 
to  J.  Taylor:  "  For  the  present  I  should  be  for  resolving 
the  alien  and  sedition  laws  to  be  against  the  constitution, 
and  merely  void;  and  I  would  not  do  anything  at  this  mo 
ment  which  would  commit  us  further,  but  reserve  ourselves 
to  shape  our  future  measures  or  no  measures  by  the  events 
which  may  happen."2 

He  assumed  precisely  the  same  position  a  year  later. 
He  now  chose  even  fewer  expressions  of  indefinite  mean 
ing.  It  was  in  his  opinion  "  essentially  necessary"  that 
the  legislatures  of  Kentucky  and  Virginia  should  issue  a 
reply  to  the  states  whose  legislatures  had  declared  against 


1  Jeff.,  Works,  IV.,  p.  25. 
1  Ibid,  IV.,  p.  260. 


DOCUMENTARY    EVIDENCE    AGAINST    JEFFERSON.          155 

the  resolutions  of  1798  and  1799,  "  in  order  to  avoid  the 
inference  of  acquiescence."  On  the  5th  of  September, 
1799,  he  sent  Wilson  C.  Nicholas  a  draft  of  such  a  reply. 
The  second  paragraph  reads  as  follows:  "Making  firm 
protestation  against  the  precedent  and  principle  and  re 
serving  the  right  to  make  this  palpable  violation  of  the 
federal  compact  the  ground  of  doing  in  future  whatever  we 
might  now  rightfully  do,  should  repetitions  of  these  and 
other  violations  of  the  compact  render  it  expedient."  He 
also  insisted  that  expression  of  warm  attachment  to  the 
Union  should  be  made,  and  added:  "  we  are  willing  to  sac 
rifice  to  this  everything  but  the  right  of  self-government 
in  those  important  points  which  we  have  never  yielded, 
and  in  which  alone  we  see  liberty,  safety  and  happiness ; 
that  not  at  all  disposed  to  make  every  measure  of  error  or 
of  wrong  a  cause  of  secession,  we  are  willing  to  look  on 
with  indulgence,  and  to  wait  with  patience,  till  those  pas 
sions  and  delusions  shall  have  passed  over,"  etc. 

Madison  did  not  wish  that  the  reservation  in  the  second 
clause  should  be  adopted  in  the  answer.  Jefferson  wrote 
on  this  subject  to  Nicholas:  "  From  this  I  recede  readily-, 
not  only  in  deference  to  his  [Madison's]  judgment,  but  be 
cause  as  we  should  never  think  of  separation  but  for  re 
peated  and  enormous  violations,  so  these,when  they  occur, 
will  be  cause  enough  of  themselves."  How  it  can  be 
claimed,  in  view  of  all  these  utterances,  that  Jefferson  did 
not  recognize  secession  and,  as  the  inevitable  and  logical 
consequence  thereof,  a  resort  to  the  sword  as  a  constitu 
tional  right,  in  the  interpretation  of  the  constitution,  it  is 
difficult  to  understand.1 

1  John  Quincy  Adams  says  in  his  eulogy  on  Madison :  "  Concurring 
in  the  doctrines  that  the  separate  states  have  a  right  to  interpose  in 
cases  of  palpable  infractions  of  the  constitution  by  the  government  of 
the  United  States,  and  that  the  alien  and  sedition  acts  presented  a  case 
of  such  infraction,  Mr.  Jefferson  considered  them  as  absolutely  null  and 
void,  and  thought  the  state  legislatures  competent,  not  only  to  declare, 


156  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

Nothing  more  can  be  granted  to  Jefferson's  defenders  than 
that  he  was  sincere  when  he  declared  that  he  would  resort 
to  "  extreme  measures"  only  with  great  reluctance.  The 
same  may  be  said  of  the  other  leaders  of  the  anti-Federal 
ists,  almost  without  exception.  But  it  is  a  falsification 
of  the  truth  of  history  to  pretend  that  they  were  now 
thinking  exclusively  of  the  establishment  of  "  principles." 
"Washington  was  of  opinion  that  the  peace  of  Virginia  and 
of  the  Union  was,  "  hastening"  towards  "  a  dreadful  cri 
sis."1  So  deeply  was  he  penetrated  by  this  conviction  that 
he  wrote  a  long  letter  to  Patrick  Henry  imploring  him  to 
appear  as  a  candidate  for  the  legislature,  in  order  to  stem 
the  current  which  was  threatening  ruin,  by  the  whole 
weight  of  his  experience  and  popularity.2  The  anti-Feder 
alists,  and  their  successors,  the  Republicans  and  the  Demo 
crats,  have  always  asserted  that  he  was  ensnared  by  Hamil 
ton  and  his  associates,  and  terrified  by  phantoms  conjured 
up  only  by  their  fancy  and  their  inordinate  desire  to  rule. 
This  excuse  is  a  poor  compliment  to  pay;  for  although 
Washington  was  now  on  the  brink  of  the  grave,  his  per 
ception  was  clear  enough  not  to  allow  that  to  be  argued 
away  which  was  transpiring  under  his  eyes.  It  was  a  fact 
that  Yirginia  had  not  only  dug  the  mine  which  she  in 
tended  at  some  indefinite  future  time  to  use,but  she  also  took 
thought  for  the  morrow,  and  with  busy  hands  carried  the 
powder  to  it,  even  although  she  did  not  yet  light  the  fuse. 

Hamilton  says  in  his  very  full  letter  to  Colonel  Dayton, 
speaker  of  the  house  of  representatives,  on  the  situation 
of  the  Union  generally,  and  especially  on  the  Yirginia  and 
Kentucky  resolutions:  "  The  late  attempt  of  Yirginia  and 
Kentucky  to  unite  the  state  legislatures  in  a  direct  resist- 
but  to  make  them  so,  to  resist  their  execution  within  their  respective 
borders  by  physical  force,  and  to  secede  from  the  Union  rather  than  sub- 
.mit  to  them,  if  attempted  to  be  carried  into  execution  by  force." 

1  Wash.,  Works,  XI..  p.  391. 

8  Ibid,  XL,  p.  387,  etc. 


VIRGINIA   PREPARES   TO    USE   FORCE.  157 

ance  to  certain  laws  of  the  Union,  can  be  considered  in  no 
other  light  than  as  an  attempt  to  change  the  government. 
It  is  stated,  in  addition,  that  the  opposition  party  in  Vir 
ginia,  the  headquarters  of  the  faction,  have  followed  up 
the  hostile  declarations  which  are  to  be  found  in  the  reso 
lutions  of  their  general  assembly,  by  an  actual  preparation 
of  the  means  of  supporting  them  by  force;  that  they  have 
taken  means  to  put  their  militia  on  a  more  efficient  foot 
ing;  are  preparing  considerable  arsenals  and  magazines, 
and  (which  is  an  unequivocal  proof  of  how  much  they  are 
in  earnest)  have  gone  so  far  as  to  lay  new  taxes  on  their 
citizens."1  He  attaches  full  faith  to  these  reports,  and 
again,  in  January,  1800,  declares  it  his  conviction  that  the 
leaders  in  Virginia  were  ready  to  possess  themselves  of 
the  government  by  force.2  Handall,  Jefferson's  biographer, 
passes  over  these  charges  in  silence,  although  he  publishes 
the  letter  to  Dayton  and  discusses  it  minutely.  It  must 
remain  undecided  whether  this  silence  is  to  be  regarded  as 
a  confession,  or  whether  it  means  that  the  person  of  the 
complainant  makes  all  refutation  superfluous.  The  reader 
must  be  satisfied  with  the  declaration  that  from  Hamil 
ton's  "  programme"  for  the  session  of  congress  he  will 
discover  "  whether  it  was  Jefferson  or  his  opponents  who 
attempted  to  misstate  them  [party  aims]  to  posterity."3 

When  the  state-rights  party  had  long  been  in  sure 
possession  of  power,  a  distinguished  member  of  it  from 
Virginia  took  care  to  let  "posterity"  know  whether  Harn- 

1  Ham.,  Works,  VI.,  p.  384 

a  "  The  spirit  of  faction  is  abated  nowhere.  In  Virginia  it  is  more 
violent  than  ever.  It  seems  demonstrated  that  the  leaders  there,  who 
possess  completely  all  the  powers  of  the  local  government,  are  resolved 
to  possess  those  of  the  national  by  the  most  dangerous  combinations ; 
and  if  they  cannot  effect  this,  to  resort  to  the  employment  of  physical 
force.  The  want  of  disposition  in  the  people  to  second  them  will  be 
the  only  preventive.  It  is  believed  that  it  will  be  an  effectual  one." 
Ham.,  Works,  VI.,  p.  416. 

'  Randall,  Life  of  Jefferson,  II.,  p.  458. 


158  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

iltoh's  charges  were  calumnies  and  phantoms  of  his  brain, 
which,  according  to  the  anti-Federalists,  always  burned 
with  the  fever  of  monarchy.  It  was  a  well-known  fact 
that  at  the  time  that  Washington  saw  a  "  dreadful  crisis 
hastening,"  a  large  establishment  for  the  manufacture  of 
arms  was  set  up  in  Richmond,  in  which,  however,  work  was 
not  commenced  until  some  years  later.  John  Randolph 
thought  it  due  to  the  reputation  of  his  state  to  remove 
every  doubt  as  to  the  object  of  the  erection  of  this  estab 
lishment.  He  declared  in  1817  in  the  house  of  represen 
tatives  :  "  There  was  no  longer  any  cause  for  concealing 
the  fact  that  the  great  armory  at  Richmond  was  built  to 
enable  the  state  of  Yirginia  to  resist  by  force  the  encroach 
ments  of  the  then  administration  upon  her  indisputable 
rights,  upon  the  plainest  and  clearest  provisions  of  the 
constitution — in  case  they  should  persevere  in  their  out 
rageous  proceedings."1 

It  is  not  possible  to  say  whether,  or  to  what  extent,  these 
preparations  were  directly  incited  by  Jefferson  and  Mad 
ison.  The  suspicion  resting  on  Jefferson  is  obviously  the 
greater,  as  Madison  was  from  first  to  last  more  cautious  in 
his  steps.  Nor  can  any  definite  answer  be  given  to  the 
question  how  far  Madison  recommended  more  moderate 
measures,  or  how  far  a  different  interpretation  of  the  con 
stitution  lay  at  the  foundation  of  these  recommendations. 
Every  move  of  his  was  made  with  anxious  deliberation,  and 
his  native  cautiousness,  which  sometimes  degenerated  into 
weakness  and  indecision,  contributed  beyond  doubt  to  cause 
him  to  advise  a  milder  and  more  tentative  procedure. 
Besides,  it  may  be  that  the  internal  struggle  between  his 
state  and  national  patriotism,  in  both  of  which  he  was 
equally  honest,  hindered  him  from  explaining  to  him 
self  the  "interpose."  Perhaps  he  desired  to  leave  open  to 

1  Reminiscences  of  J.  A.  Hamilton,  p.  39,  according  to  the  National  In 
telligencer. 


CHARACTER    OF   JEFFERSON.  159 

himself  as  well  as  to  the  legislatures  of  the  other  states  all 
possible  ways  of  coming  to  a  substantial  agreement.  It 
may  be,  too,  that  he  entertained  some  real  doubt  whether 
the  letter  and  spirit  of  the  constitution  quite  justified  the 
last  conclusion  in  the  Kentucky  resolutions  of  1799,  drawn 
from  the  correct  principles — correct  in  his  opinion — which 
were  the  common  basis  of  the  Virginia  and  Kentucky  res 
olutions.  Whatever  estimate  of  the  relative  weight  of 
these  two  motives  may  be  made,  the  r61e  played  by  Madi 
son  in  the  constitutional  conflict  which  culminated  in  1798 
and  1799  throws  much  light  on  the  real  character  of  the 
constitution  itself  and  on  the  history  of  the  development 
of  the  national  spirit  during  the  last  decade.  Much  weight 
is  not  to  be  attached  to  the  fact  that  Jefferson  read  the  con 
stitution  in  such  a  way,  that  the  union  of  the  states  was  in 
principle,  perhaps  a  looser,  and  certainly  not  a  firmer,  one, 
than  it  had  been  under  the  articles  of  confederation.1  It  was 
not  a  difficult  matter  for  Jefferson  to  act  in  opposition  to  his 
own  theories;  and  it  was  still  easier  for  him  to  reconcile 
himself  to  a  contradiction  between  his  words  and  his  deeds. 
Ambition  was  the  sovereign  trait  in  his  character.  He  was 
always  ready  to  sacrifice  much  of  his  favorite  theories  to 
his  feverish  thirst  for  power  and  distinction,  the  more 
especially  as  his  eminently  practical  instinct  caused  him 

1  Article  13  of  the  articles  of  confederation  says :  "  Every  state  shall 
abide  by  the  determination  of  the  United  States  in  congress  assembled, 
on  all  questions  which,  by  this  confederation,  are  submitted  to  them." 
The  opponents  of  the  doctrine  of  nullification  have  interpreted  this  pro- 
vision  to  mean  that  the  laws  of  congress  are  absolutely  binding  on  the 
states.  In  the  constitution  there  are  provisions  which  establish  the 
supremacy  of  the  laws  of  congress  in  a  still  more  undoubted  manner. 
If,  spite  of  this,  the  doctrine  of  nullification  could  possibly  and  logical 
ly  be  deduced  from  it,  it  must  have  been  much  easier  to  deduce  it  from 
the  articles  of  confederation,  for  several  of  the  most  important  links  in 
the  proof  are  here  expressly  mentioned,  whereas,  in  the  latter,  they  can 
only  be  inferred  from  other  provisions  or  words.  Hence  the  indirect 
proof  in  opposition  to  the  theory  of  nullification,  from  the  13th  article 
of  confederation,  has  no  value. 


160  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVEKY. 

often  to  doubt  the  tenableness  of  his  ideal  systems.  More 
over,  as  he,  partly  from  interest  and 'partly  because  misled 
by  his  idealistic  reveries,  concealed  his  ambition  under  the 
mask  of  the  greatest  simplicity,  stoical  indifference,  and  even 
of  disinclination  to  accept  any  political  honor  or  dignity, 
so,  too,  his  conscience  was  not  precisely  what  would  be 
called  tender  in  the  weighing  and  measuring  of  words, 
whether  his  own  or  those  of  others.  Such  a  character  could 
scarcely  always  resist  the  temptation  to  make  ink  and  pa 
per  say  what  in  his  opinion  they  ought  to  say.  His  mode 
of  thought,  which  was  a  mixture  of  about  equal  parts  of  dia 
lectical  acuteness  and  of  the  fanaticism  of  superficiality,  as 
shortsighted  as  it  was  daring,  made  this  a  matter  of  no 
difficulty.  Hence  it  is  that  not  the  slightest  weight  should 
be  attached  a  priori  to  his  interpretation  of  the  constitution. 
The  direct  contrary  of  this  is  true  of  Madison.  His 
was  not  a  character  so  thoroughly  and  harmoniously  con 
stituted  and  developed  as  Washington's.  He,  too,  con 
cealed  the  depth  of  his  ambition  under  a  plain  and  modest 
exterior.  "When  it  or  his  over-sensitiveness  was  wounded, 
he,  too,  could  be  unjust  to  his  opponents.  The  violence 
with  which  the  party  struggle  was  conducted  by  degrees 
carried  him,  also,  so  far  away  that  he  played  a  more  covert 
game  than  can  be  entirely  justified  by  the  excuse  of  politi 
cal  necessity.  And  when  it  was  a  question  of  opposing  a 
measure  in  too  great  conflict  with  his  own  party  programme, 
he  could  descend  to  the  letter,  and  to  petty  quibbling,  if 
he  could  not  give  his  attack  the  necessary  energy  from  the 
higher  standpoint  of  the  statesman.  Spite  of  this,  how 
ever,  there  was  nothing  of  the  demagogue  about  him.  He 
is  a  purely  constituted  character,  spite  of  the  fact  that  his 
moral  principles  did  not  so  unconditionally  govern  him  as 
to  leave  his  judgment  entirely  uninfluenced  by  his  desires. 
It  cannot  be  charged  that  he  ever  consciously  approached 
the  constitution  with  the  intention  of  discovering  in  it  a 
word  which  he  might  make  to  serve  his  purposes  by  di- 


POSITION   OF   MADISON.  161 

alectical  legerdemain.  Great  weight  must  therefore  be 
given  to  his  exposition  of  the  constitution;  for  he  played 
a  leading  part  in  the  Philadelphia  convention;  was  after 
wards  the  most  conspicuous  defender  of  the  draft  of  the 
constitution  in  the  Virginia  convention;  in  conjunction 
with  Hamilton  and  Jay  wrote  the  Federalist;  had  a 
precise  knowledge  of  the  constitution  and  had  familiar 
ized  his  thought  with  the  minutest  details  of  its  provis 
ions.  But  it  can  be  shown  that  he  now  read  the  con 
stitution  in  such  a  way  as  to  find  in  it  something  essen 
tially  different  from  what  he  had  advocated  in  Philadelphia, 
and  from  what  he  thought  he  saw  in  the  completed  draft 
of  it.  If  it  be  conceded  that  he  did  not  read  the  constitu 
tion  now  so  as  to  introduce  anything  new  into  it — and  this 
will  scarcely  be  denied  to-day — these  different  interpre 
tations  can  be  explained  only  on  two  assumptions,  that, 
leaving  all  sophistry  aside,  the  terms  of  the  constitution 
must  admit  of  essentially  different  meanings,  and  that 
Madison's  political  proclivities  and  judgment  had  expe 
rienced  a  radical  change  since  1787  and  1788.  This  last 
point  is  important  for  the  understanding  of  the  history  of 
the  constitution,  since  the  causes  of  the  change  in  Madi 
son's  political  tendency  were  not  of  a  personal,  but  of  a 
general, nature.  Madison  is  in  this  respect  only  the  most 
distinguished  representative  of  a  large  fraction  of  the 
whole  people. 

Madison  did  not  agree  in  1787  with  the  opinion  that  had 
become  current  throughout  the  country,  that  the  states  were 
sovereign  in  the  proper  sense  of  the  word.  Said  he  on 
the  29th  of  June,  in  the  Philadelphia  convention:  "Their 
[the  states']  laws  in  relation  to  the  paramount  law  of  the 
confederacy  were  analogous  to  that  of  by-laws  to  the  su 
preme  law  within  a  state."1  And  he  added  that  the  powers 
of  the  states,  under  the  proposed  form  of  government, 

1  Compare  the  preceding  note. 
11 


162  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND   SLAVERY. 

would  be  still  more  hampered.1  This  language  is  very  char 
acteristic  of  his  position.  All  his  efforts  at  the  time  had 
their  basis  in  this  fundamental  thought,  and  he  followed 
out  its  logical  conclusions  with  as  much  acuteness  as  prac 
tical  insight.  He  repeatedly  and  urgently  warned  the 
country  against  the  disastrous  consequences  of  stopping 
half-way.  He  would  not  change  the  legal  basis  of  the  re 
lation  of  the  states  to  the  Union,  because  it  was  not  neces 
sary  to  do  so  from  his  conception  of  the  nature  of  the 
articles  of  confederation.  He  desired  only  to  make  the 
theory  of  the  articles  of  confederation  a  living  fact  by 
means  of  the  constitution.  He  would  have  the  constitu 
tion  give  to  the  general  government  an  express  and  definite 
legal  remedy,  by  which  every  attempt  of  the  states  to  cur 
tail  the  legal  and  actual  supremacy  of  the  Union  could  be 
nipped  in  the  bud. 

Even  before  the  meeting  of  the  constitutional  convention 
he  writes  to  Edmund  Randolph  :2  "  Let  it  have  a  negative  in 
all  cases  whatsoever,  on  the  legislative  acts  of  the  states, 
as  the  king  of  Great  Britain  heretofore  had.  This  I  con 
ceive  to  be  essential,  and  the  least  possible  abridgment  oi 
the  state  sovereignties.  Without  such  a  defensive  power, 
every  positive  power  that  can  be  given  on  paper  will  be 
unavailing." 

During  the  course  of  the  convention  he  returns  again 
and  again  to  this  point,  insisting  upon  it  as  "  absolutely 
necessary  to  a  perfect  system,"  and  from  first  to  last  does 
not  deviate  by  a  hair's  breadth  from  his  original  demand. 
He  declares,  on  the  8th  of  June:  "  But  in  order  to  give  the 
negative  this  efficacy,  it  must  extend  to  all  cases.  A  dis 
crimination  would  be  only  a  fresh  source  of  contention 
between  the  two  authorities.  In  a  word,  to  recur  to  the 
illustrations  borrowed  from  the  planetary  system,  this 

1  Elliot,  Deb.,  V.  p.  256. 

•  April  8,  1787.    Elliot,  Deb.,  V.,  ?.  108. 


MADISON   IN   THE   CONVENTION.  163 

prerogative  of  the  general  government  is  the  great  pervad 
ing  principle  that  must  control  the  centrifugal  tendency  of 
the  states,  which  without  it  will  continually  fly  out  of 
their  proper  orbits,  and  destroy  the  order  and  harmony  of 
the  political  system."1  And  when  the  convention  finally 
adopted  the  draft  without  any  provision  of  this  kind,  he 
again  declared  that  it  "alone  could  meet  all  the  shapes 
which  these  [the  injurious  acts  of  the  states]  should  as 
sume."2  We  must  measure  the  change  in  his  personal 
views  on  the  conditions  precedent  of  a  powerful  common 
wealth,  with  a  capacity  for  life  and  built  on  a  federative 
foundation,  by  these  expressions.  But  this  is  not  say 
ing  that  the  change  in  his  personal  views  influenced  his 
interpretation  of  the  constitution,  or,  if  so,  to  what  ex 
tent.  Our  judgment  on  this  point  must  depend  upon  how 
far  he  considered  his  main  object  to  be  attained  in  1787 
and  1788,  spite  of  the  fact  that  he  was  not  able  to  secure 
an  unlimited  negative  to  the  government  of  the  Union. 

The  later  school  of  Calhoun  repeatedly  appealed  to  a 
word  used  by  Madison  in  the  constitutional  convention, 
to  prove  that  even  those  who  most  strongly  advocated  a 
"  consolidation"  of  the  states  did  not  intend  to  give  the 
federal  government  the  power  to  use  force  in  order  to  com 
pel  obedience  on  the  part  of  a  state. 

During  the  debates  on  the  clause  authorizing  the  use  of 
the  power  of  the  whole  nation  against  a  delinquent  state,  he 
remarked:  "The  use  of  force  against  a  state  would  look 
more  like  a  declaration  of  war  than  an  infliction  of  pun 
ishment,  and  would  probably  be  considered  by  the  party 
attacked  as  a  dissolution  of  all  previous  compacts  by  which 
it  might  be  bound."3 

But  this  passage  must  not  be  separated  from  the  context 
if  its  meaning  would  be  rightly  understood.  Madison  in- 


1  Elliot,  Deb.,  V.,  p.  171. 
*  Ibid,  V.,  p.  539. 
1  Ibid,  V.,  p.  140. 


164  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY    AND   SLAVERY. 

troduced  his  remarks  with  the  declaration  that  "  the  more 
he  reflected  on  the  use  of  force  the  more  he  doubted  the 
practicability,  the  justice,  and  the  efficacy  of  it,"  and  at 
the  close  he  expressed  the  hope  that  "such  a  system  would 
be   framed  as  would   render  this   resource   unnecessary." 
The  issue  of  the  question,  it  seemed  to  him,  should  be  de 
termined  by  its  expediency.     He  did  not  contest  the  right 
of  the  federal  government  to  defend  not  only  its  existence 
but  its  rights  with  force;  but  he  doubted  the  advisability 
of  making  the  use  of  this  extreme  remedy  necessary,  and 
the  possibility  of   applying   it  with  success.      Hence  he 
desired  that  the  general  government  should  have  the  abso 
lute  veto,  for  he  could  discover  no  third  means;  and  that 
congress  should  have  power  to  "  control"  the  states  was  a 
question  of  which  he  entertained  no  doubt.     Indeed,  he 
saw  the  only  danger  in  the  usurpation  of  the  states,  for 
even  if  "  a  tendency  of  the  general  government  to  absorb 
the   states"  should  appear,  it  could,  in  his  opinion,  be  at 
tended  by  no  fatal  consequence.1     The  veto  was,  therefore, 
the  mildest  means  which  could  be  discovered  to  prevent 
the  evil  which  had  grown  out  of  the  unconstitutional  pre 
tensions  of  the  state  governments.    "  The  existence  of  such 
a  check  would  prevent  attempts  to  commit  them.     Should 
no  such  precaution  be  engrafted,  the  only  remedy  would  be 
an  appeal  to  coercion.     Was  such  a  remedy  eligible?    Was 
it  practicable?     Could  the  national  resources,  if  exerted  to 
the  utmost,  enforce  a  national  decree  against  Massachu 
setts,  abetted,  perhaps,  by  several  of  her   neighbors?     It 
would  not  be  possible."2 

Madison  may  have  been  right  in  thinking  that  the  em 
ployment  of  force  against  a  state  would  be  impossible  at 
the  time,  and  that  hence  it  would  be  necessary  to  give  the 
general  government  a  peaceable  means  to  check  any  at- 


1  Elliot,  V.  p.  222. 
•  Ibid,  V.,  p.  171. 


PROPOSED    VETO    OVER    STATE    ACTS.  165 

tempt  at  revolt  before  the  agitation  should  become  so 
intense,  and  extend  to  a  circle  so  large,  that  the  authority 
of  the  federal  government  would  be  seriously  endangered. 
But  it  is  surprising  that  he,  and  with  him  all  the  distin 
guished  members  of  the  convention,  should  have  been  so 
obstinate  in  declaring  the  veto  to  be  the  only  means  by 
which  this  end  could  be  attained.  The  debate  had  pro 
gressed  a  great  way  before  he  gave  his  decisive  reasons  for 
this  and  at  the  same  time  clearly  declared  to  what  constitu 
tional  means  congress  would  be  limited  without  such  a  pro 
vision.  Said  he  on  the  17th  of  July:  "They  [the  states] 
will  pass  laws  which  will  accomplish  their  injurious  ob 
jects  before  they  can  be  repealed  by  the  general  legislature, 
or  set  aside  by  the  national  tribunals."1  With  the  excep 
tion  of  the  unambiguous  prescription  of  the  legal  means, 
the  only  essential  difference  between  the  absolute  veto  and 
the  power  of  resistance  against  the  encroachments  of  the 
states  at  the  command  of  the  federal  government,  accord 
ing  to  the  form  of  constitution  favored  by  the  convention, 
is  the  element  of  time.  The  extension  of  the  veto  power 
over  the  states,  which  he  proposed,  would  always  at  once 
prevent,  in  cases  of  urgent  need,  a  law  which  violated  the 
constitutional  prerogatives  of  the  federal  government  from 
coining  into  force.  But  if  the  veto  were  withheld,  delay 
would  be  inevitable,  and  delay  could  only  mean  giving  the 
seed  of  an  insignificant  disagreement  time  to  ripen  into 
open  rebellion. 

In  the  Federalist  he  advocated  the  same  view.  He  says, 
however:  "  But  ambitious  encroachments  of  the  federal 
government,  on  the  authority  of  the  state  governments 
.  .  .  .  would  be  signals  of  general  alarm.  Every  state 
government  would  espouse  the  common  cause.  A  corres 
pondence  would  be  opened.  Plans  of  resistance  would  be 
concerted.  One  spirit  would  animate  and  conduct  the 

1  Elliot,  Deb.,  V.,  p.  321, 


166  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY    AND    SLAVERY. 

whole.  The  same  combination  in  short  would  result  from 
an  apprehension  of  the  federal,  as  was  produced  by  the  dread 
of  a  foreign  yoke;  and  unless  the  projected  innovations 
should  be  voluntarily  renounced,  the  same  appeal  to  a  trial 
of  force  would  be  made  in  the  one  case  as  was  made  in  the 
other."1  But  he  does  not  speak  here  of  a  right  of  the 
states,  but  only  mentions  the  probability  of  a  fact.  This 
is  evident  from  the  comparison  drawn.  The  forcible  re 
sistance  of  the  states  to  the  general  government  might  be 
as  justifiable  as  the  forcible  resistance  of  the  colonies  to 
England;  but  in  law,  it  would  be,  in  this  case  as  in  that,  a 
revolution  and  not  a  mode  of  procedure  warranted  by  the 
constitution.  In  the  one  case  as  in  the  other,  there  would 
have  been  but  a  naked  fact  presented,  the  fact,  namely,  that 
the  question  had  been  taken  out  of  the  domain  of  law  and 
brought  before  the  tribunal  which  is  the  ultima  ratio  of 
every  people  and  every  age.  Madison  leaves  no  doubt  as 
to  what,  in  contrast  with  these  actual  remedies,  were  the 
legal  remedies  belonging  to  the  states.  "  In  the  first  in 
stance,"  he  says, "  the  success  of  the  usurpation  will  depend 
on  the  executive  and  judiciary  departments  which  are  to 
expound  and  give  eifect  to  the  legislative  acts;  and  in  the 
last  resort  a  remedy  must  be  obtained  from  the  people,  who 
can  by  the  election  of  more  faithful  representatives  annul 
the  acts  of  the  usurpers."2  Here  there  is  nothing  said  of 
the  duty  of  the  states  "  to  interpose."  It  is  conceded  that 
the  general  government  has  the  exclusive  right  of  decision, 
and  the  only  way  to  reverse  this  decision  is  to  labor  to  the 
end  that,  at  the  time  appointed  by  law,  other  persons  with 
different  views  may  be  entrusted  with  it.  And  how,  indeed, 
could  a  constitution  which  accorded  to  the  states  other 
means  of  defense,  be  advocated  by  the  man  who  condensed 
the  knowledge  he  had  learned  from  history  into  these  words : 


1  Federalist,  XL VI. 
1  Ibid,  XLIV. 


16T 

"  The  important  truth  which  it  unequivocally  pronounces 
in  the  present  case  is,  that  a  sovereignty  over  sovereigns,  a 
government  over  governments,  a  legislation  for  communi 
ties,  as  contradistinguished  from  individuals,  as  it  is  a  sole 
cism  in  theory,  so  in  practice  it  is  subversive  of  the  order 
and  ends  of  civil  policy,  by  sustaining  violence  in  place  of 
law,  or  the  destructive  coercion  of  the  sword  in  place  of  the 
mild  and  salutary  coercion  of  the  magistracy"?1  The  say 
ing  of  John  Quincy  Adams  already  quoted,  "  that  the  con 
stitution  itself  had  been  extorted  from  the  grinding  neces 
sity  of  a  reluctant  people,"  will  now  be  better  understood. 

1  Federalist  XX. 


168          STATE  SOVEREIGNTY  AND  SLAVERY. 


CHAPTEE  Y. 

THE  PRESIDENTIAL  ELECTION  OF  1801.  THE  FALL  OF  THE 
FEDERALIST  PARTY.  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  PURCHASE  OF 
LOUISIANA.  THE  BURR  AND  FEDERALIST  INTRIGUES. 

The  Virginia  and  Kentucky  resolutions  produced  no 
further  immediate  consequences.  The  recognized  leaders 
of  the  anti-Federalists  or  Republicans  had  given  their  in 
terpretation  of  the  constitution  and  of  the  Union  created 
by  it.  Their  declarations  remained  a  long  time  unused, 
but  also  unrecalled  and  unforgotten.  The  internal  con 
tests  continued  and  their  character  remained  the  same. 
The  revolution  in  the  situation  of  parties  now  necessitated 
a  change  of  front  on  both  sides,  and  for  a  time  also  the 
battles  between  them  were  waged  over  other  points  and  in 
part  in  another  way. 

The  next  collision  was  an  actual  struggle  for  supremacy. 
An  inadequate  provision  of  the  constitution  alone  made 
this  battle  a  possibility  to  the  Federalists;  but  the  struggle 
over  the  question  of  the  constitution  was  after  all  consid 
ered  only  as  a  mere  accidental  collateral  circumstance. 

The  Republicans  had  won  the  presidential  election  by  a 
majority  of  eight  or  nine  electoral  votes.  Their  two  can 
didates,  Jefferson  and  Aaron  Burr,  had  each  received  sev 
enty-three  votes.  They  intended  that  Jefferson  should  be 
president  and  Burr  vice-president.  Spite  of  this,  however, 
they  gave  both  the  same  number  of  votes,  either  not  to  en 
danger  Burr's  election,  or  because  he  became  a  candidate 
only  on  that  condition.1  This  was,  considering  Burr's  want 

1  Wolcott  asserted  that  Burr  proposed  this  condition  and  that  it  was 
accepted  by  prominent  Republicans.  Gibbs,  Mem.  of  Wolcott,  II.,  p. 


TIE-VOTE    FOB    THE    PRESIDENCY.  169 

of  principle,  and  the  boldness  of  his  character,  a  dangerous 
experiment.  Judge  Woodworth  charged  that  Burr  had  won 
over  one  of  the  electors  of  New  York  to  withhold  his  vote 
from  Jefferson,  and  that  this  was  prevented  only  by  the  fact 
that  the  other  electors  of  the  state  had  discovered  it  in  time.1 
If  this  charge  be  well-founded,  it  was  by  mere  accident  that 
the  country  escaped  electing  a  man  president  whose  name 
had  never  yet  been  connected  with  the  presidency  by  any 
party.  But  be  this  as  it  may,  the  danger  that  the  bank 
rupt,  foolish  voluptuary,  for  whom  no  means  was  too  low  to 
carry  out  the  adventurous  plans  of  his  daring  and  mad  am 
bition,  should  be  made  chief  of  the  republic,  was  by  no 
means  removed. 

If  an  equal  number  of  electoral  votes  should  be  cast  for 
two  or  more  candidates,  the  house  of  representatives  would 
have  to  elect  one  of  them  to  the  presidency.  In  this  case, 
the  votes  would  be  cast  by  states,  and  it  would  be  neces 
sary  that  a  majority  of  all  the  states  should  vote  for  one  of 
the  candidates  in  order  to  have  a  valid  election.  The  Fed 
eralists  had  a  majority  in  the  house  of  representatives,  but 
voting  by  states  they  could  control  only  one-half  the  votes. 
This  was  just  sufficient  to  prevent  an  election. 

ETo  one  denied  that  the  majority  of  the  people,  as  well 
as  the  republican  electors,  desired  to  make  Jefferson  presi 
dent.  But  party  passion  had  reached  such  a  feverish 
height  that  the  Federalists  resolved,  spite  of  this,  to  plant 
themselves  on  the  letter  of  the  constitution,  and  to  hinder 

488.  Hand  all,  Life  of  Jefferson,  II.,  p.  573,  calls  this  an  absurd  state- 
ment,  but  produces  no  proof  therefor,  except  a  letter  of  Jefferson's  dated 
Dec.  15, 1800,  to  Burr,  in  which  he  intimates  that  he  expects  to  receive  a 
larger  number  of  votes.  J.  C.  Hamilton,  Hist,  of  the  Rep.  of  the  United 
States,  VII.,  p.  425,  gives,  however,  good  grounds  for  the  assumption 
that  Jefferson  at  this  time  was  aware  of  the  equality  of  the  vote.  A  let 
ter  (Ibid,  VII.,  p.  424)  from  Madison  to  Monroe,  quoted  by  Hamil 
ton,  tends  rather  to  prove  than  to  disprove  that  such  a  promise  had  been 
made  in  favor  of  Burr. 
1  J.  C.  Hamilton,  VII.,  pp.  434,  435. 


170  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

Jefferson- s  election.  The  possibility  of  electing  their  own 
candidates1  was  completely  excluded  by  the  constitution. 
They  could  therefore  do  nothing  except  to  obtain  for  Burr 
a  majority  of  the  votes  of  the  states,  or  prevent  an  elec 
tion.  In  case  no  president  was  elected  by  the  states,  they 
thought  of  casting  the  election  on  the  senate.  The  senate 
was  to  elect  a  provisional  president — from  among  the  sena 
tors  or  not2 — who  then  might  be  declared  president  of  the 
United  States.  Such  a  proceeding  could  not  be  justified 
by  any  provision  of  the  constitution;  the  case  had  not  been 
provided  for  at  all.3  It  is  impossible  to  say  whether  this 
is  the  reason  why  the  plan  was  soon  dropped ;  certain  it  is, 
however,  that  Gibbs's  statement  that  such  a  plan  never 
existed  is  incorrect.4 

After  some  hesitation  they  resolved  to  try  to  elect  Burr. 
Only  six  states,  it  is  true,  voted  for  him,  but  it  was  neces 
sary  to  win  over  only  four  votes5  in  order  to  guarantee 
him  the  legal  majority  of  nine  states. 


1  Adams  and  Pinckney. 

8  They  thought,  for  instance,  of  Chief- justice  Marshall. 

8  It  is  impossible  to  understand  how,  spite  of  this,  Adams  could  write : 
"  I  know  no  more  danger  of  a  political  convulsion,  if  a  president  pro 
tempore  of  the  senate,  or  a  secretary  of  state,  or  speaker  of  the  house, 
should  be  made  president  by  congress,  than  if  Mr.  Jefferson  or  Mr. 
Burr  is  declared  such.  The  president  would  be  as  legal  [!]  in  one  case 
as  in  either  of  the  others,  in  my  opinion,  and  the  people  as  well  satis- 
fied."  Adams,  Works,  IX.,  p.  98. 

4  Mem.  ofWolcott,  II.,  p.  98. 

6  Bailey  and  Livingston,  of  New  York,  Lynn,  of  New  Jersey,  and 
Dent,  of  Maryland.  New  Jersey  and  Maryland  gave  him  an  equally 
divided  vote.  Lynn  inclined  towards  the  Federalists,  and  Dent  was  a  de 
cided  Federalist.  The  two  representatives  from  New  York  named  above 
were  not  considered  very  particular  friends  of  Jefferson.  The  assump 
tion  that,  under  certain  circumstances,  a  majority  might  be  obtained 
for  Burr  does  not  seem  to  be  quite  as  absurd  as  Randall  represents  it  in 
his  life  of  Jefferson.  Life  of  Jeff.,  II.,  p.  605.  Its  probability  is  in- 
directly  increased  by  the  fact  that  the  Federalists,  who  alone  decided  the 
issue  in  favor  of  Jefferson,  drew  upon  themselves  the  suspicion  of  cor 
rupt  influence.  See  J.  C.  Hamilton,  Hist,  of  the  Rep.  of  the  U.  S.  of 


THBEAT   OF   FORCIBLE   BESISTANOE.  171 

The  prospect  of  the  success  of  both  plans  was  at  least 
great  enough  to  inspire  the  Republicans  with  serious 
fear.  Jefferson  had  written  on  the  15th  of  December  to 
Burr  that  "  decency"  compelled  him  to  remain  "  com 
pletely  passive"  during  the  campaign.1  But  now  he  con 
sidered  the  situation  so  serious  that  he  thought  himself  no 
longer  bound  by  "decency."  He  personally  requested 
Adams  to  interfere  by  his  veto,  if  the  Federalists  should 
attempt  to  turn  over  the  government,  during  an  interreg 
num,  to  a  president  pro  tern.  Although  he  declared  that 
such  a  measure  would  probably  excite  forcible  resistance, 
Adams  refused  to  be  guided  by  his  advice.2 

Madison  proposed  another  means  of  escape.  He  thought 
that  an  interregnum  until  the  meeting  of  congress  in  De 
cember,  1801,  would  be  too  dangerous;  Jefferson  and  Burr 
should  therefore  call  congress  together  by  a  common  proc 
lamation  or  recommendation.  This  step  could  no  more 
be  justified  by  any  provision  of  the  constitution  than  an 
interregnum  under  a  provisional  president.  Madison 
himself  conceded  that  it  would  not  be  "  strictly  regular."3 
But  the  literal  interpretation  was  presumably  the  alpha 
and  omega  of  the  political  creed  of  the  Republicans. 
Spite  of  this  the  notion  met  with  Jefferson's  approbation.4 

Between  the  two  parties,  or  rather  above  them,  stood  the 
founder  of  the  Federalist  party  himself.  Even  Hamilton 


Am.,  VII.,  pp.  464,  465,  467,  468.  Benton,  in  his  Abridgment  of  the 
Debates  of  Congress,  omits  the  passage  cited  by  Hamilton  from  Bay. 
ard's  speech. 

'Jeff.,  Works,  IV.,  p.  340. 

a  The  Anas.,  Jeff.'s  Works,  IX.,  p.  210. 

1  Madison  to  Jefferson,  Jan.  10, 1801 :  "  And  if,  in  reference  to  the  con- 
stitution,  the  proceeding  be  not  strictly  regular,  the  irregularity  will  be 
less  in  form  than  any  other  adequate  to  the  emergency,  and  will  be  in 
form  only,  rather  than  in  substance."  J.  C.  Hamilton,  Hist,  of  the  Rep. 
of  the  U.  S.  of  Am.,  VII.,  pp.  431,  432.  Compare  Ham.,  Works,  VI., 
p.  509. 

4  Jeff.,  Works,  IV.,  p.  355.    Edition  of  1854. 


172  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

advised  that  a  concession  should  be  made  to  the  interests 
of  political  expediency.1  The  possibilities  which  the  equal 
electoral  vote  placed  in  the  hands  of  the  Federalists  in  the 
house  of  representatives  were  to  be  used  wherever  possible, 
to  force  certain  promises  from  Jeiferson.  But  Hamilton 
did  not  wish  to  go  any  farther.  He  declared  the  project  of 
the  interregnum  to  be  "  dangerous  and  unbecoming,"  and 
thought  that  it  could  not  possibly  succeed.2  Jefferson  or 
Burr  was  the  only  question.  When  his  party  associates 
also  seemed  to  have  adopted  this  view,  he  used  his  whole 
influence  to  dissuade  them  from  smuggling  Burr  into  the 
White  House.  He  had  written  to  Wolcott  on  the  16th  of 
December,  that  he  expected  that  at  least  New  England 
would  not  so  far  lose  her  senses  as  to  fall  into  this  snare. 
When  he  was  mistaken  in  these  expectations  he  wrote  let 
ter  after  letter  to  the  most  prominent  Federalists  who 
might  exert  an  influence  directly  or  indirectly  on  the  elec 
tion.  "  If  there  be  a  man  in  the  world,"  he  wrote  to 
Morris,  "  I  ought  to  hate,  it  is  Jefferson."3  Spite  of  this, 
however,  he  pleaded  for  Jefferson's  election  harder  than  any 

'  *  It  cannot  be  denied  that  this  concession  was  greater  than  is  to  be 
desired  for  Hamilton's  political  fame.  He  writes  to  Wolcott,  Dec.  16: 
"Yet  it  may  be  well  enough  to  throw  out  a  lure  for  him  [Burr]  in  order 
to  tempt  him  to  start  for  the  plate,  and  to  lay  the  foundations  of  dissen 
sion  between  the  two  chiefs."  Ham.,  Works,  VI.,  p.  486.  It  is  charac 
teristic  of  the  book  written  py  Hamilton's  son  and  often  here  referred  to, 
that  he  does  not  print  this  passage,  although  he  gives  a  literal  reproduc 
tion  of  a  large  portion  of  the  letter.  Hist,  of  the  Rep.  of  the  U.  S.  of 
Am.,  VII.,  pp.  434,  435.  Besides,  this  is  not  by  any  means  the  only  in 
stance  in  which  Hamilton's  political  morality  suffered  in  the  violence 
of  party  strife. 

a "  It  has  occurred  to  me  that  perhaps  the  Federalists  may  be  disposed 
to  play  the  game  of  preventing  an  election,  and  leaving  the  executive 
power  in  the  hands  of  a  future  president  of  the  senate.  This,  if  it  could 
succeed,  would  be,  for  obvious  reasons,  a  most  dangerous  and  unbecom 
ing  policy.  But  it  is  well  it  should  be  understood  that  it  cannot  sue- 
cee'd."  Ham.,  Works,  VI.,  p.  508. 

9  Ham.,  Works,  VI.,  p.  499. 


ELECTION   OF   JEFFERSON.  173 

.Republican:  "for  in  a  case  like  this,"  he  added,  "it  would 
be  base  to  listen  to  personal  considerations."1  Besides,  he 
always  dwelt  with  emphasis  on  the  folly,  the  baseness,  the 
corruption  and  impolicy  of  the  Burr  intrigue.  In  all  these 
letters,  some  of  which  are  very  lengthy,  he  shows  himself 
the  far-seeing  statesman,  and  examines  everything  with 
calmness  and  incision;  but  at  times  he  rises  to  a  solemn 
pathos.  With  the  greatest  firmness,  but  at  the  same  time 
with  a  certain  amount  of  regret,  he  writes  to  Bayard:  "  If 
the  party  shall,  by  supporting  Mr.  Burr  as  president,  adopt 
him  for  their  official  chief,  I  shall  be  obliged  to  consider 
myself  as  an  isolated  man.  It  will  be  impossible  for  me  to 
reconcile  with  my  motives  of  honor  or  policy  the  contin 
uing  to  be  of  a  party  which,  according  to  my  apprehension, 
will  have  degraded  itself  and  the  country."2 

Hamilton's  intellectual  superiority  was  still  recognized 
by  the  Federalists,  but  spite  of  this  he  stood  almost  isola 
ted  from  every  one.  The  repulsive  virulence  with  which 
the  party  war  had  been  waged  during  all  these  years,  and 
the  consciousness  that  their  defeat  was  in  a  great  measure 
due  to  the  bitter  and  exasperating  contentions  among  them 
selves,  had  dulled  the  political  judgment  and  political  mor 
als  of  most  of  the  other  leaders.  Hamilton's  admonitions 
were  not  without  effect,  but  he  was  not  able  to  bring  about 
a  complete  surrender  of  the  plan  which  was  as  impolitic  as 
it  was  corrupt.  The  electoral  contest  in  the  house  of  rep 
resentatives  continued  from  the  llth  to  the  17th  of  Feb 
ruary.  Not  until  the  thirty-sixth  ballot  did  so  many  of  the 
Federalists  use  blank  ballots  that  Jefferson  received  the 
votes  of  ten  states  and  was  declared  the  legally  elected 
president.  According  to  the  testimony  of  the  Federalist 
representatives  themselves,  the  field  would  not  even  yet 
have  been  cleared  were  it  not  that  Burr  had  surrendered 


1  Ibid,  VI.,  p.  501. 

•  Ibid,  VI.,  p.  419.    This  letter  is  erroneously  dated  Jan.  16, 1801. 


174  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY    AND    SLAVERY. 

his  ambiguous  position.  He  could  not  completely  and 
formally  renounce  his  Republican  friends,  and  hence  the 
Federalists  received  from  him  only  vague  and  meaningless 
assurances.  Under  these  circumstances,  it  would  have 
bordered  on  insanity  to  have  plied  every  art  to  secure  Burr's 
election,  for,  spite  of  his  brilliant  gifts,  he  was  looked 
upon  as  a  thoroughly  contemptible  man.1  All  the  dangers 
to  the  party  and  the  country  which  would  have  been  the 
consequences  of  the  success  of  their  intrigues,  they  would 
have  knowingly  entailed  in  order  to  place  an  unworthy 
character  at  the  head  of  the  government — one  who  would 
have  turned  his  back  on  them  the  moment  they  had  helped 
him  into  power.  They  would  have  been  throwing  dice  to 
determine  the  future  of  the  Union,  simply  for  the  satisfac 
tion  of  venting  their  hatred  on  Jefferson.2 

Every  one  was  fully  conscious  of  the  magnitude  of  the 
crisis.  Bayard  wrote  to  Hamilton  on  the  8th  of  March 
concerning  the  last  " caucus"  of  the  Federalists:  "All 
acknowledged  that  nothing  but  desperate  measures  re 
mained,  which  several  were  disposed  to  adopt,  and  but  few 
were  willing  openly  to  disapprove.  We  broke  up  each 
time  in  confusion  and  discord,  and  the  manner  of  the  last 
ballot  was  arranged  but  a  few  minutes  before  the  ballot  was 
given."3  Some  years  later  he  repeated  the  assertion  under 
oath,  that  there  were  some  who  thought  it  better  to  abide 
by  their  vote,  and  to  remain  without  a  president,  rather 
than  choose  Jefferson.4  But  reason  and  patriotism  at 

1  Sedgwick  to  Hamilton :    "  As  to  the  other  candidate  [Burr],  there  is 
no  disagreement  as  to  his  character.    He  is  ambitious,  selfish,  profligate. 
His  ambition  is  of  the  worst  kind;  it  is  a  mere  love  of  power,  regardless 
of  fame,  but  as  its  instrument ;  his  selfishness  excludes  all  social  affec 
tions,  and  his  profligacy  unrestrained  by  any  moral  sentiment,  and  de 
fying  all  decency.    This  is  agreed."    Ibid,  VI.,  pp.  512,  513. 

2  The  political  campaign  of  1872  offers  many  analogies  to  this.     See 
the  admirable  article  in  the  Nation  of  October  17,  1872,  pp.  244, 245. 

8  Ham.,  Works,  VI.,  p.  523. 

4  flandall,  Life  of  Jeff.,  II.,  p.  608 


THE    EEPTJBLICAK    ULTIMATUM.  175 

length  obtained  the  mastery.  Bayard  seems  to  have  been 
the  instrument  of  this  decision.1 

How  much  Hamilton  contributed  to  the  defeat  of  the 
advocates  of  the  va  banquet  it  is  not  easy  to  estimate. 
Randolph,  at  the  time  a  member  of  the  house  of  represen 
tatives,  often  expressed  his  conviction  that  the  safety  of  the 
republic  was  due  to  Hamilton.2  There  was  no  difference 
of  opinion  in  the  two  parties  on  this,  that  the  victory  of 
the  stubborn  Federalists  would  have  seriously  endangered 
the  republic. 

One  month  before  the  balloting  began  we  find  the  con 
viction  prevalent  among  the  Federalists  that  the  Republi 
cans  would,  under  no  circumstances,  be  satisfied  with 
an  interregnum,  or  with  the  election  of  Burr.  James 
Gunn,  a  federal  senator  from  Georgia,  wrote  to  Hamilton 
on  the  9th  of  January:  "On  the  subject  of  choosing  a 
president  some  revolutionary  opinions  are  gaining  ground, 
and  the  Jacobins  are  determined  to  resist  the  election  of 
Burr  at  every  hazard.  ...  I  am  persuaded  that  the 
Democrats  have  taken  their  ground  with  the  fixed  resolu 
tion  to  destroy  the  government  rather  than  yield  their 
point."3 

The  Republicans  did  not  oppose  this  conviction,  but  de 
clared  it  to  be  well-founded  with  all  the  emphasis  with 
which  such  declarations  have  always  been  made  in  America. 
Jefferson  wrote  to  Monroe  on  the  15th  of  February,  two 
days  before  the  election:  "If  they  [the  Federalists]  had 
been  permitted  to  pass  a  law  for  putting  the  government 
into  the  hands  of  an  officer,  they  would  certainly  have  pre 
vented  an  election.  But  we  thought  it  best  to  declare 
openly  and  firmly,  one  and  all,  that  the  day  such  an  act 

1  John  Adams  to  Jefferson,  June  14, 1813 :  "  You  and  Mr.  Madison  are 
indebted  to  Bayard  for  an  evasion  of  the  contest."    Adams,  Works,  X.,  p. 
43. 

2  Garland,  Life  of  Randolph,  I.,  p.  187. 
1  Ham.,  Works,  VI.,  p.  509. 


176         STATE  SOVEREIGNTY  AND  SLAVERY. 

was  passed  the  middle  states  would  arm,  and  that  no  such 
usurpation,  even  for  a  single  day,  should  be  submitted  to. 
This  first  shook  them,  and  they  were  completely  alarmed 
at  the  resource  for  which  we  declared,  to  wit,  a  convention 
to  re-organize  the  government  and  to  amend  it."1  Armed 
resistance,  followed  by  a  peaceful  revolution;2  such  was  the 
last  word  of  the  Republicans.  The  Federalists  rightly 
considered  this  ultimatum  to  be  no  vain  threat.  In  a  let 
ter  written  the  day  after  the  election  to  Madison,  Jefferson 
speaks  of  the  "  certainty"  that  legislative  usurpation 
would  have  met  with  armed  resistance.  And  Jefferson's 
testimony  is  by  no  means  the  only  evidence.3  Even  the 
press  began  to  treat  the  subject  of  "  fiella,  horrida  bellaf"* 
More  than  this:  In  Yirginia,  where  the  excitement  was 
greatest,  establishments  had  already  been  erected  to  supply 
the  necessary  arms,  and  even  troops.  John  Randolph,  in 
the  speech  already  mentioned,  had  completely  lifted  the 
curtain  that  hung  over  this  subject.  Reliance  was  to  be 
placed  on  Dark's  brigade,  which  had  promised  to  take  pos 
session  of  the  arms  in  the  United  States  armory  at  Harper's 
Ferry.5 

1  Jeff.,  Works,  IV,  p.  354. 

a  The  word  revolution  seems  to  be  justified,  because  it  is  not  to  be  as 
sumed  that  Jefferson  here  meant  to  speak  of  the  calling  of  a  convention 
in  the  manner  prescribed  by  the  constitution. 

•  See  the  letter  of  St.  George  Tucker  to  Monroe  (Jan.  7, 1801),  in  J.  C. 
Hamilton,Hist.  of  the  Rep.  of  the  U.  S.  of  America,  VII.,  p.  432,  and  that 
of  Th.  Mann  Randolph,  Jefferson's  son-in-law,  to  Monroe,  Feb.  14, 1801. 

4  See  an  interesting  extract  from  Porcupine's  [Gobbet's]  Gazette,  in 
Randall,  Life  of  Jeff,  II.,  p.  603. 

6  "  We  did  not  then  rely  upon  the  Richmond  armory,  not  yet  in  opera 
tion,  but  on  the  United  States  armory  at  Harper's  Ferry.  At  that  time, 
when  the  constitution  itself  was  put  at  hazard,  rather  than  relinquish 
the  long-enjoyed  sweets  of  power,  when  the  sun  rose  upon  the  house 
balloting — balloting  through  the  night,  and  through  successive  days 
for  a  chief  magistrate — had  we  not  the  promise  of  Dark's  brigade,  and 
of  the  arms  at  Harper's  Ferry,  which  he  engaged  to  secure  in  case  of 
an  attempt  to  set  up  a  pageant  under  color  of  law  to  supersede  the  pub- 


PRESIDENTIAL    POLICY    OF    JEFFERSON.  177 

The  idea  of  waging  war  on  the  Union  with  its  own 
weapons  is  very  old;  the  secessionists  did  nothing  more 
than  carry  out  the  plan  which  the  "  fathers"  of  the  re 
public  had  considered  as  embodying  the  proper  course  un 
der  certain  contingencies. 

The  victory  of  the  Republicans  did  not  by  any  means 
produce  the  revolution  in  internal  politics  which  was  to  be 
expected.  When  the  electoral  vote  had  been  made  known, 
Jefferson,  in  the  first  transports  of  his  joy  over  the  victory, 
blew  with  all  his  might  the  trumpet  of  the  opposition. 
He  tendered  Chancellor  Livingston  a  place  in  his  cabinet, 
that  he  might  be  of  some  service  in  the  "  new  establish 
ment  of  republicanism ;  I  say  for  its  new  establishment, 
for  hitherto  we  have  only  seen  its  travestie."1  The  stub 
born  resistance  of  the  Federalists,  which  wounded  his 
vanity  not  a  little,  increased  his  angry  feeling  against 
them.  On  the  18th  of  February  he  furnished  Madison 
with  an  account  of  the  election.  He  lays  particular  stress 
on  the  fact  that  the  Federalists  did  not  finally  vote  for 
him,  but  that  there  was  an  election  only  because  a  part  of 
them  abstained  from  voting,  or  only  used  blank  ballots. 
"We  consider  this,  therefore,"  he  says,  "a  declaration  of 
war  on  the  part  of  this  band."2 

These  utterances  are  thoroughly  in  keeping  with  Jeffer 
son's  preceding  course,  and  with  his  words  and  actions 
towards  the  Federalists  and  their  policy.  Spite  of  this, 
however,  his  own  future  policy  is  not  to  be  inferred  from 
them.  Hamilton  did  not  fall  into  this  error,  because  he 
was  well  acquainted  with  the  main  traits  of  Jefferson's  char- 


lie  will,  after  defeating  the  election  by  the  pertinacious  abuse,  under  the 
pretense  of  the  exercise,  of  constitutional  right  to  support  one  of  the 
persons  returned  by  artifice,  whom  they  professed  to  abhor?  General 
Hamilton  had  frowned  indignantly  upon  this  unworthy  procedure,  for 
which  he  had  paid  the  forfeit  of  his  life." 

1  Jeff.,  Works,  IV.,  p.  339. 

•  Ibid,  IV.,  p.  355. 
12 


178          STATE  SOVEREIGNTY  AND  SLAVERY. 

acter,  and  estimated  their  relative  value  correctly,  although 
his  judgment  on  the  whole  may  have  been  somewhat  too 
severe.  He  therefore  saw  and  foretold  the  character  of 
Jefferson's  policy  better  than  Jefferson  himself  could  have 
done  while  under  the  influence  of  the  excitement  of  the 
political  campaign.  Hamilton  writes  to  Bayard,  Jan.  16, 
1801 :  "Nor  is  it  true  that  Jefferson  is  zealot  enough  to 
do  anything  in  pursuance  of  his  principles  which  will  con 
travene  his  popularity  or  his  interest.  He  is  as  likely  as 
any  man  I  know  to  temporize,  to  calculate  what  will  be 
likely  to  promote  his  own  reputation  and  advantage;  and 
the  probable  result  of  such  a  temper  is  the  preservation  of 
systems,  though  originally  opposed,  which  being  once 
established  could  not  be  overturned  without  danger  to  the 
person  who  did  it.  To  my  mind,  a  true  estimate  of  Mr. 
Jefferson's  character  warrants  the  expectation  of  a  tempo 
rizing  rather  than  of  a  violent  system."1 

This  judgment  of  Hamilton  found  its  confirmation  in 
the  inaugural  address  of  the  new  president.  In  it  Jef 
ferson  counsels  that  the  rights  of  the  minority  should  be 
held  sacred,  that  a  union  in  heart  and  soul  should  be 
brought  about,  and  that  an  effort  should  be  made  to  do 
away  with  despotic  political  intolerance  as  religious  intoler 
ance  had  already  been  done  away  with.  "  We  have  called 
by  different  names  brothers  of  the  same  principle.  "We  are 
all  Republicans — we  are  all  Federalists."2 

Jefferson  could  not  only  use  such  language  without  dan 
ger,  but  it  was  unquestionably  the  best  key  in  which  he 
could  have  spoken,  although  the  extreme  Republicans  would 
have  much  preferred  to  listen  to  a  vae  metis!  He  had 
asserted  as  early  as  the  spring  of  1796,  that  "  the  whole 
landed  interest,"*  and  therefore  a  large  majority  of  the  peo- 

1  Ham.,  Works,  VI.,  p.  420. 

*  State  Papers,  IV.,  p.  10 ;  Statesman's  Manual,  I.,  p.  150. 
8  Van  Buren,  Political  Parties,  rightly  remarks  that  this  expression 
embraces  the  owners  of  the  land  as  well  as  Its  cultivators. 


DOWNFALL    OF    HAMILTON.  179 

pie,  belonged  to  the  Republican  party.1  There  is  now  little 
difference  of  opinion  on  the  point  that  Jefferson  would  im 
mediately  have  followed  Washington  in  the  presidential 
chair,  if  the  electors  had  been  nothing  but  the  men  of  straw 
into  which  they  afterwards  degenerated.  But  even  if  this 
could  be  rightly  questioned,  it  would  not  yet  follow  that 
the  majority  of  the  people  were  then  really  inclined  to  the 
Federal  party.  The  Republicans  were  far  inferior  to  the 
Federalists  in  the  numbers  and  the  ability  of  their  leaders ; 
and,  moreover,  the  great  moneyed  interests  of  the  northern 
states  were  the  corner-stone  of  the  Federal  party.  These 
were  two  elements  which  might  very  well  keep  them  in 
power  a  while  longer,  even  if  the  majority  of  the  people 
were  in  reality  more  attached  to  the  principles  of  their 
antagonists.  But  they  were  not  a  support  on  which  they 
could  establish  lasting  rule.  In  a  democratic  republic,the  po 
litical  influence  of  the  moneyed  interests,  when  they  have  not 
attained  the  immense  proportions  they  have  in  the  Amer 
ica  of  to-day,  is,  as  a  rule,  very  limited,  and  that  of  talent 
is  very  frequently  still  smaller.  Hamilton's  lead  was  fol 
lowed  as  long  as  the  pressure  of  necessity  was  felt.  But  as 
soon  as  the  most  difficult  labor  of  organization  was  done, 
his  superiority  became  one  of  the  greatest  obstacles  which 
stood  in  the  way  of  his  public  activity.  Not  only  did  the 
Federalists  put  him  aside  by  degrees,  but  their  fault-find 
ing  with  his  actions  and  omissions  began  here  and  there  to 
partake  of  the  tone  of  the  most  odious  attacks  made  by 
the  Republicans  on  his  policy.2  This  was  a  sign  of  the 
time  which  deserved  the  most  earnest  consideration.  "When 
in  a  political  party  in  a  popular  state  a  breach  occurs  be 
tween  its  founders  and  the  masses  that  compose  it,  its 
days  are  as  a  rule  numbered.  If  the  breach  takes  place 

1  Jeff.,  Works,  IV.,  p.  139. 

2  "  Hamilton  is  obnoxious  and  persecuted  by  popular  clamors,  in 
which  Federalists  to  their  shame  join."    Fisher  Ames,  Works,  I.,  p. 


180  STATE    SOVEBEIGNTY    AND    SLAVERY. 

after  the  essential  idea  on  which  the  party  was  founded  has 
been  realized,  it  will  not  and  cannot  be  long  survived. 

This  one  essential  idea,  which  constituted  the  real  spark 
of  vitality  in  the  Federalist  party,  had  been  realized  be 
fore  the  end  of  Washington's  second  term  as  president,  and 
the  existence  of  the  work  as  well  secured  as  was  possible 
under  the  circumstances.  The  force  which  moved  the 
pendulum  in  its  forward  motion  was  exhausted.  And  if 
it  did  not  begin  its  backward  course  immediately,  but 
seemed  to  stand  for  a  moment  in  suspense,  it  was  because 
an  accidental  force  acted  upon  it  from  without.  The  pro 
longation  of  the  supremacy  of  the  Federal  party  was  due 
mainly  to  the  unhealthy  attitude  assumed  by  the  anti- 
Federalists  towards  France.  When  the  fruits  of  this  be 
gan  to  be  reaped  in  the  transactions  under  the  government 
of  the  Directory,  the  power  of  the  Federalists,  which  was 
then  declining,  at  once  mounted  to  its  zenith.1  The  con 
gressional  elections  of  1799  were  very  favorable  to  them.2 
The  value  of  this  success,  however,  must  not  be  over-esti 
mated,  as  it  was  owing  to  a  question  of  external  politics. 
Only  in  case  foreign  politics,  by  the  outbreak  of  war, 
should  be  kept  most  prominently  in  the  foreground,  could 
they  hope  that  their  success  would  obtain  a  more  lasting 
character.  But  the  quarrel  between  France  and  the  United 
States  had  reached  its  height  with  the  X.  Y.  Z.  affair  and 
with  Gerry's  return.  When  Adams,  contrary  to  a  former 
solemn  assurance,  resolved  to  send  a  new  embassy  to  France, 
the  Republicans  soon  regained  the  ground  they  had  lost; 
for  the  attitude  of  the  people  towards  questions  of  home 
politics  remained  essentially  unaltered. 

1  "  Then  they  were  very    strong."     F.  Ames,  1.  c. 

a  The  change  in  the  southern  states  especially  was  very  great.  In 
Georgia  two  Federalists  were  elected.  Of  the  six  representatives  from. 
South  Carolina,  five  were  Federalists,  of  the  ten  from  North  Carolina 
seven,  and  of  Virginia's  nineteen,  eight.  In  the  New  England  states 
only  one  anti-Federalist  was  elected.  Only  in  the  middle  states  could 
the  Federalists  boast  of  no  great  success. 


GROWTH  OF  THE  REPUBLICAN  PARTY.         181 

The  position  of  tho  Federalists  in  the  presidential  elec 
tion  of  1801  had  been  a  desperate  one.  The  hopelessness  or 
their  situation  drove  them  to  the  rash  and  despicable  game 
in  the  house  of  representatives.  They  would  have  been 
deterred  from  it  if  they  could  have  ascribed  their  defeat  to 
accidental  and  transitory  causes.  The  correspondence  ot 
their  leaders,  however,  shows  plainly  that  their  faint  hope 
of  better  success  after  four  years  was  only  a  hope  against 
their  better  judgment.  The  reaction  had  fairly  set  in. 
The  Republicans  did  not  dare  to  touch  the  essential  things 
which  had  been  accomplished  during  the  twelve  years'  vic 
tory  of  the  Federalists  over  them,  and  did  not  even  desire 
to  do  so;  for  the  same  matter  is  seen  very  differently  from 
the  point  of  view  of  the  administration  and  of  the  oppo 
sition.  It  might  not  be  expected  of  them  that  they  would* 
intentionally  increase  the  heritage  left  them,  but  if  they 
would  not  immediately  squander  it,  the  capital  would  bear 
interest  and  increase.  More  was  not  to  be  expected.  The 
defeat  of  the  Federalists  was  a  decisive  one,  for  even  the 
citadel  of  their  strength  was  undermined.  While  in  the 
southern  states  a  more  temperate  feeling  prevailed,  the 
Republicans  in  the  New  England  states  began  to  celebrate 
triumphs.1  The  decisive  point,  however,  was  that  they 
obtained  a  firm  footing  in  the  rural  districts,  whereas, 
hitherto  they  had  found  adherents  only  among  the  more 
mercurial  population  of  the  large  towns.2  The  choice 
troops  of  the  Federalists  began  to  waver  on  every  side,  and 
the  intrigues  of  the  leaders  in  the  house  of  representatives 

1 "  While  the  eastern  states  have  grown  worse,  I  verily  believe  the 
southern  have  grown  better."  F.  Aines,  Works,  I.,  p.  288. 

3  "  Jacobinism  is  certainly  spreading  from  towns  and  cities  into  the 
country  places.  It  is  less  watched  and  less  warmly  resisted  in  the  latter 
than  in  the  former.  It  is  therefore  getting  to  be  much  at  home  in  the 
country,  and  will  remain  till  the  convulsion  of  some  great  inteinal 
events  shall  change  the  whole  political  and  moral  order  of  our  nation." 
F.  Ames  to  Wolcott,  Jan.  12,  1800.  Gibbs,  Mein.  of  Wolcott,  II.,  p. 
ttl. 


182          STATE  SOVEREIGNTY  AND  SLAVERY. 

gave  the  impulse  to  the  complete  dissolution  of  their 
ranks.  Yet  neither  the  sense  of  honor,  nor  the  healthy 
judgment  which  drew  from  Hamilton  the  declaration  that 
he  must  renounce  a  party  which  had  thus  soiled  its  name, 
was  wanting  among  the  masses.  It  was  seen  at  the  moment 
how  great  was  the  mistake  made.  Even  during  the  bal 
loting  in  the  house  of  representatives,  the  Federalists 
went  over  in  swarms  to  the  enemy;  every  vote  for  Burr 
was  another  nail  in  the  coffin  of  the  party.1  This  sudden 
and  violent  fall  of  the  Federal  party  explains  the  security 
which  the  continuance  of  the  Union  enjoyed  during  the 
two  following  decades.  The  party  which  represented  partic 
ularistic  tendencies  was  in  possession  of  power,  and  had  an 
overwhelming  majority.  In  the  next  presidential  election 
Jefferson  and  Clinton  received  each  one  hundred  and  sixty  - 
two  electoral  votes,  while  Charles  C.  Pinckney  and  Kufus 
King  received  only  fourteen  each,2  and  in  1805  there  were 
only  seven  Federalists  in  the  senate.  But  even  if  the  proba 
bility  of  a  disruption  was  therefore  very  small,  the  character 
of  the  internal  struggle  remained  the  same.  This  character 
was  even  placed  in  a  clearer  light  by  the  fact  that  the  parts 
played  by  each  were  changed,  so  far  as  the  question  of  right 
was  concerned,  and  that  the  opposition,  spite  of  its  weakness, 
was  not  satisfied  with  wishes  and  threats  of  separation,  but 
began  in  earnest  to  devise  plans  of  dissolution. 

According  as  it  became  evident  in  what  manner  Jeffer 
son  thought  of  carrying  out  in  detail  the  abstract  proposi 
tions  of  his  inaugural  address,  the  broken  ranks  of  the 
Federalists  began  to  rally  again.  A  large  number  had 

1  Jefferson  writes  to  Madison  the  day  after  the  election:  "  But  their 
conduct  seems  to  have  brought  over  to  us  the  whole  body  of  Federalists, 
who,  being  alarmed  with  'the  danger  of  a  dissolution  of  the  govern- 
ment,  had  been  made  most  anxiously  to  wish  the  very  administration 
they  had  opposed,  and  to  view  it,  when  obtained,  as  a  child  of  their 
own."  Jeff.,  Works,  IV.,  pp.  355,  356. 

*  The  Republicans  had  obtained  victories  even  in  New  Hampshire 
and  Massachusetts. 


THE   MISSISSIPPI   QUESTION.  183 

gone  over  permanently  to  the  Kepublican  party,  but  the 
leaders  resumed  the  struggle  with  redoubled  energy  and 
acrimony.  A  division  in  the  Republican  camp,  which  had 
been  gradually  broadened  by  Burr's  ambitious  plans,  gave 
them  new  hope  that  they  would  sooner  or  later  obtain  con 
trol  of  the  helm  once  more. 

Even  Hamilton  again  drew  near  to  his  former  associates. 
He  could  not  renounce  politics  and  naturally  sided  with 
the  opposition,  although  he  defended  Jefferson  against  the 
exaggerated  charges  of  the  rest  of  the  Federalists,  and  fore 
told  that  his  administration  would  be  comparatively  con 
servative.  Neither  a  reconciliation,  nor  even  a  momenta 
ry  suspension  of  the  animosity  between  the  ancient  rivals, 
was  possible.  Hamilton  subjected  the  very  first  message 
of  the  president  to  an  exhaustive  criticism  which  had  a 
strong  admixture  of  trenchant  irony.1  Still  more  energet 
ically  did  he  oppose  the  attacks  on  the  then  system  of 
taxation  and  on  the  federal  courts.  On  these  questions  his 
attitude  was  the  same  as  that  of  the  rest  of  the  Federalists, 
and  they  were  therefore  gratified  to  see  him  at  his  former 
post  as  their  representative.  But  in  the  most  important 
questions  which  called  for  a  solution  during  Jefferson's 
first  presidential  term,  he  deviated  as  far  from  them  as  in 
the  election  of  1801. 

The  Mississippi  question,  which  had  played  so  impor 
tant  a  part  in  the  times  of  the  confederation,  had  arisen 
again  and  demanded  a  solution,  as  Spain  had  on  the  1st  of 
October,  1800,  ceded  the  whole  of  Louisiana  to  France. 
The  United  States  had  had  experience  enough  already  of 
how  dangerous  and  how  great  an  obstacle  in  the  way  of 
the  commercial  development  of  the  country  it  might  be 
come,  if  the  mouth  of  the  Mississippi  were  in  the  posses 
sion  of  a  foreign  power,  even  if  it  were  no  stronger  than 
Spain.  Jefferson  had  not  shared  in  this  experience  in  vain. 

1  The  articles  were  signed  Lucius  Crassus. 


STATE    SOVEREIGNTY    AND    SLAVERY. 

This  was  one  of  the  instances  in  which  he  gave  evidence  of 
a  really  statesmanlike  insight.  He  wrote  on  the  18th  of 
April,  1802,  to  his  embassador  Livingston  in  Paris:  This 
cession  "  completely  reverses  all  the  political  relations  ot 
the  United  States,  and  will  form  a  new  epoch  in  our  politi 
cal  course.  .  .  ,  There  is  on  the  globe  one  single  spot, 
the  possessor  of  which  is  our  natural  and  habitual  enemy."1 
Livingston  was  instructed  to  enter  into  negotiations  im 
mediately  for  the  cession  of  New  Orleans  and  the  Flor- 
idas,  in  case  France  should  consider  the  possession  of 
Louisiana  indispensably  necessary.  As  Bonaparte  at  this 
very  time  entertained  the  idea  of  resuming  the  old  French 
colonial  policy,  the  negotiations  remained  long  without 
result.  The  uprising  of  the  negroes  in  San  Domingo  and 
the  warlike  turn  which  the  affairs  of  Europe  began  agair. 
to  assume,  disposed  him  more  favorably  towards  the  Amer 
ican  offer.  On  the  30th  of  April,  1803,  the  treaty,  ceding 
the  whole  of  Louisiana  to  the  United  States  for  $15,000,000, 
was  concluded  in  Paris.2  Hamilton  shared  Jefferson's  view, 
that  the  purchase  of  Louisiana  was  a  question  of  the  great 
est,  and  even  of  vital,  importance  for  the  Union.3  His 
opposition  on  other  occasions  to  the  policy  of  the  adminis 
tration,  and  his  personal  enmity  to  the  president,  did  not 

1  Jeff.,  Works,  IV.,  pp.  431,  432. 

8  Stat  at  Large,  VIII.,  p.  200. 

1  He  writes,  Dec.  29,  1802,  to  Charles  0.  Pinckney:  "  You  know  my 
general  theory  as  to  our  western  affairs.  I  have  always  held  that  the 
unity  of  the  empire  and  the  best  interests  of  our  nation  require  that  we 
should  annex  to  the  United  States  all  the  territory  east  of  the  Mississip 
pi,  New  Orleans  included."  Ham.,  Works,  VI.,  pp.  541,  552.  Randall, 
Life  of  Jeff.,  VII.,  p.  87,  says  that  nothing  is  known  of  Hamilton's  at 
titude  on  this  question.  Wherever  there  is  a  point  in  Hamilton's  policy 
to  which  he  cannot  refuse  his  recognition  he  shows  himself  so  ignorant 
of  it  that  design  is  the  only  explanation  of  the  fact.  Hamilton  wrote 
also  in  an  artle  in  the  Evening  Post,  signed  Pericles:  "Two  courses 
only  present  [themselves] :  First,  to  negotiate  and  endeavor  to  purchase, 
and  if  tliis  fails,  to  go  to  war.  Secondly,  to  seize  at  once  on  the  Flori- 
das  and  New  Orleans  and  then  negotiate." 


PURCHASE   OF   LOUISIANA.  185 

prevent  his  lending  him  a  helping  hand  in  this  matter 
when  an  opportunity  offered.1 

The  great  majority  of  the  Federalists  opposed  this  in 
crease  of  the  territory  of  the  Union  with  as  much  decision 
as  Hamilton  advocated  it.  They  showed  in  their  attitude 
towards  this  question  a  shortsightedness  which  would  have 
been  astonishing  even  among  the  doctrinarians  of  the 
opposite  party.  The  great  extent  of  the  southern  states, 
and  their  dominant  position  in  politics,  afforded  ground  for 
the  belief  that  their  internal  development  would  be  more 
rapid  than  that  of  the  northern  states,  and  that  they  would 
be  the  governing  power  of  the  Union  in  all  future  times.2 
The  purchase  of  such  enormous  tracts  of  land  was  therefore 
a  matter  of  the  deepest  concern  to  New  England,  as  it  seemed 
to  give  the  southern  states  a  preponderance  for  all  time. 
Little  was  thought  on  this  occasion  of  the  extension  of  the 
slave  territory,  the  only  evil,  in  fact,  connected  with  the 
purchase  of  Louisiana.  This  point  was  not  entirely  un 
noticed,  even  now;  but  it  did  not  become  very  prominent 

1  See  J.  C.  Hamilton,  Hist,  of  the  Rep.  of  the  U.  S.  of  Am.,  VII.,  p. 
604. 

a  "  The  balance  of  power  under  the  present  government  is  decidedly 
in  favor  of  the  southern  states,  nor  can  that  balance  be  changed  cr  de 
stroyed.  The  extent  and  increasing  population  of  those  states  must  for 
ever  secure  to  them  the  preponderance  which  they  now  possess.  What 
ever  changes,  therefore,  take  place,  they  cannot  permanently  restore  to 
the  northern  states  their  influence  in  the  government,  and  a  temporary 
lelief  can  be  of  no  importance."  The  very  interesting  letter  from 
which  this  passage  is  taken  is  printed  in  full  in  J.  C.  Hamilton,  Hist., 
VII.,  p.  781-786.  Its  author,  according  to  the  last-named  writer,  was  a 
leading  member  of  congress,  and  it  was  directed  to  a  member  of  Wash 
ington's  cabinet,  probably  Pickering.  Alexander  Hamilton  here  again 
gives  a  proof  of  his  intellectual  keenness  and  penetration.  Major 
Hoops  relates  that  Hamilton  said  to  him  in  a  conversation  in  February, 
1804 :  "  The  bare  attempt  to  carry  such  a  disunion  into  effect  would 
necessarily  throw  the  people  of  the  United  States  into  two  great  parties, 
geographically  denned ;  that  the  northern  division  must  prevail  in  the 
struggle  that  must  ensue,"  etc.  J.  C.  Hamilton,  Hist,  of  the  Rep.  of  the 
U.S.  of  Am.,  VII.,  p.  779. 


186  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY    AND    SLAVERY. 

until  several  years  later,  when  the  disastrous  influence  of 
slavery  on  the  whole  life  of  the  people  began  to  be  better 
understood.  In  the  later  struggles  of  party  on  the  slavery 
question  this  was  overlooked,  or  intentionally  covered  up. 
The  first  phase  of  the  conflict  over  the  Louisiana  question 
has  been  thus  placed  in  an  altogether  false  light.  The 
Federalists  have  been  represented  as  the  vanguard  of  free 
dom  ;  whereas,  in  fact,  they  represented  only  a  short-sighted, 
ungenerous,  particularistic  policy. 

The  territory  covered  by  the  name  Louisiana  embraced 
several  of  the  present  central  and  northwestern  states.1 
And  this  of  itself  shows  that  the  charge  so  often  made,  in 
later  times,  against  Jefferson  and  his  party,  that  they 
made  this  purchase  mainly  or  only  in  the  interest  of 
slavery,  is  wholly  unfounded.  The  truth  is,  that  the  New 
England  states  opposed  the  acquisition  of  this  western  ter 
ritory  more  than  that  which  lay  in  the  south.  Gouverneur 
Morris,  indeed,  declared  it  the  "  peculiar  heritage"  of  the 
eastern  states.2  But  most  of  the  Federalists  still  assumed 
the  same  standpoint  which  the  New  England  states  had 
taken  under  the  confederation  on  the  Mississippi  question. 
They  anticipated  that  the  incorporation  of  the  western 
territory  into  the  Union,  and  its  economical  development, 

1  It  stretched  from  the  mouth  of  the  Mississippi  over  Iowa,  Minne 
sota,  Dakota,  and  Kansas,  and  reached  westward  to  the  Rocky  Moun 
tains. 

a  "  To  the  eastern  states,  when  separately  considered,  this  [the  remain 
ing  of  Louisiana  in  possession  of  a  foreign  power]  may  appear  a  matter 
of  less  moment  than  to  the  other  great  divisions  of  our  country.  But 
they  will  perceive  in  it  the  loss  of  their  navigation ;  they  will  see  the 
theater  of  their  industrious  exertions  contracted;  they  will  feel  the  loss 
of  the  productions  of  that  western  world  in  (he  mass  of  their  commer 
cial  operations  ;  and,  above  all,  they  will  feel  the  loss  of  an  ample  re 
source  for  their  children.  .  .  .  The  exuberant  population  of  the  eastern 
states  flows  in  a  steady  stream  to  the  western  world,  and  if  that  be  ren 
dered  useless,  or  pass  under  the  dominion  oi  a  foreign  power,  the  fair 
est  hope  of  posterity  is  destroyed."  Speech  in  the  senate,  Feb.  24,  1803. 
Sparks  Life  of  G.  Morris,  III.,  pp.  418,  419. 


187 

would  prove  injurious  to  their  commerce,  and  they  feared 
a  disturbance  of  the  political  equilibrium  from  this  quar 
ter  as  much  as  from  the  south.1  The  two  elements  to 
gether  had  weight  enough  with  them  to  draw  from  them 
the  declaration  that  they  would  be  thus  forced  to  a  separa 
tion  from  the  Union.2 

In  the  debate  on  this  side  of  the  question,  the  Federalists 

1  Eleven  years  later  the  judgment  of  the  New  England  Federalists 
was  no  better.  In  the  resolutions  of  the  Hartford  convention,  of  which 
more  will  be  said  below,  it  was  declared  necessary  that  there  should  be 
an  amendment  to  the  constitution,  limiting  still  farther  the  right  of  con 
gress  to  admit  new  states  into  the  Union.  The  grounds  of  the  demand 
are  as  follows:  "At  the  adoption  of  the  constitution  a  certain  balance 
of  power  among  the  original  parties  was  considered  to  exist,  and  there 
was  at  that  time,  and  yet  is,  among  those  parties  a  strong  affinity  between 
their  great  and  general  interests.  By  the  admission  of  these  states  that 
balance  has  been  materially  affected,  and  unless  the  practice  is  modified, 
must  ultimately  be  destroyed.  The  southern  states  will  first  avail 
themselves  of  their  new  confederates  to  govern  the  east,  and  finally,  the 
western  states,  multiplied  in  number,  and  augmented  in  population, 
will  control  the  interests  of  the  whole.  Thus,  for  the  sake  of  present 
power,  the  southern  states  will  be  common  sufferers  with  the  east  in 
the  loss  of  permanent  advantages.  None  of  the  old  states  can  find  an 
interest  in  creating  prematurely  an  overwhelming  western  influence, 
which  may  hereafter  discern  (as  it  has  heretofore)  benefits  to  be  derived 
to  them  by  wars  and  commercial  restrictions."  Dwight,  History  of  the 
Hartford  Convention,  p.  $71.  At  the  same  time,  a  New  England  paper 
wrote :  "  The  western  states  beyond  the  mountains  are  not  taken  into 
view  in  this  connection  for  any  other  purpose  than  to  show  that  they 
do  not,  ought  not,  and  never  can  belong  to  the  Union.  Let  the  western 
states  go  off  and  take  care  of  themselves."  Ingersoll,  Second  War  be 
tween  the  U.  S.  of  America  and  Great  Britain,  II.,  p.  225. 

*  Plurner,  of  New  Hampshire,  declared  in  the  senate :  "  Admit  this 
western  world  into  the  Union,  and  you  destroy  at  once  the  weight  and 
importance  of  the  eastern  states,  and  compel  them  to  establish  a  separ 
ate,  independent  empire."  And  thus  Griswold,  of  Connecticut,  who 
was  looked  upon  as  the  leader  of  the  Federalists,  said  in  the  house, 
Oct.  25,  1803 :  "  The  vast,  unmanageable  extent,  which  the  accession  of 
Louisiana  will  give  to  the  United  States,  the  consequent  dispersion  of 
our  population,  and  the  distribution  of  the  balance  which  it  is  so  im 
portant  to  maintain  between  the  eastern  and  western  states,  threatens, 
at  no  very  distant  day,  the  subversion  of  our  Union." 


188  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

saw  themselves,  in  consequence  of  the  nature  of  the  thing, 
limited  to  a  weak  defense.  They  helped  themselves  now, 
as  the  south  had  helped  itself  from  the  beginning  in  the 
slavery  question.  As  they  could  not  refute  the  arguments 
of  their  adversaries,  but  could  only  oppose  assertions  to 
them,  they  played  their  best  card  — made  threats  supply 
the  place  of  reason.  There  was  another  side,  however,  in 
which  their  position  was  so  strong  that  their  opponents 
even  considered  it  in  parts  unassailable.  The  purchase  ot 
Louisiana  was  a  question  which  should  have  been  judged 
and  decided  only  on  statesmanlike  principles.  And  in 
truth,  the  position  of  both  parties  was  determined  by  these 
principles,  but  the  constitution  was  destined  again  to  serve 
as  sword  and  shield  to  the  minority. 

The  Federalists  claimed  that  the  constitution  did  not 
authorize  congress  to  undertake  such  a  transaction;  and 
that  it  should  not  be  completed  before  the  authority  thereto 
had  been  obtained  by  an  amendment.  To  which  Nicholson 
of  Maryland  replied,  that  if  he  had  been  asked  anywhere 
else  whether  a  sovereign  nation  had  the  right  to  acquire 
new  territory,  he  would  have  considered  the  question  an 
absurd  one;  that  the  right  in  question  appeared  so  obvious 
and  undeniable  that  it  scarcely  needed  to  be  proved.  It 
could  not  certainly  be  questioned  that  the  idea  of  sover 
eignty  embraces  this  right.  But  it  might  well  be,  that  the 
right  belonged  to  the  u  sovereign  nation"  and  not  to  con 
gress.  Congress,  according  to  the  theory  of  the  Republi 
cans,  possessed  only  such  power  as  was  expressly  given  it 
by  the  constitution,  and  the  right  in  question  was  not  given 
by  it.  The  only  provision  which  could  be  produced  in 
support  of  the  right  is  Article  IY.,  Sec.  3,  §  2:  "The  con 
gress  shall  have  power  to  dispose  of,  and  make  all  needful 
rules  and  regulations  respecting,  the  territory  or  other 
property  belonging  to  the  United  States."  But  here  evi 
dently  the  only  territory  meant  is  such  as  the  United  States 
possessed  at  the  time,  or  which  was  claimed  by  them  as 


THE    POWER    OF    ANNEXATION.  189 

their  property.1  The  Republicans  could  not  question  this.2 
Their  demonstration  of  its  constitutionality  was  therefore 
only  a  deduction  from  the  general  principles  of  political 
science— a  mode  of  interpreting  the  constitution  which  they 
had  always  declared  to  be  absolutely  untenable. 

The  Federalists  did  not  all  view  the  constitutional  ques 
tion  from  the  same  standpoint.  The  most  important  of  all 
the  objections  urged  was  based  on  the  fundamental  ques 
tion  of  the  nature  of  the  Union.  Th.  Pickering  of  Massa 
chusetts  declared  in  the  senate  that  it  was  not  in  the  power 
of  the  president,  or  of  congress,  to  incorporate  the  territo 
ry  into  the  Union,  as  the  treaty  demanded:  "  He  believed 
that  our  administration  admitted  that  this  incorporation 
should  not  be  effected  without  an  amendment  of  the  con 
stitution  ;  and  he  conceived  that  this  necessary  amendment 
could  not  be  made  in  the  ordinary  mode  by  the  concurrence 
of  two-thirds  of  both  houses  of  congress  and  the  ratifica 
tion  by  the  legislatures  of  three-fourths  of  the  several 
states.  He  believed  the  assent  of  each  individual  state 
to  be  necessary  for  the  admission  of  a  foreign  country  as  an 
associate  in  the  Union;  in  like  manner  as  in  a  commercial 
house  the  consent  of  each  member  would  be  necessary  to 
admit  a  new  partner  into  the  company."3  If  the  constitu 
tion  were  a  contract  between  sovereign  states,  this  argu 
ment  could  not  be  assailed.  But  how  did  the  Federalists 
come  to  ascribe  this  character  to  it  now,  after  they  had  for 
twelve  years  governed  the  country  on  the  assumption  that 
the  constitution  had  transformed  the  confederation  into  a 
nation?  The  Republicans  repeated  the  Federal  creed  with 

1  Scott  vs.  Sanford,  Howard's  Reports,  XIX.,  p.  615.  The  supreme 
court  did  not  base  the  constitutionality  of  the  acquisition  of  foreign  ter 
ritory  on  these  provisions  of  the  constitution,  but  on  the  authority  of 
the  president  and  the  senate  to  make  treaties.  American  Insurance 
Company  vs.  Canter,  Peter's  Reports,  I,,  p.  542. 

'  Jeff.,  Works,  IV.,  pp.  505,  506. 

•  Deb.  of  Cong.,  III.,  p.  13. 


190  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

the  utmost  fervor;  and  the  Federalists  with  equal  energy 
preached  the  Republican  gospel. 

Under  these  circumstances  a  great  deal  might  be  said 
about  the  constitutional  question,  and  yet  nothing  accom 
plished.  John  Quincy  Adams  saw  this.  He  thought  that 
constitutional  considerations  should  not  stand  in  the  way, 
even  if  well  grounded;  for  he  was  certain  that  all  the  leg 
islatures  would  adopt  an  amendment  "  amply  sufficient  for 
the  accomplishment  of  every  thing  for  which  they  had 
contracted."1  This  was  not  only  a  new  way  of  securing 
indemnity,  but  it  was  seeking  indemnification  in  a  case  in 
which  there  was  no  right  to  give  it.  If  Pickering's  view 
was  right,  even  the  ratification  of  all  the  legislatures  could 
not  make  such  an  amendment  valid.  The  constitution 
would,  on  this  supposition,  be  a  contract  between  the  states 
and  not  between  the  legislatures  of  the  states,  and  an  alter 
ation  not  provided  for  by  the  contract  could  be  considered 
only  by  the  states,  the  legal  organ  of  which  was  not  in  this 
case  the  legislatures,  since  the  constitution  did  not  give 
them  this  right,  and  the  state  constitutions  contained  pro 
visions  by  which  it  was  directly  or  indirectly  withheld  from 
them.2 

The  solution,  therefore,  proposed  by  Adams  was,  viewed 
from  Pickering's  point  of  view,  also  a  violation  of  the  con 
stitution,  and  consequently  nothing  could  be  gained  by  it. 
If  Pickering's  demand,  with  all  the  logical  consequences 
to  be  deduced  from  it,  were  conceded,  it  would  be  neces- 

1  Deb.  of  Cong.,  III.,  p.  19. 

*  The  matter  must  be  presented  in  this  way,  because  it  is  a  universally 
recognized  principle  of  American  constitutional  law  that  congress  has 
no  power  except  such  as  is  expressly  granted  it,  and  that  on  the  other 
hand  the  powers  of  the  state  legislatures  are  limited  only  by  the  reser 
vations  of  the  constitution  of  the  Union  and  of  the  state  constitutions. 
Cooley,  Constitutional  Limitations,  pp.  87,  88, 168,  173,  in  which  work 
the  judicial  decisions  on  this  point  are  collected;  Jameson,  The  Con- 
stitutional  Convention,  pp.  86,  87 ;  Tiffany,  Government  and  Constitu- 
tional  Law,  pp.  81,  175 


JEFFERSON    VIOLATES   THE    CONSTITUTION'.  191 

sary  that  the  amendment  in  question  should  be  ratified  by 
all  the  states;  that  is,  by  state  conventions  or  by  the  legis 
latures  after  they  had  been  authorized  thereto  in  one  of  the 
various  constitutional  ways  prescribed.  An  inevitable  con 
sequence  of  this  was,  that  it  would  be  optional  with  any 
state,  which  refused  to  join  the  ratification,  to  secede  from 
the  Union;  or  that  its  refusal  should,  eo  ipso,  operate  as  a 
nullification  of  the  contract  of  purchase.  Obviously  the 
federal  government  could  under  no  circumstances  accept 
this  alternative.  There  remained  to  it  therefore — speaking 
from  the  point  of  view  of  the  opposing  Federalists — only  a 
choice  between  a  violation  of  the  constitution  and  a  sur 
render  of  the  purchase  which  it  rightly  considered  was  of 
the  highest  interest,  and  even  necessary,  to  the  nation.  It 
decided  on  a  conclusion  of  the  purchase,  and  accomplished 
it  in  fact  in  such  a  way,  that  the  government  itself  was 
obliged  to  concede  that  it  had  been  guilty  of  a  breach  of 
the  constitution. 

Jefferson  himself  unconditionally  granted  that  the  con 
stitution  did  not  warrant  the  acquisition  of  foreign  terri 
tory,  still  less  its  incorporation  into  the  Union.1  And 
even  the  objections  of  some  of  his  friends  could  not 
change  his  view  of  the  constitutional  question.  Spite  of 
this,  however,  he  declared  himself  ready  to  attach  no  fur 
ther  weight  to  it  if  his  friends  thought  differently  from 

1He  writes  to  senator  Breckenridge,  of  Kentucky,  Aug.  12,  1803: 
"  But  I  suppose  they  [both  houses  of  congress]  must  then  appeal  to  the 
nation  for  an  additional  article  to  the  constitution,  approving  and  con 
firming  an  act  which  the  nation  had  not  previously  authorized.  The 
constitution  has  made  no  provision  for  our  holding  foreign  territory, 
still  less  for  incorporating  foreign  nations  into  our  Union.  The  ex 
ecutive,  in  seizing  the  fugitive  occurrence  which  so  much  advances 
the  good  of  their  country,  have  done  an  act  beyond  the  constitution. 
The  legislature,  in  casting  behind  them  metaphysical  subtleties,  and  risk 
ing  themselves  like  faithful  servants,  must  ratify  and  pay  for  it,  and  throw 
themselves  on  their  country  for  doing  for  them  unauthorized  what  we 
know  they  would  have  done  for  themselves  had  they  been  in  a  situation 
to  do  it."  Jeff.,  Works,  IV.,  p.  500. 


192  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY  AND    SLAVERY. 

himself.  The  inference  of  authority  by  "  construction," 
which  was  the  sole  legal  basis  of  his  intemperate  attacks 
on  Hamilton's  policy,  was  now  to  be  put  a  stop  to  "  when" 
it  should  produce  any  evil  effect.1  There  was  no  more 
said  about  the  amendment. 

This  manner  of  playing  with  his  own  convictions  con 
cerning  the  legality  of  a  political  step  was  not  the  only 
characteristic  of  the  man.  Long  before  the  evil  conse 
quences  which  the  purchase  of  Louisiana  had  in  extending 
the  slave  territory  were  fully  developed,  this  bold  contempt 
for  the  constitution  proved  exceedingly  disastrous.  An 
invaluable  precedent  was  afforded  to  the  "  country,  and 
especially  to  the  south,"  inasmuch  as  it  "  made  a  violation 
of  the  constitution  dependent  on  the  will  of  the  majority, 
subordinated  principle  to  interest,  and  as  a  consequence 
left  no  obstacle  in  the  way  of  the  interests  and  wishes  of 
the  south."2 

There  was  one  danger  to  which  the  violators  of  the  con 
stitution  did  not  expose  themselves,  because,  as  they 
claimed,  the  majority  of  the  people  favored  the  purchase 
of  Louisiana.  Right,  therefore,  as  the  Federalists  might 
be,  according  to  the  letter  of  the  constitution,  every  effort 
to  stir  up  the  people  against  the  reigning  majority  would 
remain  fruitless.  JS~or  did  they  ignore  this.  Fisher  Ames 
wrote,  Feb.  24,  1803:  "They  are  lazy,  or  in  despair,  and 
they  urge,  with  wonderful  eagerness,  the  futility  of  all  ex 
ertions  to  retrieve  the  public  mind  from  its  errors,  or  to 
prevent  their  consequences."3  This  applied  not  only  to 
the  Louisiana  question,  but  to  the  entire  policy  of  the 

1  "  I  confess,  then,  I  think  it  important  in  the  present  case  to  set  an 
example  against  broad  construction  by  appealing  for  new  power  to  the 
people.  If,  however,  our  friends  shall  think  differently,  certainly  I 
shall  acquiesce  with  satisfaction,  confiding  that  the  good  sense  of  our 
country  will  correct  the  evil  of  construction  when  it  shall  produce  ill 
effects."  To  W.  C.  Nicholas,  Sept.  7, 1803.  Ibid,  IV.,  p.  507. 

a  Kapp,  Geschichte  der  Sklaverei,  pp.  98,  99. . 

•  F.  Ames,  Works,  I.,  p.  318. 


FORMAL    PLANS    OF    SECESSION.  193 

country,  home  as  well  as  foreign.  "  The  Federalists  know 
that  eo  nomine  they  are  gone  forever."1  There  were  now 
only  three  Federalist  state  legislatures.  "  Connecticut," 
says  Fisher  Ames,  "  stands,  but  its  good  men  should  say 
incessantly  'take  heed  lest  we  fall.'  Massachusetts,  on  the 
other  hand,"  he  complained,  had  only  a  "  show  of  federal 
ism.  It  may  last  a  year  longer."2  Spite  of  this,  however, 
the  radical  wing  of  the  Federalists  did  not  give  up  all 
hope.  The  undeniable  ruin  of  the  party  caused  them  to 
change  their  base  of  operations,  but  in  all  other  respects 
it  only  urged  them  on  to  the  adoption  of  measures  which 
grew  more  extreme  every  day. 

An  effort  has  often  since  been  made  to  represent  it  as 
one  of  many  malicious  and  entirely  ungrounded  calumnies, 
that  there  was  at  this  time  any  serious  thought  of  a  dis 
ruption  of  the  Union.  This  is  only  one  instance  of  the 
"  white- washing"  tendencies  and  decorative  coloring  char 
acteristic  of  the  greater  number  of  American  historical 
works.3  In  the  letters  of  the  Federalists  we  find  not  only 
that  wishes  to  this  end  were  expressed,  but  that  formal 
plans  were  devised.  True,  these  had  no  prospect  of  success. 
Even  among  the  leaders  the  greatest  want  of  unanimity 
prevailed.  Some  of  them,  especially  Hamilton,  were  very 
decidedly  opposed  to  the  project,  and  the  majority  either 
held  that  its  time  was  not  yet  come,  or  they  were  wanting 
in  courage,  or  in  the  energy  to  act.4  In  consequence  of 

1  Jeff.,  Works,  IV.,  p.  543. 

1  Fisher  Ames,  Works,  I.,  pp.  320, 321. 

1  In  the  same  proportion  as  their  friends  are  painted  in  too  glowing 
colors,  their  enemies  are  drawn  in  colors  altogether  too  dark. 

4  We  read  in  the  letter  of  a  "leading  member  of  congress"  to  a  mem 
ber  of  Washington's  cabinet  from  Massachusetts,  already  referred  to : 
"  We  have  endeavored  during  this  session  to  rouse  our  friends  in  New 
England  to  make  some  bold  exertions  in  that  quarter.  They  generally 
tell  us  that  they  are  sensible  of  the  danger,  that  the  northern  states  must 

unite,  but  they  think  the  time  has  not  yet  arrived It  appear! 

impossible  to  induce  our  Iriends  to  make  any  decisive  exertions." 
13 


194:  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

this  all  open  agitation  among  the  people  was  nipped  in 
the  bud,  and  had  it  been  attempted  on  a  larger  scale,  it 
would  doubtless  have  found  a  pitiable  and  speedy  end. 
But  the  intrigue  which  was  to  introduce  the  realization  of 
the  scheme  was  so  nicely  planned  that  in  case  it  succeed 
ed  there  would  have  been  room  for  very  serious  fears. 

Hamilton  was  not  wont  to  see  phantoms  in  broad  day 
light,  nor  will  he  be  accused  of  uttering  malicious  calum 
nies  against  the  Federalists;  and  yet  he  declared  the  plan 
of  secession  to  be  a  fact,  and  considered  it  necessary  to  give 
a  thorough  exposition  of  his  fears.  He  read  on  the  10th 
of  February,  1804,  before  an  informal  meeting  of  distin 
guished  Federalists,  gathered  to  discuss  the  pending  gu 
bernatorial  election  in  New  York,  a  paper  on  the  reasons 
which  made  it  desirable  that  Mr.  Lansing  should  be  success 
ful  rather  than  Colonel  Burr.  In  the  sixth  paragraph  of 
this  paper  he  says:  "These  causes  are  leading  to  an  opinion, 
that  a  dismemberment  of  the  Union  is  expedient.  It  would 
probably  suit  Mr.  Burr's  views  to  promote  this  result,  to  be 
the  chief  of  the  northern  portion ;  and,  placed  at  the  head  of 
the  state  of  New  York,  no  man  would  be  more  likely  to  suc 
ceed."1  This  was,  in  a  few  words,  the  aim  and  end  of  the 
intrigues  of  the  Burrites  and  radical  Federalists  combined. 
Burr  was  to  be  made  governor  of  New  York,  and  to  use 
the  position  as  a  stepping-stone  to  the  White  House. 
Burr's  organ  communicated  this  much  very  frankly  to  the 
public.2  Whether  this  plan  was  devised  by  Burr  or  by  his 

1  J.  C.  Hamilton,  Hist,  of  the  Repub.  of  the  U.  S.  of  Amer.,  VII.,  p. 
771. 

3  Burr  was  nominated  governor  in  the  city  of  New  York,  Feb.  20, 
1804.  Two  days  later  the  Morning  Chronicle  wrote :  "  They  offer  Bun 
as  a  man  who  must  be  supported,  or  the  weight  of  the  northern  states  in 
the  scale  of  the  Union  is  irrevocably  lost.  If  the  southern,  and  partic 
ularly  the  Virginia,  interests  are  allowed  to  destroy  this  man,  we  may 
give  up  all  hope  of  ever  furnishing  a  president  to  the  United  States. 
The  influence  of  the  northern  states  in  the  affairs  of  the  Union  and  their 
future  prosperity  imperiously  demand,  therefore,  that  we  sustain  Aaron 


FEDERALIST   INTRIGUES   WITH    BUKR.  195 

Federal  supporters,  and  whether  Burr  was  advised  by 
these  of  their  ultimate  designs,  it  is  not  possible  to  dis 
cover. 

The  fact  that  these  Federalists  thought  of  using  Burr,  is 
alone  a  judgment  on  themselves  and  their  cause,  and  shows 
satisfactorily  how  poor  were  their  prospects  of  success. 
The  contempt  with  which  Burr's  moral  character  inspired 
them  remained  as  strong  as  ever,  and  they  gave  uncon 
cealed  expression  to  it  in  their  letters.  Besides,  they  feared 
that  he  might  deceive  them,  because  the  field  offered  to 
him  by  their  plans  might  not  seem  broad  enough  for  his 
ambition.  Yet,  notwithstanding  this,  they  inquired  what 
else  they  could  do.  To  remain  inactive,  they  said,  was 
certain  ruin  to  them;  their  friends  alone  would  make  no 
endeavors.  As  supporters  of  Mr.  Burr,  they  would  receive 
some  assistance,  although  even  that  was  of  a  doubtful  nature, 
and  they  had  reason  enough  to  be  jealous  of  it.  This 
was  good  reasoning.  If  they  could  realize  their  plans  at 
all,  it  could  be  done  only  with  the  aid  of  the  Burrites. 
And  if  Burr  were  made  governor  of  New  York,  by  the  aid 
of  the  Federalists,  such  a  union  was  perhaps  possible,  for,  as 
Hamilton  remarked,  the  leaders  ot  the  Republicans  in  New 
England  were  Burrites,  and  Burr  enjoyed  no  small  popu 
larity  among  the  masses  of  the  New  England  Federalists. 
If  the  union  could  be  effected,  what  was  essential  was  at 
tained.  The  -Federalists  did  not  at  all  desire  to  see  Burr 
elevated  to  the  presidency.  The  real  importance  of  the 
whole  project  was  in  the  thought  of  a  fusion,  and  the  prac 
tical  consequences  which  its  Federal  advocates  hoped  to 
draw  from  it  were  in  keeping  with  the  reasons  which  had 
led  to  the  adoption  and  prosecution  of  that  idea. 

When  in  1796  it  seemed  possible  that  Jefferson  would 
be  the  next  president,  there  appeared  some  articles  in  the 

Burr  from  sinking  in  the  fury  of  this  contest.  We  can  only  do  this  by 
making  him  our  governor."  Cited  by  J.  C.  Hamilton,  VII.,  p.  777. 


196  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY    AND    SLAVERY. 

.Connecticut  Courant  which  endeavored  to  incline  the 
northern  states,  in  such  a  case,  to  a  division  of  the  Union. 
"We  quote :  "  The  northern  states  can  subsist  as  a  nation,  as  a 
republic,  without  any  connection  with  the  southern.  .  . 
I  shall  in  future  papers  consider  some  of  the  grave  events 
which  will  lead  to  a  separation  of  the  United  States.  .  . 
endeavor  to  prove  the  impossibility  of  our  union  for  any 
long  period  in  the  future,  both  from  the  moral  and  politi 
cal  habits  of  the  citizens  of  the  United  States,  and  finally 
examine  carefully  to  see  whether  we  have  not  already  ap 
proached  the  era  when  they  must  be  divided."1  This  idea, 
which  then  could  find  no  support,  was  now  again  taken  up 
by  the  Federalists.  The  parties  had  from  the  beginning 
corresponded,  to  a  great  extent,  with  the  geographical  sec 
tions;  but  henceforth  the  name  of  Federalist  was  to  be 
dropped  and  the  war-cry  to  be  expressly  and  exclusively  "the 
North!"  and  "the  South!"  There  were  interests  enough 
to  recommend  such  a  project.  If  there  was  no  danger  of 
its  realization  at  the  present  time,  the  conditions  might 
sooner  or  later  be  different.  And  if  it  should  ever  happen 
that  specifically  sectional  parties  should  take  the  place  of 
national  parties  in  the  country,  the  continued  existence  of 
the  Union  would  depend  entirely  on  the  nature  of  the  fun 
damental  question  on  which  they  should  divide.  But, 
even  assuming  that  no  question  should  ever  arise  to  make 
the  sectional  division  the  only  natural,  that  is,  the  only 
possible  one,  and  therefore  the  existence  of  the  Union 
after  the  old  fashion  impossible,  it  was  still  imperative 
that  the  mere  plan  should  be  promptly  and  energeti 
cally  checked  in  the  beginning.  If  this  were  not  done,  it 
might  frequently  lead  to  the  greatest  embarrassment,  even 
if  never  carried  into  execution. 

The  project  of  fusion  was  not  confined  to  the  ultra  Fed 
eral  agitators.    The  articles  of  "  New  Englander"  in  the 

1  Randall,  Jefferson,  III.,  pp.  634,  685. 


NORTHERN   SECESSION   SYMPATHY.  197 

Connecticut  Courant  demanded  only  an  intimate  coalition 
of  the  northern  states  to  get  rid  of  the  "  tyranny  of  the 
south,"  and  to  establish  a  just  "balance  of  power."1  The 
ultras  dM  not  consider  this  possible.  They  based  their 
judgment  on  the  diversity  of  material  interests,  and  the 
alleged  assiduity  with  which  the  south  and  the  middle 
states  so  nurtured  this  that  a  reconciliation  could  never 
take  place.2  Hence  the  northern  party  was  to  be  consti 
tuted  of  men  ready  to  go  to  the  utmost  extreme  —  that  is, 
even  to  division  of  the  Union.3  The  three  Federal  New 
England  states,  and  first  of  all  Massachusetts,  were  to  take 
the  initiative  in  the  building  up  of  the  northern  party.  If 
they  could  succeed  in  securing  Burr's  election  in  New 
York,  it  might  be  possible  to  carry  out  the  whole  plan.4 
The  plan  of  the  ultras  was  only  an  extension  of  the 

1  "  Are  we  to  submit  to  the  guidance  and  the  tyranny  of  the  south  ? 
.  .  .  The  purchase  of  Louisiana  at  the  expense  of  fifteen  millions  of 
dollars  for  the  augmentation  of  the  southern  interest  must  finally  con 
vince  the  states  north  of  the  Chesapeake,  that  they  must  unite  in  the 
common  northern  interest.  Let,  therefore,  the  disinterested  among  our 
Federal  and  Democratic  Republicans  lay  aside  their  fatal  dissensions, 
which  serve  to  no  purpose,  but  to  the  purpose  of  their  enemies.  We 
Bhall  then  be  able  to  fix  a  just  balance  of  power  in  the  United  States." 

9  We  quote  from  the  letter  already  cited  to  a  member  of  Washington's 
cabinet:  "Their  [the  southern  states']  enmity  of  commerce,  on  which 
our  prosperity  depends,  is  riveted  and  unyielding.  Besides,  there  is  an 
inveterate  enmity  and  jealousy  of  the  northern  states,  which  pervades 
every  part  of  the  southern  and  middle  states.  This  spirit  is  evidently 
increasing.  Since  they  have  obtained  the  power,  they  have  become  arro 
gant,  and  appear  determined  to  carry  this  spirit  into  all  classes  of  socie 
ty,  with  a  view  of  riveting  the  prejudices  so  strongly  as  to  prevent  a 
union  of  views  between  north  and  south  under  all  future  circum 
stances." 

8  "  In  forming  the  northern  party,  it  is  important  to  consider  what  the 
ultimate  views  of  that  party  ought  to  be,  and  to  avoid  as  much  as  possi 
ble,  embarrassing  the  party  with  men  who  will  oppose  the  accomplish 
ment  of  those  ultimate  objects.  I  have  no  hesitation  myself  in  saying, 
that  there  can  be  no  safety  to  the  northern  states  without  a  separation 
from  the  confederacy."  1.  c. 

4l.c. 


198  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY    AND    SLAVERY. 

logical  consequences  of  "New  Englander's;"  for,  as  Jeffer 
son  said:  "The  idea  of  forming  seven  eastern  states  is, 
moreover,  clearly  to  form  the  basis  of  a  separation  of  the 
Union."1  He  was  right  also  in  the  expectation  that  the 
project  would  fail.  Jefferson  owed  it  again  to  his  bitterest 
enemy  that  its  development  did  not  extend  so  far  as  to 
cause  any  embarrassment.2  Hamilton  frustrated  Burr's 
election  as  governor  of  New  York,  which  was  looked  up 
on  by  both  Burrites  and  Federalists  as  a  condition  prece 
dent  of  the  fusion.  It  was,  indeed,  more  than  question 
able  whether  it  could  have  been  honorably  accomplished, 
even  if  Burr  had  been  elected;  because  there  were  no 
great  differences  between  the  Burrite  and  Jeffersonian 
wings  of  the  Republicans.  The  northern  Republicans 
were  jealous  of  the  southern,  and  their  leaders  were  bent 
on  obtaining  the  seats  at  the  head  of  the  table.  Since 
they,  as  representatives  of  the  minority,  had  no  prospect 
of  being  invited  there  by  the  majority  of  their  own  party, 
they  were  prepared  to  lean  on  the  opposite  party  which 
offered  them  support.  If  the  leaders  of  both  sides  had  been 
won  over  to  the  plan  by  its  originators,  they  would  per 
haps  have  had  enough  influence  on  the  masses  to  make  the 
position  of  those  Republicans  led  by  Virginia  a  rather 
hard  one  in  a  presidential  election.  But  the  ultimate  ob- 

1  Jeff.,  Works,  IV.,  p.  542. 

a  The  assertion  made  later  by  Plumer,  of  New  Hampshire,  to  which 
Ingersoll  (Hist.  Sketch  of  the  Second  War  between  the  U.  S.  of  Amer 
ica  and  Great  Britain,  II.,  p.  221,  etc.)  attaches  so  much  weight,  that 
Hamilton  desired  to  attend  the  proposed  meeting  of  the  coospirators  at' 
Boston,  is  evidently  entirely  valueless.  Even  if  no  historical  credit  is  to 
be  given  to  the  message  said  to  have  been  sent  to  Boston,  and  mentioned 
by  Hamilton's  son  (J.  C.  Hamilton,  VII.,  p.  382)  the  memorial  read  in 
Albany  is  sufficient  proof  that  Hamilton  was  opposed  to  the  project. 
If,  therefore,  he  wished  to  go  to  Boston,  it  could  only  be  with  the  inten 
tion  of  hindering  the  further  prosecution  of  the  plan.  It  is  scarcely 
necessary  to  add  that  the  insinuation  to  the  contrary  is  not  warranted, 
because  Plumer  expected  forgiveness  for  his  participation  in  the  in 
trigue,  by  accusing  his  accomplices. 


ABSOLUTE    POWEK    OF   THE    REPUBLICANS.  199 

ject  of  the  Federalists  could  never  be  attained  in  this  way. 
The  motives  of  the  Burrites  were  just  sufficient  to  operate  a 
momentary  fusion,  but  not  to  found  a  political  party  that 
could  live,  and  certainly  not  a  party  with  such  extreme  ten 
dencies  as  the  Federalists  wished.  The  whole  matter  in 
volved  not  a  political  principle,  but  only  a  corrupt  political 
intrigue.  Its  significance  lies  entirely  in  this,  that  it  serves 
as  a  measure  by  which  to  estimate  how  far,  up  to  that  time, 
the  national  feeling  had  been  developed,  and  in  this  also, 
that  it  assumed  as  its  basis  an  idea  which,  in  the  course 
of  years,  grew,  through  another  question,  to  be  one  of  ter 
rible  vitality. 

The  only  immediate  consequence  of  the  intrigue  was  a 
still  greater  diminution  of  the  political  credit  of  the  Burr 
ites  and  Federalists.  In  Kew  York  the  feuds  between  the 
Republicans  still  continued,  and  in  Pennsylvania  violent 
dissensions  broke  out  among  them.  But,  looked  at  from 
a  national  point  of  view,  the  malcontents  were  still  only  a 
faction,  which  might  indeed  be  injurious,  but  not  danger 
ous,  while  the  Federalists,  by  their  abandonment  of  sound 
political  morals,  had  clipped  their  own  wings.  The  pre 
ponderance  of  the  administration  party  was  so  great  that  it 
seemed  to  depend  entirely  on  their  tact  and  moderation 
whether  the  country  should  at  last  be  secured  some  years 
of  internal  quiet.  Its  foreign  politics  alone  threatened 
fresh  embarrassment.  The  character  which  the  struggle 
between  England  and  France  began  to  assume  placed  the 
United  States  in  a  situation  from  which  they  could  not  easily 
escape  uninjured.  But  it  would  have  been  readily  possible, 
by  a  firm,  rational,  and  practical  policy,  to  turn  the  exter 
nal  dangers  into  a  means  of  internal  strength.  But  Jef 
ferson  was  not  the  man  for  such  a  policy,  when  his  an 
tipathy  to  England  and  his  sympathy  for  France  came  into 
play,  and  when  economical  questions  constituted  an  essen 
tial  factor  in. the  problem  to  be  solved. 


200         STATE  SOVEREIGNTY  AND  SLAVERY. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

THB  EMBARGO.1   MADISON  AND  THE  SECOND  WAS  WITH  ENG 
LAND.    THE  HARTFORD  CONVENTION. 

Jay's  treaty  had  not  removed  all  the  well-grounded 
grievances  of  the  United  States  against  England,  and  by 
degrees  new  ones  were  added  to  the  old.  The  prospects  of 
a  friendly  understanding  were  few;  partly  because  Jeffer 
son  rode  a  very  high  horse,  and  would  accept  nothing  un 
less  he  could  obtain  everything,  and  partly  because  Eng 
land's  attitude,  notwithstanding  occasional  advances,  grew 
more  disregarded  every  day.  Napoleon  found  herein  a 
convenient  pretence  to-assert  "might  before  right"  in  a  still 
more  brutal  manner,  and  it  was  not  long  before  England 
and  France  formally  emulated  one  another  in  willful  al 
terations  in  the  hitherto  recognized  laws  of  neutrality. 
England's  blockade  declaration  of  May  16,  1806,  and  the 
order  in  council  of  Nov.  11,  1807,  on  the  one  hand,  and 
Napoleon's  Berlin  decree  of  Nov.  21,  1806,  and  his  Milan 
decree  of  Dec.  17,  1807,  on  the  other,  were  a  Scylla  and 
Charybdis,  between  which  the  neutral  seafaring  nations 
could  not  possibly  sail  uninjured.  Neither  interest  nor 
self-respect  could  allow  the  United  States  quietly  to  acqui 
esce  in  this  violence.  The  Federalists  desired  to  see  the 
knot  cut  in  two.  Their  programme  was  to  assume  a  bold 

1  See  Hildreth  (Hist,  of  the  U.  S.)  for  the  history  of  the  diplomatic 
manoeuvres  precedent  to  the  struggle  which  began  with  the  embargo  and 
ended  in  the  war  of  1812.  In  D wight's  History  of  the  Hartford  Con- 
vention,  many  of  the  most  important  documents  are  given,  some  in  full 
arid  some  by  extracts.  The  only  worth  of  that  verbose  and  badly-writ 
ten  book  consists  in  these  reprints. 


LAYING    AN    EMBARGO.  201 

front  towards  France,  and  thus  induce  England  to  adopt  a 
more  favorable  policy,  provided  it  were  found  impossible 
to  make  a  formal  treaty  with  the  latter.  Such  was,  doubt 
less,  the  best  "  political  policy"  that  could  be  followed. 
The  administration  party,  on  the  other  hand,  would  hear 
nothing  of  war;  it  did  not  want  one  with  France,  and  it 
feared  one  with  England.  Hence  there  remained  only  one 
thing  for  it  to  do :  to  make  reprisals,  or  to  surrender  the 
ocean  commerce  of  the  United  States  until  it  pleased  the 
two  great  European  powers  to  conclude  peace. 

As  early  as  1806  an  attempt  was  made,  by  putting  ob 
stacles  in  the  way  of  the  importation  of  British  goods,  to 
exert  some  influence  on  England.  The  provisions  in  ques 
tion  were  to  go  into  force  in  November,  but  in  December 
the  time  was  extended  until  the  following  July.  The 
measures  were  not  sufficient  of  themselves  to  obtain  the 
desired  object,  and  by  this  vacillation  the  little  impression 
which  they  had  made  on  England  was  still  farther  weaken 
ed.  Jefferson  and  the  congressional  majority,  therefore, 
soon  came  to  the  conclusion  that  it  was  necessary  to  take 
a  very  decided  stand.  They  resolved,  as  they  supposed,  on 
making  extensive  reprisals,  but  as  a  matter  of  fact  they 
sacrificed  their  maritime  commerce. 

On  the  18th  of  December  the  president  recommended 
an  embargo.1  Congress  immediately  took  the  message 
under  advisement  with  closed  doors.  Without  taking  the 
least  time  for  deliberation  the  senate  adopted  a  bill  in  har 
mony  with  the  message.2  In  the  house  of  representatives 
the  opposition  were  not  allowed  more  time,  and  as  the  de- 


1  Amer.  State  Papers,  V.,  p.  258.    Statesman's  Manual,  I.,  p.  204. 

*  There  was  a  touch  of  the  ridiculous  in  the  over-haste  of  the  senate. 
John  Quincy  Adams  exclaimed :  "  The  president  has  recommended  this 
measure  on  his  high  responsibility.  I  would  not  consider,  I  would 
not  deliberate,  I  would  act.  Doubtless  the  president  possesses  further 
information  as  will  justify  the  measure."  Hildreth,  Hist,  of  the  U.  S., 
VI.,  p.  37. 


STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

bates  were  there  also  carried  on  with  closed  doors,  they 
were  completely  kept  from  the  people  until  an  accomplish 
ed  fact  was  before  it.  The  bill  was  passed  with  a  few 
changes,  to  which  the  senate  immediately  agreed,  on  the 
21st  of  December.1 

The  law  was  silently  received  by  the  population  of  the 
commercial  states.  Since  the  time  of  the  Revolution  the 
people  had  always  entertained  the  opinion  that  the  inter 
ruption  of  commercial  relations  was  a  very  simple  and  in 
fallible  means  of  defense  against  any  injustice  on  the  part 
of  the  European  powers.2  The  National  Intelligencer ', 
which  might  be  considered  the  semi-official  organ  of  the 
administration,  threatened  two  years  before,  in  high  sound 
ing  phrases,  the  resumption  of  this  policy.  The  embargo 
could  not,  therefore,  be  a  complete  surprise,  and  the  tradi 
tion  concerning  its  wonderful  power  was  still  so  prevalent 
in  the  commercial  states  that  it  was  accepted  with  resigna 
tion.  It  was,  however,  soon  otherwise.  The  people  felt 
its  weight,  and  before  long  began  to  murmur  and  to  mur 
mur  the  louder,  the  more  apparent  it  became  that  the 
promised  effects  were  not  produced,  and  the  more  cogently 
it  was  demonstrated  in  congress  that  they  never  could  be 
produced,  by  its  means.  The  demonstration  was  so  incon 
trovertible,  that,  after  a  long  struggle,  it  could  not  fail  to 
be  recognized  as  conclusive.  Jefferson  and  his  uncondi 
tional  supporters  took  this  all  the  more  to  heart,  because 
their  opponents  thrust  sharp  thorns  into  the  weakest 
parts  of  their  policy,  which  more  than  once  had  exposed 
the  country  to  serious  danger.  Herein  lies  the  importance 
of  the  embargo  struggle  for  the  history  of  the  democracy 
and  of  the  internal  conflict  of  the  United  States.  The  Re 
publicans  presented  on  this  occasion  a  striking  example  of 

1  By  82  against  44  votes.    Deb.  of  Congress,  III.,  p.  641. 

*  Quincy  in  tlie  house  of  representatives,  Deb.  of  Congress,  1  V.t  p. 
107.  See  also  John  Adams'  interesting  letter  to  Quincy,  Dec.  23, 
1808.  Quincy,  Life  of  J.  Quincy,  p.  162. 


CONSTITUTIONALITY    OF   THE   EMBARGO.  203 

the  frivolity  and  incapacity  with  which  economical  ques 
tions  of  national  significance  have  as  a  rule  been  treated  in 
congress.  The  half-educated  mediocrity,  which  has  always 
a  broad  field  of  action  in  the  political  life  of  all  pure  de 
mocracies,  has  probably  nowhere  shown  itself  more  reck 
less  or  more  presumptuous.  The  Federalists  rightly 
claimed  that  history  afforded  no  other  instance  in  which  a 
government  had  thus  laid  violent  hands  on  the  economical 
existence  of  hundreds  of  thousands  of  its  citizens.  Great 
blame  would  therefore  have  attached  to  the  Republicans, 
even  if  their  senseless  policy  had  not  made  the  breach  be 
tween  the  north  and  the  south  greater,  after  there  seemed 
to  be  some  prospect  that  it  was  about  to  begin  to  close. 

The  opposition,  to  which  some  Republicans  also,  like 
John  Randolph,  belonged,  raised  the  constitutional  qties- 
tion  on  this  occasion.  In  the  debates  of  the  Philadelphia 
convention  the  question  of  the  right  to  lay  an  embargo  was 
only  incidentally  touched  upon.  Madison  understood  the 
clause  prohibiting  the  taxation  of  exports  to  be  a  reserva 
tion  of  that  right  to  the  general  government.  Ellsworth 
opposed  this  view  and  the  convention  clearly  agreed  with 
him.1  "No  express  provision  on  this  subject  was  incorpo 
rated  into  the  constitution.  The  right  claimed  by  congress 
was,  therefore,  to  be  deduced  from  its  authority  to  regulate 
commerce.2  The  opposition  acknowledged  the  correctness 
of  this  construction.3  They  did  not  question  the  right  of 

1  Elliot,  Deb.,  V.,  p.  455. 

*  Art.  I.,  Sec.  8,  §  3.  "  Mr.  McHenry  conceived  that  power  to  be  in- 
eluded  in  the  power  of  war."  Elliot,  Deb.,  "V.,  p.  455. 

8  An  attempt  was  made  later  to  confine  the  scope  of  this  clause  within 
very  narrow  limits ;  but  the  supreme  court  favored  the  most  liberal  con 
struction  which  the  terms  of  the  constitution  would  admit  of.  "  Com 
merce  ...  is  intercourse.  It  describes  the  commercial  intercourse 
between  nations  and  parts  of  nations,  in  all  its  branches,  and  is  regula 
ted  by  prescribing  rules  for  carrying  on  that  intercourse.  ...  It  is  the 
power  to  regulate ;  that  is,  to  prescribe  the  rule  by  which  commerce  is  to 
be  governed.  This  power,  like  all  others  vested  in  congress,  is  com- 


204         STATE  SOVEREIGNTY  AND  SLAVERY. 

congress  to  lay  an  embargo,  which  had  already  been  done 
in  1794.  They  insisted  only  that  the  embargo  of  1807  was 
unconstitutional  for  the  reason  that,  unlike  that  of  1794,  it 
was  not  limited  to  a  definite  time;  that  an  unlimited  em 
bargo  was  not  a  regulation,  but  an  annihilation,  of  com 
merce,  which  the  constitution  did  not  authorize.1  Much 
was  advanced  in  favor  of  this  theory  which  sounded  very 
plausibly,  but  which  was  for  all  that  mere  declamation. 
The  only  thing  in  the  whole  debate  on  the  constitutional 
question  which  is  worthy  of  mention  is  the  characteristic 
inconsistency  of  which  the  majority  were  guilty.  The 
Republicans  did  not  hesitate  to  rely  on  the  introductory 
words  of  the  constitution,  although  the  orthodox  mode 
of  interpretation  set  up  by  them  declared  it  to  be  an  ab 
surdity  to  endeavor  to  deduce  from  these  any  authority 
whatever.2  There  was  scarcely  any  occasion  for  such  a 
denial  of  their  old  confession  of  faith.  The  constitutional 
question  was  at  least  so  doubtful  that  they  would  have  had 
little  to  fear  from  the  opposition  if  the  latter  had  not  had 
other  arguments  to  advance  against  the  embargo.  The  ma 
jority,  therefore,  liked  to  expatiate  on  the  constitutional 
question,  while  the  opposition  avoided  it  almost  entirely 

plete  in  itself,  may  be  exercised  to  its  utmost  extent,  and  acknowledges 
no  limitations  .other  than  are  prescribed  in  the  constitution.  .  .  . 
The  wisdom  and  the  discretion  of  congress,  their  identity  with  the  peo 
ple,  and  the  influence  which  their  constituents  possess  at  elections,  are 
in  this,  as  in  many  other  instances  ...  the  sole  restraints  on  which 
they  have  relied  to  secure  them  from  its  abuses."  Marshall,  in  Gibbons 
vs.  Ogden,  Wheaton's  Rep.,  IX.,  pp.  190,  196. 

1  Ibid,  p.  192.  Story,  the  learned  commentator  on  the  constitution, 
who  at  the  time  belonged  to  the  Republican  party,  says :  "  I  have  ever 
considered  the  embargo  a  measure  which  went  to  the  utmost  limit  of 
constructive  power  under  the  constitution.  It  stands  upon  the  extreme 
verge  of  the  constitution,  being  in  its  very  form  and  terms  an  unlimited 
prohibition  or  suspension  of  foreign  commerce."  Life  and  Letters  of  J. 
Story,  I.,  pp.  185,  186. 

*  Deb.  of  Congress,  III.,  p.  679.  Compare  Madison's  letter  of  Nov. 
27, 1830,  to  Stevenson,  Niles1  Reg.,  supplement  to  vol.  XLIII.,  p.  29. 


THE   PEGS  AND   CONS.  205 

and  dwelt  on  the  political  and  economic  side  of  the  ques 
tion,  because  here  they  felt  the  solid  ground  under  their 
feet. 

The  majority  urged  that  the  United  States  could  not  go 
to  war  with  England  and  France  at  the  same  time.  But 
the  nation's  honor  and  the  nation's  rights  had  been  ignored 
by  both  in  the  same  way;  and  honor  and  interest  therefore 
demanded  that  the  same  redress  should  be  had  for  the 
wrong  committed  by  both  powers.  As  it  was  not  possible 
to  obtain  this  redress  with  the  sword,  it  was  possible  and 
could  be  made  efficacious,  only  by  the  laying  of  the  em 
bargo. 

The  opposition  charged  that  this  mode  of  reasoning  was 
not  only  fallacious,  but  sordid.  They  claimed  that  the 
administration  party  did  not  measure  the  two  aggressive 
powers  with  the  same  rule  and  did  not  wish  so  to  measure 
them.  The  whole  world  knew  what  the  consequences  of 
the  long  war  with  England  were  to  the  navy  and  mer 
chant  marine  of  France,  and  every  child  could  infer  that 
all  the  weight  of  the  embargo  was  intended  to  rest  on  Eng 
land  alone.  It  helped  France  against  England,  and  it  was 
intended  to  do  so. 

This  reproach  was  a  blow  with  a  two-edged  sword.  The 
old  shibboleth  of  the  French  and  English  faction  was  ban 
died  about  once  more,  and  was  taken  up  with  eagerness. 
But  it  could  no  longer  be  represented  as  self-evident  that 
sympathy  with  France  in  opposition  to  the  rest  of  Europe 
was  synonymous  with  sympathy  for  freedom  against  con- 
spiriDg  tyrants.  Napoleon  was,  as  became  more  evident 
every  day,  striving  after  the  supremacy  of  the  world,  and 
England  appeared  to  be  the  only  insurmountable  obstacle 
in  the  way  of  the  realization  of  his  dream.  But  too  many 
requisitions  had  been  made  on  the  services  of  rhetoric  to 
permit  them  to  have  their  old  enchanting  power  over  the 
American  people  in  the  mouth  of  the  emperor.  Jefferson 
and  his  associates  took  great  care,  therefore,  not  to  orna- 


206          STATE  SOVEREIGNTY  AND  SLAVERY. 

ment  their  policy  as  openly  as  they  had  been  wont  with  the 
French  cockade.  But  they  had  by  no  means  completely 
broken  with  this  part  of  their  past.  Whether  their  devo 
tion  to  France  was  still  so  great  that  they  wished  to  afforcl 
her  indirect  support  in  her  war  with  England,  has  not  yet 
been  settled  with  certainty,  and  it  is  doubtful  if  it  ever 
can  be  settled.  But  they  were  certainly  aware  that  the 
embargo  would  not  operate  to  make  reprisals  on  France, 
and  Napoleon  did  not  consider  that  it  did  so  operate.1  This 
was  enough  to  throw  a  shadow  over  the  political  morality 
of  the  administration  and  of  the  majority  of  congress,  as 
well  as  to  refute  their  above-mentioned  argument  for  the 
embargo.  They  could  not  at  least  clear  themselves  of  the 
suspicion  of  a  partiality  which  could  be  justified  on  no 
political  or  moral  grounds,  nor  could  they  justly  claim  that 
they  had  thrown  dust  in  the  eyes  of  even  one  of  the  offend 
ing  powers. 

And  even  England  had  relatively  very  little  to  suffer 
from  the  embargo.  At  first  it  was  scarcely  heeded,  more 
important  events  claiming  the  attention  of  the  country.2 

1  General  Armstrong,  the  American  ambassador  to  France,  wrote, 
Aug.  30, 1808 :  u  We  have  somewhat  overrated  our  means  of  coercion  of 
the  two  great  belligerents  to  a  course  of  justice.  The  embargo  is  a 
measure  calculated,  above  any  other,  to  keep  us  whole,  and  keep  us  in 
peace ;  but  beyond  this  you  must  not  count  upon  it."  (Dwight,  Hist, 
of  the  Hartford  Convention,  p.  96.)  Jefferson  himself  wrote,  Oct.  15, 
1808,  to  Rob.  L.  Livingston  (Jeff.,  Works,  V.  p.  370) :  "  He  [Napoleon] 
concludes,  therefore,  as  every  rational  man  must,  that  the  embargo,  the 
only  remaining  alternative,  was  a  wise  measure."  The  duke  de  Cadore 
gives  still  stronger  expression  to  this  fact.  He  writes  to  general  Arm 
strong,  Aug.  5,  1810:  "The  emperor  had  applauded  the  general  embar 
go."  Dwight,  p.  163.  Compare  also  Deb.  of  Cong.,  IV.,  p.  9.  Fisk 
of  Vermont,  an  ardent  defender  of  the  embargo,  admitted  in  the  house 
of  representatives  in  April,  1808,  that  as  regards  France  the  measure 
had  no  effect.  In  the  debates  on  the  suspension  of  the  embargo  he 
inquired:  "What  do  gentlemen  now  ask?  That  we  should  open 
our  ports  to  Great  Britain  alone :  for  that  would  be  the  effect  of  raising 
the  embargo."  Deb.  of  Congress,  III.,  p.  691. 

a  Armstrong  writes :  "  In  England  (in  the  midst  of  the  more  interest. 


INEFFIOACY   OF    THE    EMBARGO.  207 

Besides,  it  was  soon  shown  that  the  injuries  which  England 
was  made  to  suffer  by  the  embargo  were  compensated  for 
by  many  advantages.1  Moreover,  the  injury  was  much 
smaller  than  had  been  expected,  even  in  England.  Hill- 
house,  in  the  senate,  and  Quincy  and  Key,  in  the  house  of 
representatives,  did  not  weary  of  showing  that  it  was  im 
possible,  on  account  of  the  great  extent  of  sea-coast,  to  en 
force  a  strict  observance  of  the  embargo.2  They  reaped 
no  advantage,  however,  from  the  abundance  of  actual 
proof  of  the  assertion  that  only  the  conscientious  had  any 
thing  to  suffer,  while  the  unscrupulous  grew  rich,  and  that 
England  could  with  little  difficulty  obtain  any  desired 
quantity  of  American  goods.  The  misfortune  was,  it  was 
answered  to  this,  that  the  embargo  was  not  conscientiously 
observed;  that  were  it  only  so  observed,  it  would  be  in 
fallibly  attended  by  the  promised  results.  "When  it  was 
objected  that,  in  politics,  all  calculations  should  be  based 
on  what  is,  and  not  upon  what  should  be,  the  declaimers 
answered  that  if  the  people  had  sunk  so  low  that  for  the 

ing  events  of  the  day)  it  is  forgotten."  Foreign  Relations,  III.,  p.  256. 
Annals  of  Cong.,  2,  X.,  p.  1684. 

1  "  The  British  ministry  also  became  acquainted  about  this  time 
[June]  with  the  unexpected  and  unexampled  prosperity  of  their  col 
onies  of  Canada  and  Nova  Scotia.  It  was  perceived  that  one  year  of  an 
American  embargo  was  worth  to  them  twenty  years  of  peace  or  war 
under  any  other  circumstances ;  that  the  usual  order  of  things  was  re 
versed  ;  that  in  lieu  of  American  merchants  making  estates  from  the 
use  of  British  merchandise  and  British  capital,  the  Canadian  merchants 
were  making  fortunes  of  from  ten  to  thirty  or  forty  thousand  pounds  in 
a  year  from  the  use  of  American  merchandise  and  American  capital." 
Lloyd,  of  Massachusetts,  in  the  house  of  representatives,  Nov.  21.  Deb. 
of  Congress,  IV.,  p.  9.  "  I  consider  the  embargo  as  a  premium  to  the  com 
merce  of  Great  Britain."  Key,  of  Maryland,  in  the  same  place,  Dec.  8, 
1808,  Ibid,  IV.,  p.  66. 

*  Even  John  Qnincy  Adams,  who  had  just  separated  himself  from 
the  Federalists  and  joined  the  administration  party,  says,  in  a  letter 
dated  Dec.  21, 1808 :  "  The  law  will  not  be  executed.  It  will  be  resisted 
under  the  organized  sanction  of  state  authority."  Niles'  Register, 
XXXV.,  p.  220. 


208  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY    A1H)    SLAVERY. 

love  of  filthy  lucre  they  would  not  endure  such  a  sacrifice 
in  order  to  preserve  the  national  honor,  they  no  longer  de 
served  to  be  free  and  independent,  and  that  it  were  better 
they  should  return  to  and  be  again  under  English  rule. 

This  much  was  now  granted:  that  the  United  States  had 
imposed  a  sacrifice  upon  themselves  by  the  embargo.  Jef 
ferson,  in  his  message  of  December  18,  1807,  had  claim 
ed  that  its  object  was  the  protection  of  American  com 
merce.  The  debates  in  congress,  however,  leave  no  doubt 
that,  in  reality,  the  leading  thought  was  the  making  of  re 
prisals.  It  was  only  after  experience  had  shown  that  as 
such  it  was  a  mistaken  measure,  that  greater  stress  was  laid 
on  the  words  of  the  president.  But  little  was  gained  by  the 
change.  Quincy  chastised  the  doctrinarians  with  his  in 
cisive  irony,  and  with  equal  severity  under  both  subter 
fuges,  so  that  they  were  obliged  to  shield  themselves  by 
having  recourse  now  to  one  and  now  to  the  other.  He 
had  called  the  embargo  a  doubtful,  uncertain,  difficult,  and 
exceedingly  costly  measure,  but  as  a  protection  to  Amer 
ican  commerce  he  remarked  it  was  saving  the  golden  egg 
by  killing  the  goose  that  laid  it.1 

Quincy's  argument  could  not  be  refuted.  The  choice  of 
the  shield  with  which  it  was  now  attempted  to  receive  his 
arrows  and  those  of  his  associates  worthily  closed  the  cir 
cle  of  contradictory  absurdities.  The  representatives  of 
the  planters  and  of  the  agricultural  interests  did  not  wish 
to  concede  that  the  commercial  portion  of  the  population 
had  suffered  most  from  the  embargo.  Such  was  the  zeal 
with  which  all  parties  strove  for  the  honor  of  being  the 

1  "  When  all  the  property  of  a  multitude  is  at  hazard,  the  simplest  and 
surest  way  of  securing  the  greatest  portion  is  not  to  limit  individual 
exertion,  but  to  stimulate  it;  not  to  conceal  the  nature  of  the  exposure, 
but,  by  giving  a  full  knowledge  of  the  state  of  things,  to  leave  the  wit 
of  .every  proprietor  free  to  work  out  the  salvation  of  his  property  ac 
cording  to  the  opportunities  he  may  discern."  Debates  of  Congress, 
III.,  p.  698. 


INDUSTRIAL    RUIN    OF    NEW    ENGLAND.  209 

greatest  martyr,  that  one  might  believe  the  embargo  had 
been  laid  for  no  other  purpose  but  to  test  the  various  de 
grees  of  patriotic  devotion. 

The  question,  what  interests  bore  the  burthen  of  the  em 
bargo,  and  which  the  heaviest  share  of  it,  was,  indeed, 
important  enough.  And  it  became  all  the  more  important 
when  it  was  discovered  that  it  grew  more  difficult  every 
day  to  find  a  satisfactory  solution  of  the  question  of  what 
was  intended  by  the  pursuit  of  the  senseless  policy.  Only 
enough  was  established  by  this  peculiar  controversy  to 
show  that  all  interests  had  suffered  severely  from  the  em 
bargo.  In  order  to  rescue  the  ships  and  their  cargoes 
which  the  United  States  would  have  lost  by  the  unjust 
procedure  of  England  and  France,  all  their  ships  must  rot 
in  the  docks,  a  large  portion  of  their  exports  perish  entire 
ly,  and  the  rest  remain  for  a  long  time  unrealized  upon. 
The  calculation  was  so  simple  that  even  financial  artists 
like  Jefferson  could  not  have  failed  to  reach  the  right  result 
if  they  had  not  permitted  themselves  to  be  ruled  by  the 
idea  of  making  reprisals. 

It  was  quite  as  easy  to  discover  the  proportion  in  which 
the  different  interests  had  to  suffer.  The  planters'  staple 
articles,  principally  tobacco  and  cotton,  remained  unsold, 
but  the  planters  themselves  suffered  relatively  but  little 
damage.  They  were  sure  of  finding  a  market  again  as  soon 
as  the  harbors  were  open.  The  farmers  sold  a  considerable 
portion  of  their  products  in  the  country  itself ;  the  rest  was 
for  the  most  part  a  total  loss.  The  productive  industry  of 
the  New  England  fishermen,  ship-builders,  ship-owners,  im 
porters  and  exporters  and  all  who  depended  on  them,  ceased 
almost  entirely.1 

In  this  dispute  also  it  is  impossible  not  to  recognize  a 
division  of  parties  arising  from  different  interests  produced 
by  geographical  position,  and  every  struggle  in  which  this 

1  See  Deb.  of  Congress,  III.,  p.  692;  IV.,  p.  64. 
14 


210          STATE  SOVEREIGNTY  AND  SLAVERY. 

played  any  part  became  in  consequence  doubly  bitter.  Tlie 
south,  which  held  the  balance  of  power  in  the  reigning 
party  and  was  primarily  responsible,  would  have  least 
to  suffer,  if  the  expectation  of  a  moderate  duration  of  the 
embargo  were  realized.  The  powerless  minority  of  the 
New  England  states,  the  consideration  of  whose  inter 
ests,  as  it  was  pretended,  dictated  the  measures  of  the 
administration,  had  greatest  cause  for  complaint.  The  mid 
dle  states  occupied  a  medium  position;  their  interests  un 
questionably  inclined  them  more  towards  the  north,  but 
they  wavered  from  one  side  to  the  other. 

The  manner  in  which  the  majority  exercised  their  su 
premacy  only  added  oil  to  the  flames.  The  administration 
permitted  itself  to  adopt  a  mysterious  course,  proper  in  a 
democratic  state  only  when  the  interests  of  the  country 
indubitably  demand  it.  This  could  not  be  pretended  here 
and  in  no  case  was  it  allowable  towards  the  minority  in 
congress.  The  majority  virtually  adopted  the  standpoint 
of  John  Quincy  Adams,  although  it  did  not  announce  it  as 
frankly.  The  president  must  have  reasons  for  his  recom 
mendation,  hence, — such  was  the  essence  of  the  defense  with 
which  the  party,  to  whom,  when  in  the  opposition,  no  lim 
its  to  the  powers  of  the  government  seemed  too  narrow, 
gratified  their  brutal  policy.  "When  the  minority  rose  up 
in  righteous  indignation  against  this,  the  old,  worn-out  cry 
of  "  want  of  patriotism"  and  "  British  faction"  was  raised 
again.  And  when  at  last  the  choleric  Gardinier  of  New 
York,  a  man  of  small  school  education,  but  possessed  of 
excellent  judgment,  could  no  longer  control  his  anger,  and 
spoke  the  unadorned  truth  to  the  house  of  representa 
tives,1  his  boldness  involved  him  in  a  duel  in  which  he  was 

1  "All  our  surplus  produce  shall  rot  on  our  hands.  God  knows  what 
all  this  means ;  I  cannot  understand  it.  I  am  astonished ;  I  am  dis 
mayed.  I  see  effects,  but  I  can  trace  them  to  no  cause.  I  fear  there  is 
an  unknown  hand  guiding  us  to  the  most  dreadful  destinies,  unseen  be 
cause  it  cannot  endure  the  light.  Darkness  and  mystery  overshadow  this 


TYRANNY    OF   MAJORITIES.  211 

severely  wounded.  The  whole  conflict,  as  carried  on  by 
the  administration,  was  an  unworthy  spectacle,  and  a  co 
gent  proof  that  the  tyranny  of  majorities,  in  a  popular  state, 
may  often  be  placed  on  a  footing  with  the  tyranny  of  abso 
lute  sovereigns.  If,  in  the  former  case,  the  means  of  de 
fense  are  far  greater  than  here,  the  dangers,  on  the  other 
hand,  are  more  serious,  because  tyranny  comes  clothed  in 
the  garb  of  free  institutions.  In  the  instance  before  us, 
these  dangers  were  all  the  greater  because  threatened  by  a 
party  which  in  theory  placed  no  limit  to  freedom  but  the 
widest,  and  honestly  believed  itself  to  be  the  sole  possessor 
of  free  tendencies. 

But  tyranny  was  bound  to  corne  to  an  end,  no  matter 
how  great  the  majority  of  the  administration  party.  The 
pockets  of  the  people  were  made  to  feel  daily  that  the 
views  advocated  by  the  opposition  were  the  right  ones, 
and  this  is  an  argument  which  no  people  can  long  resist. 
It  is  exceedingly  strange  that  it  took  more  than  a  year  to 
prevail.  The  only  explanation  is  that  a  majority  of  the 
people  as  well  as  the  president  arid  the  majority  in  con 
gress  still  adhered  to  the  perverse  faith  of  Revolutionary 
times  in  the  effects  which  the  interruption  of  commercial 
relations  with  European  countries  would  necessarily  pro 
duce.  The  embargo  controversy  is  one  of  the  best  illus 
trations  of  the  tenacity  with  which  this  practical  people 
hold  in  the  face  of  experience  to  political  theories,  once 
they  have  accepted  them  as  true, 

house,  and  the  whole  nation.  We  know  nothing,  we  are  permitted  to 
know  nothing.  We  sit  here  as  mere  automata.  We  legislate  without 
knowing,  yea  without  wishing  to  know,  why  or  wherefore.  We  are 
told  what  to  do  and  we  do  it.  We  are  put  in  motion ;  but  how,  I  for 
one  cannot  tell.  .  .  .  We  are  treated  as  enemies  of  our  country.  We 
are  permitted  to  know  nothing  and  are  execrated  because  we  do  not  ap 
prove  of  measures,  the  origin  and  tendency  of  which  are  carefully  con- 
cealed  from  us.  We  are  denounced  because  we  have  no  confidence  in 
an  executive  that  refuses  to  discover  to  us  or  to  the  nation  its  actual  po 
sition."  Hildreth,  Hist,  of  the  U.  8.,  VI.,  pp.  54,  55. 


212  STATE  SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

Nearly  all  the  state  legislatures  formally  approved  the 
embargo.  Even  New  England  was  represented  by  New 
Hampshire,  and  the  legislatures  of  Massachusetts,  Vermont 
and  Rhode  Island  expressed  a  desire  that  Jefferson  should 
be  a  candidate  for  the  presidency  a  third  time.  But  the 
majority  over-estimated  the  value  of  these  manifestations. 
In  the  north,  the  greater  part  of  the  population  bitterly  op 
posed  the  embargo,  even  when  they  supported  the  admin 
istration  in  everything  else.  In  the  middle  states  also,  the 
contrary  current  gained  rapidly  in  strength.  In  the  "New 
York  legislature,  a  resolution  favorable  to  the  embargo  was 
carried  only  by  the  overpowering  influence  of  Clinton,  who 
had  changed  his  position  on  the  question  from  personal 
motives.  Its  opponents  in  Maryland  by  a  happy  combi 
nation  obtained  the  upper  hand  in  the  house  of  represen 
tatives  for  a  while.  The  number  of  the  malcontents  in 
Pennsylvania  was  considerably  increased.  And  while  the 
president  was  in  receipt  of  a  large  number  of  approving 
addresses,  congress  was  stormed  with  petitions,  which  grew 
more  violent  every  day,  for  the  raising  of  the  embargo.1  In 
short,  it  became  continually  more  evident  in  what  direc 
tion  the  current  of  public  opinion  was  setting. 

The  administration  and  its  supporters  in  congress  did 
not  learn  anything  better  from  all  this,  but,  on  the  con 
trary,  grew  more  obstinate  in  their  courses.  Act  after  act 
was  passed  to  enforce  the  observance  of  the  embargo,  and 
providing  means  to  enforce  it  which  grew  to  be  more  and 
more  coercive.2  This  was  the  best  means  which  could  have 

1  Fisk,  a  warm  defender  of  the  embargo,  said  in  the  house  of  repre 
sentatives,  April  13, 1809 :  "  The  table  of  the  house  has  been  loaded  with 
petitions  against  the  embargo."  Deb.  of  Congress,  III.,  p.  690. 

9  The  administration  party  adduced  as  their  principal  ground  of  jus 
tification  that  an  experiment  should  be  made  to  ascertain  whether  the 
federal  authorities  had  the  power  to  enforce  the  observance  of  the  laws 
of- the  Unioq.  Quincy,  in  his  journal,  gives  an  account  of  a  conversa 
tion  held  by  him  with  Giles,  of  Virginia :  "  As  to  removing  the  embar 
go,  he  was  in  favor  of  adhering  to  it  at  all  hazards.  He  was  in  favor  of 


FORCIBLE   RESISTANCE   TO    THE    EMBARGO.  213 

• 

been  found  to  cause  the  opposition  so  to  increase  111  extent 
and  intensity  that  it  would  have  been  the  utmost  folly  to 
resist  it.  When  the  president  recommended  that  the 
militia  should  be  called  out  to  enforce  the  law,  the  smug 
glers  crossed  over  the  Canadian  border  in  armed  bands; 
when  he  removed  a  reluctant  tax-collector,  juries  ac 
quitted  the  violators  of  the  law;1  when  he  dispatched  gun 
boats  to  the  eastern  harbors,  the  opposition  press  struck 
with  increased  energy  the  same  threatening  key  in  which 
it  had  spoken  in  1801,  1803,  and  1804. 2  It  mattered  not 
how  emphatically  congress  and  the  administration  protest 
ed  that  they  had  only  the  best  interests  of  the  ISTew  Eng 
land  states  in  view,  these  were  at  last  firmly  resolved  not 
to  permit  themselves  to  be  economically  ruined  without 
offering  any  resistance,  and  all  for  the  sake  of  the  theories 
of  those  in  power.  And  whence  could  the  administration 
draw  the  resolution  which  would  enable  it  to  run  the  risk 
of  violent  resistance  on'a  greater  scale,  when  it  was  already 
convinced  that  war  would  soon  be  preferable  to  the  em 
bargo  ?  t 
Jefferson  acknowledges  this  in  his  private  correspon- 

putting  «o  trial  what  the  strength  of  the  federal  arm  was ;  and  if  it  was 
not  sufficient  to  enforce  its  own  laws,  it  might  as  well  be  known  now  as 
hereafter."  Quincy,  Life  of  J.  Quincy,  p.  143.  Compare  Ibid,  p.  151. 
The  Union  has  had  to  pay  dearly  for  the  failure  to  make  this  trial  more 
frequently.  The  claim  was  in  poor  keeping  with  the  conduct  of  the 
party  during  the  administrations  of  Washington  and  Adams. 

1  An  article  authorized  by  J.  Q.  Adams,  in  the  National  Intelligencer 
says:  "The  people  were  constantly  instigated  to  forcible  resistance 
against  it  [the  embargo],  and  juries  after  juries  acquitted  the  violators  01 
it  upon  the  ground  that  it  was  unconstitutional,  assumed  in  the  face  of 
a  solemn  decision,  of  the  district  court  of  the  United  States."  Niles' 
Register,  XXXV.,  p.  138.  In  a  precisely  similar  manner  Adams,  in  a  let 
ter  dated  Dec.  21, 1808,  describes  the  course  of  the  opposition  in  Massa 
chusetts.  Ibid,  XXXV,  p.  220. 

a  See  a  number  of  characteristic  examples  in  Randall,  Life  of  Jeff., 
III.,  pp.  282,  283. 


214:  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

dence,  in  June,  1808.1  Spite  of  this,  however,  the  opposi 
tion  was  obliged  to  hear  for  half  a  year  more,  with  undi- 
minished  bitterness,  that  it  had  wished,  Judas-like,  to  bar 
gain  away  the  honor  and  independence  of  the  country.  In 
January,  1809,lSricholas,  of  Virginia,  the  leader  of  the  ad 
ministration  party  in  the  house  and  the  special  mouthpiece 
of  the  president,  made  public  avowal  of  the  change  of  front. 
He  introduced  a  resolution  which  deserves  to  be  cited 
verbatim.  It  reads:  "Resolved,  as  the  opinion  of  this 
house,  that  the  United  States  ought  not  to  delay  beyond 
the  —  day  of to  repeal  the  embargo  laws,  and  to  re 
sume,  maintain,  and  defend  the  navigation  of  the  high  seas 
against  any  nation  or  nations  having  in  force  edicts,  or 
ders,  or  decrees  violating  the  lawful  commerce  and  neutral 
rights  of  the  United  States."  He  desired  that  the  first  of 
June  should  be  fixed  as  the  date  of  the  repeal  of  the  law. 
Translated  into  the  plain  language  of  e very-day  life,  this 
resolution  meant:  "  England  and  France  have  allowed 
themselves  to  violate  the  rights  which  are  ours  by  the  law 
of  nations.  To  protect  ourselves  and  punish  these  powers, 
we  have,  for  thirteen  months,-  renounced  completely  the 
exercise  of  the  right  which  they  had  in  part  violated.  We 
now  inform  them  that  we  shall  persevere  in  this  policy 
four  months  longer.  If  by  that  time  they  do  not  promise 
to  deal  more  equitably  with  us,  we  shall  be  compelled  to 
surrender  this  policy,  because  we  suffer  too  much  from  it. 
We  shall,  at  the  end  of  that  time,  resume  the  exercise  of 

1  He  writes  to  Dr.  Leib,  June  23 :  "  It  is  true  the  time  will  come  when 
we  must  abandon  it  But  if  this  is  before  the  repeal  of  the  orders  of 
council,  we  must  abandon  it  only  for  a  state  of  war.  The  day  is  not 
distant  when  that  will  be  preferable  to  a  longer  continuance  of  the 
embargo.  But  we  can  never  remove  that,  and  let  our  vessels  go  out  and 
be  taken  under  these  orders  without  making  reprisals.  Yet  this  is  the 
very  state  of  things  which  these  federal  monarchists  [!]  are  endeavoring 
to  •  bring  about,  and  in  this  it  is  but  too  possible  they  may  succeed." 
Jeff.,  Works,  V.,  p.  304. 


CHANGE    OF   FRONT.  215 

our  rights,  and,  if  necessary,  defend  them."  "Was  it  pos 
sible  in  a  few  words  to  give  a  more  destructive  criticism 
of  the  policy  of  the  administration  than  the  administration 
party  had  itself  here  given  expression  to  ? 

The  opposition  would,  of  course,  not  listen  to  this  "con 
ditional  declaration  of  war,"  as  Dana,  of  Massachusetts, 
called  the  resolution.  The  administration  party  had  vir 
tually  lost  its  cause,  and  the  opposition  did  not  wish  to 
come  to  an  agreement  with  it  on  terms  thus  easy.  In  a 
democratic  republic  a  policy  in  direct  conflict  with  the  in 
terests  of  the  country  can  be  prosecuted  only  so  long  as 
the  majority  of  the  people  remain  ignorant  of  its  true 
character  and  consequences,  and  the  government  contin 
ues  consistent  in  its  error.  "When  the  people  awake  to  a 
correct  understanding,  and  the  government  concedes  its 
error  conditionally,  or  in  part,  the  opposition  must  be  very 
badly  led  if  it  does  not  in  a  short  time  achieve  a  complete 
victory. 

In  the  opposition  states,  the  administration  was  allowed 
to  know  the  minds  and  feelings  of  the  people  more  unre 
servedly  than  ever.1  In  congress  the  opposition  continued 
its  attacks  with  redoubled  energy  and  the  hitherto  serried 
ranks  of  the  administration  began  to  show  marks  of  de 
moralization  with  astounding  rapidity.  From  among 
themselves  they  were  destined  to  hear  a  voice,  recalling  to 
their  memory  the  principle  which  is  the  kernel  of  the  idea 
of  the  republican  state,  viz. :  that  it  is  the  spirit  and  the 
duty  of  republican  governments  to  make  laws  agreeable  to 
the  people,  and  not  to  endeavor  to  accommodate  the  people 

1  Thus  the  Massachusetts  senate  declared :  "  The  people  of  New  Eng 
land  perfectly  understand  the  distinction  between  the  constitution  and 
the  administration.  ...  On  such  occasions  passive  obedience  would, 
on  the  part  of  the  people,  be  a  breach  of  their  allegiance,  and  on  our 
part,  treachery  and  perjury.  The  people  have  not  sent  us  here  to  sur 
render  their  rights,  but  to  maintain  and  defend  them ;  and  we  have  no 
authority  to  dispense  with  the  duties  thus  solemnly  imposed."  Hildreth, 
Hist,  of  the  U.  S.,  V.,  p.  116. 


216  SPATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

to  the  laws.  Their  charge  that  the  opposition  was  fed  only 
by  the  British  and  "  monarchical  faction"  was  of  no  avail, 
for  their  staunchest  supporters  declared  now  with  solemn 
earnestness,  that  the  whole  north  was  of  one  opinion  on 
this  question.1  The  fate  of  Nicholas's  resolution  was  proof 
enough  of  this.  ~No  time  was  allowed  to  those  who  had 
remained  true  to  the  administration  to  collect  their 
thoughts.  The  deserters  from  the  party  went  so  far  even 
as  to  offer  their  aid  to  hoodwink  them  by  a  parliamentary 
stroke.  Nicholas  had  so  amended  his  resolution  on  the 
30th  of  January,  that  letters  of  marque  and  reprisal  were 
to  be  issued  in  case  the  objectionable  orders  of  the  powers 
were  not  recalled  at  the  date  to  be  determined  on.  The 
opposition  moved  for  a  division  of  the  question,  and  ob 
tained  it,  because  the  majority  were  completely  surprised 
by  the  motion.  The  motion  supported  by  the* administra 
tion,  to  fix  the  1st  of  June  as  the  date  of  the  raising  of 
the  embargo,  was  rejected,  and  the  4th  of  March  fixed  in 
stead.2  After  the  first  part  of  the  resolution  was  thus 
adopted  with  this  amendment  by  seventy-six  votes,  the 
second  part  was  rejected  by  fifty-seven  against  thirty-nine 
votes. 

Jefferson  was  very  much  surprised  by  this  defeat  just 
before  his  retirement  to  private  life.3  He  could  not  ex- 

1  Cook,  a  Republican  member  of  the  Massachusetts  house  of  represen 
tatives,  said  :  "  The  south  say  embargo  or  war ;  the  north  and  east  say, 
no  embargo,  no  war.  ...  To  comply  with  the  general  wish  of  the 
north,  the  embargo  acts  must  be  repealed  at  an  early  day."  Hildreth,  VI., 
p.  127.  Stofy  writes,  Jan  4,  1809 :  u  The  southern  states  are  all  for  a  con- 
tinuance ;  the  middle  and  western  are  all  ready  to  unite  in  any  measure. 
But  with  very  few  exceptions,  the  Republicans  from  New  England  re 
ceive  almost  daily  letters  which  urge  a  repeal."  Life  and  Letters  of  J. 
Story,  I.,  p.  174. 

8  The  number  of  those  voting  "  aye"  was  seventy ;  the  number  voting 
**  no"  is  not  given.  Annals  of  Congress,  1808-9,  p.  1334.  Hildreth  er- 
ronfcously  gives  the  1st  of  March  as  the  date. 

3  Quincy  writes  to  John  Adams,  Dec.  18, 1808  :  "  Fear  of  responsibility 


REPEAL    OF   THE   EMBARGO.  217 

plain  this  sudden  revolution  of  opinion.1  Notwithstanding 
his  confession  to  Dr.  Leib,  seven  months  before,  he  now 
said  that  the  "pseudo-Republican"  Story  was  responsible 
for  the  whole  misfortune,  and  that  the  removal  of  the  em 
bargo  had  inflicted  an  incurable  wound  on  the  interests  of 
the  country.2 

and  love  of  popularity  are  now  master  passions  and  regulate  all  the 
movements.  The  policy  is  to  keep  things  as  they  are,  and  wait  for 
European  events.  .  .  .  The  presidential  term  will  have  expired,  and 
then  away  to  Monticello,  and  let  the take  the  hindmost.  I  do  be 
lieve  that  not  a  whit  deeper  project  than  this  fills  the  august  mind  of  your 
successor."  Quincy,  Life  of  J.  Quincy,  p.  146.  Jefferson's  character  and 
his  personal  attitude  towards  the  embargo  question  during  the  last 
months  of  his  administration  are  described  in  these  few  words  with 
masterly  skill. 

1  "  I  thought  congress  had  taken  their  ground  firmly  for  continuing 
the  embargo  till  June,  and  then  war.    But  a  sudden  and  unaccountable 
revolution  of  opinion  took  place  the  last  week,  chiefly  among  the  New 
England  and  New  York  members,  and  in  a  kind  of  panic  they  voted  the 
4th  of  March  for  removing  the  embargo,  and  by  such  a  majority  as  gave 
all  reason  to  believe  they  would  not  agree  either  to  war  or  non-inter 
course."    Jefferson  to  Th.  M.  Randolph,  Feb.  7, 1809.    Jeff.,  Works,  V., 
p.  424. 

2  July  16, 1810,  he  writes  to  Dearborn :  "The  Federalists,  during  their 
short-lived  ascendency,  have,  nevertheless,  by  forcing  us  from  the  em 
bargo,  inflicted  a  wound  on  our  interests  which  can  never  be  cured, 
and  on  our  affections  which  will  require  time  to  cicatrize.    1  ascribe 
all  this  to  one  pseudo- Republican,  Story.    He  came  on    ...    and 
staid  only  a  few  days ;  long  enough,  however,  to  get  complete  hold  of 
Bacon,  who,  giving  in  to  his  representations,  became  panic-struck,  and 
communicated  his  panic  to  his  colleagues,  and  they  to  a  majority  of  the 
sound  members  of  congress.    They  believed  in  the  alternative  of  repeal 
or  civil  war,  and  produced  this  fatal  measure  of  repeal."    Jeff.,  Works, 
V.,  p.  529.    On  the  other  hand,  he  writes  to  W.  B.  Giles,  Dec.  25,  1825 : 
"  He  [John  Quincy  Adams]  assured  me  that  there  was  eminent  danger 
that  the  convention  [of  the  New  England  states]  would  take  place ; 
and  that  to  enable  its  [the  Union's]  friends  to  make  head  against  it  the 
repeal  of  the  embargo  was  absolutely  necessary.    I  expressed  a  j  ust  sense 
of  the  merit  of  this  information,  and  of  the  importance  of  the  disclosure 
to  the  safety  and  even  the  salvation  of  our  country ;  and  however  reluctant 
I  was  to  abandon  the  measure  (a  measure  which,  persevered  in  a  little 
longer,  we  had  subsequent  and  satisfactory  assurance,  would  have  effect- 


218  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND   SLAVERY. 

There  was  an  element  of  truth  in  this  view  of  Jefferson. 
The  terror  which  had  taken  hold  of  the  majority  was  in 
deed  exaggerated.  Heavy  as  the  embargo  weighed  on  the 
northern  states,  it  might  have  been  continued  some  time 
longer  without  any  danger  of  entailing  civil  war.  The 
majority  soon  perceived  that  they  had  too  hastily  dropped 
their  arms,  and  the  partial  resumption  of  the  policy 
hitherto  pursued  by  them  was  far  from  leading  to  an  immedi 
ate  crisis.  The  more  moderate  agreed,  before  the  adjourn 
ment  of  congress,  on  the  !N"on -intercourse  Act,1  which 
postponed  the  raising  of  the  embargo  to  the  15th  of  March, 
and  allowed  it  to  remain  in  force  so  far  as  France  and 
England  were  concerned  to  the  end  of  the  next  session  of 
congress.  Even  this  partial  success  of  the  opposition  was  suf 
ficient  to  operate  powerfully  as  an  appeasement  of  the  ex 
citement.  The  masses  had  not  as  yet  formed  such  an  idea  of 

ed  its  object  completely)  from  that  moment,  and  influenced  by  that  in 
formation,  I  saw  the  necessity  of  abandoning  it,  and  instead  of  effecting 
our  purpose  by  this  peaceable  weapon  we  must  fight  it  out,  or  break  the 
Union.  I  then  recommended  to  yield  to  the  necessity  of  a  repeal  of  the 
embargo,  and  to  endeavor  to  supply  its  place  by  the  best  substitute  in 
which  they  could  procure  a  general  concurrence."  Jeff.,  Works,  VII., 
pp.  425, 426.  There  is  no  reason  to  ascribe  this  evident  contradiction  to 
an  impure  motive.  Jefferson  was  then  83  years  old,  and  his  memory 
may  therefore  have  proved  treacherous.  Story  writes  in  his  autobiog 
raphy  :  "  Mr.  Jefferson  has  honored  me  by  attributing  to  my  influence 
the  repeal  of  the  embargo.  I  freely  admit  that  I  did  all  1  could  to  ac 
complish  it,  though  I  returned  home  before  the  act  passed.  The  very 
eagerness  with  which  the  repeal  was  supported  by  a  majority  of  the  Re 
publican  party  ought  to  have  taught  Mr.  Jefferson  that  it  was  already 
considered  by  them  as  a  miserable  and  mischievous  failure.  .  .  The 
truth  is,  that  if  the  measure  had  not  been  abandoned  when  it  was,  it 
would  have  overturned  the  administration  itself,  and  the  Republican 
party  would  have  been  driven  from  power  by  the  indignation  of  the 
people,  goaded  on  to  madness  by  their  sufferings."  Story,  Life  and 
Letters  of  J.  Story,  I.,  p.  185.  In  a  letter  to  Everett  he  says:  "The 
credit  of  it  [the  repeal  of  the  embargo]  is  due  to  the  firmness  and  in 
tegrity  of  Mr.  Bacon."  Ibid,  I.,  p.  187.  Quincy  agrees  in  this  opin 
ion.  Life  of  J.  Quincy,  p.  185. 
1  Annals  of  Cong.,  2,  X.,  1824;  Stat.  at  L.,  II.,  p.  528. 


THE  FEDERALISTS  LACK  LEADERS.          219 

the  ruinousness  of  the  policy  of  the  administration  as  to 
seriously  threaten  the  power  of  the  Republicans.  They 
could  again  go  back  immediately,  slowly  but  surely,  over 
the  road  which  naturally  ended  in  an  unnecessary  and  not 
very  honorable  war;  a  war  which,  it  is  true,  was  not  fruitless, 
but  which  left  all  the  questions  for  which  it  was  waged  un 
solved.  They  could  with  impunity  venture  to  introduce 
their  policy  anew,  by  a  second  embargo  of  ninety  days, 
and  during  its  continuance  to  lay  a  third  one.  At  last, 
indeed,  the  Federalists  enjoyed  a  great  moral  triumph,  for 
the  president  himself  recommended  its  recall;  but  Jeffer 
son's  unfortunate  policy  had  already  borne  fruit  in  abun 
dance. 

The  haste  which  characterized  the  course  of  the  Feder 
alists  when  the  dismay  of  the  northern  Republicans  afforded 
them  the  opportunity  of  a  partial  victory  in  February,  1809, 
was  therefore,  a  great  political  mistake.  Since  Hamilton's 
death  they  were  wanting  in  a  leader  with  the  coolness  of 
judgment  absolutely  necessary  to  turn  the  errors  of  their 
opponents  completely  to  account.  They  wasted  their  ammu 
nition  in  useless  demonstrations  and  petty  skirmishes,  and 
could  therefore  never  engage  in  a  decisive  battle.  Had 
they  had  to  deal  with  statesmanlike  talent  of  a  higher  or 
der,  they  might  perhaps  have  been  schooled  by  the  contest 
to  pursue  their  endeavors  towards  the  realization  of  their, 
more  correct  political  ideas  in  a  more  efficient  manner. 

The  ultimate  cause  of  their  mistake  was,  as  on  so  many 
former  occasions,  that  they  had  not  discovered  the  right 
political  point  of  view.  They  over-estimated  the  momen 
tary  excitement  of  the  masses,  and  under-estimated  their 
loyalty  to  the  federal  authorities  and  their  fidelity  to  the 
Union.  The  Republicans  had  repeatedly  fallen  into  the 
same  mistake  when  they  were  in  the  opposition,  and  they 
now  committed  the  very  same  errors  in  their  calculations. 
Hence  the  "  panic  terror"  on  their  part,  and  on  the  part  of 
the  Federalists  the  haste  to  take  advantage  of  it.  The 


220  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY    AND    SLAVEIiY. 

majority  of  American  historians  have  made  use  of  this  cir 
cumstance  to  paint  the  tendencies  of  the  opposing  party 
towards  resistance  or  separation  in  individual  cases  in  too 
glaring  colors,  or  to  deny  that  disloyal  plans  had  been  de 
vised  or  the  thought  of  secession  seriously  entertained  by 
their  own  party.  Judged  from  an  impartial  standpoint, 
the  fact  that  the  possibility  of  a  civil  war  or  of  a  division 
of  the  Union  was  so  frequently,  and  on  relatively  insigni 
ficant  occasions,  thought  of  on  both  sides,  may  be  taken  as 
a  measure  of  the  degree  of  consolidation  the  Union  had  at 
tained  at  the  time.  The  leaders  undervalued  the  solidari 
ty  of  material  interests  which  already  obtained,  and  the 
instincts  of  the  people  were  therefore  juster  than  the  well- 
pondered  judgments  of  the  leaders.  On  the  one  hand,  the 
conflict  of  interests  and  the  particularistic  tendencies  of  the 
masses  were  yet  so  great  that  the  leaders  were  always 
goaded  into  a  policy  disloyal  and  particularistic  in  its  ten 
dencies,  and  they  found  so  much  sympathy  with  the  masses 
that  what  at  first  were  only  thoughts  soon  ripened  into 
plans.  On  the  other  hand,  the  solidarity  of  interests,  and 
the  national  feeling  which  it  fed,  were  already  so  strong  that 
the  masses  refused  their  services  even  before  the  plans  had 
gone  so  far  as  to  find  expression  in  an  attempt  at  action.1 

1  "  It  is  a  melancholy  reflection — a  subject  that  excites  our  best  and 
inmost  feelings — that  projects  or  speculations,  as  to  a  dissolution  of  this 
Union,  have  been  so  frequently  indulged.  That  leading  men  in  Vir 
ginia  looked  to  a  dismemberment  in  1798-9,  when  the  armory  was  built, 
etc., — that  Burr  and  his  confederates  had  an  eye  to  the  establishment  of 
a  western  government,  in  1805-6, — that  many  contemplated  a  building, 
up  of  the  'nation  of  New  England'  from  1808  to  1815,— and  that  now  [1828] 
some  in  the  south  are  calculating  a  division  at  the  Potomac,  seems  to  us 
undoubted ;  but  the  lengths  to  which  either  party  proceeded  or  will  pro- 
ceed  rests  very  much  on  conjecture  or  depends  on  opinion. 
These  are  fearful  things  to  think  of.  But  whatever  have  been,  or  may 
be,  the  designs  of  individuals,  we  have  always  believed,  and  yet  trust, 
that  the  vast  body  of  the  people  ever  have  been,  and  are,  warmly  at- 
tached  to  the  Union ;  and  that  it  never  perhaps  was  really  more  strong 
than  when  it  seemed  most  endangered,  even  during  the  darkest  period 
of  the  late  war."  Niles'  Reg.,  XXXV.,  p.  210. 


AN  ENGLISH   SPY.  221 

It  mattered  not  how  often  the  laboring  mountain  had  given 
birth  to  nothing  greater  than  a  mouse,  the  labor  itself  and  the 
political  judgment  of  American  statesmen  are  not  on  that 
account  to  be  lightly  estimated.  The  actual  condition  of 
affairs  presented  so  unusual  a  complication  of  positive  and 
negative  factors  so  peculiarly  grouped  that  it  was,  indeed, 
no  easy  matter  to  discover  their  sum-total. 

European  statesmen,  who  observed  from  the  nearest 
point,  fell  into  the  same  error.  In  February,  1809,  Sir  James 
Craig,  governor  of  Canada,  sent  a  secret  agent,  Henry  by 
name,  to  Boston.  His  main  task  was  to  form  an  opinion 
as  to  how  great  or  how  small  the  prospects  of  the  Federal 
ists  were  to  obtain  control  of  the  country,  and  how  far  they 
would  feel  inclined  in  case  of  a  disruption  of  the  Union  to 
look  for  support  to  England.1  In  very  general  terms,  but 
in  such  as  were  easily  intelligible,  his  instructions  further 
directed  him  to  find  out  from  the  leaders  of  the  Federalists, 
whether  England,  in  case  of  a  war  with  the  United  States, 
could,  to  a  certain  extent,  rely  on  them,  and  in  what  man 
ner  indirect  support  was  to  be  expected  from  them.  Jef 
ferson  asserts  that  John  Quincy  Adams  said  at  the  time 
that  this  was  to  be  done,  according  to  Craig's  plan,  by  a 
declaration  of  neutrality.2 

« 

1  Sir  James  Craig  to  Henry,  Feb.  6,  1809:  "It has  been  supposed  that 
if  the  Federalists  of  the  eastern  states  should  be  successful  in  obtaining 
that  decided  influence  which  may  enable  them  to  direct  the  public 
opinion,  it  is  not  improbable  that  rather  than  submit  to  a  contin 
uance  of  the  difficulties  and  distress  to  which  they  are  now  subject,  they 
will  exert  that  influence  to  bring  about  a  separation  of  the  general  union. 
The  earliest  information  on  this  subject  may  be  of  great  importance  to 
our  government,  as  it  may  also  be,  that  it  should  be  informed,  how  far 
in  such  an  event  they  would  look  up  to  England  for  assistance,  or  be 
disposed  to  enter  into  a  connection  with  us."  D wight,  Hist  of  the 
Hartfard  Convention,  p.  200. 

a  Jefferson  to  John  Adams,  April  20, 1812 :  "  He  [J.  Q.  Adams]  stated  a 
particular  which  Henry  has  not  distinctly  brought  forward,  which  was, 
that  the  eastern  states  were  not  to  be  required  to  make  a  formal  act  of 
separation  from  the  Union,  and  to  take  a  part  in  the  war  against  it,  a 


STATE    SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

Henry  himself  became  convinced  after  a  short  time  that 
his  mission  would  remain  fruitless.1  The  Federalists,  later, 
relying  on  this  declaration,  represented  the  whole  plan  as 
an  absurdity  ab  initio.  Henry's  disclosures  were  certainly 
not  worth  the  $50,000  which  Madison  paid  for  them,  but 
the  plan  cannot  be  looked  upon  as  the  clumsy  mystifica 
tion  of  a  common  cheat,  simply  because  it  remained  with 
out  results.  Henry  had  come  to  Boston  at  an  unfortunate 
moment.  After  the  partial  removal  of  the  embargo  and 
the  acceptance  of  the  friendly  proposals  of  Great  Britain 
through  Mr.  Madison,  he  could  expect  no  advances  from 
the  extreme  Federalists.2  But  it  does  not  follow  from  this 
that  he  would  have  met  the  same  reception  if  the  adminis 
tration  party  had  not  yielded,  as  up  to  February  seemed 
probable.  One  of  the  most  distinguished  sons  of  whom 
Massachusetts  can  boast  was  of  opinion  that  Henry  would 
have  found  support  enough  for  his  operations,  if  the  policy 
hitherto  pursued  had  been  persevered  in.  As  early  as  No 
vember,  1808,  John  Quincy  Adams  expressed  the  fear  that 
this  might  lead  to  civil  war.8  Later  he  claimed  to  have  "une 
quivocal  evidence"  tending  to  show  that  there  was  a  sys- 

mcasure  deemed  much  too  strong  for  their  people :  but  to  declare  them 
selves  in  a  state  of  neutrality,  in  consideration  of  which  they  were  to 
have  peace  and  free  commerce,  the  lure  most  likely  to  ensure  popular 
acquiescence."  Jeff.,  Works,  VI.,  p.  50. 

1  He  writes,  May  25, 1809 :  "  1  beg  leave  to  suggest  that  in  the  present 
state  of  things  in  this  country,  my  presence  can  contribute  very  little  to 
the  interests  of  Great  Britain."  Niles'  Reg.,  II.,  p.  25.  The  whole  cor 
respondence  bearing  on  this  subject  is  to  be  found  in  Ann.  of  Congress, 
1,  XII.,  p.  1162,  etc.;  Foreign  Relations,  III.,  p.  545,  etc.;  Niles' Reg., 
II.,  p.  19,  etc. 

*  See  Henry's  letters  of  the  5th  and  25th  of  May. 

*  "  Between  the  embargo  and  the  non-intercourse  system,  under  my 
present  state  of  information,  I  should  strongly  incline  to  the  last.    It 
would,  indeed,  incur  new  hazard  of  eventual  war  abroad,  but  I  think  it 
would  remove  the  risk  of  war  at  home  for  the  present."    Nov.  17, 1808. 
Niles'  Register,  XXXV.,  p.  220.  Compare  also  the  letters  from  Desausure, 
Dec.  7, 1808,  and  Jan.  21, 1809,  and  from  Crafts,  Jan.  30, 1809,  to  Quincy. 
Life  of  Quincy,  pp.  189-192. 


PROJECT   FOR   SECESSION   OF   THE   EAST.  223 

tematic  attempt  making  to  dissolve  the  Union.  In  his 
opinion  New  England  would  have  undoubtedly  made  sure 
of  the  assistance  of  Great  Britain  if  the  administration 
had  made  civil  war  inevitable  by  an  effort  to  overcome  the 
resistance  to  the  embargo  by  force.1 

The  Federalists,  on  whom  in  particular  the  suspicion 
would  rest,  declared  Adams's  disclosures  to  be  malicious 
calumnies,  wanting  foundation  in  fact.  How  far  Adams's 
works  and  correspondence,  the  publication  of  which  is 
going  on,  will  contain  proofs  of  his  assertion,  it  is  impos 
sible  to  conjecture.  The  accuser  and  the  accused  were 
both  honorable  men,  whose  words  had  equal  weight,  but 
of  course  the  burden  of  proof  is  on  the  former.  As  long 
as  this  has  not  been  produced,  equity  demands  that  the 
peculiar  position  in  which  Adams  was  placed  at  the  time 
should  be  considered  in  favor  of  the  party  accused.  He 

1  In  an  article  in  the  National  Intelligencer  of  Oct.  21,  1828,  author 
ized  by  Adams,  we  read :  "  A  separation  of  the  Union  was  openly  stim 
ulated  in  the  public  prints,  and  a  convention  of  delegates  of  the  New 
England  states  to  meet  at  New  Haven  was  intended  and  proposed.  .  . 
He  [Adams]  urged  that  a  continuance  of  the  embargo  much  longer 
would  certainly  be  met  by  forcible  resistance,  supported  by  the  legisla 
ture,  and  probably  by  the  judiciary  of  the  state.  That  to  quell  that  re 
sistance,  if  force  should  be  resorted  to  by  the  government,  it  would  pro 
duce  a  civil  war ;  and  that  in  that  event,  he  had  no  doubt  the  leaders  of 
the  party  would  secure  the  co-operation  with  them  of  Great  Britain. 
That  their  object  was,  and  had  been  for  several  years,  a  dissolution  of 
the  Union  and  the  establishment  of  a  separate  confederation,  he  knew 
from  unequivocal  evidence,  although  not  provable  in  a  court  of  law; 
and  that  in  case  of  a  civil  war  the  aid  of  Great  Britain  to  effect  that 
purpose  would  be  as  surely  resorted  to  as  it  would  be  indispensably 
necessary  to  the  design."  Niles'  Register,  XXXV.,  p.  138.  Story  writes 
Jan.  4,  1809:  "If  I  may  judge  from  the  letters  I  have  seen  from  the 
various  districts  of  Massachusetts,  it  is  a  prevalent  opinion  there,  and 
in  truth,  many  friends  from  the  New  England  states  write  us  that  there 
is  great  danger  of  resistance  to  the  laws,  and  great  probability  that  the 
Essex  junto  have  resolved  to  attempt  a  separation  of  the  eastern  states 
from  the  Union ;  and  if  the  embargo  continues  that  their  plan  may  re 
ceive  support  from  our  yeomanry."  Life  and  Letters  of  J.  Story,  I., 
p.  174.  Compare  also  Ibid,  p.  182. 


224:  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

had  just  separated  from  the  Federalists,  and  was  a  warm 
advocate  of  the  most  essential  points  of  the  policy  of  the 
administration,  although  he  did  not  go  over  formally  and 
entirely  to  the  Republican  camp.  The  odium  which  he 
thereby  drew  down  upon  himself  might,  indeed,  have  in 
fluenced  him  so  far  as  to  cause  him  to  see  more  than  there 
really  was  to  be  seen.  This  assumption  gains  in  probabil 
ity  from  the  fact  that  he  was  not  free  from  the  morbid  dis 
trust  and  the  consequent  easy  credulity  which  were  the 
most  prominent  features  in  his  father's  character.  On 
the  other  hand,  his  whole  political  life  is  a  sufficient  guar 
anty  that  he  would  not  have  made  the  charges  if  he  had 
not  been  perfectly  satisfied  of  their  truth,  and  he  was  in 
a  position  to  obtain  complete  and  reliable  information  in 
regard  to  them.  The  final  decision  of  history  must  there 
fore  remain  suspended.  To  the  more  important  question, 
however,  what  prospect  there  was  of  the  probable  success 
of  Craig's  and  Henry's  plan,  if  the  reigning  party  had 
not  in  part  retraced  their  steps,  the  history  of  the  follow 
ing  years  gives  a  satisfactory  answer. 

One  of  the  principal  arguments  by  which  the  adminis 
tration  had,  from  the  beginning,  defended  the  embargo, 
was  that  the  only  choice  lay  between  the  embargo  and 
war,  and  that  war  should  be  avoided  as  long  as  possible.1 
The  ultra-Federalists  censured  this  view  as  one  of  im 
potent  cowardice.  In  the  winter  of  1805—6,  the  most  im 
portant  commercial  towns  of  the  northern  and  middle 
states  sent  memorials  to  congress,  in  which  they  urged  it 
to  an  energetic  defense  of  the  rights  granted  to  neutrals  by 
international  law,  in  the  interest  of  American  commerce 
The  memorials  were  couched  throughout  in  the  most  de- 

1 "  If  we  had  put  the  question  to  every  man  in  the  nation,  the  head  of 
a  family,  whether  we  should  go  to  war  or  lay  an  embargo  (the  only 
choice  we  had)  nineteen  out  of  twenty  would  have  voted  for  an  e  m- 
bargo."  Williams,  of  South  Carolina,  Dec.  9, 1808,  in  the  house  of  rep. 
resentatives.  Deb.  of  Cong.,  IV.,  p.  76.  Ibid,  pp.  13, 14,  41,  57,  78. 


HENRY    CLAY    APPEARS    IN    POLITICS.  225 

cided  terms,  and  some  of  them  declared  that  war  might  per 
haps  be  necessary  for  the  protection  of  the  rights  and  honor 
of  the  country.1  Later  the  administration  party  was  oblig 
ed  to  hear  that  it  was  impossible  to  "Kick"  it  into  a  war.  But 
the  more  the  damage  which  commerce  had  sustained  from 
the  violation  of  the  neutrality  laws  and  the  irrational 
policy  of  the  administration  was  felt,  the  less  loud  grew 
the  warlike  tone  of  the  Federalists.  At  first  they  denied 
that  the  choice  really  lay  only  between  subjection,  embar 
go,  and  war;  then  they  reproached  the  majority  that  by 
their  shyness  of  war  they  made  war  inevitable,  and  be 
sides,  that  they  did  not  seem  to  see  that  if  there  should  or 
must  be  war,  it  were  better  it  should  be  begun  before  the 
strength  of  the  country  had  been  weakened  by  the  embar 
go;  and  lastly,  they  adopted  as  their  battle-cry  against  the 
Republicans  unconditional  opposition  to  a  war  with  Eng 
land. 

The  administration  party  took  at  the  same  time  a  still 
more  radical  turn  and  in  the  opposite  direction.  The  de 
termining  influence  was  exercised  here  by  the  extreme 
Republicans  of  the  south  and  the  representatives  of  the 
young  western  states.  "Williams  of  South  Carolina  was 
still  of  opinion  in  December,  1808,  that  by  a  war  they  had 
nothing  to  gain  and  everything  to  lose.2  And  yet  if 
the  embargo  was  not  removed,  he  declared  himself  rejoiced 
at  the  opportunity  afforded  by  Jackson's  motion  of  regis 
tering  his  vote  for  the  war.3  One  year  later,  Clay,  who 
already  carried  great  weight,  spite  of  his  youth,  made  an 
equally  frank  declaration  in  the  senate.  With  the  profuse 
rhetoric  of  youth,  and  genuine  American  self-admiration, 
he  avowed  most  candidly  that,  in  case  of  a  war,  it  would 

1  See  the  extracts  from  a  number  of  these  memorials  in  Niles'  Reg., 
VII.,  pp.  327-329. 

2  "  The  people  have  nothing  to  gain  by  war,  nothing  by  bloodshed; 
but  they  have  everything  to  lose."    Deb.  of  Congress,  IV.,  p.  76. 

'  Hildreth,  Hist,  of  the  U.  S.,  VI.,  j.  136. 
15 


STATE    SOVEREIGNTY    AND    SLAVERY. 

not  only  be  necessary  to  look  to  the  defense  of  the  country, 
but  that  the  conquest  of  Canada  should  be  kept  in  view.1 
Clay  was  elected  a  member  of  the  house  of  representa 
tives  the  following  year,  and  was  chosen  speaker.  He  used 
the  disproportionately  great  influence  of  his  position2  with 
masterly  skill  and  astounding  recklessness  to  realize  the 
idea  proposed  in  the  above  programme.  He  appointed 
Calhoun,  who  had  been  elected  to  congress  for  the  first  time, 
the  second  member  of  the  important  committee  of  foreign 
affairs,  and  he  (Calhoun)  soon  became  its  actual  head.  The 
first  month  of  the  session  had  not  yet  passed,  when  the 
two  young  zealots  had  brought  it  to  such  a  pass  that  they 
could  proclaim  as  a  fixed  resolution,  what  a  year  and  a  half 
before,  Clay  had  given  expression  to  as  an  eventual  wish. 
On  the  29th  of  November,  1811,  the  committee  on  foreign 
affairs  made  their  report,  and  laid  a  mass  of  resolutions  be 
fore  the  house.3  The  report  recited :  "  Forbearance  has 
ceased  to  be  a  virtue.  .  .  .  The  period  has  arrived  when 

1  "  Your  whole  circle  of  commercial  restrictions  .  .  .  presented 
resistance — the  peaceful  resistance  of  the  law.  When  this  is  abandoned 
without  effect,  I  am  for  resistance  by  the  sword.  .  .  .  It  is  said,  how 
ever,  that  no  object  is  attainable  by  a  war  with  Great  Britain.  In  its 
fortunes  we  are  to  estimate  not  only  the  benefit  to  be  derived  to  our 
selves,  but  the  injury  to  be  done  the  enemy.  The  conquest  of  Canada  is 
in  your  power.  I  trust  I  shall  not  be  deemed  presumptuous  when  I  state 
that  I  verily  believe  that  the  militia  of  Kentucky  are  alone  competent  to 
place  Montreal  and  Upper  Canada  at  your  feet.  ...  Is  there  no  dan 
ger  that  we  shall  become  enervated  by  the  spirit  of  avarice  unfortunately 
so  predominant?  ...  A  certain  portion  of  military  ardor  (and  that 
is  what  I  desire)  is  essential  to  the  protection  of  the  country.  .  .  We 
shall  want  the  presence  and  living  example  of  a  new  race  of  heroes  to 
supply  their  [the  heroes  of  the  revolutionary  war]  places,  and  to  ani 
mate  us  to  preserve  what  they  have  achieved."  Deb.  of  Congress,  IV., 
pp.  177,  178.  The  plan,  however,  haunted  the  heads  of  the  younger  pol 
iticians  a  year  earlier.  See  Quincy's  speech  of  the  19th  of  Jan.,  1809. 
Life  of  Quincy,  p.  176.  Compare  also,  Ibid,  p.  203. 
•  *  The  speaker  of  the  house  has  been  rightly  styled  the  second  person 
age  in  the  republic. 

'  Niles'  Reg.,  I.,  pp.  252,  254. 


ADOPTION    OF    WAR    MEASURES.  227 

in  the  opinion  of  your  committee  it  is  the  sacred  duty  of 
congress  to  call  forth  the  patriotism  and  resources  of  the 
country."  The  resolutions  among  other  things  asked  for 
an  increase  of  the  regular  army  by  the  addition  of  ten 
thousand  men,  and  that  the  president  should  be  authorized 
to  call  volunteers  to  the  number  of  fifty  thousand  under 
arms.  Randolph  said  during  the  debates  on  the  report 
that  the  question  lay  between  peace  and  war,  and  that  war, 
a  war  of  conquest  against  England.1  Wright  of  Maryland 
claimed,  on  the  other  hand,  that  there  was  no  longer  any 
question  of  peace;  that  there  was  no  choice  but  subjugation 
or  war.2  The  committee  itself  left  no  doubt  as  to  what  was 
intended  by  the  resolutions.  Calhoun  expressly  declared 
that  the  proposed  measures  had  a  meaning  only  when  they 
were  looked  upon  as  a  preparation  for  war  and  that  war 
could  not  be  declared  at  once,  only  because  the  country 
was  not  ready  for  it.8  The  house  adopted  both  the  resolu 
tions,  one  by  one  hundred  and  ten  to  twenty-two  and  the 
other  by  one  hundred  and  thirteen  to  sixteen  votes.4  By  an 
overpowering  majority,  it  resolved  also  that  the  war  should 
begin  as  soon  as  the  necessary  preparations  were  made ;  for 
this  is  the  legitimate  interpretation,  which,  according  to 
Calhoun's  declaration,  is  to  be  put  on  the  vote. 

Randolph  had  said  in  his  great  speech  of  the  10th  of 
December,  that  the  committee  had  gone  farther  than  the 
president.  Madison  was,  indeed,  far  from  being  able  to 
master  the  situation.  Endowed  by  nature  with  a  clearer 
insight  into  matters  of  state  and  with  a  much  finer  moral 


1  Deb.  of  Congress,  IV.,  pp.  436,  438. 

9  Ibid,  IV.,  p.  445. 

1 "  I  certainly  understand  that  the  committee  recommended  the  meas 
ures  now  before  the  house  as  a  preparation  for  war;  and  such  in  fact 
was  its  express  resolve,  agreed  to,  I  believe,  by  every  member,  except 
that  gentleman  [Randolph].  .  .  .  Indeed  the  report  could  mean 
nothing  but  war  or  empty  menace."  Calhoun's  Works,  II.,  p.  2. 

4  Deb.  of  Congress,  VI.,  p.  465. 


228  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY   AND   SLAVERY. 

constitution  than  Jefferson,  he  became  like  wax  in  his 
hands,  once  the  Republican  party  had  permanently  obtained 
the  mastery  in  Virginia.  The  gift  of  persuasion  which  he 
possessed  in  an  eminent  degree,  and  which  made  him  an 
invaluable  ally,  became  almost  ruinous  to  him.  When 
there  were  obstacles  placed  in  the  way  of  his  ambition, 
which  his  moral  sense  would  not  permit  him  to  evade,  his 
judgment  was  wont  to  be  misled  by  his  sharp  and  flattering 
logic.  The  impulse  in  this  direction  he  always  received 
from  others.  He  was  deficient  in  the  independence  and 
energy  of  will  which  are  the  necessary  requisites  of  a  great 
political  leader.  Hence,  while  he  always  remained  a  polit 
ical  attorney  of  extraordinary  ability,  he  never  rose  to  the 
height  of  the  statesman.  These  were  qualities  which  emi 
nently  qualified  him  to  serve  as  the  right-hand  man  of  his 
predecessor  in  the  presidency.  But  when  he  was  himself 
placed  at  the  head  of  the  state,  he  found  himself  entangled 
in  a  terrible  net,  which  he  had  wrought  with  his  own 
hands.  He  was  not  the  man  to  tear  it  to  pieces  with 
quick  resolution.  And  his  participation  in  the  ruinous 
work  was  so  great  that  he  could  not  see  that  the  net  could 
be  unraveled  wi  th  success  only  on  condition  that  the  work 
was  begun  without  delay  and  prosecuted  in  accordance 
with  a  well-matured  plan.  But  even  if  he  had  seen  it,  he 
would  scarcely  have  taken  such  a  resolution,  for,  in  doing 
so,  he  would  have  been  passing  judgment  not  only  on  Jef 
ferson,  but  on  himself.  Besides,  now  that  the  decision 
rested  with  him,  his  real  nature  got  the  better  of  him. 
Moderate  in  his  thought  and  judgment,  he  had  always 
cautiously  felt  his  way  towards  a  middle  course,  in  which 
he  followed  only  his  own  mind  and  inclinations.  Under 
the  burthen  of  responsibility,  this  commendable  modera 
tion  was  now  transformed  into  a  painful  uncertainty. 
Whatever  was  positive  in  the  programme  devised  by  Jeffer 
son  crumbled  away  like  baked  sand  in  his  hands.  The 
state  of  the  country  demanded  more  imperatively  every 


CHAKACTER    OF    MADISON.  229 

day,  that  a  decided  initiative  should  be  taken,  but  the  man 
whose  duty  it  was  to  take  it  was  wanting  not  only  in  the 
necessary  qualities  of  character,  but  his  whole  programme 
was, like  that  of  the  opposition,  a  purely  negative  one.1 

Under  such  conditions,  the  field  belongs,  in  a  popular 
state,  to  those  possessed  of  the  courage  to  resolve  and  do. 
The  homines  novi  in  congress  had  this  courage,  and  Madi 
son  therefore  became  their  tool.  Their  unsatiated  ambition 
expected  to  earn  in  war,  in  rich  abundance,  the  laurels 
which  the  contest  over  questions  of  internal  politics  offered 
them  little  prospect  of  winning  in  the  near  future,  because 
the  Democrats2  were  possessed  of  an  overwhelming  prepon 
derance. 

That  there  had  been  for  years  sufficient  cause  for  war, 
cannot  be  questioned,  but  it  was,  notwithstanding,  the 
work  of  a  small,  ambitious  party  in  congress.  The  country 
was  drawn  into  it,  although  the  opposition  party  condemned 
it  in  a  manner  and  to  an  extent  which  excited  fear  of  for 
cible  resistance  and  of  treason ;  although  the  bearer  of  the 
executive  authority  and  the  head  of  the  party  did  not  de 
sire  it,  and  spite  of  the  fact  that  only  a  small  minority 
considered  it  really  inevitable  and  wished  for  it  with  un 
affected  enthusiasm.  This  is  a  remarkable  instance  how 
little,  under  certain  circumstances,  even  among  peoples 
wrho  rejoice  in  the  most  unlimited  self-government,  there 
is,  in  truth,  any  self-government,  and  how  often  facts  give 
the  lie  to  the  principle  of  the  sovereignty  of  the  majority. 

The  war  party  obtained  control  in  congress  because 
vanity  and  the  party  interests  of  the  majority  prevented 
their  acknowledging  their  former  mistakes.  They  had 
imposed  every  kind  of  restriction  on  commerce,  and  all 
that  they  had  accomplished  was  to  seriously  damage  their 

1  Compare  Quincy's  opinion.    Life  of  Quincy,  p.  204. 

9  The  names  Republicans  and  Democrats  were  for  a  long  time  used 
indifferently.  From  the  9th  congress,  the  latter  designation  began  to 
encroach  upon  the  other. 


230  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND   SLAVERY. 

own  interests.1  So  long  as  it  would  not  be  conceded  that 
the  idea  which  lay  at  the  foundation  of  these  restrictions 
was  a  false  one,  it  was  necessary  to  hold  that  there  was  no 
choice  except  between  them  and  war,  and  that  policy  and 
good  morals  had  operated  for  a  decision  in  favor  of  the 
lesser  evil,  so  long  as  by  this  means  the  attainment  of  the 
wished-for  end  still  seemed  possible.  From  this  it  direct 
ly  followed  not  only  that  war  was  justifiable,  but  that  it 
should  be  declared  necessary. 

The  same  burden  of  logical  consequences,  drawn  from 
premises  which  he  had  made  himself,  weighed  heavily  on 
Madison.  The  enthusiasts  in  favor  of  war  were  in  a  con 
dition  to  give  importance  to  another  element,  and  this  de 
cided  the  issue.  The  presidential  election  was  impending, 
and  the  war  party  made  the  unconditional  adoption  of 
their  policy  a  sine  qua  non  of  his  renomination.2  That 

1  It  has  already  been  remarked  that  the  planters  had  least  to  suffer 
from  the  embargo.  But  it  is  evident  that  the  grounds  above  adduced 
could  produce  the  effects  mentioned  only  during  a  short  time.  When 
the  restrictions  on  commerce  had  lasted  for  years,  the  planters'  states, 
poor  in  capital  and  in  manufactures  and  obliged  to  obtain  the  greater 
part  of  the  necessaries  of  life  from  the  west,  suffered  most  from  it. 
Randolph  says  in  his  speech  of  Dec.  10,  1811:  "By  a  series  of  most 
impolitic  and  ruinous  measures,  utterly  incomprehensible  to  every 
rational,  sober-minded  man,  the  southern  planters,  by  their  own  votes, 
had  succeeded  in  knocking  down  the  price  of  cotton  to  seven  cents, 
and  of  tobacco  (a  few  choice  crops  excepted)  to  nothing,  and  in  raising 
the  price  of  blankets,  coarse  woolens,  and  every  article  of  first  neces 
sity,  three  or  four  hundred  per  cent."  Deb.  of  Cong.,  IV.,  p.  438.  Th. 
Pinckney,  of  South  Carolina,  wrote  May  25,  1808:  "We  are  here 
smarting  under  the  effect  of  the  embargo."  Quincy,  Life  of  J.  Quincy, 
p.  140.  Quincy  writes  in  his  diary,  Nov.  8,  1808 :  "  In  the  evening, 
Lewis,  of  Virginia,  called  on  us.  He  represented  the  sufferings  of  that 
state  under  the  embargo  as  extreme;"  and  on  Nov.  16,  "  Conversation 
with  J.  Randolph.  He  said  the  embargo  was  ruining  Virginia."  Ibid, 
p.  143. 

*  The  fact  was  so  notorious  that  it  was  mentioned  in  the  most  direct 
way  in  congress.  Said  Quincy,  on  the  5th  of  January,  1813,  in  the 
house  of  representatives :  "  The  great  mistake  of  all  those  who  reasoned 
concerning  the  war  and  the  invasion  of  Canada,  and  concluded  that  it 


THE   THIRD    EMBARGO.  231 

the  threat  could  be  carried  into  effect  was  to  be  looked  up 
on  as  certain ;  for  Monroe  and  Clinton  were  already  pre 
pared  to  accept  the  nomination  from  the  war  party,  and 
this  party  could  not,  therefore,  be  at  a  loss  for  candidates. 
Madison  was  not  a  man  of  such  rigid  moral  firmness 
that  his  convictions  could  have  withstood  such  a  tempta 
tion.  He  fell  a  victim,  like  others  before  him,  and  like 
men  of  the  greatest  political  talents  after  him,  to  the 
presidential  fever.  Clay  and  Calhoun,  who  had  mainly 
abetted  him  in  this  bargain,  which  was  made  at  the  expense 
of  the  country,  afterwards  wasted  away  under  the  influence 
of  the  same  incurable  malady. . 

Madison  was  forced  farther  step  by  step.  At  first  he 
was  compelled  to  write  a  confidential  message  which  recom 
mended  an  embargo  of  sixty  days.1  Grundy,  of  Tennes 
see,  replied,  on  inquiry,  in  the  name  of  the  committee  on 
foreign  relations,  that  it  was  to  be  looked  upon  as  the 
immediate  precursor  of  war.2  Clay  and  Smilie  agreed  in 
this  view,  and  expressed  their  great  satisfaction  that  the 
matter  had  progressed  so  far.3 

Randolph  had  called  attention  to  the  fact  that  the  em-- 
bargo  had  not  in  reality  originated  with  Madison.4  True, 
Calhoun  and  Grundy  contested  his  assertion;  but  it  was 

was  impossible  that  either  should  be  seriously  intended,  resulted  from 
this  that  they  never  took  into  consideration  the  connection  of  both  these 
events  with  the  great  election  for  the  chief  magistracy,  which  was  then 
pending.  It  never  was  sufficiently  considered  by  them  that  plunging 
into  war  with  Great  Britain  was  among  the  conditions  on  which  the 
support  for  the  presidency  was  made  dependent."  Deb.  of  Cong.,  IV., 
pp.  629,  630. 
1  April  1, 1812.  Statesman's  Man.,  I.,  p.  292. 

3  "  Mr.  Grundy  said    .    .    .    that  he  understands  it  as  a  war  measure, 
and  it  is  meant  that  it  shall  lead  directly  to  it ;  that  with  any  other 
view  there  was  no  propriety  in  it;  as  a  peace  measure  he  had  no  idea 
that  the  president  would  have  recommended  it,  nor  would  the  committee 
have  agreed  to  it."    Deb.  of  Cong.,  IV.,  p.  544. 

'  Ibid,  IV.,  pp.  545,  546. 

4  Ibid,  IV.,  p,  546. 


232          STATE  SOVEREIGNTY  AND  SLAVERY. 

their  well-settled  policy  to  make  the  president  the  mouth 
piece  by  which  they  made  known  their  resolutions.  Mad 
ison  had  already  given  evidence  of  his  willingness  to  sign 
a  declaration  of  war.  But  this  did  not  satisfy  the  war 
party.  They  wanted  him  not  only  to  join  them,  but  to 
completely  identify  himself  with  them.  He  was  informed 
that  he  would  have  either  to  do  without  their  support,  or 
to  prevail  on  congress  to  make  the  declaration  of  war. 
He  yielded,  and  sent  congress  another  confidential  mes 
sage,  in  which  he  laid  before  it  at  length  the  wrongs  which 
had  been  inflicted.  England,  he  said,  was  already  practi 
cally  at  war  with  the  United  States,  and  it  was  now  incum 
bent  on  congress  to  decide  whether  force  should  be  opposed 
to  force.1 

This  virtually  decided  the  triumph  of  the  war  party ;  but 
they  nevertheless  followed  up  their  victory  with  such  im 
petuosity,  that  it  seemed  they  were  not  completely  sure  of 
it  until  it  was  an  accomplished  fact.  On  the  3rd  of  June, 
Calhoun,  in  the  name  of  the  committee  on  foreign  affairs, 
presented  a  report  on  the  message  to  the  house  in  which  he 
recommended  "  an  immediate  appeal  to  arms."2  He  moved 
at  the  same  time  that  a  formal  declaration  of  war  against 
Great  Britain  should  be  made,  and  it  was  passed  to  a 

1  "  We  behold,  in  fine,  on  the  side  of  Great  Britain  a  state  of  war 
against  the  United  States,  and  on  the  side  of  the  United  States  a  state 
of  peace  toward  Great  Britain.  Whether  the  United  States  shall  con 
tinue  passive  under  the  progressive  usurpations  and  these  accumulating 
wrongs,  or,  opposing  force  to  force  in  defense  of  their  national  rights, 
shall  commit  a  just  cause  into  the  hands  of  the  Almighty  disposer  of 
events  ...  is  a  solemn  question  which  the  constitution  wisely  con 
fides  to  the  legislative  department  of  the  government.  In  recommend 
ing  it  to  their  early  deliberations  I  am  happy  in  the  assurance  that  the 
decision  will  be  worthy  the  enlightened  and  patriotic  councils  of  a  vir 
tuous,  free,  and  powerful  nation."  State  Papers,  VIII.,  p.  132.  Slates- 
man's  Manual,  I.,  pp.  297,  298. 

a  Deb.  of  Congress,  IV.,  pp.  554^558. 


DECLARATION    OF   WAR.  233 

third  reading  on  the  following  day  by  a  vote  of  seventy- 
nine  to  forty-nine.1 

The  senate  did  not  show  the  same  zeal.  Now  that  the 
last  bridge  was  to  be  cut  down,  a  part  of  the  Democrats 
began  to  waver  to  such  an  extent  that  the  motion  made 
by  Gregg  of  Pennsylvania,  to  recommit  the  bill  pro 
viding  for  the  declaration  of  war,  was  adopted  on  the  llth 
of  June,  by  seventeen  votes  to  thirteen.2  Not  until  the 
17th  of  June,  did  a  sufficient  number  of  reluctant  Demo 
crats  yield,  to  allow  the  amended  bill  to  be  passed  to  a 
third  reading  by  a  vote  of  nineteen  to  'thirteen.3  The 
house  agreed  to  the  amendments  on  the  following  day. 

The  majority  had  repeatedly  recognized  that  the  Feder 
alists  had  carried  on  their  opposition  during  the  whole 
session  of  this  congress  in  a  most  worthy  manner.  The 
war  party  rewarded  this  course  of  theirs  by  the  most  reck 
less  uses  of  its  power.  The  transactions  of  the  house 
were  carried  on  in  a  manner  which  suggested  rather  a  con 
clave  of  tyrants  than  the  legislative  body  of  a  free  people. 
Since  the  beginning  of  the  new  difficulties  with  England, 
the  most  important  papers  were  kept  from  congress  by  the 
executive  authority;  and  the  minority  might  deem  them 
selves  happy  when  their  demands  for  the  suppressed  doc 
uments  were  received  with  an  observance  of  at  least  exter 
nal  decorum.  And  the  majority  of  the  people  said  amen 
to  it,  when  with  blind-folded  eyes  they  were  carried  on 

1  Deb.  of  Congress,  IV.,  p.  559.   The  declaration  of  war  thus  received  a 
majority  of  only  thirty  votes,  although  the  democratic  majority  in  the 
full  house  (one  hundrer*  and  forty-two  members)  was  seventy 

2  Ibid,  IV.,  p.  416. 

3  Six  Democrats  voted  to  the  last  with  the  Federalists.    Bayard  de 
clared  on  the  16th  of  June :  "  When  the  bill  before  us  was  first  brought 
ap  from  the  other  house,  it  was  the  opinion  of  very  few  that  it  would 
obtain  the  support  of  a  majority  of  the  body;  and  even  now  it  was  like 
ly  to  pass,  not  because  it  was  approved  by  a  majority,  but  of  the  differ. 
Alices  of  opinion  which  existed  among  gentlemen  as  to  other  courses 
which  had  been  proposed."    Deb.  of  Congress,  IV.,  p.  419. 


234  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY    AND    SLAVERY. 

from  one  folly  to  another,  till  finally  they  were  dragged 
into  war.  The  high-sounding  hymns  to  Freedom,  the  Peo 
ple  and  Self-government  directed  their  eyes  away  from  the 
unworthy  game  which  their  delegates  were  playing  with 
them.  The  principle  of  the  necessity  that  the  majority 
should  rule  was  carried  to  the  greatest  extreme,  and  the 
principle  no  less  true,  that  the  conscientious  respect  of  the 
rights  of  the  minority  is  the  condition  precedent  of  a  ra 
tional  republic,  was  forgotten — nay,  not  even  as  much  as 
conceived.  Time  was  not  left  to  the  opposition  to  develop 
their  views  on  the  most  important  questions,  nor  was  an 
opportunity  offered  them  to  bring  them  before  the  people 
at  the  right  time.  The  debates  on  the  embargo  recom 
mended  by  Madison  on  the  1st  of  April,  1812,  were  car 
ried  on  with  closed  doors,  and  after  the  committee  had 
made  its  report,  the  war  party  desired  to  have  it  carried 
through  in  a  single  day.  Nelson  wanted  time  for  consid 
eration.  Quincy  requested  the  house  to  accord  one  day 
more  for  debate,  in  order  that  he  might  take  part  in  it. 
Widgery  answered  that  the  responsibility  rested  on  the 
majority,  and  Quincy's  motion  was  defeated  by  a  vote  of 
fifty-seven  to  fifty-four.1  The  debates  on  the  declaration 
of  war,  also,  were  carried  on  in  the  same  manner.  Ran 
dolph's  motion  to  open  the  doors  was  rejected  by  a  vote  of 
seventy-seven  to  forty-five.  Milnor  renewed  the  motion 
on  the  next  day,  but  it  met  with  the  same  fate.  And  when 
the  third  reading  of  the  bill  was  resolved  upon,  Stow  asked 
that  it  should  be  postponed  to  the  following  day,  but  this 
motion  also  received  only  forty-eight  ayes  to  seventy-eight 
nays.2 

In  this  way  a  surprise  was  prepared  for  the  people.  They 
learned  on  the  18th  of  June  that  they  were  at  war  with  the 
greatest  naval  power  in  the  world.  There  was  no  effort 


1  Deb.  of  Congress,  IV.,  p.  547. 
9  Ibid,  IV.,  pp.  558,  559. 


PEOTEST  OF  THE  MINORITY.  235 

made  to  justify  this  except  in  the  ingenuous  manner 
adopted  by  Widgery. 

Thirty-four  representatives  of  the  minority  published  a 
vigorous  protest,  in  the  form  of  an  address  to  their  constit 
uents,  both  against  the  war  and  the  manner  in  which  the 
declaration  of  war  was  brought  about.1  They  would  have 
no  share  in  the  misfortunes  which  would  grow  out  of  the 
war.  When  they  were  refused  the  privilege  of  public  de 
bates,  they  had  refrained  from  all  participation  in  the  dis 
cussion,  for  the  reason  that  it  would  have  been  useless  to 
have  taken  part  in  it  and  that  they  did  not  wish  in  any 
way  to  help  to  give  "  implied  validity  to  so  flagrant  an 
abuse  of  power." 

The  discussion  of  the  history  of  the  diplomacy  anteced 
ent  to  this  war,  which  was  treated  exhaustively  in  this  ad 
dress  as  it  had  been  in  nearly  all  the  speeches  delivered,  is 
not  within  the  province  of  this  work.  It  is  necessary  to 
mention  particularly  only  one  point  of  the  protest,  because 
it  embraces  in  a  few  words  all  that  is  of  importance  in  the 
war  of  1812  for  the  constitutional  history  of  the  United 
States  and  in  part  also  for  the  history  of  American  democ 
racy. 

Those  who  protested  against  the  war  insisted  that  any  war 
was  pregnant  with  great  danger  to  the  United  States,  because 
of  the  peculiar  nature  of  their  union.  The  "  moral  bond" 
which  united  "  the  powerful  and  independent  sovereign 
ties"  should  not  have  been  subjected  to  such  a  strain,  so 
long  as  its  new  institutions  were  not  more  mature.  In  this 
instance,  it  was  doubly  foolish  to  fight,  because  the  people 
entered  upon  the  war  a  divided  people,  on  account  of  im 
portant  "  moral  and  political  objections."2 

1  Niles'  Reg.,  II.,  pp.  309-315. 

1 "  In  addition  to  the  many  moral  and  prudential  considerations  which 
should  deter  thoughtful  men  from  hastening  into  the  perils  of  such  a 
war,  there  were  some  peculiar  to  the  United  States,  resulting  from  the 
texture  of  the  government  in  no  small  degree  experimental,  composed 


236          STATE  SOVEREIGNTY  AND  SLAVERY. 

The  ground  last  named  was  considered  by  the  protesters 
as  of  the  greatest  weight.  The  presidential  election  gave 
these  words  a  special  emphasis.  The  war  was  the  great 
question  in  the  presidential  campaign,  and  the  result 
showed  the  geographical  separation  of  parties  more  clearly 
than  it  had  been  seen  for  years.  With  the  exception  of 
Vermont,  all  the  New  England  states,  and  New  York,  New 
Jersey,  and  Delaware  gave  their  solid  electoral  vote  for 
DeWitt  Clinton.  Maryland  was  divided,  and  Pennsyl 
vania,  with  all  the  western  and  southern  states,  voted 
unanimously  for  Madison. 

But  even  if  the  division  had  not  been  to  so  great  an  ex 
tent  of  a  geographical  kind,  an  element  of  the  highest  im 
portance  remained.  Only  the  young  men  of  the  war  party 
were  ready  to  say  that  it  operated  as  a  spur  rather  than  as 
a  damper  upon  their  blind  war  feeling.  It  was  not  re 
served  for  "Webster  to  be  the  first,  after  the  country  had,  for 
a  year  and  a  half,  tormented  itself  with  the  rashest  experi 
ments,  to  lay  bare  the  truth  that  a  party  war  of  such  di 
mensions  could  not  be  bi  ought  to  a  successful  issue  in  a 
popular  state,  especially  in  a  popular  state  of  such 
peculiar  structure.1  Indeed,  six  months  before  the  decla- 

of  powerful  and  independent  sovereignties  associated  in  relations,  some 
of  which  are  critical  as  well  as  novel ;  should  not  be  hastily  precipi 
tated  into  situations  calculated  to  put  to  trial  the  strength  of  the  moral 
bond  by  which  they  are  united.  Of  all  states  that  of  war  is  most  likely 
to  call  into  activity  the  passions  which  are  hostile  and  dangerous  to 
such  a  form  of  government.  Time  is  yet  important  to  our  country  to 
settle  and  mature  its  recent  institutions.  Above  all,  it  appeared  to  the 
undersigned  from  signs  not  to  be  mistaken,  that  if  we  entered  upon  this 
war,  we  did  it  as  a  divided  people;  not  only  from  a  sense  of  the  inade 
quacy  of  our  means  to  success,  but  from  moral  and  political  objections 
of  great  weight  and  very  general  influence." 

1  "The  truth  is,  sir,  that  party  support  is  not  the  kind  of  support 
necessary  to  sustain  the  country  through  a  long,  expensive  and  bloody 
contest ;  and  this  should  have  been  considered  before  the  war  was  de 
clared.  The  cause,  to  be  successful,  must  be  upheld  by  other  sentiments 
and  higher  motives.  It  must  draw  to  itself  the  sober  approbation  of 


A   PARTY,    NOT   NATIONAL,    WAR.  237 

ration  of  war,  it  was  emphatically  declared  by  one  of 
themselves,  and  a  very  distinguished  personage,  that  the 
end  for  which  they  contended  could  be  attained  only  by  a 
really  national  war.1 

That  the  war  from  the  beginning  bore  the  character  of  a 
mere  party  war  was  a  fact  so  patent  that  not  even  the  bold 
est  advocates  of  the  war  party  dared  to  deny  it.  This  did 
not  by  any  means  prove  that  it  might  not  become  a  na 
tional  war;  but  the  hope  that  such  would  be  the  case  was 
based  solely  on  the  experience  that  in  war  the  feeling  of 
nationality  as  a  rule  silences  all  others.  The  war  party 
had  expected  with  so  much  certainty  that  this  would  be 
the  case,  that  they  declared  the  mere  existence  of  the  war 
made  it  a  positive  duty  to  abandon  all  further  opposition, 
of  no  matter  what  form.  The  Federalists  and  their  Dem 
ocratic  allies  replied  that  if  it  was  impolitic  and  unjust  to 
begin  the  war,  it  could  not  be  politic  and  just  to  continue 
it,  only  because  it  was  begun.  It  did  not  follow  that  be 
cause  they  had  not  been  able  to  prevent  the  war,  they  were 
obliged  to  lend  their  aid  to  magnify  the  evil  indefinitely. 
It  was  incumbent  on  them,  as  men  and  citizens,  to  use  all 
lawful  means  in  their  power  to  put  an  end,  as  soon  as 
possible,  to  a  course  which,  in  their  opinion,  was  simply 
criminal.  The  war  party,  on  the  other  hand,  harped  on 


the  great  mass  of  the  people.  It  must  enlist,  not  their  temporary  or 
party  feelings,  but  their  steady  patriotism  and  their  constant  zeal.  Un 
like  the  old  nations  of  Europe,  there  are,  in  this  country,  no  dregs  of 
population,  fit  only  to  supply  the  constant  waste  of  war,  and  out  of 
which  an  army  can  be  raised  for  hire  at  any  time,  and  for  any  pur 
pose.  Armies  of  any  magnitude  can  here  be  nothing  but  the  people  em- 
todied;.  and  if  the  object  be  one  for  which  the  people  will  not  embody 
there  can  be  no  armies."  Deb.  of  Cong.,  V.,  p.  139. 

1  Macon,  of  North  Carolina,  said:  "And  here,  sir,  permit  me  to  say 
that  I  hope  this  is  to  be  no  party  war,  but  a  national  war.  .  .  .  Such 
a  war,  if  war  we  shall  have,  can  alone,  in  my  judgment,  obtain  the  end 
for  which  we  mean  to  contend,  without  any  disgrace."  Ibid,  IV., 
p.  452. 


STATE    SOVEREIGNTY    AND    SLAVERY. 

the   honor   of  the  country  which  was  involved  in  the  issue, 
and  branded  these  views  as  "  moral  high  treason." 

Looked  at  from  an  absolute  standpoint,  much  might  be 
said  in  favor  of  both  views;  but  it  is  the  political  philoso 
pher  and  not  the  practical  statesman  who  should  judge  such 
questions  from  an  absolute  standpoint.  This  the  war  party 
had  overlooked.  Webster  demonstrated  to  them,  in  a  mas 
terly  oration,  that  the  given  circumstances  made  this  change 
of  this  party  war  into  a  national  one  materially  more  diffi 
cult,  and  that  they  had,  besides,  done,  and  were  doing,  all 
in  their  power  to  make  it  impossible.  Their  fundamental 
error  was  that  they  had  treated  the  whole  question  as  a 
legal  one.  True,  it  was  necessary  to  make  it  appear  that 
there  were  sufficient  reasons  to  declare  war,  but  that  was 
not  enough;  its  wisdom  and  expediency  should  also  have 
been  proven.  The  strength  of  the  government  was  based 
on  the  united  conviction  of  the  people,  and  a  rational  gov 
ernment  would  not  therefore  have  taken  so  important  a 
step  without  ascertaining  whether  such  a  united  convic 
tion  existed.  Especially  should  the  public  opinion  of  those 
states  whose  interests  were  mainly  to  be  protected  by  the 
war  have  been  taken  into  consideration.  But  even  all  this 
would  not  have  been  enough.  "  The  nature  and  struc 
ture  of  the  government,  the  general  habits  and  pur 
suits  of  the  community,  .  .  .  the  variety  of  impor 
tant  local  interests,"  should  have  been  kept  in  view.  In 
a  word,  "reasons  of  a  general  nature,  considerations  which 
go  back  to  the  origin  of  our  institutions,"  should  have 
been  taken  into  account.  He  had  heard  no  justification  ol 
the  war  on  such  grounds.1  If  its  advocates,  he  had  said  a 
few  days  before,  could  show  that  it  was  undertaken  on 
grounds  manifestly  just,  that  it  was  necessary  and  unavoid 
able,  and  strictly  an  American  war,  it  would  then  change 
its  character,  and  grow  as  energetic  as  it  was  now  weak 

» I>ek  of  Coiig.,  V.,  pp.  137, 138, 


POSITION   OF   THE   FEDERALISTS.  239 

and  feeble.  It  would  then  become  the  affair  of  the  people 
and  no  longer  remain  that  of  a  party.1 

This  "  if"  could  never  be  met  to  the  satisfaction  of  the 
Federalists,  which  is  only  another  way  of  saying  that  they 
would  never  look  upon  the  war  as  a  national  one.  The 
year  and  a  half  which  had  passed  since  its  beginning 
ought  to  have  been  enough  to  lead  them  to  this  conclusion, 
if  that  were  at  all  possible.  The  probability  of  such  an 
event  was  all  the  smaller,  because  the  elements  on  which 
the  war  party  had  calculated  so  strongly  were  not  with 
out  influence  from  the  first.  Even  Monroe  acknowledged, 
in  September,  1812,  that  success  as  well  as  defeat  had  con 
tributed  to  bring  the  opposition  nearer  to  the  war  party. 
But  he  took  the  erroneous  view  that  this  influence  would 
suffice  to  soon  make  the  war  a  national  one.2 

This  error  of  the  war  party,  so  pregnant  with  results,  had 
a  very  good  foundation,  which  was  pointed  out  in  the  pro 
test  already  mentioned,  and  by  "Webster.  Wherever  a  vital 
national  feeling  exists,  it  will  always,  with  the  vast  majority 
of  the  people,  cast  every  other  consideration  into  the  shade, 
when  once  a  war  has  been  begun  for  reasons  as  important  as 

1  Curtis,  Life  of  Webster,  I.,  pp.  117, 118. 

a  Monroe  to  Clay,  Sept.  12,  1812 :  "  From  the  northern  army  we  have 
nothing  which  inspires  a  confident  hope  of  any  brilliant  success.  The 
disaffection  in  that  quarter  has  paralyzed  every  effort  of  the  government, 
and  rendered  inoperative  every  law  of  congress.  I  speak  comparatively 
with  what  might  have  been  expected.  On  the  public  mind,  however, 
a  salutary  effect  is  produced  even  there  by  the  events  which  have  oc 
curred.  Misfortune  and  success  have  alike  diminished  the  influence  of  for 
eign  attachments  and  party  animosities,  and  contributed  to  draw  the  peo 
ple  closer  together.  The  surrender  of  our  army  excited  a  general  grief, 
and  the  naval  victory  a  general  joy.  Inveterate  toryisin  itself  was  com 
pelled  in  both  instances  to  disguise  its  character  and  hide  its  feelings, 
by  appearing  to  sympathize  with  those  of  the  nation.  If  Great  Britain 
does  not  come  forth  soon  and  propose  honorable  conditions,  I  am  con- 
vinced  that  the  war  will  become  a  national  one,  and  will  terminate  in 
the  expulsion  of  her  force  and  power  from  the  continent."  Private 
Correspondence  of  H.  Clay,  pp.  23,  24. 


240  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND   SLAVERY . 

in  the  case  before  us,  and  even  when  a  very  large  portion 
of  the  people  are  decidedly  opposed  to  the  declaration  of 
war,  because  of  doubts  as  to  the  possibility  of  bringing  it 
to  a  successful  issue,  or  because  of  the  injury  it .  may  be 
calculated  to  entail  upon  certain  special  interests.  But  a 
live  national  feeling  can  obviously  be  found  only  among  a 
people  who  constitute  a  nation  in  the  real  sense  of  the 
word.  The  people  of  the  United  States,  however,  were  yet 
far  removed  from  being  a  nation  in  this  sense,  although 
they  had  among  them  the  conditions  precedent  of  a  rapid 
national  intergrowth,  and  although  these  conditions  had  be 
come  vastly  more  favorable  since  the  revolutionary  war.  The 
war  party  had  calculated  on  a  national  feeling  which  did 
not  yet  exist,  although  the  war  might  contribute  to  beget 
it.  The  national  feeling  that  existed  was  not  even  so 
strong  that  it  could  be  credited  exclusively  or  mainly 
with  the  approximation  of  the  opposition  to  the  majority, 
which  Monroe  conceded  had  taken  place.  The  conscious 
ness  of  duty  and  a  recognition  of  the  interests  which  had 
their  root  in  the  political  unity  of  the  states,  had  a  much 
greater  influence  in  producing  this  result. 

The  leaders  of  the  opposition  declared  from  the  first,  in 
express  terms,  that  they  would  take  this  ground.  They 
were  loyal,  but  they  coldly  and  exactly  calculated  what  the 
laws  made  it  their  duty  to  do,  and  peremptorily  refused  to 
do  more.1  Even  in  January,  1812,  during  the  debate  on 

1  Neumann,  in  his  "  Geschickte  der  Vereinigten  Staaten,"  speaks  of 
the  "  lawless  conduct"  of  Connecticut  and  Massachusetts  (II.,  p.  168),  of 
the  '*  baseness"  of  the  opposing  Federalists  (II.,  p.  176),  and  of  the  "  long- 
exploded  objections"  of  the  Federalist  opponents  of  the  administration. 
Neumann  has  scarcely  the  most  superficial  knowledge  of  American  con 
stitutional  law,  and  without  a  thorough  knowledge  of  it,  it  is  simply 
impossible  to  write  a  history  of  the  United  States.  The  Commentaries 
of  Kent  and  Story,  the  Federalist,  Curtis  on  the  History  of  the  Constitu- 
tipn,  Whiting  on  the  War  Powers  of  the  President,  etc.,  and  one  of  Lu 
ther's  essays,  are  the  only  works  relating  to  the  constitution  named  in 
his  three  volumes,  but  even  these  the  author  has  evidently  not  once 


UTTEEEST   THE   ONLY   BOND   OF   UNION.  241 

the  increase  of  the  marine,  Quincy  remarked,  that  the 
interests  of  the  states  should  be  the  "  polar  lights" 
of  every  American  statesman  in  the  decision  of  every  ques 
tion  of  vital  importance.  This  was  predicated  on  •  the 
sovereignty  of  the  states.  The  u  artificial  ties  of  parch 
ment  compact"  would  be  found  to  be  too  weak  the  moment 
the  interests  of  the  states  ceased  to  hold  them  together.1 

really  studied.  He  has  not  even  made  any  use  of  the  decisions  of 
the  supreme  court  or  of  the  opinions  of  the  attorneys-general.  And 
the  other  numerous  sources  which  the  author  has  used,  he  has  worked 
only  very  superficially.  It  is  impossible  to  account  on  any  other  hy 
pothesis  for  the  fact  that  he  has  been  able  to  overlook  or  completely  to 
misunderstand  tho  most  essential  matters  in  the  documents  which  he 
quotes.  This  last  is  accounted  for  in  part  by  the  fact  that  he  had  no 
personal  knowledge  of  the  United  States,  and  his  idealistic  republican 
doctrines  are  the  thread  of  Ariadne  by  which  he  guides  himself  through 
the  labyrinth  of  their  history.  He  was  not  satisfied,  however,  with  writ 
ing  their  history  "  for  better  or  worse"  but,  as  he  says  himself  in  the  pre 
face  (III.,  p.  IX)  for  "  a  text  book  for  all  other  nations."  Yet  the  book  is 
not  without  its  good  points.  He  deserves  credit  especially  for  having, 
during  the  darkest  hours  of  the  republic,  with  an  enthusiasm  which  was 
always  honest  if  not  critical,  lauded  its  good  and  healthy  parts,  and 
preached  with  the  deepest  conviction,  that  without  any  manner  of  doubt 
the  north,  with  its  free  labor  and  free  political  institutions,  would  win  the 
victory  over  the  south,  based  on  slavery  and  on  slavery  in  the  form  most 
antagonistic  to  morals  and  civilization.  As  a  historical  work,  however, 
I  consider  it  of  so  little  value,  that  I  simply  take  occasion  to  refer  to  it 
to  point  out  some  of  the  most  flagrant  errors.  And  here  I  wish  to  espec 
ially  say  that  it  is  no  place  to  look  for  information  on  constitutional 
questions. 

1  "  I  confess  to  you,  Mr.  Speaker,  I  never  can  look— indeed  in  my  opin 
ion  no  American  statesman  ought  ever  to  look — on  any  question  touch 
ing  the  vital  interests  of  this  nation,  or  any  of  its  component  parts,  with 
out  keeping  at  all  times  in  distinct  view  the  nature  of  our  political  asso 
ciation  and  the  character  of  the  independent  sovereignties  which  com 
pose  it.  Among  states  the  only  sure  and  permanent  bond  of  union  is  inter 
est.  And  the  vital  interests  of  states,  although  they  may  be  sometimes 
obscured,  can  never  for  a  very  long  time  be  misapprehended.  .  .  . 
And  neeoVI  tell  statesmen  that  when  great  local  discontent  is  combined 
in  those  sections  [the  states]  with  great  physical  power,  and  with  ac 
knowledged  portions  of  sovereignty,  the  ties  of  nature  will  be  too  strong 
for  the  artificial  ties  of  parchment  compact?  Hence  it  results  that  the 
16 


242  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY    AND    SLAVERY. 

The  anti-Federalists  had  not,  even  in  the  times  of  the 
greatest  excitement  during  the  administrations  of  "Wash 
ington  and  Adams,  insisted  more  strongly  on  the  confeder 
ate  nature  of  the  Union.  Quincy  not  only  looked  upon  it 
as  an  unquestionable  fact  that  the  Union  was  not  a  nation; 
in  his  opinion  it  was  also  undeniable  that  there  was  no 
present  national  feeling  or  national  interests  which  could 
in  a  lasting  and  far-reaching  struggle  prevail  over  the  sep 
arate  interests  of  the  individual  states. 

Webster  gave  more  prominence  to  the  other  side  of  the 
question.  Apart  from  general  political  and  moral  consid 
erations,  it  was  his  conviction  that  the  war  could  not  and 
should  not  become  a  national  one,  because  the  interests 
of  the  northern  and  eastern  states  were  especially  in 
jured.  He  also  charged  the  reigning  party  with  endan 
gering  the  continued  existence  of  the  Union,  for  it  could 
not  be  preserved  by  law  alone.1.  But  at  the  same  time  he 
assured  them  that  the  demands  of  the  government  would 
be  yielded  to,  to  the  precise  extent  of  constitutional  liabil 
ity,  because  the  war  was  the  law  of  the  land.2 

essential  interests  of  the  great  component  parts  of  our  association  ought 
to  be  the  polar  lights  of  all  our  statesmen — by  them  they  should  guide 
their  course.  .  .  .  No  political  connection  among  free  states  can  be 
lasting,  or  ought  to  be,  which  systematically  refuses  to  protect  the  vital 
interests  of  any  of  the  sovereignties  which  compose  it."  Deb.  of  Con 
gress,  IV.,  pp.  499,  500  ;  Ann.  of  Cong.,  2,  XII.,  p.  208. 

1  In  the  Rockingham  Memorial.  Curtis,  Life  of  D.  "Webster,  I.,  pp. 
107,  108. 

1  In  a  speech  delivered  July  4,  1812,  before  the  Washington  Benevo 
lent  Society  of  Portsmouth,  he  said :  "  With  respect  to  the  war  in  which 
we  are  now  involved,  the  course  which  our  principles  require  us  to  pur 
sue  cannot  be  doubtful.  It  is  now  the  law  of  the  land  and  as  such  we 
are  bound  to  regard  it.  Resistance  and  insurrection  form  no  part  of 
our  creed.  The  disciples  of  Washington  are  neither  tyrants  in  power, 
nor  rebels  out.  If  we  are  taxed  to  carry  on  the  war  we  shall  disregard 
certain  distinguished  examples,  and  shall  pay.  If  our  personal  services 
are  required,  we  shall  yield  them  to  the  precise  extent  of  our  constitu 
tional  liability."  Ibid,  II.,  p.  105.  Compare  also  his  speech  of  Jan.  14, 
1814,  in  the  house  of  representatives.  Deb.  of  Congress,  V.,  p.  138. 


SLANDER    AND    LIBEL.  243 

• 

The  exaggerated  and  insulting  charges  of  the  majority 
against  the  opposition  were  little  calculated  to  move  them 
to  a  change  of  attitude.  Even  in  Massachusetts  the  ad 
ministration  party  used  its  momentary  supremacy  in  the 
senate,  notwithstanding  the  undoubted  feeling  of  a  major 
ity  of  the  people,  to  issue  an  address  which  had  the  tone  of 
a  common  libel  against  the  leaders  of  the  opposition.1 
They  were  not  only  branded  as  "  enemies  of  republics," 
who  had  acknowledged  themselves  as  monarchists  and  did 
not  conceal  their  intention  to  attempt  a  revolution,  but  it 
was  also  declared  with  assurance  that  they  had  formed  "  a 
deep  and  deadly  design  against  our  happy  Union."  This 
was  the  tone  assumed  by  the  majority  everywhere  and  not 
least  of  all  in  congress.2  Unmeasured  praise  and  blame 
have  not  become  characteristics  of  the  political  life  of  the 
United  States  only  in  recent  times:  they  are  as  old  as  the 
republic,  and  it  is  easy  to  show  that  democratic  republics 
have  always  to  suffer  more  from  this  cause  than  states  of  a 
different  constitution. 

The  minority  of  the  house  of  representatives  of  the 
Massachusetts  legislature  expressed  themselves,  from  pru 
dential  motives,  in  more  temperate  terms  in  their  memo 
rial  to  congress,  but  they  endeavored  to  confine  legitimate 
opposition  within  much  narrower  limits.  When,  during 
Adams's  presidency,  the  Virginia  resolutions  were  decided 
ly  discountenanced  by  Massachusetts  and  other  states, 
Madison  met  their  objections  with  the  declaration  that  the 
legislature  had  only  given  expression  to  its  own  view,  and 
wished  to  incite  the  other  legislatures  to  similar  expres 
sions  of  opinion.  At  that  time,  even  the  most  extreme  Fed- 

1  Niles'  Reg.,  II.,  pp.  308,  309. 

'  Thus,  for  instance,  Henry  Clay  said :  "  His  [Jeflerson's]  own  beloved 
Monticello  is  not  more  moved  by  the  storms  that  beat  against  its  sides, 
than  is  this  illustrious  man  by  thehowlingsof  the  whole  British  pack, 
set  loose  from  the  Essex  kennel  I"  Life  and  Speeches  of  H.  Clay,  I., 
p.  38. 


244         STATE  SOVEREIGNTY  AND  SLAVERY. 

* 

eralists  had  not  questioned  that  the  legislature  of  Yir- 
ginia  had  not  trespassed  its  constitutional  authority,  if  it 
were  granted  that  this  was  all  its  resolutions  implied.  It 
was  reserved  for  the  Democratic  representatives  of  Massa 
chusetts  to  question  the  "  expediency,  as  well  as  the  con 
stitutionality"  of  their  Federalist  colleagues,  in  "  address 
ing  congress  on  the  subject  of  peace  or  war  in  their  capac 
ity  of  legislators."1  The  Federalist  majority  in  the  Massa 
chusetts  house  of  representatives  proposed  in  their  address 
to  the  people  of  the  state  precisely  the  same  programme 
proposed  by  Webster  in  his  speech  of  July  4.2  He  said 
that  the  war  was  "  an  instance  of  inconceivable  folly  and 
desperation,"  but  at  the  same  time  advised  the  people  "to 
discourage  all  attempts  to  obtain  redress  of  grievances  by 
any  acts  of  violence  or  combinations  to  oppose  the  laws;" 
for  it  was  the  duty  of  every  citizen  "  to  support  all  consti 
tutional  laws."  How  far,  in  this  case,  it  was  the  opinion  of 
the  legislature  that  their  support  should  go,  was  pointed  out 
with  sufficient  clearness.  It  was  the  duty  of  the  citizen 
to  defend  the  country  against  invasion  without  any  refer 
ence  to  the  necessity  or  justice  of  the  war,  and  not  to  op 
pose  the  conscription;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  volunteers 
should  -resort  to  arms  only  in  a  defensive  war.  The  choice 
of  other  men  to  fill  the  executive  and  legislative  offices  of 
the  Union  and  the  organization  of  a  peace  party  were  pro 
posed  as  the  only  legitimate  means  of  redress. 

The  other  New  England  states,  with  the  exception  of 
Vermont,  assumed  the  same  position  as  Massachusetts,  in 
which  they  were  joined  by  New  Jersey.3  The  two  leading 
states  of  the  northeast,  Massachusetts  and  Connecticut,  as 
well  as  the  small  state  of  Rhode  Island,  immediately  gave 
a  practical  illustration  to  their  declarations.  General 
Dearborn  demanded  that  the  governors  should  call  out  a 

1  Niles'  Register,  II.,  p.  274. 

9  Ibid,  II.,  pp.  417-419. 

1  See  the  "  Declaration"  of  the  legislature.    Ibid,  III.,  p.  179 


MILITIA- AID   REFUSED   BY  NEW   ENGLAND  245 

certain  quota  of  the  state  militia  and  muster  them  into 
the  service  of  the  United  States.  The  governors  refused 
to  acquiesce  and  raised  the  question  of  constitutionality.1 
The  legislatures  approved  their  decision.  In  Rhode  Island 
a  council  of  war,  called  by  the  governor,  decided  that  the 
governor  alone  could  determine  whether  a  case  had  arisen 
in  which  the  constitution  warranted  such  a  demand  on  the 
part  of  the  federal  executive.2  The  supreme  court  of 
Massachusetts  expressed  the  same  opinion  in  answer  to  a 
question  put  to  it  by  the  governor.3  The  president  com 
plained  in  his  message  of  Nov.  4,  1812,  that  under  this 
interpretation  of  the  constitutional  provision  in  question, 
"  they  [the  United  States]  are  not  one  nation  for  the  pur 
pose  most  of  all  requiring  it."4  The  complaint  was  only 
too  well  founded;  but  what  party  was  it  that  for  twelve 
years  had  industriously  labored  to  unravel,  and  even  to 
sever,  the  national  bonds  which  the  constitution  was  in 
tended  to  create?  By  what  right  did  the  anti-Federalists 
think  they  could  assume  that  the  old  proverb,  that  he  who 
BOWS  the  wind  shall  reap  the  whirlwind,  should  not  be  true 
as  applied  to  them?  Had  not  Madison,  ten  years  before, 
stood  in  the  first  rank  of  those  who  labored  and  inveighed 
against  the  further  strengthening  of  the  nation  with  so 

1  Niles'  Register,  III.,  pp.  24, 117, 179. 

1  Official  Documents  of  the  State  of  Connecticut,  Aug.,  1812.  Niles' 
Reg.,  III.,  p.  180. 

*  Dwight,  Hist,  of  the  Hartford  Convention,  p.  256.  The  supreme 
court  of  the  United  States  in  the  case  of  Martin  vs.  Mott.  1827,  decided: 
"  We  are  all  of  opinion  that  the  authority  to  decide  whether  the  exigency 
[of  calling  forth  the  militia]  has  arisen  belongs  exclusively  to  the  presi 
dent,  and  that  his  decision  is  conclusive  upon  all  other  persons."  Wheat- 
on's  Reports,  XII.,  p.  30;  Curtis,  Decisions  of  the  Supreme  Court,  VII.,  p. 
12.  See  also  Kent,  Coinm.,  I.,  pp.  278,  279;  Story,  Comm.,  §§  1210-1215. 
Compare  also  the  act  of  congress  of  March  3, 1863.  Statutes  at  Large, 
XII.,  p.  731,  etc.  The  constitutionality  of  this  law  "has  been  variously 
decided  in  the  different  states.  See  Paschal,  Constitution  of  the  U.  S., 
p.  136. 

4  Amer.  State  Papers,  VIII.,  p.  317.    Statesman's  Manual,  I.,  p.  300. 


246  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND   SLAVERY. 

much  ardor  that  the  original  national  party  now  dared,  in 
the  most  important  of  all  respects,  to  lay  hands  on  the 
very  roots  of  the  national  character  of  the  state. 

The  course  of  the  New  England  states  on  the  militia 
question  must  have  satisfied  the  administration  that  the 
opponents  of  the  war  had  not  uttered  mere  idle  threats 
when  they  declared  that,  in  their  support  of  the  war,  they 
would  go  only  to  the  limits  of  their  legal  liability,  so  long 
as  there  was  no  necessity  of  defending  their  own  soil. 
The  New  England  states  soon  came,  indeed,  to  a  com 
promise  on  the  question ;  but  the  following  elections  showed 
that  the  party  which  offered  aid  only  for  a  defensive 
war  increased  in  strength.  In  the  especially  important 
state  of  New  York,  a  coalition  of  the  war  party  proper 
with  those  who  assumed  on  the  war  question  a  national 
attitude,  in  harmony  with  that  of  the  war  party,  elected 
its  candidate  for  governor.  Tompkins,  however,  re 
ceived  a  majority  of  only  3506  votes  over  his  opponent, 
Yan  Rennselaer,  and  in  the  house  of  representatives  the 
Federalists  had  a  majority  of  eight  votes.1  Delaware  was 
represented  in  both  houses  of  congress  by  peace  members, 
and  the  opponents  of  the  war  had  a  majority  in  the  legis 
lature  of  Maryland.2  In  the  house  of  representatives  of 
the  thirteenth  congress,  in  which  the  number  of  members 
had  been  increased  from.  142  to  182,  the  Democratic  major 
ity  of  TO  in  the  twelfth  congress  shrunk  to  46. 

No  change  took  place  in  the  position  of  the  minority  in 
congress.  They  urged  peace.  They  were  ready  to  vote 
the  means  necessary  to  carry  on  a  defensive  war,  but  stead 
ily  refused  to  agree  to  the  demands  made  by  the  govern 
ment  for  men  and  money,  because  they  considered  that  it 
was  proposed  to  carry  on  an  aggressive  war.  The  majority 


.  l  N lies'  Register,  IV.,  p.  432. 

9  Ingersoll,  Second  War  between  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain, 
II.,  p.  20. 


GEOGRAPHICAL   DIVISION   OF    PARTIES.  247 

did  not  concede  this  and  defended  their  protest  on  the  prin 
ciple  that  attack  was  often  the  best  means  of  defense.  As 
an  abstract  truth  this  could  not  be  questioned;  and  looked 
at  from  a  military  point  of  view,  it  might  have  been  correct 
in  this  particular  instance.  But  it  was  now  too  late  to 
represent  the  conquest  of  Canada  only  as  a  means  to  the 
end,  and  still  less  was  it  politic  to  refrain  from  holding  it 
out  to  the  people  as  the  most  brilliant  fruit  of  the  war.  To 
this  allurement  was  due,  in  a  great  measure,  the  popularity 
of  the  contest  in  the  west  and  even  in  the  south;  and 
there  was  now  double  need  of  it  because  the  great  prom 
ises  of  the  first  year  had  shamefully  and  disgracefully 
failed  of  realization.  The  Federalists  were  guilty  of  ridic 
ulous  exaggeration  when  they  represented  that  the  princi 
pal  cause  of  the  conflict  was  a  longing  to  take  possession  of 
Canada.  But  when  the  wrongs  inflicted  by  England  had 
become  so  intolerable  that  there  was  just  ground  for  a  dec 
laration  of  war,  the  hope  of  its  acquisition  silenced  many 
considerations  which  otherwise  might  easily  have  decided 
the  issue  in  favor  of  the  peace  party.  That  the  love  of 
conquest  had  its  home  now  as  later  in  the  aristocratic  south 
and  in  the  west — from  the  very  first  the  seat  of  American 
ambition — was  not  a  mere  accident.  The  northeast,  to 
which  the  acquisition  of  Canada  would  have  been  of  the 
greatest  advantage,  and  which  would  have  been  benefited 
by  it  soonest,  could  not  be  won  over  to  the  project,1  partly 
on  account  of  the  narrow  view,  so  disastrous  to  its  own  in 
terests,  which  had  governed  its  policy  in  the  question  of 
the  Louisiana  purchase  and  the  admission  of  new  states 
into  the  Union. 

The  sectional  separation  of  parties  came  to  light  not  only 
as  to  the  question  of  war  in  general,  but  also  as  to  the  mode 


1  On  the  alleged  gain  of  Goodrich  to  the  plans  of  the  war  party  see 
Ingersoll,  Second  War  between  the  U.  S.  and  Great  Britain,  IIM  pp.  236, 
237. 


248  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY  AND   SLAVERY. 

of  conducting  it,1  and  as  to  one  of  the  principal  objects 

1  This  contest  turned  mainly  on  the  question  whether  the  decision  of 
the  struggle  should  be  made  on  land  or  on  the  water.  The  south  and 
west  here  gave  evidence  of  the  same  short-sightedness  and  want  of  gen 
erosity  which  the  north  had  shown  in  relation  to  the  points  men 
tioned  in  the  text  The  course  of  events  quickly  decided  the  question 
in  favor  of  the  policy  advocated  by  the  north.  Little  as  was  done  for 
the  fleet,  it  accomplished  most  of  what  the  Americans  had  to  boast  of. 
If  the  south  and  west  had  surrendered  their  irrational  prejudices  in  the 
first  year  of  the  war,  its  course  might  perhaps  have  been  more  favorable. 
On  this  condition  Webster  promised  even  the  strong  support  of  the 
New  England  states.  He  closed  his  speech  of  Jan.  14,  1814,  with 
these  words;  "If,  then,  the  war  must  be  continued,  go  to  the  ocean. 
If  you  are  seriously  contending  for  maritime  rights,  go  to  the  theatre 
where  alone  those  rights  can  be  defended.  Thither  every  indication  of 
your  fortune  points  you.  There  the  united  wishes  and  exertions  of  the 
nation  will  go  with  you.  Even  our  party  divisions,  acrimonious  as  they 
are,  cease  at  the  water's  edge.  They  are  lost  in  attachment  to  national 
character  on  the  element  where  that  character  is  made  respectable.  In 
protecting  naval  interests  by  naval  means,  you  will  arm  yourselves  with 
the  whole  power  of  national  sentiment  and  may  command  the  whole 
abundance  of  the  national  resources.  In  time  you  may  enable  your- 
selves  to  redress  injuries  in  the  place  where  they  may  be  offered,  and  if 
need  be,  accompany  your  own  flag  throughout  the  world,  with  the  pro 
tection  of  your  own  cannon."  Deb.  of  Congress,  V.,  pp.  140,  141.  To 
the  honor  of  Henry  Clay,  it  must  be  said  that  he  did  not  adopt  the  nar 
row  views  of  the  majority  of  his  party  allies.  He  said  in  January,  1812 : 
"It  appears  a  little  extraordinary  that  so  much  unreasonable  jealousy 
should  exist  against  the  naval  establishment."  Life  and  Speeches  ot 
H.  Clay,  I.,  p.  23.  But  he  remained  far  behind  the  broader  and  really 
statesmanlike  views  of  Webster.  In  the  same  speech  he  says:  "  Indeed, 
I  should  consider  it  as  madness  in  the  extreme  in  this  government  to 
attempt  to  provide  a  navy  able  to  cope  with  the  fleets  of  Great  Britain.'* 
Ibid,  p.  25.  He  contented  himself  with  demanding  a  fleet  sufficient  for 
coast  defense,  but  was  of  opinion  that  it  would  require  ten  years  to  pro 
cure  this.  For  the  present  he  stated  that  he  was  satisfied  with  a  naval 
force  sufficient  successfully  to  repel  the  attacks  of  individual  ships.  As 
far  back  as  the  23d  of  December,  1807,  John  Adams  had  written :  "  The 
resources  of  the  country  ought  at  present  to  be  appropriated  to  the  sea." 
Quincy,  Life  of  Quincy,  p.  162.  See  also  the  declarations  of  Ch.  C. 
Pinckney,  in  1788,  in  the  convention  of  South  Carolina.  Elliot,  Deb., 
IV,,  p.  284.  What  was  done  immediately  before  the  war  and  during  it  for 
the  fleet  is  to  be  found  in  Stat.  at  Large,  II.,  pp.  699,  788,  821 ;  III.,  pp. 
104, 144. 


POSITION    OF    THE    SEVERAL    STATES.  249 

sought  to  be  attained  by  it.  The  ruinous  consequences  of 
this  separation  made  themselves  felt  more  and  more  every 
day;  but  the  majority  cast  all  considerations  of  political 
wisdom  to  the  wind.  Infinite  variations  were  played  on 
the  old  theme,  that  the  fact  of  the  war  sufficed  to  make  it 
the  duty  of  every  citizen  to  support  it  by  all  means  in  his 
power.  The  opposition  answered  that  it  was  time  that  the 
majority  should  really  place  itself  on  the  ground  of  facts. 
"Now  it  was  a  fact  that  the  Union  was  made  up  of  different 
sections,  and  congress  in  its  legislation  should  consider  this 
fact,  for  better  or  worse.1  The  majority  were  warned  that 
they  undermined  the  assumption  on  which  the  Union  was 
built  in  not  yielding  to  the  justice  of  this  demand;  but  the 
warning  came  this  time  not  from  a  New  Englander,  but 
from  a  member  from  Virginia.2 

It  was  the  policy  of  the  majority  to  pour  all  the  vials  of 
their  wrath  upon  the  New  England  states,  as  if  there  alone 
the  opposition  was  to  be  found.  By  this  means  the  false 
appearance  was  created  that  the  sectional  division  of  par 
ties  was  much  more  clearly  defined  than  it  was  in  reality. 
The  so-called  middle  states  took  a  medium  course,  as  they 
had  done  on  so  many  previous  occasions.  Pennsylvania, 
by  a  large  majority,  remained  faithful  to  her  close  alliance 
with  the  south.  In  New  Jersey,  parties  were  so  nearly 
equally  divided,  that  first  one  and  then  the  other  had  the 
preponderance.  In  New  York  the  peace  party  was  so 
powerful  that  it  was  only  with  great  difficulty  that  gov 
ernor  Tompkins  could  keep  it  under  to  such  an  extent  that 
the  majority  could  count  the  state  among  the  "  patriotic." 
Delaware  and  Maryland  could  not  be  unconditionally 
claimed  by  any  party,  but  at  times  their  peace  tendencies 

1  See  the  speech  by  Bleeker  of  New  York,  Deb.  of  Congress,  IV.,  p. 
645.  Randolph  shows,  in  a  letter  dated  Dec.  15, 1814,  how  sectionalism 
and  particularism  were  fed  by  ignorance  of  the  situation  and  condition 
of  affairs  in  other  states.  Niles'  Reg.,  VII.,  p.  260. 

9  See  Sheffey's  speech.    Deb.  of  Congress,  IV.,  p.  666. 


250  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

greatly  preponderated;  and  finally  there  was  even  in  Vir 
ginia  a  considerable  minority  against  the  administration. 
We  need  only  to  examine  the  vote  in  the  house  of  repre 
sentatives  on  some  of  the  most  important  laws  to  be  con 
vinced  of  the  injustice  there  was  in  casting  the  whole  odi- 
-um  of  the  opposition  on  the  New  England  states.1  If, 
notwithstanding  the  fair  estimate  of  the  actual  situation  of 
things  during  this  period,  which  all  democratic  writers 
have  made,  the  New  England  states  must  be  reproached 
with  having  soiled  their  name  by  their  opposition,  the  re 
proach  must,  more  or  less  extenuated  it  is  true,  be  extend 
ed  to  a  large  portion  of  the  population  of  the  other  states. 
It  is  not  equitable  in  this  case  to  speak  only  of  the  states, 
instead  of  the  population  of  the  states.  The  simple  repe 
tition  of  the  untruth  has,  because  of  the  admixture  of 
truth  it  contained,  been  sufficient  to  falsify  historical  judg 
ment  for  several  decades. 

The  democratic  press  endeavored  to  show  that  the  in 
terests  of  the  New  England  states  had  suffered  least  from 
the  war,  and  even  that  they  had  been  benefited  by  it;  that 
therefore  their  opposition  was  all  the  more  inexcusable.2 
In  this  assertion,  too,  there  was  a  certain  amount  of  truth, 
although  the  proofs  adduced  might  be  attacked  on  more 
than  one  ground.3  In  view  of  the  urgent  questions  of 

1  Of  the  forty-two  members  who  voted  on  the  14th  of  January,  1813, 
against  the  increase  of  the  army,   there  were  two  from  Maryland,  one 
from  Delaware,  six  from  New  York  and  eight  from  Virginia.    Deb.  of 
Congress,  IV.,  p.  702.    In  the  vote  on  the  bill  providing  for  further  en 
listments,  of  the  fifty-eight  who  voted  against  it,  there  were  two  from 
Delaware,  four  from  New  Jersey,  four  from  Virginia  and  fifteen  from 
New  York.    Ibid,  V.,  p.  147.     On  the  3d  of  March,  1814,  fifty-five  mem 
bers  voted  against  the  authorization  of  a  loan  of  $25,000,000 ;  of  these 
six  were  from  Virginia  and  fifteen  from  New  York.    Ibid,  V.,  p.  287. 

2  See  Niles'  Reg.,  VII.,  pp.  193-197. 

*  It  is  characteristic  of  the  politico-economical  ignorance  of  the  time 
that  the  opinion  was  very  prevalent  among  the  Democrats  that  the  loss 
of  New  England's  carrying  trade  would  be  of  no  consequence  to  the 
rest  of  the  Union,  and  might  even  be  advantageous  to  it. 


THE    SECOND    MASSACHUSETTS    MEMORIAL.  251 

political  expediency,  which  grew  out  of  their  dissatisfac 
tion,  it  was  a  matter  of  complete  indifference  whether,  and 
to  what  extent,  their  charges  were  exaggerated.  The  ad 
vantages  which  they  enjoyed  at  the  beginning  of  the  war 
were  not,  in  large  part,  lasting.  England  had  at  first 
treated  them  with  great  consideration.  Bat  when  she  was 
satisfied  that  there  was  little  prospect  of  their  rising  up 
against  the  federal  government,  or  of  her  coming  to  a 
separate  understanding  with  them,  their  ports  also  were 
subjected  to  a  strict  blockade.1  Dissension,  in  consequence 
of  this,  and  of  the  increasing  losses  of  human  life,  and 
of  the  other  misfortunes  always  attendant  upon  war, 
as  well  as  of  the  want  of  success  of  the  war  in  general, 
steadily  increased.  The  legislature  of  Massachusetts  voted 
on  the  12th  of  June,  1813,  another  memorial  to  congress, 
couched  in  terms  much  more  decided  and  excited  than  that 
of  the  preceding  year.2  The  declaration  of  war  was  called 
"  premature,"  and  its  prosecution  after  the  publication  of 
the  English  orders  in  council  "  improper,  impolitic,  and 
unjust."  All  the  other  grievances,  both  earlier  and  later, 

1  The  Democratic  press  of  the  time,  and  many  later  historians  of  the 
same  political  complexion,  have  adduced  a  correspondence  of  the  Bos 
ton  Daily  Advertiser  as  one  of  the  most  damaging  pieces  of  evidence  to 
prove  the  treasonable  plans  which  were  devised  in  the  New  England 
states.  The  truth  is,  however,  that  the  correspondence  has  no  signifi 
cance  further  than  as  an  illustration  of  the  ingenuousness  with  which 
the  lack  of  national  feeling  and  the  view  of  the  confederate  nature  of  the 
Union  found  occasional  expression.  The  correspondent  recommended 
that  the  New  England  states  should  conclude  a  separate  treaty  with 
England.  He  did  not  in  this  contemplate  an  unconstitutional  measure, 
for  he  said  that  the  permission  of  congress  to  this  end  should  first  be 
obtained.  The  constitution  only  forbade  the  states  to  make  treaties 
with  foreign  powers  without  the  consent  of  congress.  The  Netherlands 
and  Germany  were  cited  to  prove  that  such  separate  treaties  and  wars 
were  not  at  variance  with  the  idea  of  a  federated  state.  But  if  congress 
should  "  unreasonably  refuse"  this  just,  reasonable,  and  constitutional 
effort,  it  would  "then  remain  for  the  wise  and  prudent  to  decide"  what 
Bhoald  be  done.  Niles'  Reg.,  V.,  pp.  199,  200. 

1  files'  Reg.,  IV.,  pp.  297-301. 


252  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

were  also  brought  forward  again.  A  solemn  protest  was 
raised  against  the  creation  of  new  states  out  of  the  terri 
tory  which  lay  without  the  limits  of  the  original  union. 
The  address  concluded  with  an  urgent  prayer  that  every 
effort  should  be  made  to  bring  about  a  just  and  honorable 
peace.  These  and  similar  demonstrations  in  the  other  New 
England  states  met  with  as  little  success  as  the  former 
ones.  Instead  of  endeavoring  to  effect  a  reconciliation, 
the  irritation  was  increased  by  insulting  insinuations;  in 
stead  of  thinking  of  removing  well-founded  grievances,1 
the  thorn  was  pressed  still  deeper  into  their  sides  by  ex 
aggerated  mistrust  and  open  injustice.  The  minority  of 
the  Massachusetts  legislature  issued  a  protest  against  the 
memorial  of  the  majority,  in  which  they  declared  that  only 
those  who  were ."  altogether  and  exclusively  British"  could 
read  this  "  humiliating  remonstrance"  without  the  deep 
est  indignation.2  The  administration  made  the  New  Eng 
land  states  keenly  feel  that,  on  account  of  their  behavior, 
they  deserved  only  the  treatment  accorded  to  step-children. 
Viewed  from  a  purely  military  standpoint,  the  administra 
tion  might  be  justified  in  employing  all  its  strength  to 
carry  out  its  plan  for  the  conquest  of  Canada,  and  leaving 
the  defense  of  the  coast  to  the  militia  of  the  Atlantic 
states.  But  such  a  mode  of  warfare  is  always  dangerous 
in  a  state  of  loose  structure,  and  hazardous  when  the  parts 
most  exposed  share  in  the  war  only  with  reluctance.  It 

1  Story,  himself  a  Republican,  but  not  of  the  Jefferson  school,  asserted 
that  Jefferson  had  extended  this  mistrust  even  to  the  Republicans  of 
"New  England.  He  writes  :  "  One  thing,  however,  I  did  learn  .  .  . 
while  I  was  a  member  of  congress :  and  that  was  that  New  England 
was  expected,  so  far  as  the  Republicans  were  concerned,  to  do  every 
thing  and  to  have  nothing.  They  were  to  obey,  but  not  to  be  trusted. 
This,  in  my  humble  judgment,  was  the  steady  policy  of  Mr.  Jefferson 
at  all  times.  We  were  to  be  kept  divided,  and  thus  used  to  neutralize 
each  other.  So  it  will  always  be  unless  we  learn  wisdom  for  ourselves 
and  our  own  interests."  Life  and  Letters  of  J.  Story,  I.,  p.  187. 

1  Niles'  Reg.,  IV.,  p.  301. 


THE   LAST   EMBARGO.  253 

can  be  politically  justified  only  on  the  ground  that  power, 
when  compact  and  centralized,  deals  blows  of  the  greatest 
weight.  The  Madisonian  mode  of  warfare  was  characterized 
by  bold  plans,  to  be  carried  out  at  a  distance  and  slowly  and 
weakly  prosecuted.  But  even  apart  from  this,  the  course 
of  the  administration  can  not  be  justified.  It  not  only 
left  New  England  to  itself,  but  refused  Massachusetts  the 
arms  she  needed  for  her  protection,  and  to  which  she  was  en 
titled.  This  was  not  only  a  contemptible  piece  of  perse 
cution,  but  it  showed  also  that,  under  certain  circum 
stances,  the  administration,  as  well  as  the  New  England 
states,  was  wanting  in  the  national  feeling.  But  it  was 
wanting  still  more  in  political  judgment.  The  rich  ex 
perience  which  had  already  been  gained  was  of  no  avail 
to  it.  It  stuck  fast  in  the  swamp  into  which  the  head 
master  of  'the  Democratic  party  had  guided  the  commerce 
and  policy  of  the  country.  On  the  9th  of  December,  1813, 
Madison,  in  a  confidential  message  to  congress,  recom 
mended  a  new  embargo  and  greater  restrictions^on  impor 
tation.1  As  ground  for  this  he  adduced  the  extensive 
smuggling  trade  carried  on  with  the  enemy,  the  introduc 
tion  of  British  products  and  manufactured  articles,  and 
other  illegal  importations. 

Mason  of  New  Hampshire  exposed  the  folly  and  the 
danger  of  the  measure  in  a  short,  clear  speech  in  the  senate.'14 
That  body  was  compelled  to  hear  again  that  it  danced  in 
the  dark  to  the  president's  music.  If,  as  was  asserted  in  the 
message,  the  enemy  obtained  provisions  from  the  United 
States,  the  president  must  have  evidence  of  that  fact  in  his 
possession,  and  if  he  had  such  proofs  it  was  his  duty  to  lay 
them  before  congress.  And,  besides,  what  sense  was  there 
in  prohibiting  all  exportation  in  order  that  the  enemy 
might  be  prevented  from  obtaining  provisions? 


1  Amer.  State  Papers,  VIII.,  p.  503;  Statesman's  Manual,  I.,  p.  317. 
•Deb.  of  Congress,  V.,  p.  79. 


254          STATE  SOVEREIGNTY  AND  SLAVERY. 

Mason  had  not  expected  to  make  any  impression ;  he  said 
that  he  desired  only  to  register  his  "  solemn  protest."  The 
opposition  had  grown  used  to  have  their  remonstrances 
looked  upon  only  as  an  exercise  in  declamation.  The  ein- 
hargo  was  resolved  on  by  both  houses  in  secret  session,  and  a 
bill  passed  which  imposed  the  most  unbearable  restrictions 
on  commerce  on  inland  waters.1  The  administration  and  the 
majority  acted  as  if  they  were  testing  how  far  they  might 
go  with  impunity,  in  imposing  on  the  patience  of  the  com 
mercial  states.  They  did  not  accomplish  what  they  had 
intended;  but  they  were  fully  enlightened  as  to  the  feeling 
of  the  New  England  states. 

Numerous  petitions  praying  for  relief  from  a  state  of  things 
which  grew  worse  daily  poured  in  upon  the  Massachusetts 
legislature.  On  the  18th  of  February,2  the  joint  committee 
of  the  two  houses  reported  on  them.8  The  committee,  in  ac 
cord  with  the  petitioners,  declared  the  embargo  unconsti 
tutional:  "  A  power  to  regulate  commerce  is  abused  when 
employed  to  destroy  it;  and  a  manifest  and  voluntary  abuse 
of  power  sanctions  the  spirit  of  resistance,  as  much  as  a 
direct  and  palpable  usurpation.  The  sovereignty  reserved 
to  the  states  was  reserved  to  protect  ths  citizens  from  acts 
of  violence  by  the  United  States,  as  well  as  for  purpose  of 
domestic  regulation.  "We  spurn  the  idea  that  the  free, 
sovereign  and  independent  state  of  Massachusetts  is  reduced 
to  a  mere  municipal  corporation,  without  power  to  pro 
tect  its  people  and  defend  them  from  oppression,  from 
whatever  quarter  it  comes.  When  the  national  compact  is 
violated,  and  the  citizens  of  the  state  are  oppressed  by  cruel 
and  unauthorized  law,  this  legislature  is  bound  to  interpose 
its  power  and  wrest  from  the  oppressor  his  victim." 

Thus  the  point  of  the  sword  was  turned  against  those 

1  Stat.  at  Large,  III.,  pp.  88-93. 

8  Hildreth,  Hist,  of  the  U.  S.,  VI.,  p.  470,  erroneously  gives  Feb.  16  as 
the  date. 
«  Niles'  Reg.,  VI.,  pp.  4-8. 


THE    MASSACHUSETTS    REPORT   OF    1814:.  255 

who  had  forged  it.  The  "bound  to  interpose1'  is  a  ver 
batim  transcript  from  the  Yirginia  resolutions,  and  the 
Massachusetts  legislature  was  well  aware  of  the  fact.  The 
report  went  on  to  say  that  this  was  "  the  spirit  of  our 
Union,"  and  that  it  had  been  so  declared  by  the  very  man 
who  now  bade  defiance  to  all  the  principles  of  his  earlier 
political  life.  It  asserted  that  the  question  was  not  one 
of  might  or  right,  but  of  time  and  expediency.1 

The  "  sage  of  Monticello"  could  not  remember  exactly 
where  the  last  significant  words  were  first  used.  The  whole 
report  was  in  fact  but  a  second  edition  of  the  Yirginia  and 
Kentucky  resolutions.  Political  parties  never  more  com 
pletely  changed  places.  The  originators  of  the  disintegra 
ting  doctrine  cried  out  now,  with  one  voice,  Treason!  and 
the  Federalists  who  at  its  first  appearance  had  branded  it 
as  treasonable,  now  saw  in  it  "the  spirit  of  the  Union;" 
but  both  parties  claimed  in  1798  and  1799,  as  in  1814,  that 
they  and  they  alone  stood  on  the  platform  of  the  constitu 
tion  ! 

The  report  went  a  step,  and  not  an  unimportant  one, 
farther  than  the  Yirginia  and  Kentucky  resolutions.  The 
petitioners,  among  many  measures  recommended  for  the 
removal  of  all  grounds  of  complaint,  introduced  a  resolu 
tion  providing  that  a  convention  of  the  commercial  states 
should  be  called  to  propose  the  necessary  amendments  to 
the  constitution  and  to  labor  for  their  adoption.  There- 
port  stated  that  such  a  course  was  perfectly  warranted  and 
cited  Madison  as  a  witness.  Only  on  various  grounds  of  ex 
pediency  was  the  advice  given  to  leave  the  decision  whether 
this  course  should  be  adopted  to  the  next  legislature. 

1  Even  in  congress  itself  the  right  of  resistance  was  now  claimed. 
Webster  wrote,  Feb.  5, 1814,  to  his  brother:  "  I  do  not  know  how  it 
happened,  but  one  thing  led  to  another,  till  Mr.  King  came  out  in  plump 
terms  on  the  right  of  remonstrance  and  of  resistance.  He  said  it  was 
a  question  of  mere  prudence  how  far  any  state  would  bear  the  present 
state  of  things,  etc.,  etc."  Private  Correspondence  of  Daniel  Webster, 
I,  p.  241. 


256  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

The  "  Jacobins,"  as,  by  a  strange  perversion  of  the  lan 
guage  employed  during  the  last  decade  of  the  preceding 
century,  the  Federalists  were  now  called,  were  content  with 
mere  oratory.  That  this  consoling  conviction  was  won, 
was  the  only  fruit  which  the  new  experiment  with  embargo 
policy  brought  to  the  administration.  Its  situation,  how 
ever,  was  by  no  means  an  enviable  one.  Its  credit  was  not 
the  best,  and  it  became  continually  harder  for  it  to  obtain 
the  necessary  troops.  There  could  be  no  question  of  an 
exhaustion  of  the  country  in  either  respect.  Besides,  this 
was  the  last  ground  which  the  war  party  would  have  con 
ceded.  But  neither  would  they  grant  that  the  war  did  not 
enjoy  the  popularity  which  they  had  claimed  for  it  from 
the  first.  The  harder  it  became  to  carry  it  on,  the  more 
firmly  was  it  asserted  that  nearly  the  whole  people  sup 
ported  it  with  enthusiasm,  and  that  only  the  barren  quar 
rels  of  a  few  malcontents  created  the  semblance  of  a  pow 
erful  opposition;  and  yet  the  opposition  was  blamed  for 
every  failure.  Webster  strikingly  demonstrated  the  con 
tradiction  in  this  mode  of  reasoning,  and  between  it  and 
the  actual  demands  which  they  saw  themselves  com 
pelled  to  make.1 

•  "Gentlemen,  sir,  fall  into  strange  inconsistencies  on  this  subject.  They 
tell  us  that  the  war  is  popular;  that  the  invasion  of  Canada  is  popular; 
that  it  would  have  succeeded  before  this  time  had  it  not  been  for  the 
force  of  opposition  in  this  country.  Sir,  what  gives  force  to  opposition 
in  this  country  ?  Certainly  nothing  but  the  popularity  of  the  cause  of 
opposition,  and  the  members  who  espouse  it.  Upon  this  argument,  then, 
in  what  an  unprecedented  condition  are  the  people  of  these  states  ?  We 
have  on  our  hands  a  most  popular  war;  we  have  also  a  most  popular 
opposition  to  that  .war.  We  cannot  push  the  measure,  the  opposition  is 
so  popular.  We  cannot  retract  it,  the  measure  itself  is  so  popular.  We 
can  neither  go  forward  nor  backward.  We  are  at  the  very  centre  of 
gravity — the  point  of  perpetual  rest.  .  .  .  Look  to  the  bill  before 
you ;  does  not  that  speak  a  language  exceeding  everything  I  have  said  ? 
You  last  year  gave  a  bounty  of  sixteen  dollars,  and  now  propose  to  give 
a  bounty  of  one  hundred  and  twenty-foui  dollars,  and  you  say  you  have 
no  hope  of  obtaining  men  at  a  lower  rate.  This  is  sufficient  to  convince 


STRUGGLES  TO  CABBY  ON  THE  WAS.         257 

The  message  which  the  president  sent  to  congress  on  the 
20th  of  September,  1814,  was  also  written  in  the  same  pe 
culiar  double  tone.  Madison  assured  the  country  that  the 
direct  and  indirect  taxes  had  been  paid  with  the  utmost 
promptness  and  alacrity,  and  that  the  citizens  had  rushed 
with  enthusiasm  to  the  scenes  where  danger  and  duty 
called  them.1  The  enemy,  he  said,  had  little  cause  to  con 
template  his  last  feats  of  arms  with  pride.  At  the  same 
time,  however,  he  acknowledged  that  the  situation  of  the 
country  made  the  greatest  efforts  necessary.  The  secreta 
ry  of  war  gave  a  fuller  explanation  of  what  was  to  be  un 
derstood  by  the  vague  innuendoes  which  the  president  had 
made  in  his  message.  After  the  confidence  with  which  it 
was  represented  that  Canada  was  the  easy  and  certain  prize 
of  the  war,  it  was  strange  now  to  hear  that  the  United 
States  were  fighting  for  their  "  independence"  and  even 
for  their  life.2  The  defense  of  the  coast  and  the  further 
prosecution  of  the  plan  in  relation  to  Canada  demanded, 
according  to  Monroe,  that  the  regular  army  should  be  in 
creased  to  one  hundred  thousand  men.  How  impossible 
he  considered  it  to  obtain  so  great  a  force  by  the  enlist 
ment  of  volunteers  is  evident  from  the  plan  which  he  rec 
ommended  to  congress.3  The  whole  free  male  population 
from  eighteen  to  forty -five  years  of  age  was  to  be  divided 
into  classes  of  one  hundred,  and  each  class  was  to  be  re 
quired  to  furnish  a  definite  number  of  recruits.  If  any 
class  failed  to  meet  the  demands  made  upon  it,  the  recruits 
were  to  be  drawn  by  lot.  The  bounty  hitherto  paid  by  the 
United  States  was  to  be  furnished  by  each  class  to  its  own 

me,  it  will  be  sufficient  to  convince  the  enemy  and  the  whole  world, 
yourselves  only  excepted,  what  progress  your  Canada  war  is  making  in 
the  affections  of  the  people."  Deb.  of  Congress,  V.,  p.  139. 

1  Amer.  State  Papers,  VIII.,  p.  537. 

a  Dwight,  History  of  the  Hartford  Convention,  p.  313.  The  docu 
ments  bearing  on  the  question  are  also  to  be  found  in  Niles'  Reg.,  VII., 
pp.  137-141. 

'  Dwight,  pp.  318-322. 
17 


258  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

recruits.  If  not  paid  within  a  definite  time,  it  was  to  be 
assessed  and  levied  on  all  the  property  of  the  members  of 
the  class.  A  similar  classification  of  the  sea-faring  popu 
lation  was  proposed  to  procure  recruits  for  the  navy,  but 
the  demands  made  on  the  services  of  the  latter  were  much 
greater  than  those  made  on  the  former.1  At  the  same 
time  that  the  secretary  of  war  submitted  this  plan  to  con 
gress,  a  bill  was  introduced  into  the  senate  providing 
among  other  things  for  the  conscription  of  minors  without 
the  written  consent  of  their  parents,  guardians  or  tutors. 

All  these  projected  measures  excited  dissatisfaction  and 
consternation  in  many  parts  of  the  country.  Naturally  the 
discontent  was  again  greatest  in  the  New  England  states. 
The  legislature  of  Massachusetts  once  more  took  up  the 
idea,  from  the  immediate  carrying  out  of  which  the  report 
of  the  committee,  February  18,  had  dissuaded  it.  The 
prospect  of  the  co-operation  of  the  other  New  England 
states  seemed  good.  The  legislature  of  Rhode  Island  had 
in  its  previous  session  authorized  the  governor  to  enter 
into  communication  with  the  governors  of  the  other  states 
to  bring  about  a  co-operation  to  this  end.2 

The  programme  recommended  in  the  report  made  by 
Otis  in  the  Massachusetts  house  of  representatives  was 
cautious  and  vague.3  The  remaining  New  England  states 
were  to  be  requested  to  nominate  delegates  to  a  convention 
to  propose  such  measures  in  relation  to  the  grievances  and 
other  matters  affecting  them  all  as  should  seem  to  them 
appropriate,4  and  if  they  considered  it  desirable,  to  adopt 
measures  to  have  a  convention  of  all  the  states  called  for 
the  purpose  of  revising  the  constitution. 

1  Dwight,  p.  333. 

1  Niles'  Reg.,  VII.,  p.  181. 

s  Oct.  8,  1814.    Niles'  Reg.,  VII.,  pp.  149-152. 

.  *  Otis  had  already  proposed  the  holding  of  such  a  convention  at 
Hartford  in  Dec.,  1808.  The  claim  to  the  paternity  of  the  thought  seems 
to  belong  to  him.  See  his  letter  of  Dec.  15,  1808,  to  Quincy.  Life  of 
Quincy,  p.  165. 


MASSACHUSETTS   ARMS   HERSELF.  259 

These  resolutions  were  preceded  by  others  which  afford 
a  deeper  insight  into  the  spirit  which  dictated  the  calling 
of  the  convention.  Governor  Strong  had  already  informed 
the  secretary  of  war  that  he  had  considered  it  necessary, 
in  the  interest  of  the  state,  not  to  place  the  militia,  who 
had  been  called  out  to  defend  the  coast,  under  the  com 
mand  of  an  officer  of  the  federal  army.  At  the  same 
time  he  inquired  whether  the  general  government  would 
be  willing  to  make  good  the  expenses  which  had  been  in 
curred  by  the  state  in  the  adoption  of  measures  necessary 
to  its  protection.1  Monroe  answered  that  this  could  not 
be  when  the  state  acted  of  its  own  accord,  and  maintained 
itself  the  command  of  the  militia  who  had  hitherto  been 
called  out.  Strong  laid  the  correspondence  before  the  leg 
islature,  which  approved  his  course.  It  resolved,  more 
over,  in  accordance  with  the  proposals  made  in  the  report 
above  named,  to  organize  an  army  of  not  more  than  ten 
thousand  men  for  the  defense  of  the  state,  by  enlistments 
for  one  year,  or  for  the  war,  who  should  remain  under  the 
command  of  the  governor.  The  governor  was,  besides, 
authorized  to  borrow,  from  time  to  time,  a  sum  of  not  more 
than  a  million  of  dollars. 

It  was  not  necessary  to  put  the  worst  of  interpretations 
on  these  resolutions  to  consider  them  of  a  very  serious 
nature.  If  Madison  had  rightly  claimed  that  the  national 
character  of  the  Union  was  destroyed  in  that  which  was 
most  essential  to  it,  in  case  the  governors  had  the  right  to 
decide  when  the  president  was  authorized  to  call  the  mili 
tia  into  the  service  of  the  Union,  it  might  be  said  with 
much  more  truth  that  a  still  more  severe  attack  would  be 
made  on  the  national  character  of  the  Union  if  troops 
might  be  conscripted  by  the  states  and  kept  in  their  ex 
clusive  service.  True  the  constitution  only  provided:  "No 

1  Niles'  Reg.,  VII.,  p.  143. 


260  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND   SLAVERY. 

state  shall,  without  the  consent  of  congress,  keep  troops 
in  time  of  peace."1  At  the  very  beginning 
of  hostilities  Connecticut,  too,  had  made  known  her  be 
lief  that  this  right  belonged  to  the  states  in  time  of  war.2 
The  wording  of  the  clause  seems  to  fully  justify  this 
interpretation,  and  if  the  question  should  ever  be  brought 
before  the  supreme  court  of  the  United  States3  this  view 
of  the  case  will  probably  be  sustained.  But  it  should 
not  be  inferred  from  the  constitutionality  of  the  power 
that  its  exercise  might  not,  under  certain  circumstances, 
be  dangerous  to  the  internal  peace  of  the  Union.  Much 
less  does  its  constitutionality  show  that  Connecticut  and 
Massachusetts,  by  exerting  it  in  this  particular  case,  did 
not  manifest  a  significant  increase  of  the  particularistic 
spirit. 

At  the  time  the  possible  consequences  of  this  resolve  of 
the  legislature  of  Massachusetts  were  not  overlooked. 
Greater  attention  was  directed,  however,  to  the  invitation 
to  the  Hartford  convention,  since  Massachusetts,  if  she 
were  left  to  stand  alone,  could  not,  in  the  gloomiest  view 
of  the  case,  be  looked  upon  as  really  dangerous. 

In  a  time  of  calm  judgment  the  reception  given  the  in 
vitation  would  have  necessarily  quieted  the  exaggerated 
fears  which  part  of  the  Republicans  cherished.  In  Yer- 
mont  the  committee  to  which  the  request  had  been  referred 
for  consideration  reported  unanimously  in  favor  of  declin 
ing  it.  Yet  the  majority  of  the  committee  were  Federal 
ists.  The  house  of  representatives  unanimously  adopted 

1  Art  I.,  Sec.  10,  §  3. 

'  Niles'  Reg ,  V.,  p.  199. 

3  As  far  as  I  know,  this  has  not  yet  happened.  In  Luther  vs.  Borden, 
the  supreme  court  declined  to  discuss  in  detail  the  powers  belonging  to 
the  states  in  this  respect.  It  simply  decided  that  "  the  government  of 
a  state  by  its  legislature  has  the  power  to  protect  itself  from  destruction 
by  armed  rebellion  by  declaring  martial  law."  Howard,  Rep.,  VII., 
pp.  33,  45 ;  Curtis,  XVII.,  pp.  2,  13.  Compare  Story,  Comm.,  §  8  1401- 
1409. 


_ 

THE    HARTFORD    CONVENTION.  261 

the  report.1  No  delegates  were  named  from  New  Hamp 
shire,  because  the  legislature  was  not  in  session,  and  in 
the  council,  which  had  to  authorize  its  convocation,  the 
Democrats  had  the  majority.  Rhode  Island2  and  Connec 
ticut3  accepted  the  invitation.  Yet  both  states,  like  Massa 
chusetts,  denied  their  delegates  all  powers  except  that  of 
making  proposals,  and  especially  charged  them  that  their 
proposals  must  be  in  harmony  with  the  duties  owed  to  the 
Union. 

The  ultra-Democrats  saw  in  these  declarations  a  bold 
political  trick,  designed  to  win  the  support  of  the  waver 
ing  elements  which  would  have  declared  decidedly  against 
the  Federalists,  if  the  latter  had  made  known  their  true 
aim — the  destruction  of  the  Union.  Only  party  passion 
could  so  greatly  misjudge  the  true  state  of  the  case.  There 
were  certainly  only  a  few  Federalists — if  there  were  any  at 
all — who  would  have  unconditionally  preferred  a  league  of 
the  New  England  states  to  the  relations  that  then  existed. 
If  it  is  to  be  inferred  from  single  utterances  of  the  most 
extreme  Federalist  journals4  that  this  idea  was  widespread, 
yet  this  would  not  prove  the  existence  of  a  plan  of  separa 
tion,  for  there  is  a  great  difference  between  a  wish  and  a 
belief  in  the  possibility  of  its  realization.  Moreover,  the 
possibility  of  executing  such  a  plan  was  evidently  still  less 
now  than  in  1804.  Taken  all  in  all,  the  war  had  not  weak 
ened,  but  strengthened,  the  bands  of  the  Union.  This 
was,  in  fact,  its  best  result.  Although  it  gave  the  New 
England  states  more  reason  for  complaint,  they  would  have 
been  much  more  ready  to  receive  such  a  project  in  1808, 
when  the  embargo  paralyzed  their  trade,  than  they  were 
now.  Among  the  masses  of  a  vigorous  people,  there  al 
ways  lives  a  strong  feeling  of  honor,  and  in  democracies 

1  Niles'  Reg.,  VII.,  p.  167. 

1  Ibid,  VII.,  p.  181 ;  in  the  house  of  representatives  by  39  to  23  votes, 
'  Ibid,  VII.,  p.  158;  in  the  house  of  representatives  by  153  to  36  votes. 
«  Compare  Randall,  Life  of  Jeff.,  II.,  pp.  412,  414. 


262  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

this  feeling  is  even  pitched  too  high,  as  far  as  the  position 
of  the  state  toward  foreign  powers  which  maintain  a 
hostile  attitude  toward  it  is  concerned.  The  great  fault  of 
the  Federalist  leaders  lay  in  this,  that  in  their  coolly-reck 
oned  policy  of  self-interest  they  did  not  estimate  this  fac 
tor  high  enough.  But  the  experience  already  acquired 
had  not  been  without  effect  upon  them.  They  were  there 
fore  able  to  persuade  the  majority  of  the  people  of  the 
ISTew  England  states,  by  appealing  to  their  interests  and 
their  prejudices,  to  give  the  most  sluggish  possible  support 
to  the  administration,  as  long  as  they  were  not  too  hard 
pressed  themselves.  But  they  would  have  had  to  have 
been  not  only  far  worse  patriots,  but  also  far  worse  politi 
cians,  than  they  were,  if  they  had  ventured  to  dream  that 
they  could  bring  the  states,  during  the  war,  to  open  re 
volt,  either  by  separation  from  the  Union  or  by  the  con 
clusion  of  a  separate  peace.  The  cowardice  of  such  an 
action  would  alone  have  sufficed  to  ensure  the  angry  rejec 
tion  of  every  such  proposal. 

Aside  from  these  general  grounds,  the  instant  in  which 
the  convention  was  called  together  and  met  was  especially 
unfavorable  for  such  suggestions.  The  victory  at  Platts- 
burg,  the  successes  of  Chauncey  and  Brown,  the  patriotic 
conduct  of  Governor  Tompkins  of  New  York  and  Jackson's 
energetic  action  in  the  south  had  made  an  impression 
which  could  not  be  effaced  by  the  abandonment  and  blow- 
ing-up  of  Fort  Erie,  the  blockading  of  Chauncey's  squad 
ron  and  the  wretched  condition  of  the  finances.  More 
over,  the  peace  negotiations  at  Ghent  were  in  progress,  and 
as  long  as  they  were  not  broken  off,  there  was  no  need  of 
despair,  even  if  the  reports  were  not  of  a  favorable  tenor. 
But  with  the  conclusion  of  peace,  the  main  grievances  of 
the  New  England  states  ceased  to  exist  of  themselves. 
All  these  things  co-operated  to  prevent,  even  in  the  most 
radical  circles,  any  enthusiasm  for  the  convention  project. 
Even  in  Massachusetts  it  had  a  surprisingly  lukewarm  re- 


THE    CONVENTION    MEETS.  263 

ception.  This  could  not  be  misinterpreted  by  the  origin 
ators  of  the  plan,  and  could  have  been  just  as  little  disre 
garded,  even  if  they  had  thrown  all  other  reasons  to  the 
wind.  Nothing  had  happened  which  could  have  nerved 
them  to  the  point  of  suddenly  cutting  themselves  off  from 
any  way  of  retreat.  All  the  reasons  drawn  from  the  inner 
and  outer  facts  of  the  case  led  much  more  to  the  conclu 
sion  that  the  best  course  was  to  really  entertain  no  design 
except  the  one  that  had  been  stated.  Awaiting  the  fur 
ther  course  of  events,  men  wished .  to  try  to  unite  upon  a 
common  programme  and — whatever  might  be  decided 
Upon — make  a  stronger  impression  upon  the  dominant 
party  by  harmonious  action.  The  method  and  way  in 
which  the  convention  went  to  work  and  the  result  which  it 
brought  about,  are  the  practical  confirmation  of  this  view 
of  the  case. 

Dec.  15,  1814,  twenty-six  delegates1  met  together  at 
Hartford  and  began  their  deliberations  with  closed  doors. 
If,  as  the  Democrats  wished  to  have  it  thought,  a  conspira 
cy  was  being  worked  up  which  aimed  at  the  separation  of 
the  New  England  states  from  the  Union,  the  sentence  of 
death  had  already  been  passed  upon  the  affair.  A  con 
spiracy  which  aims  at  the  overthrow  of  a  government  is 
a  chimera  in  the  United  States.  And  if  the  conspirators 
meet  on  a  publicly  appointed  day,  but  exclude  the  public 
from  their  deliberations  over  the  method  of  executing  their 
project,  the  conspiracy  becomes  a  complete  absurdity.  In 
this  country  thorough  political  changes  can  be  effected  on 
ly  by  the  direct  and  energetic  participation  of  the  people, 
and  the  only  way  to  make  sure  of  this  is  to  carry  on  a 
public  and  long-continued  agitation.  As  far  as  the  Dem 
ocrats  feared  in  good  faith  a  dissolution  of  the  Union  on 
account  of  the  resolutions  to  be  adopted  in  Hartford,  they 

1  Three  of  them  were  irregular,  two  from  New  Hampshire  and  one 
from  Vermont,  who  had  been  chosen  by  local  conventions. 


264          STATE  SOVEREIGNTY  AND  SLAVERY. 

not  only  underestimated  the  attachment  of  the  Federalists 
to  the  Union,  but  failed  to  appreciate  how  thoroughly  the 
people  were  really  pervaded  by  the  democratic  spirit. 

The  Democrats  pleased  themselves  then  and  thereafter  by 
roundly  denying  that  they  had  nourished  any  fears  whatev 
er.  Jefferson  wrote,  Feb.  15, 1815,  to  Lafayette:  "  But  they 
[the  British^ministers]  have  hoped  more  in  their  [!]  Hart 
ford  convention.  .  .  The  cement  of  this  Union  is  in  the 
heart-blood  of  every  American.  I  do  not  believe  that  there 
is  on  earth  a  government  established  on  so  immovable  a 
basis.  .  .  They  [the  members  of  the  convention]  have 
not  been  able  to  make  themselves  even  a  subject  of  conver 
sation,  either  of  public  or  private  societies.  A  silent 
contempt  has  been  the  sole  notice  they  excite.''1  It 
is  true  that  Jefferson  had  never  feared  that  the  Union 
would  be  brought  to  an  end  by  the  convention.  But  before 
Jackson's  victory  at  New  Orleans  and  before  the  receipt  of 
the  news  of  the  signing  of  the  treaty  of  Ghent,  he  would  not 
have  used  such  language.  It  corresponded  with  his  char 
acter  to  blow  a  great  blast  of  triumph,  now  that  the  con 
vention,  whatever  significance  it  might  have  had  for  the 
moment,  stood  before  the  world  as  a  wretched  farce.  It  is, 
indeed,  not  difficult  to  obtain  from  his  writings  the  proof 
that  he  had  by  no  means  such  an  unconditional  trust  in 
that  "  cement."  Yet,  whatever  he  might  think,  the  asser- 


1  Jefferson,  Works,  VI.,  pp.  425,  426.  The  passage  left  out  in  the 
text  may  show  with  what  shallowness  Jefferson  judged  the  case: 
"  Their  [the  English  ministry's]  fears  of  republican  France  being  now 
done  away,  they  are  directed  to  republican  America,  and  they  are  play- 
Ing  the  same  game  for  disorganization  here  which  they  played  in  your 
country.  The  Marats,  the  Dantons  and  Robespierres  of  Massachusetts, 
are  in  the  same  pay,  under  the  same  orders,  and  making  the  same  efforts 
to  anarchize  us  that  their  prototypes  in  France  did  there.  I  do  not  say 
that  all  who  met  in  Hartford  were  under  the  same  motives  of  money. 
Some  of  them  are  Outs  and  wish  to  be  Ins ;  some  the  mere  dupes  of 
the  agitators  or  of  their  own  party  passions,  while  the  Maratists  alone 
are  in  the  real  secret." 


ANXIETY    ABOUT  THE    CONVENTION.  265 

tion  that  the  convention  had  not  even  become  a  subject  of 
conversation,  misrepresented  the  facts  in  a  foolish  way.  As 
early  as  the  spring  of  1814,  the  position  of  the  E"ew  Eng 
land  states  excited  serious  apprehension  even  among  the 
ambassadors  to  Europe,  although  the  latter  looked  at  things 
more  clearly  for  not  being  exposed  to  the  immediate  influ 
ence  of  the  daily  squabbles  and  exaggerated  descriptions 
of  the  press.1  As  soon,  then,  as  the  three  states  which 
were  represented  in  the  convention  took  a  position  which 
must  lead  to  a  new  phase  of  the  struggle,  the  Democratic 
party  began  to  hurl  its  anathemas  against  the  "Jacobins" 
with  threefold  zeal.  At  the  same  time,  it  lavished  loud 
praise  upon  the  noble  community  which  (it  said)  was 
about  to  thrust  the  traitors  into  the  abyss  of  eternal  shame 
and  political  oblivion.  From  an  easily  intelligible  policy, 
exaggeration  was  resorted  to  in  both  directions.  If  the 
student  disregards  these  exaggerations,  which  pretty  near 
ly  balance  each  other,  he  still  finds  traces  of  more  anxiety 
than  was  reasonable.  This  was  even  more  true  of  the  ad 
ministration  than  of  the  press.  The  constitution  did  not 
give  the  president  the  power  to  hinder  the  meeting  of  the 
convention.  There  was  no  cause  for  this,  inasmuch  as  the 
delegates  were  only  empowered  by  their  respective  legisla 
tures  to  make  proposals.  It  was  also  not  easy  to  see 
how  the  twenty-six  men  could  be  able  to  surprise  the  gov 
ernment  by  suddenly  lighting  the  torch  of  insurrection. 
Yet  it  was  considered  necessary  to  notify  Col.  Jessup  to 
watch  them  carefully.  The  letters  exchanged  between 
Jessup  and  the  president  have  unfortunately  been  in  great 
part  lost,  but  enough  is  known  of  them  to  prove  that  Mad 
ison  took  the  matter  very  seriously.  From  Dec.  15,  1814, 
to  Jan.  23,  1815,  Jessup  sent  a  daily  report  to  the  presi- 

1  Thus,  for  instance,  Gallatin  writes,  April  22,  1814:  "  Above  all,  our 
own  divisions  and  the  hostile  attitude  of  the  eastern  states  give  room  to 
apprehend  that  a  continuance  of  the  war  might  prove  vitally  fatal  to  the 
United  States."  Priv.  Cor.  of  H.  Clay,  I.,  p.  30. 


266  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY    AND    SLAVERY. 

dent.1  The  letters  were  mostly  sent  in  a  private  way,  and 
sometimes  the  colonel  himself  brought  them  to  New  York 
in  order  that  they  might  not  be  intercepted.  This  precau 
tion  was  superfluous,  indeed,  inasmuch  as  the  news  to  be 
sent  was  by  no  means  of  such  an  important  nature.  Jessup 
wrote  from  New  Haven,  on  the  day  the  convention  met: 
"  I  am  surprised  how  little  interest  [among  the  Federal 
ists]  the  meeting  excites."2  Writing  later  from  Hartford, 
he  had  only  to  announce  that  so  far  as  he  could  learn,  the 
convention  kept  strictly  within  the  limits  of  the  law. 

If  he  nevertheless  kept  on  sending  his  daily  reports  for 
fourteen  days  after  the  adjournment  of  the  convention  and 
spoke  in  them  of  "  plans  to  destroy  the  government,"  "  at 
tempts  to  gain  possession  of  the  public  stores,"  etc.,  we 
may  well  infer  that  Madison  did  not  share  Jefferson's 
pretended  view. 

People  in  Washington  and  in  the  whole  country  were 
surprised,  and,  to  speak  truth,  not  merely  pleasantly  sur 
prised,  that  the  report  of  the  convention,  in  which  the  re 
sults  of  its  secret  deliberations  were  summed  up,  was  not 
a  more  revolutionary  document.  As  affairs  now  began  to 
shape  themselves,  the  ruling  party  would  have  preferred  a 
somewhat  more  decided  manifesto  in  order  to  master  the 
"  conspiracy"  with  greater  eclat.  It  was  not  contented 
with  being  able  to  punish  it  only  by  scorn  and  "contempt." 

After  a  thorough  recapitulation  of  the  complaints  so 
often  discussed,  the  report  recommends  to  the  legislatures 
of  the  represented  states  certain  measures  for  the  removal 
of  the  most  pressing  hardships,  suggests  a  series  of  amend 
ments  to  the  federal  constitution,  provides  for  the  calling 
of  a  new  convention  in  certain  eventualities,  and  finally 
authorizes  some  of  the  delegates  to  again  convoke  the 
present  convention.3  The  report  starts  on  the  assumption 

1  Ingersoll,  Second  War  between  the  U.  S.  and  Great  Britain,  II.,  p.  238. 

'  *  Ingersoll,  Second  War  between  the  U.  S.  and  Great  Britain,  II.,  p.  225. 

8  The    whole  report  is  given  in  Niles'  Reg.,  VII.,  pp.  305-313  and  in 

Dwight's  Hist,  of  the  Hart.  Con.,  pp.  352-379.  Niles'  Reg.,  VII.,  pp.  328- 


KEPOET    OF    THE    CONVENTION.  267 

that  a  "  summary"  removal  of  tlie  evils  complained  of 
would  be  possible  only  by  "  direct  and  open  resistance," 
since  they  had  become  a  "  system."  The  view  had  already 
struck  root,  that  the  final  reasons  for  this  were  to  be  found 
in  "  intrinsic  and  incurable  defects  in  the  constitution." 
The  delegates,  however,  did  not  consider  this  as  yet  suffi 
ciently  proved,  but  confessed  their  conviction  that  perma 
nent  help  could  be  procured  only  by  various  amendments 
to  the  constitution.  In  their  opinion,  then,  these  formed 
the  most  important  part  of  the  report.  Their  substance 
was,  in  brief,  as  follows:  Representation  in  the  house 
should  henceforth  be  based  upon  the  free  population  alone; 
the  president  must  not  be  eligible  for  re-election;  state 
offices  should  be  entrusted  only  to  native-born  citizens; 
embargoes  should  be  limited  to  sixty  days;  and  a  vote  of 
two-thirds  of  each  house  should  be  necessary  for  a  prohibi 
tion  of  commercial  intercourse,  the  admission  of  new  states 
into  the  Union,  the  authorization  of  hostilities  (except  in 
case  of  invasion)  and  a  declaration  of  war. 

It  was  not  meant  by  the  substitution  of  these  constitu 
tional  changes  for  summary  relief  by  direct  and  open  re 
sistance,  that  until  their  adoption  or  rejection  the  critical 
condition  of  affairs  which  had  been  brought  about  by  the 
ignorance  and  the  unconstitutional  encroachments  of  the 
government  should  be  quietly  borne.  The  convention 
recommended  the  most  energetic  opposition  to  the  follow 
ing  measures,  already  executed  or  projected  by  the  federal 
authorities:  Calling  out  the  militia  by  the  president  with 
out  the  co-operation  of  the  state  governments;  the  trans 
fer  of  the  command  of  the  militia  to  officers  of  the  reg 
ular  army;  the  classification  of  the  militia  proposed  by 
Monroe;  the  recruiting  of  the  regular  army  "by  a  for- 

332,  gives  also  the  statistical  lists  contained  in  the  report,  and  Dwight,  pp. 
383-398,  prints  the  whole  journal  of  the  convention.  The  latter,  how 
ever,  is  quite  worthless,  since  it  records  only  the  meetings,  adjourn 
ments,  etc. 


268  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

cible  draft  or  conscription";  and  the  enlistment  of  minors 
without  the  consent  of  their  parents  or  guardians.  Finally, 
the  federal  government  should  act  in  such  a  way  that  the 
states  concerned  "  may,  separately  or  in  concert,  be  em 
powered  to  assume  upon  themselves  the  defense  of  their 
territory  against  the  enemy."  To  this  end,  a  part  of  the 
federal  taxes  should  flow  into  the  treasuries  of  the  states. 
This  resolution  then  recommended  the  legislatures  to  re 
ciprocally  pledge  themselves  to  help  each  other  with  a  part 
of  their  militia,  or  volunteer  regiments  raised  especially 
for  this  purpose,  or  their  regular  troops,  in  order  to  repel 
invasion. 

In  these  last-mentioned  resolutions  the  absurd  notion  of 
a  separate  league  reached  its  highest  point.  Further  prac 
tical  results  were  not  to  be  attributed  to  the  little  league 
of  three  states  in  opposition  to  the  federal  government. 
The  dissolution  of  the  Union  was  of  course  thought  about, 
but  only  as  perhaps  desirable  in  the  future.  If  this  con 
viction  was  arrived  at,  then  the  separation  u  should,  if 
possible,  be  the  work  of  peaceable  times  and  deliberate 
consent.  .  .  .  But  a  severance  of  the  Union  by  one  or 
more  states  against  the  will  of  the  rest,  and  especially  in 
time  of  war,  can  be  justified  only  by  absolute  necessity." 
These  u  objections  against  precipitate  measures  tending  to 
disunite  the  states  .  „  .  must,  it  is  believed,  be  deem 
ed  conclusive." 

The  form  of  these  sentences  was  so  skillfully  selected 
that  it  cannot  be  said  with  certainty  whether  the  conven 
tion  deduced  from  the  nature  of  the  Union  a  positive 
right  in  the  individual  states  to  withdraw  from  the  Union, 
or  whether  it  claimed  only  a  moral  justification  for  revolu 
tion.  It  was  prudent  enough  in  the  declaration  of  its 
position  on  the  constitutional  question  not  to  venture 
beyond  vague,  double-meaning  expressions,  except  so  far 
as  it  could  appeal  to  its  opponents.  But  it  went  just  far 
enough  to  repeat  almost  verbatim  the  declaration  of 


SIGNIFICANCE   OF   THE    CONVENTION.  269 

faith  laid  down  in  the  Kentucky  resolutions  of  1798.  If 
the  members  of  the  convention,  and  those  in  sympathy 
with  them,  were  "  Maratists,"  they  could  claim  that  they 
had  become  so  in  the  school  of  Madison  and  Jefferson. 
They  had  learned  from  Madison  that  a  state  had  not  only 
the  right  but  the  duty  to  "  interpose  its  authority"  as  a 
shield  between  its  citizens  and  the  federal  powers;  and 
Jefferson  had  taught  them  that  the  fundamental  principle 
of  the  autocratic  right  of  deciding  in  strifes  between 
parties  without  a  common  umpire  applied  to  the  relation 
of  the  states  to  the  Union.1 

The  report  was  adopted  by  the  legislatures  of  Massa 
chusetts  and  Connecticut.  Both  these  states  thus  formally 
declared  their  acceptance  of  the  constitutional  theories 
maintained  in  it  as  their  own.  American  historians  have 
laid  only  little  weight  upon  this.  They  have  almost  wholly 
limited  themselves  to  giving  the  proof  or  repelling  the  as 
sertion  that  the  originators  and  the  members  of  the  con 
vention  had  plans  which  were  inimical  to  their  fatherland, 
or  thoroughly  treasonable.  They  have  pushed  the  senti 
mental  and  moral  side  of  the  question  so  far  into  the  fore 
ground  that  they  have  thus  lost  the  proper  point  of  view 
whence  its  political  significance  is  especially  to  be  sought. 

1  The  passage  bearing  on  this  point  in  the  report  of  the  convention 
reads:  "  It  does  not,  however,  consist  with  the  respect  and  forbearance 
due  from  a  confederate  state  towards  the  general  government  to  fly  to 
open  resistance  upon  every  infraction  of  the  constitution.  The  mode 
and  the  energy  of  the  opposition  should  always  conform  to  the  nature 
of  the  violation,  the  intention  of  its  authors,  the  extent  of  the  injury 
inflicted,  the  determination  manifested  to  persist  in  it,  and  the  danger 
of  delay.  But  in  cases  of  deliberate,  dangerous,  and  palpable  infrac 
tions  of  the  constitution,  affecting  the  sovereignty  of  a  state  and  the 
liberties  of  the  people,  it  is  not  only  the  right  but  the  duty  of  such  a 
state  to  interpose  its  authority  for  their  protection  in  the  manner  best 
calculated  to  secure  that  end.  When  emergencies  occur  which  are 
either  beyond  the  reach  of  the  judicial  tribunals,  or  too  pressing  to  ad 
mit  of  the  delay  incident  to  their  forms,  states  which  have  no  common 
umpire  must  be  their  own  judges  and  execute  their  own  decisions." 


270  STATE  SOVEREIGNTY  AND  SLAVERY. 

The  convention  and  its  resolutions  are  of  weight  only  so 
far  as  they  were  not  simply  the  product  of  a  few  scattered 
"Oatalinarian  existences,"  but  gave  expression  to  the  be 
liefs  and  ideas  living  in  an  important  fraction  of  the  peo 
ple,  or  in  the  whole  "people.  If  the  convention  had  been, 
as  historians  of  Democratic  tendencies  make  it  out  to  be, 
a  quite  exceptional  bit  of  infamy,  it  would  have  been 
simply  meaningless.  If  the  Hartford  convention  had  not 
been  the  culmination  of  the  inner  struggle  from  1801  to 
1815,  it  would  be  mentioned,  like  the  proposal  made  al 
most  half  a  century  later  by  Fernando  Wood,  that  the 
city  of  New  York  should  cut  loose  from  the  Union  and 
constitute  itself  an  independent  state,  as  an  entertaining 
historic  anecdote. 

Hate  of  England  and  admiration  of  France  did  not  allow 
the  domineering  south  to  attribute  an  equal  share  of  the 
guilt  of  infringing  neutral  rights  to  each  of  the  belligerant 
powers.  Ignorance  of  the  laws  which  govern  industrial 
life  drove  it  into  a  policy  of  defense  which  was  practically 
a  policy  of  reckless  attack  upon  the  commercial  interests 
of  its  own  country.  Long-cherished  prejudices  against 
the  commercial  interests  and  the  peculiarly  commercial 
states  and  a  misjudgment  of  the  intimate  connection  of 
these  with  the  other  economic  interests  of  the  whole 
country,  made  it  stray  ever  deeper  into  these  unfortunate 
politics,  until  party  policy  made  return  impossible. 
Wholly  unprepared  for  war,  the  party  had  to  adopt  the  war 
policy  which  its  few  young  and  ambitious  leaders  dic 
tated  to  it.  The  declared  aim  of  the  war  was  the  vindica 
tion  of  the  rights,  the  infringement  of  which  was  espe 
cially  injurious  to  the  interests  of  the  commercial  states. 
But  the  latter  persuaded  themselves  that  the  dominant 
party  had  tried,  under  a  false  mask,  to  injure  the  commer 
cial  interests  from  the  beginning.  They  expected  only  an 
aggravation  of  the  evils  from  the  war  with  England  and 
condemned  the  way  of  conducting  the  war  as  the  crowning 


CHARACTER    OF    THE    OPPOSITION    TO    THE    WAR.          271 

of  a  reprehensible  policy,  directed  by  sectional  spirit.  The 
stronger  this  conviction  became,  the  more  decided  was 
their  reaction.  Thus  they  themselves  constantly  gave  the 
struggle  a  more  marked  sectional  character.  They  fought 
the  fight  not  as  a  national  party,  but  as  an  isolated  geo-  - 
graphical  section,  the  well-being  of  which  depended  upon 
commerce  and  the  opposition  of  which  was  therefore  a 
struggle  against  ruin^  because  the  rest  of  the  Union  syste 
matically,  and  perhaps,  indeed,  on  principle,  made  war  upon 
this  interest.  On  this  account  they  did  not  limit  them 
selves  to  making  representations  and  presenting  protests  as 
states,  but  they  tried  to  form  a  formal  league  with  each 
other  which  would  have  made  them  a  union  within  the 
Union.  And  all  these  steps  were  not  justified  by  the  iron 
law  of  necessity,  but  were  put  on  the  ground  of  a  positive 
.constitutional  right.  The  threat  of  revolution  was  not 
made,  but  acting  on  the  principle  of  the  sovereignty  of  the 
states,  an  ultimatum  was  reserved  in  the  utterances  of  the 
founders  of  the  opposition  party  and  of  the  originators  of 
its  confession  of  faith. 

In  these  last  sentences  I  have  condensed  the  true  mean 
ing  of  the  strife  which  reached  its  culmination  in  the 
Hartford  convention  and  came  to  a  sudden  end  by  the  con 
clusion  of  peace  with  England.  The  convention  consisted 
of  delegates  from  three  state  legislatures  and  the  state  leg 
islatures  represented  not  only  legally,  but  actually,  the 
majority  of  the  population  of  the  states,  for  the  latter  had 
had  repeated  opportunities  to  choose  men  of  other  opinions. 
And  a  very  strong  minority  in  several  other  states  enter 
tained  the  same  or  similar  views.  It  is  therefore  lau^ha- 

O 

ble  folly  to  consider  the  convention  as  a  gathering  of  brain 
sick  conspirators,  although  it  must  be  admitted  that  the 
leaders  of  the  party  formed  its  radical  wing.  But  the  pro 
gramme  of  the  convention  was  always  a  party  programme, 
and  this  party  programme  adopted,  on  the  fundamental 
constitutional  question,  the  position  first  chosen  by  the 


STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND   SLAVERY. 

radical  wing  of  the  opposite  party.  Ultra-Federalists  and 
ultra-Republicans  met  on  a  principle  of  constitutional  law, 
the  logical  result  of  which  was  the  dependence  of  the-ex- 
istence  of  the  Union  upon  the  free  will  of  every  single 
•state.  If  the  practical  application  of  this  principle  in  a 
way  which  would  have  seriously  endangered  the  existence 
of  the  Union  was  attempted,  at  the  moment,  in  neither  of  the 
two  cases,  this  was  only  of  secondary  importance.  The  one 
or  the  other  party  could  sooner  or  later  hold  that  the  time 
had  come  for  such  an  attempt,  and  neither  the  one  nor  the 
other  could  oppose  the  attempt  on  the  ground  of  positive 
right,  without  putting  itself  into  contradiction  with  its  own 
past. 


THE   TREATY   OF   GHENT. 


273 


OHAPTEE  VII. 

HlSTOKY   OF   THE   SLAVERY   QUESTION  TO    1787.      THE  OOM- 
PEOMISES   OF   THE   CONSTITUTION   ON   SLAVERY. 

The  news  that  the  treaty  of  peace  had  been  signed  at 
Ghent  was  received  with  loud  jubilation.  Jay  had  been 
denounced  as  a  British  hireling  and  a  traitor,  while  the 
contents  of  the  treaty  negotiated  by  him  were  still  kept 
secret.  The  same  party  now  boasted  of  a  magnificent  tri 
umph,  before  it  knew  the  stipulations  of  the  peace  con 
cluded  by  its  ambassadors.  This  over-hasty  joy  was  the 
best  proof  in  what  straits  the  administration  found  itself, 
and  how  weary  of  war  the  whole  nation  was. 

The  extraordinary  capacity  of  political  parties  to  forget 
at  the  demand  of  the  moment,  stood  the  Democrats  in  good 
stead.  If  the  declaration  of  war  had  been  delayed  only  a 
short  time,  the  United  States  would  have  heard  that  the 
orders  in  council  already  mentioned  had  been  recalled. 
From  the  beginning  of  the  war,  the  so-called  pressing  of 
alleged  British  subjects  found  on  American  ships  was 
the  only  one  of  the  officially  stated  causes  of  the  declara 
tion  of  war  which  remained  in  existence.1  The  report 
made  to  the  house  of  representatives,  June  3,  1812,  by  the 
committee  on  foreign  affairs,  declared  that "  it  is  impossible 
for  the  United  States  to  consider  themselves  an  indepen 
dent  nation"  as  long  as  this  mischievous  practice  was  not 
put  an  end  to.2  In  the  course  of  hostilities,  it  was  reiter 
ated  by  the  executive  as  well  as  sharply  declared  by  con 
gress,  that  a  prime  object  of  the  war  was  to  force  England 

1  Am.  State  Papers,  VIII.,  p.  135. 
1  Ibid,  VIII.,  p.  159. 

18 


274  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

to  give  up  this  pretended  right.1  Even  the  conclusion  of  a 
truce  was  made  dependent  upon  England's  abandonment  of 
this  practice.2  Monroe,  in  his  instructions  of  April  13, 
1813,  to  the  plenipotentiaries  who  were  charged  with  the 
negotiations  for  peace,  declared  that  "  a  submission  to  it 
by  the  United  States  would  be  the  abandonment,  in  favor 
of  Great  Britain,  of  all  claim  to  neutral  rights  and  of  all 
other  rights  on  the  ocean."8  But  on  June  27,  1814,  he  com 
municated  to  the  peace  commissioners,  by  order  of  the 
president,  the  advice  that  they  should  conclude  the  treaty 
without  any  stipulation  on  this  point,  if  it  should  appear 
to  be  an  impassable  obstacle.4  It  so  happened  that  in  the 
treaty  of  peace  not  a  word  was  said  on  either  this  point, 
or  the  whole  question  of  neutral  rights.5 

Under  these  circumstances  it  needed  a  bold  front  to  be 
gin  the  message,  in  which  the  president  announced  to  con 
gress  the  conclusion  of  peace,  with  the  words:  "I  con 
gratulate  you  and  our  constituents  upon  an  event  which 
is  highly  honorable  to  the  nation,  and  terminates  with 
peculiar  felicity  a  campaign  signalized  by  the  most  bril 
liant  successes."6  The  Federalists  naturally  did  not  fail 
to  point  out  with  biting  mockery  the  contrast  between  the 
facts  and  this  presumptuous  assertion.  But  the  people  by 
no  means  always  see  events  in  a  new  light  on  account  of 
their  results.  The  nation  wished  peace  if  it  did  not  have 
to  be  bought  in  a  precisely  shameful  way,  and  had  feared 
for  some  time  lest  it  should  perhaps  cost  some  unbearable 

1  Am.  State  Papers,  VIII.,  pp.  338,  425,  560. 
8  Ibid,  VII  I.,  pp.  318,  336,  345. 

•  Ibid,  VIII.,  p.  567.    There  are  two  differently  paged  editions  of  the 
State  Papers.    In  the  other  edition,  this  reference  would  be :    Amer. 
State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  III.,  p.  695. 

4  Ibid,  VIII.,  pp.  593-4. 

*  Statutes  at  Large,  III.,  pp.  218-223. 

•  •American  State  Papers,  VIII.,  p.  653.  Statesman's  Manual,  I.,  p. 
825.  In  the  latter  the  message  is  erroneously  dated  on  the  20th  instead 
of  the  18th  of  February. 


DEATH  OF  THE  FEDERALIST  PARTY.         275 

sacrifice.  It  was  not  difficult,  then,  for  it  to  persuade  it 
self,  with  the  help  of  the  national  pride,  that  the  restora 
tion  of  the  status  ante  was  "  highly  honorable."  The 
picture,  seen  "  through  the  smoke  of  Jackson's  victory," 
•was  fair  enough  to  look  upon.  It  happened,  moreover, 
that  the  state  of  things  in  Europe  promised  a  long 
peace,  and  so  there  was  practically  little  ground  for  the 
fear  that  England  would  soon  again  have  occasion  to  at 
tempt  a  violation  of  neutral  rights  or  the  impressment  of 
sailors.  And  her  inclination  to  risk  such  an  attempt 
must  decrease  every  day  with  the  powerful  growth  of  the 
United  States  in  population  as  well  as  in  wealth. 

Despite  the  mockery  and  the  blame,  thoroughly  justified 
in  certain  respects,  which  the  Federalists  lavished  upon  the 
Democratic  party,  the  latter  came  out  of  the  war  strength 
ened,  while  all  was  now  over  with  the  Federalists.  Holmes 
had  warned  them  that  they  were  driving  on  to  the  "ship 
wreck  of  their  party."1  Now  that  the  sufferings  of  the  war 
and  of  the  whole  "policy  of  restriction"  were  over  and, 
thanks  to  the  great  prosperity  of  the  country,  were  quickly 
forgotten,  men  only  remembered  how  tardily  the  Federalists 
had  discharged  their  duty  to  the  Union  in  its  hour  of  need. 
The  latter  could  not  free  themselves  from  the  suspicion 
that  they  had  been  willing  to  wholly  withdraw  their  aid 
from  the  country,  or  even  to  turn  against  it,  for  a  convinc 
ing  proof  against  such  a  suspicion  can  not  be  brought  for 
ward  when  a  man  will  not  be  convinced.  The  positive 
assertions  of  their  opponents  left  a  shadow  upon  them, 
and  the  mass  of  the  party  was  well  contented  to  let  itself 
be  considered  as  innocently  led  astray.  All  the  blame 
lavished  upon  the  Federalists  on  account  of  their  conduct 
during  the  war  was  ever  more  and  more  summed  up  in 
the  one  expression  "  Hartford  convention,"  and  the  inex 
piable  guilt  which  was  conveyed  by  these  words  rested 

1  See  the  whole  speech  in  Niles'  Reg.,  VI.,  Sup.,  pp.180-184. 


276  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY   AND   SLAVERY. 

only  on  the  leaders.  These  apt  tactics  isolated  the  leaders 
more  and  more,  and  soon  made  the  number  of  their  follow 
ers  dwindle  into  a  little  crowd,  not  worth  noticing.1 

The  Democrats  remained  masters  of  the  field,  practically 
without  a  contest,  and  until  circumstances  developed  new 
questions  which  could  serve  as  a  basis  for  party  action 
their  supremacy  could  no  longer  be  endangered.  The 
European  commotions  which  had  given  rise  to  dangerous 
crises  in  American  politics  since  Washington's  first  ad 
ministration,  had  finally  come  to  .an  end.  On  this  side  of 
the  water,  too,  there  was  no  longer  any  great  danger  of 
internal  commotion  to  be  cared  for.  The  dawn  of  the 
"  era  of  good  feeling"  had  come. 

This  time  of  outward  rest  was  of  no  slight  value  for  the 
inner  strengthening  of  the  Union.  In  this  commonwealth, 
which  develops  with  truly  wonderful  rapidity,  as  much 
progress  is  often  made  in  months  as  in  years  in  the  more 
completely  crystallized  states  of  Europe.  But  it  was  a  de 
structive  delusion  which  now  mastered  many  heads,  that 
this  momentary  rest  could  become  permanent.  If  a  repub 
lican  form  of  government  were  the  condition  precedent  of 
the  millenium,  when  lion  and  lamb  will  lie  down  together; 
if  the  United  States  was  the  land  chosen  by  fate;  yet  the 
realization  of  this  dream  was  now  more  distant  than  on 

1  In  the  next  presidential  election  only  34  of  the  217  electoral  votes 
were  cast  for  the  Federalist  candidates.  Even  Rhode  Island  had  now 
cut  loose  from  her  union  with  Massachusetts  and  Connecticut,  while 
little  Delaware  voted  for  Rufus  King.  How  demoralized  the  party  had 
become  appears  still  more  clearly  from  the  fact  that  the  three  states 
divided  up  their  vote  for  vice-president.  Massachusetts  voted  for 
Howard,  Delaware  for  Harper,  and  Connecticut  divided  her  votes  be 
tween  Ross  and  Marshall.  (Deb.  of  Cong.,  V.,  p.  662.)  The  union  of 
the  Federalist  votes  upon  King  was,  on  account  of  his  peculiar  position 
in  regard  to  the  war,  an  equally  convincing  proof  of  how  deep  the 
party  had  sunk  in  public  estimation.  He,  like  the  other  Federalists, 
had  been  opposed  to  the  declaration  of  war,  but  had  wished,  when  it 
had  once  been  declared,  that  they  should  support  it  with  all  their 
strength.  Compare  Niles'  Reg.,  VII.,  pp.  318, 826,  327. 


LEGALITY   OF   SLAVERY.  277 

the  day  of  the  birth  of  the  Union.  The  dragon- seed  of 
slavery  had  steadily  grown  rank  and  had  already  budded 
out  so  far  that  its  true  nature  had  often,  been  recognized 
and  very  plainly  pointed  out.  The  violence  with  which 
former  questions  had  been  fought  out,  and  their  pressing 
importance,  had,  up  to  this  time,  only  pushed  this  weight 
iest  of  all  questions  again  and  again  into  the  background. 
But  now  it  began  every  day  to  protrude  itself  more  into 
the  foreground,  and  in  a  few  years  it  led  to  a  crisis  which 
was  more  dangerous  than  all  the  others  through  which  the 
Union  had  passed  since  the  adoption  of  the  new  constitu 
tion.  The  contest  over  the  conditions  of  the  admission  of 
Missouri  to  the  Union  cannot  be  discussed  until  the  his 
tory  of  the  slavery  question  up  to  this  time  has  been  re 
called. 

At  the  outbreak  of  the  American  revolution  slavery  was 
a  recognized  fact  in  all  the  thirteen  colonies.  Whether  it 
was  thoroughly  legal  may  at  least  be  questioned.  Neither 
according  to  the  common  nor  the  statutory  law  of  England 
had  slavery  a  legal  existence,  and  both  common  and  statu 
tory  laws  were  valid  in  the  colonies  so  far  as  they  applied 
to  their  circumstances  and  were  not  in  opposition  to  their 
peculiar  rights  and  privileges.1  But  the  charters  of  the 
colonies  make  no  mention  of  slavery,  and  give  the  colonies 
no  legal  powers  from  which  an  undeniable  right  for  the 


1  The  supreme  court  of  the  United  States  declared  in  1815,  in  the  case 
of  the  town  of  Powlet  vs.  Clark :  "Independent,  however,  of  such  a 
provision  [as  appears  in  the  first  "royal  commission"  for  the  provinces] 
we  take  it  to  be  a  clear  principle  that  the  common  law  in  force  at  the 
emigration  of  our  ancestors  is  deemed  the  birthright  of  the  colonies, 
unless  so  far  as  it  is  inapplicable  to  their  situation  or  repugnant  to  their 
other  rights  and  privileges.  A  fortiori,  the  principle  applies  to  a  royal 
province."  Cranch,  Reports,  IX.,  p.  333 ;  Curtis,  Dec.  of  the  Sup.  Ct., 
III.,  pp.  370,  371.  The  first  congress  mentioned  the  common  law,  in  its 
declaration  of  rights  of  Oct.  14,  1774,  among  the  u  indubitable  rights 
and  liberties  to  which  the  respective  colonies  are  entitled."  Journal  of 
Congress  ,  I.,  p.  28. 


278  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

introduction  of  negro  slavery  can  be  deduced.  Although 
the  matter  has  no  practical  value,  jet,  based  upon  these 
grounds,  the  question  may  be  asked  whether  the  colonial 
laws,  which  start  out  on  the  supposition  of  the  legality  of 
existing  facts,  were  of  such  a  sort  as  to  give  slavery  a  really 
legal  existence.1  The  fact  of  its  existence  was  not  only  al 
ways  recognized  by  the  mother  country,  but  the  king's  gov 
ernment  constantly  favored  the  introduction  of  slaves;  and 
when  different  colonies  wished  to  forbid  their  further  im 
portation  it  had  repeatedly  interposed  with  its  decisive  veto.2 
The  colonists  were  fully  convinced  of  the  rightfulness  of  sla 
very,  and  up  to  the  beginning  of  the  revolutionary  period 
there  was  only  here  and  there  a  doubt  expressed  about  its 
moral  justice.8  There  are  many  reasons  for  the  supposition 
that  in  some  states,  for  instance  in  Virginia,  the  knowledge 
of  the  political  and  economic  disadvantages  of  slavery  found 
expression  in  these  doubts.  One  of  the  first  results  of  the 
contest  with  the  motherland  in  regard  to  colonial  rights 
was  to  direct  attention,  on  a  somewhat  greater  scale,  to  the 
moral  side  of  the  question.  Until  then  the  matter  had 
been  regarded  almost  exclusively  in  the  light  of  positive 
religion.  The  Quakers  have  the  honor  of  having  begun 
the  agitation  from  this  standpoint  earliest  and  most  radi 
cally.  Thanks  to  the  fiery  zeal  of  some  members  of  this 

1  8.  Hopkins,  one  of  the  first  and  most  energetic  opponents  of  slavery, 
declared  in  1776,  in  his  letter  dedicated  to  congress,  A  Dialogue  Con- 
cerning  the  Slavery  of  the  Africans,  Showing  it  to  Be  the  Duty  and  In 
terest  of  the  American  States  to  Emancipate  all  their  African  Slaves : 
"  The  slavery  that  now  takes  place"  is  "  without  the  express  sanction 
of  civil  government."  Goodell,  Slavery  and  Anti-slavery,  p.  76.  See 
also  p.  112,  where  a  judicial  decision  of  the  supreme  court  of  Massa 
chusetts,  which  maintains  this  view,  is  quoted  from  Washburn's  Judi 
cial  History  of  Massachusetts,  p.  202. 

9  Lord  Dartmouth  declared  in  1774 :  "  "We  cannot  allow  the  colonies 
to  check  or  discourage,  m  any  degree,  a  traffic  so  beneficial  to  the  na 
tion."  W.  Jay,  Miscellaneous  Writings  on  Slavery,  p.  210.  See  also 
Bancroft,  Hist  of  the  U.  S.,  VI.,  pp,  413-415. 

1  See  Life  of  J.  Jay,  I.,  p.  233;  Adams,  Works,  X.,  p.  380. 


INFLUENCE   OF   FBENCH   PHILOSOPHY.  279 

sect,  the  religious  and  moral  instruction  of  the  slaves  and 
the  struggle  against  any  further  importation  of  the  negroes 
were  begun  by  the  close  of  the  seventeenth  century.  By 
the  middle  of  the  eighteenth  century  the  emancipation  of 
slaves  had  gradually  become  a  matter  of  action  by  the 
whole  Quaker  body,1  while  similar  attempts  in  other  sects 
were  rather  the  acts  of  individuals.8  If  the  agitation  had 
been  wholly  left  to  the  churches  it  would  have  been  long 
before  men  could  have  rightly  spoken  of  a  "  slavery  ques 
tion." 

It  was  due  to  the  political  philosophy  of  the  18th  cen 
tury  that  American  politicians  now  began  to  concern  them 
selves  about  slavery  much  more  and  from  wholly  new 
standpoints.  The  negro  had  been  long  looked  upon, 
uprightly  and  honestly,  as  an  animal.  There  was  no  con 
sciousness  whatever  that  any  injustice  had  been  done  him. 
When  conscience  began  to  slowly  assert  itself,  it  was 
quieted  by  the  argument  that  bringing  heathen  doomed  to 
hell  to  America  made  the  blessings  of  Christianity  attaina 
ble  to  them.  A  sluggish  faith  could  content  itself  with 
this  lie,  since  it  harmonized  with  worldly  interests.  But 
it  could  not  stand  before  "  sound  common  sense."  The 
most  notable  characteristic  of  this  period  of  the  history  of 
western  civilization  was  that  the  French  philosophers  made ' 
the  demands  of  sound  common  sense  the  basis  of  their 
political  speculations  and  that  the  revolutionary  politicians 
wished  to  make  the  results  of  these  speculations  the  rule  of 
conduct  and  the  goal  for  practical  politics.  The  American 
revolution  was  not  based  upon  this  philosophy,  but  the 

1  "  By  a  resolution  of  that  year  [1774]  all  members  concerned  in  im 
porting,  selling,  purchasing,  giving,  or  transferring  negroes  or  other 
slaves,  or  otherwise  acting  in  such  a  manner  as  to  continue  them  in 
slaverj-  beyond  the  term  limited  by  law  or  custom  [for  white  men],  were 
directed  to  be  excluded  from  membership,  or  disowned."  Clarkson,  p. 
60.  Two  years  later  this  resolution  was  extended  to  cover  the  cases  of 
those  who  delayed  to  set  their  slaves  free. 

3  See  some  interesting  notes  in  Goodell,  pp.  106-108,  and  elsewhere. 


280  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

majority  of  its  leaders  were  more  or  less  affected  by  it.  The 
more  the  struggle  for  definite  political  rights  clothed  itself 
in  the  glittering  garb  of  a  struggle  for  "  freedom"  in  gen 
eral,  the  more  unavoidable  it  was  that  men  should  earnestly 
ask  themselves  whether  their  idealistic  theories  could  be 
reconciled  with  the  fact  of  slavery.1  The  idealistic  impulse 
was  not  strong  enough  to  overcome  all  the  delays  due  to 
self-interest  and  political  policy,  but  yet  it  was  so  great 
that  the  contrast  between  the  institution  of  slavery  and  the 
theory  of  human  rights  was  recognized  as  a  question  of 
practical  politics,  the  solution  of  which  must  be  found 
forthwith. 

There  was  no  thought  of  a  direct  attack  upon  slavery. 
It  was  supposed  that  by  forbidding  any  farther  importation 
of  slaves,  the  gradual  destruction  of  the  institution  would 
be  accomplished.  Erroneous  as  this  hope  was  proved  to 
be,  it  is  readily  explainable.  The  number  of  slaves  at  the 
outbreak  of  the  revolution  w.as  about  half  a  million.2  But 
as  the  increase  of  the  free  population  was  greater  than  that 
of  the  slaves,  the  comparative  number  must  have  been 
more  in  favor  of  the  former" every  year.  Moreover,  eman- 

1  Life  of  Jay,  I.,  pp.  229,  231 ;  Laurens,  of  South  Carolina,  in  the  Col 
lection  of  the  Zenger  Club,  pp.  20, 21,  quoted  by  Greeley,  in  The  Ameri 
can  Conflict,  I.,  p.  36 ;  Bancroft,  VI.,  p.  417 ;  and  many  other  author- 
ities. 

*  According  to  the  census  of  1790,  there  were  697,897  slaves  in  the 
United  States.  These  were  divided  among  the  different  states  as  fol 
lows: 

NORTH.  SOUTH. 

New  Hampshire 158  Delaware 8,887 

Vermont 17  Maryland. 103,038 

Rhode  Island 952  Virginia ,293,427 

Connecticut 2,759  North  Carolina 100,572 

Massachusetts  [6] South  Carolina 107,094 

New  York 21,324  Georgia 29,264 

New  Jersey 11,423  Kentucky 11,830 

Pennsylvania. 3,737  Tennessee 3,417 

Totals 40,370  657,527 


ANTI-SLAVERY  SENTIMENT  IN  THE  SOUTH.      281 

cipation  was  expected  to  make  great  advances  everywhere 
and  to  become  a  rule  almost  without  an  exception,  so  that 
the  abolition  of  slavery  would  be  striven  for  on  political 
and  economic  as  well  as  moral  grounds.  According  to  the 
avowals  everywhere  made,  it  was  only  natural  to  suppose 
that  sooner  or  later  all  slave-owners  would  say  with  Lau- 
rens  of  South  Carolina:  "  I  am  devising  means  for  man 
umitting  many  of  my  slaves.  .  .  Great  powers  oppose 
me,  the  laws  and  customs  of  my  country,  my  own  and 
the  avarice  of  my  countrymen.  .  .  These  are  difficul 
ties,  but  not  insuperable.  1  will  do  as  much  as  I  can  in  my 
time  and  leave  the  rest  to  a  better  hand." 

As  long  as  it  was  generally  considered  advisable  that 
these  wishes  should  have  practical  results,  men  acted  with 
great  unanimity.  In  the  articles  of  the  so-called  "  associa 
tion,"  which  the  first  congress  adopted  Oct.  20,  1774  and 
which  was  considered  as  the  corner-stone  of  the  Union,  it 
was  declared  that  after  December,  no  more  slaves  should 
be  imported  and  that  the  importations  should  not  be  aided 
in  any  way  whatever.1  Article  II.  declared  that  those  who 
acted  contrary  to  these  articles  of  union  ought  to  be  "  uni 
versally  condemned  as  the  enemies  of  American  liberty," 
and  article  XIY.  signalized  "  any  colony  or  province" 
which  did  not  enter  into  the  union  as  "  unworthy  the 
rights  of  free  men."  These  articles,  as  Chase  of  Ohio 
expressed  it  in  the  senate  in  1850,  were  "  ratified  by  col 
onial  conventions,  county  meetings,  and  little  gatherings 
throughout  the  country,  and  became  the  law  of  America — 
so  to  speak,  the  fundamental  constitution  of  the  first  Amer 
ican  union."  It  is  noteworthy  that  some  of  the  most 
emphatic  declarations  in  favor  of  article  II.  and  so  against 
the  importation 'of  slaves  came  from  slave  states  which 

1  Amer.  Archives.  4th  Series,  I,  p.  915. 


282  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY  AND   SLAVERY. 

were  afterwards  the  earliest  and   most  determined  cham 
pions  of  slavocratic  interests.1 

During  the  next  two  years,  the  same  standpoint  was 
maintained.  April  6,  1776,  congress  repeated  the  prohibi 
tion  of  the  importation  of  slaves  without  any  opposition 
from  any  quarter.2  But  a  few  months  thereafter  it  became 
evident  that  in  some  states  the  suggestions  of  momentary 
self-interest  had  begun  to  be  listened  to.  In  the  draft  of 
the  Declaration  of  Independence,  Jefferson  had  bitterly 
complained  of  George  III.,  because  the  latter  had  forbidden 
the  attempts  "  to  prohibit  or  restrain  this  execrable  com 
merce."  This  passage  was  struck  out,  mainly  at  the  re 
quest  of  the  delegates  from  South  Carolina  and  Georgia.3 
When  we  think  of  the  later  modes  of  speech  of  the  slave- 
barons,  we  must  admit,  to  the  honor  of  South  Carolina  and 

1  This  appears,  for  instance,  in  the  declaration  of  the  representatives  of 
the  Darien  district  in  Georgia:  "To  show  the  world  that  we  are  not 
influenced  by  any  contracted  or  interested  motives,  but  a  general  phil 
anthropy  for  all  mankind  of  whatever  climate,  language  or  complexion, 
we  hereby  declare  our  disapprobation  and  abhorrence  of  the  unnatural 
practice  of  slavery  in  America  (however,  the  uncultivated  state  of  our 
country  or  other  specious  arguments  may  plead  for  it)  — a  practice 
founded  in  injustice  and  cruelty,  and  highly  dangerous  to  our  liberties 
(as  well  as  lives),  debasing  part  of  our  fellow-creatures  below  men,  and 
corrupting  the  virtue  and  morals  of  the  rest,  and  is  laying  the  basis  of 
that  liberty  we  contend  for  .  .  .  upon  a  very  wrong  foundation.  We 
therefore  resolve  at  all  times  to  use  our  utmost  endeavors  for  the  manu 
mission  of  our  slaves  in  this  colony,  upon  the  most  safe  and  equitable 
footing  for  the  master  and  themselves."  Amer.  Archives,  4th  Series,  I., 
p.  1136. 

3  Elliot,  Deb.,  I.,  p.  54;  Adams,  Works,  III.,  p.  39. 

8  Jefferson  writes:  "The  clause  was  struck  out  in  complaisance  to 
South  Carolina  and  Georgia,  who  had  never  attempted  to  restrain  the 
importation  of  slaves  and  who,  on  the  contrary,  still  wished  to  continue 
it."  Jeff.,  Works,  I.,  p.  170.  This  passage  has  been  quoted  in  nearly 
every  work  on  this  period,  but  the  fact  has  been  almost  wholly  unno 
ticed  that  in  South  Carolina,  at  any  rate,  such  attempts  had  been  made. 
These  efforts,  however,  had  never  attained  so  much  significance  that 
England  hail  needed  to  oppose  them,  as  she  did  in  the  case  of  Virginia. 
Elliot,  Deb.,  V.,  p.  459. 


SLAVERY  AND  THE  DECLARATION  OF  INDEPENDENCE.  283 

Georgia,  that  they  did  not  demand  a  strengthening  of  the 
passage  because  they  had  resolved,  like  Patrick  Henry,  to 
pay  "the  devoir  to  virtue"  in  gambling  coin,  that  is,  to  sat 
isfy  their  consciences  by  openly  acknowledging  the  duty  of 
reform  and  then  to  announce,  by  appealing  to  the  weak 
ness  of  the  flesh,  that  they  meant  to  persevere  in  the  sweet 
sin.1 

The  excision  of  the  passage  I  have  mentioned  from  the 
Declaration  of  Independence  was  a  turning  point  in  the 
relation  of  congress  to  the  slavery  question.  Men  did  not 
at  once  retreat,  but  they  stood  still,  and  eo  ipso  lost  the 
ground  already  won.  Up  to  this  time  congress,  as  a  revo 
lutionary  body,  had  used  only  de  facto  power.  Now,  when 
it  was  endowed  with  legal  powers,  all  control  over  slavery 
was  taken  away  from  it.  The  responsibility  for  this  lies 
mostly  on  congress  itself,  since  it  elaborated  the  draft  of 
the  articles  of  confederation.  It  is  not  probable  that  the 
states  would  have  made  weighty  concessions,  but  at  least 
an  attempt  should  have  been  made  to  keep  what  had  al 
ready  been  obtained.  The  resolutions  of  1774  and  1776 
had  not  the  force  of  law,  and  with  the  provision  for  leaving 


1  Patrick  Henry  writes,  in  January,  1773,  to  a  Quaker :  "  Is  it  not 
amazing  that,  at  a  time  when  the  rights  of  humanity  are  defined  and  un 
derstood  with  precision,  in  a  country  above  all  others  fond  of  liberty,  in 
such  an  age,  we  find  men,  professing  a  religion  the  most  humane,  mild, 
meek,  gentle  and  generous,  adopting  a  principle  as  repugnant  to  hu 
manity  as  it  is  inconsistent  with  the  Bible  and  destructive  of  liberty  ? 
Every  thinking,  honest  man  rejects  it  in  speculation,  but  how  few  in 
practice  from  conscientious  motives !  .  .  .  Would  any  one  believe 
that  I  am  master  of  slaves  of  my  own  purchase  ?  I  am  drawn  along  by 
the  general  inconvenience  of  living  without  them.  I  will  not,  I  cannot, 
justify  it;  however  culpable  my  conduct,  I  will  so  far  pay  my  devour  to 
virtue  as  to  own  the  excellence  and  rectitude  of  her  precepts,  and  la 
ment  my  want  of  conformity  to  them.  .  .  .  We  owe  to  the  purity 
of  our  religion,  to  show  that  it  is  at  variance  with  that  law  which  war 
rants  slavery.  .  .  .  I  could  say  many  things  on  this  subject,  a  se 
rious  view  of  which  gives  a  gloomy  prospect  to  future  times."  Ban 
croft,  VI.,  pp.  416,  417. 


STATE    SOVEREIGNTY    AND    SLAVERY. 

the  regulation  of  commerce  to  the  individual  states  con 
gress  resigned  all  right  to  again  bring  before  its  forum 
the  question  of  slave-importation  in  any  shape  whatever. 
The  development  of  circumstances  has  shown  the  great 
ness  of  this  mistake.  Yet  the  blame  should  not  be  meas 
ured  only  by  the  greatness  of  the  fault.  During  the  years 
of  war  the  slavery  question  could  only  find  scanty  atten 
tion,  since  congress  was  completely  absorbed  in  the  con 
sideration  of  more  pressing  needs.  Even  in  the  north  its 
consideration  was  postponed,  so  far  as  it  was  a  national 
question.  In  regard  to  their  own  slaves  several  of  the 
northern  states  went  much  farther  than  the  continental 
congress  had  done.  In  New  York  gradual  emancipation 
became  a  subject  of  earnest  debate,  and  if  the  proposals 
in  relation  thereto  could  not  at  once  be  carried  through, 
at  least  there  was  developed  a  righteous  conviction  that 
slavery  could  not  exist  there  much  longer.  Pennsylvania 
did  not  put  off  the  decision  of  the  matter  into  the  uncer 
tain  future,  but  at  once  assured  her  speedy  and  complete 
deliverance  from  the  evil.  In  Massachusetts,  before  the 
Declaration  of  Independence,  decisions  had  repeatedly 
been  given  by  juries  which  can  be  justified  only  by  the 
supposition  that  slavery  had  no  legal  existence  in  the 
colony.1  But  it  was  not  till  after  the  end  of  the  war  that 
the  anti-slavery  efforts  again  assumed  more  of  a  national 
character.  The  abolition  societies  of  Pennsylvania  sprang 
again  into  activity  with  greater  energy  and  a  broader  pro 
gramme;  and  in  New  York,  Eh6de  Island,  Connecticut, 
Maty  land,  Virginia,  and  New  Jersey,  abolition  societies 

1  See  this  more  in  detail  in  Goodell,  pp.  109-117.  Yet  the  complete 
abolition  of  slavery  in  the  north  took  a  long  time.  It  will  astonish 
many  readers  to  know  that  as  late  as  1840  Massachusetts,  Maine,  Ver 
mont,  and  Michigan  were  the  only  states  which  contained  no  slaves  at 
all.  The  number  of  slaves  in  the  so-called  free  states  in  this  year  was 
1,129.  Census  of  1840. 


ABOLITION   SOCIETIES.  285 

were  founded  by  the  aid  of  the  most  prominent  citizens.1 
The  southern  states  by  no  means  saw  in  this  movement 
from  the  beginning  any  interference  with  their  "sovereign" 
right  of  autonomy  or  a  declaration  of  war  against  an  in 
terest  vital  and  peculiar  to  them.  In  them  that  spirit  had 
not  as  yet  wholly  died  out  which  not  only  wished  a  sweep 
ing,  practical  acknowledgment  of  human  rights,  but  also 
considered  it  as  practicable  and  sought  to  compass  it.  Thus 
for  instance,  Virginia,  in  1788,  forbade  the  importation  of 
slaves,  and  a  committee  which  was  charged  with  a  revision 
of  the  statutes  drew  up  a  plan  for  a  law  for  the  gradual 
emancipation  of  all  slaves.  But  wherever  federal  affairs 
which  concerned  slavery  came  up  for  discussion  and  for 
the  passage  of  resolutions,  there  the  southern  states  went 
boldly  on  in  a  way  which  showed  how  little  belief  they 
really  had  in  the  speedy  end  of  the  "  abominable  institu 
tion."  July  12,1777,  the  question  of  federal  taxation  was 
debated  in  congress.  The  article  relating  to  it  in  the  draft 
of  the  articles  of  confederation  proposed  that  federal  taxes 
should  be  laid  in  proportion  to  the  total  number  of  inhab 
itants  in  the  different  states.  Chase  of  Maryland  moved, 
instead  of  this,  their  imposition  in  proportion  to  the  num 
ber  of  "  white  inhabitants,"  because  taxation  should  be 
regulated  by  population  and  the  slaves  were  "  property," 
and  the  southern  states  would  therefore  be  doubly  taxed  if 
the  clause  should  be  adopted  in  its  present  form.  This  ar 
gument  was  opposed  by  the  delegates  of  the  northern 
states.  It  is  noteworthy  that  John  Adams  rested  his  op 
position  upon  the  assertion  that  the  number  of  inhabitants 
should  be  adopted  as  the  measure  of  the  wealth  of  a  state, 
and  that  slaves  produced  no  less  surplus  wealth  than  free 
men  did.  "Wilson  supported  this  view,  and  explained  it 

1  In  the  five  states  last  named  the  societies  were  first  organized  after 
the  new  constitution  had  come  into  force. 


286          STATE  SOVEREIGNTY  AND  SLAVERY. 

by  saying  that  free  laborers  always  produced  more,  but 
also,  and  in  the  same  proportion,  consumed  more.1 

On  the  13th  of  October  the  question  came  once  more 
before  congress.  After  the  proposition  to  lay  federal  taxes 
in  proportion  to  the  aggregate  property  of  each  state  had 
been  defeated,  it  was  moved  that  slaves  should  be  wholly 
exempt  from  taxation.  The  four  "New  England  states 
voted  against  this,  Virginia,  Maryland,  and  the  two  Caro- 
linas  for  it.  The  decision  then  lay  with  the  middle  states. 
The  vote  of  Pennsylvania  and  New  York  was  divided. 
New  Jersey,  therefore,  had  the  decision  of  the  issue,  and 
decided  it  in  favor  of  the  south.2  In  the  debate  of  July 
12,  Harrison  had  proposed  to  reckon  two  slaves  as  one  free 
man  in  reference  to  taxation.  Wilson  had  said,  in  reply, 
that  this  would  be  setting  a  premium  on  the  farther  im 
portation  of  slaves.  A  northern  state,  and,  indeed,  a  third- 
rate  northern  state,  now  paid  this  premium  to  the  south  at 
the  cost  of  the  Union.3 

The  full  meaning  of  this  first  victory  of  the  slave-hold 
ing  interest  was  not  appreciated  at  the  south  or  at  the 
north.  The  southern  states  were  now  thinking  only  of 
the  protection  of  their  own  immediate  interests;  the  idea 
of  a  slavocratic  propaganda  lay  far  beyond.  After  Vir 
ginia  (March  1,  1784)  had  ceded  her  territory  northeast  of 
the  river  Ohio  to  the  Union,  a  committee  appointed  on 

1  See  the  whole  debate,  according  to  Jefferson's  notes,  in  Elliot,  Deb., 
I.,  pp.  70-74. 

8  Bancroft,  IX.,  p.  442:  Wilson,  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Slave  Power  in 
America,  I.,  p.  16. 

8  In  March,  1783,  the  report  of  the  committee  on  the  finances  brought 
the  question  again  before  congress.  The  committee  went  back  to  the 
proposition  made  by  Harrison  in  1777.  Madison  moved,  in  place  of 
this,  that  five  slaves  should  be  counted  as  three  freemen.  The  amend 
ment  was  adopted,  but  immediately  thereafter  the  whole  clause  was 
stricken  out.  (Elliot,  Deb.,  V.,  p.  79.)  Hamilton,  however,  April  1, 
moved  a  re-consideration,  and  Madison's  proposition  was  then  adopted 
without  opposition.  (Ibid,  V.,  p.  81.)  Then  and  there  the  germ  of  the 
notorious  "  three-fifths  compromise"  was  planted. 


KAELY   LEGISLATION   ON    SLAVERY.  287 

Jefferson's  motion  laid  before  congress  a  plan  for  the  gov 
ernment  of  "  the  territory  ceded  or  to  be  ceded  by  the  dif 
ferent  states  to  the  United  States."  The  latter  phrase  was 
understood  as  referring  to  the  territory  then  belonging  to 
North  Carolina  and  Georgia,  between  31°  and  37°,  which 
comprises  the  present  states  of  Tennessee,  Alabama,  and 
Mississippi.  The  plan  divided  the  whole  territory  into 
future  states,  and  declared,  among  other  things,  that  after 
the  year  1800  "neither  slavery  nor  involuntary  servitude" 
should  exist  in  them.  Spaight  of  North  Carolina  moved, 
April  19,  to  strike  out  this  passage.  The  four  New  Eng 
land  states,  New  York,  and  Pennsylvania  voted  to  "retain 
it;  Maryland,  Virginia,  and  South  Carolina  voted  against 
it,  and  the  vote  of  North  Carolina  was  lost  by  the  division 
of  its  delegates.  The  decision,  therefore,  lay  again  with 
New  Jersey,  since  the  articles  of  confederation  made  the 
vote  of  a  majority  of  all  the  states  necessary  for  the  adop 
tion  of  a  resolution.  As  only  one  delegate  from  New 
Jersey  was  present,  the  vote  of  the  state  could  not  be  given, 
and  the  slave  interest  therefore  gained  a  victory  again  by 
this  chance.  The  significance  of  this  triumph  was  far 
greater  than  that  of  the  first,  on  the  question  of  taxation. 
If  slavery  had  been  eradicated  from  Kentucky,  Tennessee, 
Alabama,  and  Mississippi,  the  free  states  would  have  soon 
had  a  decisive  superiority.  Without  doubt  this  circum 
stance  decided  the  votes  of  Maryland,  Yirginia,  and  South 
Carolina.  But  it  would  be  transferring  the  spirit  of  a 
later  time  to  this  period  if  we  should  suppose  that  they 
aimed  in  this  at  the  perpetuation  of  slavery  and  the  forma 
tion  of  a  slavocracy.  The  territories  about  which  the  dis  • 
cussion  took  place  were  ceded  to  the  Union  by  slave  states, 
and  the  latter  therefore  thought  it  only  right  and  proper 
that  slavery  should  be  permitted  to  continue  to  exist  in 
them  as  long  as  they  were  not  free  from  it  themselves. 
Their  moral  and  political  judgment  on  slavery  was  not 
shown  by  the  vote.  Interest  had  not  yet  become  of  such 


288  STATE  SOVEREIGNTY   AND   SLAVERY. 

power  that  self-deception  had  changed  to  conscious  false 
hood. 

The  so-called  ordinance  of  1787  gives  a  practical  proof 
of  the  justice  of  this  view  of  the  case.  July  11,  1787,  a 
committee  of  which  Nathan  Dane,  of  Massachusetts,  was 
chairman,  laid  before  congress  a  plan  for  the  government 
of  the  territory  northwest  of  the  Ohio.  Article  YI.  of 
the  "  compact  between  the  original  states  and  the  people 
and  states  in  the  said  territory"  forbade  forever  slavery 
and  involuntary  servitude,  but  provided  for  the  surrender 
of  fugitives  "from  whom  labor  or  service  is  lawfully 
claimed  in  any  one  of  the  original  states."  The  whole 
plan  was  unanimously  adopted  July  13  by  the  states,  and 
the  only  member  of  congress  who  voted  against  it  was 
Yates  of  JSTew  York.1 

The  readiness  with  which  the  northern  half  of  the  ter 
ritory  had  been  devoted  to  free  labor  was  in  sharp  contrast 
with  the  stiff-neckedness  with  which  the  slaveholding  in 
terest  of  the  southern  states  was  simultaneously  defended. 
While  congress,  in  session  at  New  York,  voted  tLe  ordi 
nance  of  1787,  the  convention  which  was  to  draw  up  a 
practical  constitution  for  the  Union  sat  at  Philadelphia. 
In  this,  too,  some  of  the  southern  delegates  remained  true 
to  the  principles  they  had  followed  in  Revolutionary  times ; 
but  the  decisive  votes  belonged  to  those  who  dismissed 
freedom  and  human  rights  with  words,  and  demanded 
privilege  after  privilege  for  the  sake  of  supporting  slavery. 

An  exhaustive  history  of  all  the  incidents  of  the  struggle 
over  these  demands  would  exceed  the  limits  set  to  this 
book2  The  bare  statement  of  the  result  does  not  come  up 
to  those  limits.  In  these  debates,  for  the  first  time,  the 

1  The  first  congress  under  the  new  constitution  ratified  the  ordinance 
August  7, 1789.  Both  acts  are  in  the  Statutes  at  Large,  I.,  pp.  50-53. 

*  The  reader  who  wishes  to  gain  a  more  exact  knowledge  without 
searching  at  the  sources  (Elliot's  Debates)  will  find  a  correct  and  inter 
esting  sketch  in  Curtis,  History  of  the  Constitution. 


THE    THREE-FIFTHS   COMPROMISE.  289 

veil  was  rent  which  had  hitherto  made  a  clear  conception 
of  the  true  state  of  the  slavery  question  impossible.  The 
rents  were  wide  enough  to  let  it  be  seen  that  behind 
them  lay  a  world  of  war,  of  war  to  the  knife,  although 
they  did  not  show  how  this  war  would  develop  and  how  it 
would  end. 

The  strife  broke  forth  over  the  question  of  representa 
tion  and  of  direct  taxation.  Wilson  of  Pennsylvania,  a 
man  of  clear,  statesmanlike  ways  of  thinking,  and  a  de 
termined  opponent  of  slavery,  suggested  that  in  regard  to 
representation  five  slaves  should  be  considered  equal  to 
three  freemen.1  He  who  draws  his  political  inspiration 
simply  and  solely  from  his  bible  of  principles  plays  Don 
Quixote.  Political  policy  is  a  necessity.  But  a  concession 
which  involves  a  principle  that  can  be  neither  morally  nor 
politically  justified  is  a  heavy  weight,  which  sooner  or 
later  becomes  too  heavy  for  the  strongest  political  swim 
mer.  In  1777  "Wilson  had  branded  Harrison's  similar 
proposal  as  a  premium  on  the  importation  of  slaves. 
Now  he  himself  offered  the  premium,  but  paid  it  in  more 
valuable  coin.  The  proposition  was  hastily  adopted  by 
nine  votes  to  two,2  and  was  afterwards  again  brought  be 
fore  the  convention  by  a  committee.3  Thus  Wilson  did  not 
alone  encounter  the  reproach  of  having  been  faithless  to 
his  principles.  The  great  majority  of  the  convention  ap 
proved  of  his  proposition,  and  it  was  at  the  same  time  ex 
pressly  pointed  out  that  congress  had  already  united  on 
the  same  compromise  between  the  northern  and  southern 
states  on  the  question  of  taxation. 

"Wilson  justified  himself  by  the  "  necessity  of  a  com 
promise."4  In  the  course  of  the  debate,  Sherman  and 
Ellsworth  sought  through  each  other  to  bring  the  parties 

'Elliot,  Deb.,  V.,  p.  181. 
1  Delaware  and  New  Jersey. 
'Elliot,  Deb.,  V.,  p.  190. 
4  Ibid,  V.,  p.  301. 

19 


STATE    SOVEREIGNTY    AND    SLAVERY. 

nearer  to  one  another  and  so  urged  the  unavoidableness  of 
a  compromise.  Gradually  propositions  were  found  on 
which  the  requisite  majority  agreed.  The  race  of  north 
ern  politicians  who  sated  their  thirst  for  glory  by  serving 
as  trainbearers  to  the  slavocracy  had  not  yet  arisen.  The 
struggle  was  therefore  severe.  "When  the  "  three-fifths 
compromise"  came  up  for  the  decisive  vote,  only  Connec 
ticut,  Virginia,  !N~orth  Carolina  and  Georgia  voted  for  it, 
and  Massachusetts,  "New  Jersey,  Pennsylvania,  Delaware, 
Marvland  and  South  Carolina  against  it.1  Among  the 

••  O  O 

states  in  the  negative,  the  first  three  and  South  Carolina 
naturally  belonged  there,  although  the  latter 's  vote  was  de 
termined  by  exactly  opposite  reasons.2  All  the  southern 
states  agreed  with  Randolph  that  they  must  demand  an 
"  especial  assurance"  in  regard  to  their  slaves  by  reckoning 
them  in  making  up  the  ratio  of  representation.3  Pinckney 
was  not  contented  with  this.  He  demanded  the  complete 
equality  of  slaves  and  freemen  in  this  respect.4  On  the 
other  side,  the  delegates  of  the  northern  states  refused  "  to 
give  such  an  encouragement  to  the  slave-trade  as  would 
be  involved  in  an  allowance  of  representatives  for  the  ne 
groes."  Gouverneur  Morris  added  that  the  complete  ex 
clusion  of  the  negroes  would  be  unjust  to  the  southern 
states,  but,  if  he  had  only  the  choice  between  this  or  being 
"unjust  to  human  nature,"  his  decision  could  not  be 
doubtful.  But  at  the  same  time  he  expressed  his  convic 
tion  that  the  southern  states  "  would  never  confederate  on 
terms  that  would  deprive  them  of  the  slave-trade."5  The 
legalizing  and  direct  encouragement  in  the  constitution  of 
a  crying  sin  against  human  rights  or  the  surrender  of  the 
Union — this,  according  to  Morris,  was  the  dilemma  which 


1  Elliot,  Deb.,  V.,  p.  301. 

*  Maryland  wished  only  a  change  in  the  wording. 
•Elliot,  Deb.,  V.,  p.  304. 

<Ibid,  V.,  p.  805. 

•  Ibid,  V.,  p.  301. 


THE    SLAVE    TRADE.  291 

confronted  them.  His  judgment  found  proofs  of  this  in 
the  expressions  of  part  of  the  southern  delegates  during 
the  debate  over  the  slave-trade. 

In  the  committee  report,  which  Rutledge  laid  before  the 
convention  August  6,  art.  TIL,  sec.  4  of  the  draft  of  the 
constitution  provided  that  "  no  tax  or  duty  shall  be  laid  by 
the  legislature  upon  the  migration  or  importation  of  such 
persons  as  the  several  states  shall  think  proper  to  admit; 
nor  shall  such  migration  or  importation  be  prohibited." 
Both  the  Pinckneys  declared  that  South  Carolina,  Baldwin 
that  Georgia,  and  Williamson  that  the  southern  states  in 
general,  could  not  adopt  the  constitution  unless  all  legal 
power  in  these  two  particulars  was  denied  to  the  legisla 
ture  of  the  Union.1  The  northern  states,  they  said,  should 
be  content  with  the  assertion  that  "peuhaps"  all  the  south 
ern  states,  following  the  example  of  Virginia  and,  Mary 
land,  would  voluntarily  forbid  the  importation  of  slaves, 
if  the  whole  matter  was  left  for  them  to  decide.  Charles 
C.  Pinckney  scorned  to  cover  his  views  with  such  juggling 
dissimulation.  He  freely  confessed  that  the  most  to  be  ex 
pected  from  South  Carolina  was  an  occasional  prohibition 
of  the  importation.2  The  delegates  from  Connecticut  have 
the  sad  honor  of  having  encouraged  the  remainder  of  the 
southern  delegates  to  throw  off  their  masks.  Roger  Sher 
man  deprecated  the  slave-trade,  but  thought  that  u  the  pub 
lic  good  did  not  demand"  that  the  right  of  importing  slaves 
should  be  taken  away  from  the  states.  Ellsworth  went  still 
farther.  To  the  future  chief  justice  of  the  United  States, 
the  "  morality  and  wisdom  of  slavery"  were  matters  which 
did  not  concern  the  Union.  With  a  bold  hand,  he  threw 
the  dollar  as  a  decisive  weight  into  the  balance.8  And  if 

1  Elliot,  Deb ,  V.,  pp.  379,  459,  460.  .1 

3  Ibid,  V.,  p.  460;  compare  IV.,  pp.  272,  273. 

8  "  Let  every  state  import  what  it  pleases.  The  morality  or  wisdom 
of  slavery  are  considerations  belonging  to  the  states  themselves.  What 
enriches  a  part  enriches  the  whole,  and  the  states  are  the  best  judges  of 


292  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND   SLAVERY. 

some  of  the  most  cultured  rnen  in  the  north  treated  the 
slavery- question  with  such  moral  and  political  stupidity, 
it  is  not  strange  that  there  were  some  men  in  the  south 
who  had  completely  done  with  the  dreams  of  the  Revolu 
tionary  period  about  a  speedy  general  emancipation. 
Charles  C.  Pinckney  bluntly  said :  "  South  Carolina  and 
•Georgia  cannot  do  without  slaves."  Far  from  seeking  ex 
cuses  for  this,  he  minutely  followed  up  Ellsworth's  argu 
ment.1  Rutledge  took  the  last  step.  He  systematically 
rejected  every  argument  drawn  from  "  religion  or  human 
ity,"  because  "  interest  alone  is  the  governing  principle 
with  nations."2  South  Carolina,  Georgia  and  North  Caro 
lina  would  not  be  "  such  fools"  as  to.deprive  themselves  of 
such  an  important  advantage.2  So  said  another  man,  who 
was  afterwards  chosen  for  chief  justice  of  the  United  States. 
The  extreme  champions  of  the  slaveholding  interest  can 
not  be  reproached  with  not  having  clearly  defined  their 
position.  The  delegates  of  the  northern  states  made  the 
compact  with  open  eyes  and  complete  knowledge.  Their 
motive,  as  they  repeatedly  declared  at  Philadelphia  and 
later  in  the  ratification  conventions  of  the  different  states, 
was  the  firm  conviction  that  only  in  this  way  could  the 
Union  be  maintained. 

their  particular  interest.  The  old  confederation  had  not  meddled  with 
this  point;  and  he  did  not  see  any  greater  necessity  for  bringing  it 
within  the  policy  of  the  new  one."  Elliot,  Deb.,  V.,  p.  457. 

1  "  He  contended  that  the  importation  of  slaves  would  be  for  the  inter 
est  of  the  whole  Union.  The  more  slaves,  the  more  produce  to  employ 
the  carrying  trade;  the  more  consumption  also;  and  the  more  of  this, 
the  more  revenue  for  the  common  treasury."  Ibid,  V.,  p.  459.  Compare 
IV.,  p.  296. 

a  "Religion  and  humanity  had  nothing  to  do  with  this  question.  In 
terest  alone  is  the  governing  principle  with  nations.  The  true  question 
at  present  is,  whether  the  southern  states  shall  or  shall  not  be  parties  to 
the  Union.  If  the  northern  states  consult  their  interest,  they  will  not 
oppose  the  increase  of  slaves,  which  will  increase  the  commodities  of 
which  they  will  become  the  carriers."  Ibid,  V.,  p.  457. 

•  Ibid,  V.,  p.  460. 


THE   GREAT   COMPROMISE.  293 

The  compromise,  as  the  bargain  was  called,  contained  two 
points:  (1)  representation  and  direct  taxation  shonldbe  in 
the  same  ratio,  and  in  estimating  them  five  slaves  should 
be  reckoned  as  three  freemen;1  (2)  congress  was  forbidden 
to  prohibit  the  importation  of  slaves  into  the  states  then 
existing  before  the  year  1808,  but  it  was  allowed  to  lay  a 
tax  of  not  more  than  $10  per  capita  on  the  importation.2 

These  provisions  did  not  concede  everything  which  had 
been  asked  by  some  of  the  southern  delegates.  Whether 
and  how  far  they  can  be  called  a  compromise  demands 
more  careful  examination. 

Under  the  confederation  the  states,  as  such,  were  repre 
sented,  and  hence  each  had  an  equal  voice.  This  principle 
was  preserved  in  a  modified  form  by  the  system  of  repre 
sentation  in  the  senate.  For  representation  in  the  house, 
the  population  was  taken  as  a  basis.  This  was  not.  the  de 
velopment  of  one  distinct  and  clearly  formulated  concep 
tion.  In  the  debates  the  most  common  expression  was 
that  the  population  was  the  best  measure  of  the  industrial 
capacity,  that  is,  of  the  public  well-being.  But  if  this 
supposition  was  just  and  if  the  representation  should  be 
measured  by  the  public  well-being,  then  no  objection  can 
be  made  to  the  first  part  of  the  compromise,  provided  the 
relation  between  the  productiveness  of  slaves  and  of  free 
men  was  measured  with  approximate  accuracy.  Yet  the 
south  pretended  that  it  far  surpassed  the  north  in  wealth 
and  constantly  used  this  circumstance  as  a  pretext  for  the 
more  emphatic  urging  of  its  claims.  If  this  assertion  was 
well  founded,  then  its  quota  of  representatives  as  well  as  of 
taxes  was  set  too  low.  It  did  not  rest  its  claim  to  greater 
wealth. upon  higher  industrial  capacity  or  greater  industry. 
The  extent  of  the  states,  the  fertility  of  the  soil,  the  re 
markable  value  of  its  products  and  its  slaves  were  the  main 

'Art  I.,  Sec. 2,  §8. 
•  Ibid,  Sec.  9,  §  1. 


294:  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND   SLAVERY. 

features  in  its  inventory.  It  acknowledged  by  this  that 
outside  of  the  number  of  people,  many  other  causes  must 
be  taken  account  of  in  order  to  determine,  even  approxi 
mately,  industrial  capacity.  It  was,  therefore,  evidently 
unjust  to  apportion  representation  and  direct  taxes  simply 
according  to  the  number  of  people,  when  this  was  con 
sidered  only  as  a  measure  of  industrial  value.  But  besides 
this,  and  above  all,  the  selection  of  public  wealth  as  the 
basis  of  representation  is  in  contradiction  to  the  idea,  not 
only  of  a  democratic  republic,  but  of  any  sort  of  represen 
tative  state.  The  idea  of  representation  is  always  based, 
more  or  less,  upon  the  individual,  to  whom  as  a  member 
of  the  political  community,  an  indirect  share  in  the  regu 
lation  of  political  affairs  by  representation  belongs.  The 
fact  that  the  political  institutions  of  no  state  have  ever 
fully  realized  this  idea,  and  that  they  never  can  fully  real 
ize  it,  is  a  matter  of  no  moment.  Institutions  realize  the 
idea  more  or  less  closely,  and  whether  this  right  belongs 
to  all  men  of  full  age  or  only  to  a  part  of  them,  who  thus 
act,  so  to  speak,  as  trustees  for  the  whole  people,  involves  a 
difference  of  degree,  not  kind.  Even  where  a  so-called  rep 
resentation  of  interests  or  a  grouping  of  population  with 
a  graduated  quota  of  representation  exists,  the  idea  of  repre 
sentation  remains  the  same.  Interests  as  such  are  not  repre 
sented,  but,  instead,  a  number  of  individuals,  as  the  mana 
gers  of  certain  interests ;  and  the  gradation  of  the  right  of 
representation  only  recognizes  the  principle  that  this  right 
should  be  measured  by  the  proportion  of  certain  industries 
to  the  whole,  but  does  not  thrust  out  of  sight  the  principle 
that  to  the  individual,  as  a  member  of  the  political  com 
munity,  an  indirect  share  in  the  regulation  of  political 
affairs  by  representation  belongs.  But,  by  the  nature  of 
things,  the  supposition  of  this  right  must  rest  on  the  po 
litical  existence  of  the  individual,  or,  at  least,  on  the  full 
recognition  by  the  state  of  his  personal  existence.  The 
slaves  were  evidently  not  citizens,  and  in  the  southern  states 


REPRESENTATION    OF   SLAVES.  295 

they  practically  lacked,  in  the  right  meaning  of  the  word, 
a  personal  existence,  although  the  constitution  designated 
them  as  "  persons."  As  a  general  rule,  the  slave  had  no 
rights,  for  every  right  is  positive,  while  the  so-called  rights 
of  the  slave  were  merely  negative,  that  is,  were  limitations 
of  the  arbitrary  power  of  his  master.  It  was  therefore  a 
contradiction  in  itself  to  speak  of  the  representation  of 
slaves.  The  rights  and  interests  of  the  slaves  were  not 
represented,  but  the  people  who  considered  it  their  interest 
to  keep  the  slave  absolutely  without  rights  were,  as  the 
owners  of  human  chattels,  more  fully  represented  than 
others  entitled  to  representation.  It  has  never  been  denied 
that  not  only  were  the  states  represented  in  relation  to 
their  population,  but  that  also  the  population  of  the  states 
ought  to  be  represented.  Yet  Charles  C.  Pinckney  openly 
declared  in  the  debates  of  the  legislature  of  South  Caro 
lina  over  the  constitution  that  the  slaves  would  be  reckoned 
in  the  representation  as  property,  so  that  the  slaveholders, 
besides  their  right  of  representation  in  proportion  to  the 
population  of  freemen  and  of  persons  bound  to  service  for 
a  certain  time,  would  have  a  still  further  right  of  represen 
tation  as  the  owners  of  this  especial  sort  of  property.1 
This,  indeed,  cannot  be  read  in  plain  words  in  the  constitu 
tion.  It  does  not  at  all  say  Who  or  What  is  to  be  repre 
sented,  but  speaks  only  of  the .  apportionment  of  represen 
tation.  This  circumstance  was  made  great  use  of  by  those 
northern  politicians  who  did  not  justify  the  bargain  by  sad 
necessity,  but  sought  to  demonstrate  its  complete  equity. 
Through  all  this  whirl  of  sophisms,  however,  we  always 
come  back  to  the  simple  facts  that  a  representation  of  prop 
erty  was  granted  to  the  south,  which  the  north  did  not 
have,  and  that  as  a  result  of  this  the  vote  of  the  owner  of 

1  "  We  thus  obtained  a  representation  for  our  property ;  and  I  confess 
I  did  not  expect  that  we  had  conceded  too  much  to  the  eastern  states, 
when  they  allowed  us  a  representation  for  a  species  of  property  which 
they  have  not  among  them."  Elliot,  Deb.,  IV.,  p.  283. 


STATE    SOVEREIGNTY   AND   SLAVERY. 

fifty  slaves  was  of  as  much  weight,  in  regard  to  representa 
tion  in  the  house  of  congress,  as  the  votes  of  thirty  free 
men. 

In  the  ratification  conventions  of  the  northern  states, 
the  defenders  of  the  constitution  made  the  farther  asser 
tion  that,  since  the  slaves  were  also  reckoned  in  the  appor 
tionment  of  direct  taxes  in  the  proportion  of  five  to  three, 
a  just  recompense  was  made  to  the  north  for  this  conces 
sion.  The  fictitiousness  of  this  statement,  however,  is 
shown  by  the  fact  that  the  direct  taxes  which  were  to  be 
raised  were  not  worth  speaking  of.  Moreover,  the  north 
paid  much  more  than  its  share  of  indirect  taxes,  because 
as  good  as  nothing  flowed  into  the  federal  treasury  from 
the  whole  slave  population  in  this  way.  The  south  had 
gained  the  advantage  in  representation  as  well  as  in  the 
taxes  for  the  support  of  the  federal  government. 

In  regard  to  the  second  part  of  the  compromise,  it  was 
possible  for  the  northern  delegates  to  assert,  at  the  same 
time,  that  the  maintenance  of  the  Union  would  have  de 
pended  upon  its  adoption,  provided  the  threats  of  the  dele 
gates  of  the  two  Oarolinas  and  Georgia  would  have  been 
made  true  by  their  respective  states.1  But  many  of  the 
defenders  of  the  constitution  also  praised  the  provision 
concerning  the  importation  of  slaves  as  a  great  gain  for 
the  north  and  for  freedom.  This  view,  as  well  as  its  op 
posite,  can  be  better  defended  the  farther  back  a  man 

1  Some  later  utterances  of  the %  delegates  show  that  these  states  might 
safely  have  been  put  to  the  test.  Thus,  for  instance,  Charles  C.  Pinck- 
ney  said  in  the  legislature  of  South  Carolina:  "The  honorable  gentle 
man  alleges  that  the  southern  states  are  weak.  I  sincerely  agree  with 
him.  We  are  so  weak  by  ourselves  that  we  could  not  form  a  union 
strong  enough  for  the  purpose  of  effectually  protecting  each  other. 
Without  union  with  the  other  states  South  Carolina  must  soon  fall.  Is 
there  any  one  among  us  so  much  a  Quixote  as  to  suppose  that  this  state 
could  long  maintain  her  independence  if  she  stood  alone,  or  was  only 
connected  with  the  southern  states  ?  I  scarcely  believe  there  is."  Elliot, 
Deb.,  IV.,  pp.  283,  284 


THE    TWENTY.- YEARS    REPRIEVE.  297 

chooses  Lis  standpoint  from  which  to  judge.  Under  the 
articles  of  confederation  it  was  claimed  that  congress  had  no 
control  whatever  over  the  importation  of  slaves.  It  was 
evidently,  then,  an  advance  that  it  could  now  hinder  it  by 
taxation,  and  could,  after  twenty  years,  forbid  it  altogether. 
This  was  answered  by  Madison's  remark  in  the  convention, 
that  twenty  years  would  be  sufficient  for  working  the  evil 
that  was  to  be  feared  from  permitting  the  importation  of 
slaves.1  Mason  had  been  of  the  same  opinion,  and  had 
given  as  the  ground  of  his  belief  that  the  west  was  already 
strongly  desirous  of  introducing  slavery.  On  the  other 
side,  men  consoled  themselves  with  the  hope  that  a  pro 
hibition  of  importing  slaves  from  Africa,  even  after  twenty 
years,  would  still  suffice  to  assure  the  gradual  destruction 
of  slavery.2  This  view  was  contradicted  with  great  deci 
sion  by  a  very  important  section  of  the  country.  In  the 
legislature  of  South  Carolina,  the  clause  concerning  the 
import  of  slaves  met  with  the  strongest  opposition  that 
was  anywhere  shown  against  the  constitution.  Charles 
C.  Pinckney  considered  the  reprieve  of  twenty  years  that 
had  been  agreed  upon  as  amply  sufficient,  and  declared,  in 
relation  to  it,  that  he  would  oppose  every  limitation  of  the 
importation  "  as  long  as  an  acre  of  marsh  is  uncultivated 
in  South  Carolina."  Barn  well,  too,  ridiculed  the  fear  that 
the  eastern  states,  even  after  twenty  years,  would  so  little 
grasp  their  true  interest  as  to  put  obstacles  in  the  way  of 
the  importation, — "  without  we  ourselv.es  put  a  stop  to 
them,  the  traffic  for  negroes  will  continue  forever."8  The 

1  Elliot,  Deb.,  V.,  p.  477. 

1 "  But  we  may  say  that  although  slavery  is  not  smitten  by  apoplexy, 
yet  it  has  received  a  mortal  wound  and  will  die  of  a  consumption." 
Dawes,  in  the  ratification  convention  of  Massachusetts,  Elliot,  Deb., 
II.,  p.  41.  Compare  also  Wilson,  in  the  Pennsylvania  convention,  Ibid, 
II.,  p.  452.  John  Adams  wrote  in  18dl,  with  a  mistaken  view  of  facta 
that  is  hard  to  understand :  "  The  practice  of  slavery  is  fast  diminish 
ing."  Adams,  Works,  IX.,  p.  92. 

1  Elliot,  Deb.,  IV.,  pp.  296,  297. 


298  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY    AND    SLAVERY. 

doubt  cast  on  the  pretended  victory  of  the  cause  of  free 
dom  by  such  utterances  seemed  still  more  grave  when  men's 
minds  went  back  to  the  history  of  the  time  from  1774  to 
1776.  Then  the  delegates  from  all  the  colonies  had  been 
for  putting  an  end  at  once  and  forever  to  the  slave-trade. 
Now  Virginia  was  reproached  with  opposing  unlimited 
importation  only  through  motives  of"  interest,"  and  South 
Carolina  was  aware  only  of  "  religious  and  political  prej 
udices"  of  the  eastern  states  against  slavery. 

Yet  men's  minds  needed  not  to  go  back  so  far  in  order 
to  find  reasons  for  thinking  that  the  public  judgment  on 
slavery  had  become  more  lax.  The  constitution  contains 
still  a  third  provision  affecting  slavery,  which,  strangely 
enough,  received  very  little  attention  in  the  ratification 
conventions  of  the  northern  states.  Art.  IY.,  sec.  2,  §  3 
provides  that  persons  lawfully  bound  in  any  state  to  u  ser 
vice  or  labor,"  who  fled  into  another  state,  should  not  be 
released  from  the  service  or  the  labor  by  a  law  or  "  any 
regulation"  of  the  latter,  but  should  be  delivered  up  on 
demand.  This  clause  was  unanimously  adopted,  without 
debate,  by  the  convention  at  Philadelphia.1  This  was  a 
backward  step  of  great  import  and  disastrous  consequen 
ces.  The  articles  of  confederation  had  contained  no  similar 
provision  and  it  had  never  been  pretended  that  the  rendi 
tion  of  fugitive  slaves  was  a  self-evident  duty.  Even  Charles 
C.  Finckney  admitted  that  the  south  had  gained  a  new 
right  in  this.2  If  the  articles  of  confederation  had  imposed 
no  limits  whatever  upon  the  states  in  regard  to  slavery, 
they  had  also,  on  the  other  hand,  imposed  no  duties  what 
ever  upon  the  Union.  The  new  constitution  did  this  and 
this  is  the  weak  point  of  the  slavery  compromise  of  the 

1  Elliot,  Deb.,  V.,  p.  492.  Only  the  wording  was  changed  in  the  final 
revision  of  the  constitution.  The  clause  referred,  too,  to  apprentices 
and  the  so-called  "  bound  servants,"  but  it  was  self-evidently  especially 
directed  against  fugitive  slaves. 

8  Elliot,  Deb.,  IV.,  p.  286 ;  see  also  p.  176 


THE    CONSTITUTION    ON   SLAVERY.  299 

constitution.  Slavery  was  not  made  a  federal  institution 
and  the  constitution  did  not  contain,  as  was  later  asserted, 
a  formal  "guaranty"1  of  the  "peculiar  institution,"  but 
it  recognized  it  not  only,  as  the  articles  of  confederation 
did,  by  silence;  there  were  three  provisions  of  the  great 
est  weight  in  favor  of  slavery  contained  in  the  funda 
mental  law  of  the  Union,  and,  without  regard  to  the  con 
tents  of  these  provisions,  by  means  of  them  a  mighty 
pillar  of  support  was  thrust  under  the  rotten  structure.  Al 
though  the  words  "  slave"  and  "  slavery"  were  not  used  in 
them,  yet  this  was  not  only  a  matter  of  no  value,  but  made 
the  thing  still  worse.  Never  have  men  tried  by  such  a  pit 
iable  trick  to  lie  to  themselves  and  the  world  about  facts 
which  could  no  more  be  lied  away  than  the  sun  from  the 
firmament.  But  the  worst  of  it  was  that  these  circumlo 
cutions  were  used  on  the  demand,  not  of  the  south,  but  of 
the  north.2  The  plantation-owners  had  already  become  such 
complete  slavocrats  that  their  ears  were  no  longer  offended 
by  the  word  which  carries  in  its  sound  its  condemnation; 
and  the  north,  which  was  henceforth  to  bear  the  banner  of 
freedom  alone,  had  already  become  such  a  moral  coward 
that  it  tried  to  escape,  by  shunning  the  word,  the  respons 
ibility  for  the  legal  recognition  of  the  thing. 

Some  of  the  most  determined  opponents  of  slavery  af 
terwards  sought,  strange  to  say,  a  just  basis  for  their  strug- 

1  In  Prigg  vs.  The  Commonwealth  of  Pennsylvania,  however,  the 
supreme  court  of  the  United  States  declared :  "  Historically,  it  is  well 
known  that  the  object  of  this  clause  was  to  secure  to  the  citizens  of  the 
slaveholding  states  the  complete  right  and  title  of  ownership  in  their 
slaves,  as  property,  in  every  state  in  the  Union  into  which  they  might 
escape  from  the  state  where  they  were  held  in  servitude.  The  full  recog 
nition  [!]  of  this  right  and  title  was  indispensable  to  the  security  of  this 
species  of  property  in  all  the  slaveholding  states,  and,  indeed,  was  so  vital 
to  the  preservation  of  their  domestic  interests  and  institutions  that  it 
cannot  be  doubted  that  it  constituted  a  fundamental  article  without  the 
adoption  of  which  the  Union  could  not  have  been  formed."  Peters, 
Rep.,  XVI.,  p.  611 ;  Curtis,  XIV.,  pp.  420,  421. 

1  Elliot,  Deb.,  II.,  pp.  451,  452;  IV.,  pp.  102,  176;  V.,  p.  477. 


300  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND   SLAVERY. 

gle  against  it  in  the  fact  that  the  constitution  recognizes  no 
"  slaves"  but  only  "  persons."  This  would  make  a  good 
theme  for  very  logical  dissertations,  but  the  dissertations 
cannot  destroy  the  strong  band  of  the  logic  of  facts,  by 
which  the  south  tugged  the  north,  step  by  step,  farther  along 
its  path.  It  has  already  been  related  in  another  chapter, 
with  what  arrogance  the  south  seized  the  first  opportunity 
to  do  so.  It  could  be  answered,  but  it  could  not  be  si 
lenced.  Fig-trees  do  not  grow  from  thistles  in  America 
any  more  than  elsewhere.  The  principle  had  been  bar 
gained  away  for  the  sake  of  the  Union,  and  hence  every 
new  demand  dictated  to  the  slavocracy  by  the  impulse  of 
self-preservation  presented  to  the  north  the  alternative  of 
yielding  and  therewith  taking  a  farther  step  away  from  the 
right  principle  or  of  endangering  the  Union.  This  was  the 
result  which  the  relentless  logic  of  historic  justice,  that  is, 
of  the  moral  order  of  the  world,  involved.  Taxes  could  be 
laid  without  tearing  the  Union  asunder,  only  as  long  as  in 
the  south  the  interests  bound  up  in  the  Union  outweighed 
the  slavocratic  interests.  The  longer  men  shrank  back 
from  the  test,  so  much  the  more  dictatorially  did  the  south 
necessarily  speak,  so  much  the  more  did  it  necessarily  de 
mand,  so  much  the  more  was  necessarily  conceded  to  it,  so 
much  the  more  did  the  distinct  slavocratic  interest  neces 
sarily  outgrow  the  interests  connected  with  the  Union. 

An  earnest  struggle  of  the  southern  states  against  slavery 
on  their  own  initiative  was  impossible  as  long  as  they 
thought  that  not  only  their  industrial  well-being,  but  their 
very  industrial  existence,  depended  upon  it.  But  this  con 
viction  already  existed,  at  least  in  South  Carolina  and 
Georgia.1 

1  In  the  debates  of  the  legislature  of  South  Carolina  over  the  consti 
tution,  Lowndes  said :  "Without  negroes,  this  state  would  degenerate 
into  one  of  the  most  contemptible  in  the  Union,"  and  Charles  C.  Pinck- 
ney :  "  I  am  as  thoroughly  convinced  as  that  gentleman  is,  that  the  na 
ture  of  our  climate  and  the  flat,  swampy  situation  of  our  country  oblige 


THE   SLAVERY  DILEMMA.  301 

If  it  remained  confined  to  these  states  and  grew 
weaker  elsewhere,  then  human  rights  and  the  blessings 
of  free  labor  would  necessarily  and  steadily  gain  ground. 
If  it  struck  deeper  root  and  spread  wider,  then  human 
rights,  free  labor  and  all  freedom,  political,  religious 
and  moral,  would  perforce  ever  bow  lower  under  the 
yoke  of  the  slavocracy,  as  long  as  men  would  neither  sac 
rifice  the  Union  nor  venture  to  fight  for  the  Union.  The 
preservation  of  the  status  quo  was  impossible. 

us  to  cultivate  our  lands  with  negroes,  and  that  without  them  South  Car- 
olina  would  soon  be  a  desert  waste.  .  .  We  .  .  .  assigned  rea 
sons  for  our  insisting  on  the  importation,  which  there  is  no  occasion  to 
repeat,  as  they  must  occur  to  every  gentleman  in  the  house."  Elliot, 
Deb.,  IV.,  pp.  272,  285.  The  debates  of  the  Georgia  convention  are  not 
preserved,  but  the  votes  of  the  Georgia  delegates  at  Philadelphia  and 
the  way  in  which  they  let  the  South  Carolina  delegates  speak  for  them 
fully  justify  the  assertion  made  in  the  text.  In  May,  1789,  the  first  skir 
mish  in  congress  on  the  slavery  question  took  place.  The  provocation 
thereto  was  the  motion  by  Parker  of  Virginia  to  lay  a  tax  of  $10  per 
head  upon  slaves  imported.  Jackson  of  Georgia  said  on  this  occasion : 
"  They  [gentlemen]  do  not  wish  to  charge  us  for  every  comfort  and  en 
joyment  of  life  and  at  the  same  time  take  away  the  means  of  procuring 
them;  they  do  not  wish  to  break  us  down  at  once."  Deb.  of  Congress, 
L,  p.  73.  Georgia  was  for  a  long  time  the  only  state  which  permitted 
the  importation  of  slaves.  South  Carolina  did  not  repeal  her  prohibition, 
which  had  existed  since  the  time  of  the  Philadelphia  convention,  until 
1803.  Georgia  had  then  again  forbidden  it  and  by  a  clause  in  the  con 
stitution  of  1798.  Opinions  of  the  Attorneys  General,  I.,  p.  449. 


302          STATE  SOVEREIGNTY  AND  SLAVERY. 


CHAPTEK  VIII. 

HISTORY  OF  THE  SLAVERY  QUESTION  FROM  1789  UNTIL  THE 
MISSOURI  COMPROMISE. 

Washington  had  written  as  early  as  1786  to  Lafayette 
that  he  "  despaired"  of  seeing  the  spirit  of  freedom  gain 
the  upper  hand.1  Politicians  and  people,  however,  contin 
ued  to  be  convinced  of  the  contrary,  although  under  the 
new  constitution  proofs  of  the  justice  of  Washington's 
view  rapidly  accumulated.  A  most  notable  symptom  of 
this  was  that  no  one  was  conscious  how  quickly  the  nation 
was  striding  forward  on  the  wrong  path.  The  constant 
speaking  and  writing  about  freedom  during  the  Eevolution 
bore  evil  fruits.  The  gulf  between  abstract  political  rea 
soning  and  the  actual  development  of  freedom  had  become 
perilously  broad.  Not  only  was  the  faculty  of  political 
judgment  hurt,  but  the  political  will  of  the  nation  had 
suffered.  Men  became  impatient  and  unjust  because  they 
had  talked  themselves  into  believing  the  flattering  illusion 
that  in  the  struggle  against  the  injustice  of  others,  one 
starts  from  the  absolute  principle  of  justice.  The  speediest 
courser  on  the  road  to  despotism  is  a  principle  ridden 
without  reins.  If  men  had  given  themselves  up  to  gross 
illusions,  at  first,  in  regard  to  the  readiness  with  which  real 
interests  would  be  sacrificed  at  the  altar  of  principle,  they 
now  ruthlessly  rejected  the  principle  for  the  sake  of  empty 
prejudices.  Their  position  on  the  slavery  question  might 
have  been  more  or  less  excused  by  sad  political  necessity. 
But  for  the  shameful  treatment  of  the  free  men  of  color, 
not  even  this  dubious  justification  can  be  brought  forward 

Wash.,  Writ,  IX.,  p.  163. 


TREATMENT  OF  FREE  NEGEOES.  303 

— at  least  not  yet — and  it  therefore  throws  an  especially 
clear  light  upon  how  far  the  principles  of  the  Declaration 
of  Independence,  with  their  consequences,  had  become 
flesh  of  the  flesh  and  bone  of  the  bone  of  the  people. 

The  free  men  of  color,  especially  those  in  the  northern 
states,had  had  an  honorable  share  in  the  war  of  independence. 
On  different  occasions,  as,  for  instance,  at  the  defense  of 
Red  Bank,  they  had  greatly  distinguished  themselves.  The 
republic  now  praised  them  for  this,  while  congress  de 
clared  them  unworthy  to  serve  in  the  militia.1  This  did 
the  slaveholders  a  service  that  involved  the  greatest  con 
sequences,  for  it  had  now  been  recognized  as  a  fundamental 
fact  that  race  and  color  were  principles  which  should  nec 
essarily  be  taken  account  of  in  making  laws. 

The  consequences  logically  resulting  from  this  fact  were 
practically  followed  up  so  widely  that  they  almost  instant 
ly  amounted  to  an  emphatic  recognition  of  slavery  as  a 
national  institution.  In  the  southern  states,  slavery  was 
looked  upon  as,  without  doubt,  the  natural  position  of  per 
sons  of  color,  so  that  the  presumption  of  the  law  was  that 
every  colored  man  was  a  slave.2  If  the  freedom,  of  a  col 
ored  man  was  questioned  by  any  one  whatever,  the  burden 
of  proof  to  the  contrary  rested  on  him.  This  upsetting  of 
the  fundamental  principle  of  law  recognized  by  all  civil 
ized  peoples- — a/ffirmanti)  non  neganti,  incwribit  probatio— 
was  formally  approved  by  congress  when  it  resolved  that, 
in  the  District  of  Columbia,  over  which  the  constitution 
gave  it  unlimited  power,3  the  laws  of  Maryland  and  Yir- 
ginia  should  respectively  remain  in  force.4  Yet  this  is  not 

1  Law  of  May  8, 1792.    Stat.  at  Large,  I.,  p.  271. 

*  "  In  a  state  where  slavery  is  allowed,  every  colored  person  is  pre 
sumed  to  be  a  slave."    Prigg  vs.  Commonwealth  of  Pennsylvania. 
Peters,  Kep.,  XVI.,  p.  669;  Curtis,  XIV.,  p.  470. 

•  Art.  I.,  Sec.  8,  §  17. 

4  Law  of  Feb.  27,  1801 ;  Stat.  at  Large,  II.,  p.  105.  The  part  of  the  Dis 
trict  ceded  by  Virginia  was  afterwards  given  back  to  that  state.  In  the 
report  of  the  committee  for  the  District,  Jan.  11, 1827,  it  is  affirmed: 


804         STATE  SOVEREIGNTY  AND  SLAVERY. 

all.  Henceforth  slavery  existed  in  the  District  only  by 
virtue  of  this  law  — a  slavery  with  a  code  which  was  a  veri 
table  muster-roll  of  horrors.  It  is  possible,  and  in  truth 
probable,  that  most  members  of  congress  were  not  aware 
what  sort  of  abominations  they  had  made  laws  of  the  Union 
by  adopting  the  slave-code  of  Maryland,  then  nearly  a  cen 
tury  old.1  But  how  far  does  the  excuse  reach?  If  human 
rights  had  already  become  so  much  of  a  lie,  as  far  as  race 
and  color  were  concerned,  that  it  was  no  longer  deemed 
worth  the  trouble  to  inquire  what  laws  were  made  about 
them,  then  the  nation  was  only  one  step  from  letting  such 
outrages  against  the  first  demands  of  justice,  humanity  and 
morality,  to  say  nothing  of  the  principles  of  freedom,  be 
framed  into  laws  with  the  full  consciousness  of  their  mean 
ing.  History  affords  proof  of  this.2  Some  decades  after- 

"In  this  District,  as  in  all  the  slave-holding  states  in  the  Union,  the  le 
gal  presumption  is  that  persons  of  color  going  at  large  without  any  evi 
dences  of  their  freedem  are  absconding  slaves  and  prima  facie  liable 
to  all  legal  provisions  applicable  to  that  class  of  persons."  Reports  of 
Committees,  XIX  Congress,  2d  Sess.,  I.,  No.  43. 

1  "  Laws  of  the  Union"  so  far  as  congress,  according  to  the  decision  of 
the  supreme  court  of  the  United  States,  is  not  simply  the  local  legisla 
ture  of  the  District,  but  acts,  even  in  this  respect,  as  the  legislature  of 
the  Union.  In  Cohens  vs.  Virginia  (1821)  the  court  affirmed  that  "  this 
power  ...  is  conferred  on  congress  as  the  legislature  of  the  Union ; 
for  strip  them  of  that  character,  and  they  would  not  possess  it.  In  leg 
islating  for  the  District,  they  necessarily  preserve  the  character  of  the 
legislature  of  the  Union.  .  .  Those  who  contend  that  acts  of  congress 
made  in  pursuance  of  this  power  do. not,  like  acts  made  in  pursuance 
of  other  powers,  bind  the  nation,  ought  to  show  some  safe  and  clear  rule 
which  shall  support  this  construction  and  prove  that  an  act  of  congress 
clothed  in  all  the  forms  which  attend  other  legislative  acts,  and  passed 
in  virtue  of  a  power  conferred  on  and  exercised  by  congress  as  the  legis 
lature  of  the  Union,  is  not  a  law  of  the  United  States  and  does  not  bind 
them,"  Wheaton,  Rep.,  VI.,  pp.  424,  425  ;  Curtis,  V.,  p.  112. 

*  In  the  report  already  quoted  of  the  committee  for  the  District  of 
Columbia,  it  is  said :  "  If  a  free  man  of  color  should  be  apprehended  as  a 
runaway,  he  is  subjected  to  the  payment  of  all  fees  and  rewards  [ !]  given 
by  law  for  apprehending  runaways ;  and  upon  failure  to  make  such 
payment  is  liable  to  be  sold  as  a  slave."  The  committee  recommended 


SLAVE  CODE  OF  CONGRESS.  305 

wards,  through  the  direct  action  of  congress,  it  became  law 
at  the  seat  of  the  national  government  that  persons  known 
to  be  free  should  be  sold  as  slaves  in  order  to  cover  the  costs 
of  imprisonment  which  they  had  suffered  on  account  of 
the  false  suspicion  that  they  were  runaway  slaves.  And 
this  law  was  repeatedly  put  into  full  effect.  How  many 
crowned  despots  can  be  mentioned  in  the  history  of  the  old 
world  who  have  done  things  which  compare  in  accursed- 
ness  with  this  law  to  which  the  democratic  republic  gave 
birth?  Can  all  history  furnish  a  second  example  of  a  na 
tion  throwing  so  great  a  lie,  with  such  insolent  hardihood, 
in  the  face  of  the  world,  as  the  United  States,  with  their 
belief  in  the  principles  of  the  Declaration  of  Independence, 
did  for  almost  a  century? 

The  judgment  is  hard,  but  just.  Many  people  will  not 
allow  the  least  blame  to  be  cast  on  this  period,  because  it 
does  not  harmonize  with  their  admiration  of  the  "fathers, M 
and  because  they  have  adopted,  without  any  proof,  the 
common  view  that  the  deeper  shadows  of  slavery  and  slav- 
ocracy  first  appeared  comparatively  late.  If  we  consider 
the  spirit  which  filled  the  law-makers  as  the  essential  thing, 
we  can  still  accept  this  view  only  as  a  partial  justification. 
In  order  to  judge  of  the  spirit  rightly,  we  must  by  no 
means  fall  into  the  very  common  error  of  overlooking  the 
sins  of  omission  chargeable  to  congress.  In  reading 
through  the  debates,  single  striking  instances  of  injustice 
do  not  make  the  deepest  impression.  It  is  the  omnipres 
ent  unwillingness  to  practice  justice  towards  colored  per 
son  — yes,  even  to  recognize  them  as  actual  beings.  When 
the  defense  of  their  rights  is  demanded,  then  congress  has 
always  a  deaf  ear.  The  representatives  of  the  slave  states 
oppose  to  every  demand  their  firm  and  yet  passionate  Non 
poxsumus  with  a  consistency  and  energy  which  would  have 

that  the  municipality  of  Washington  should  be  charged  with  the  costs, 
but  the  law  remained  unchanged. 

20 


30C  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND   SLAVERY. 

reflected  honor  on  the  papal  curia.     And  in  most  cases 
they  carry  the  majority  with  them. 

Swan  wick  of  Pennsylvania  laid  before  the  house  of  rep 
resentatives,  Jan.  30,  1797,  a  petition  from  four  North 
Carolina  negroes  who  had  been  freed  by  their  masters. 
Since  a  state  law  condemned  them  to  be  sold  again,  they 
had  fled  to  Philadelphia.  There  they  had  been  seized  un 
der  the  fugitive  slave  law,  a  full  explanation  of  which  is 
given  hereafter,  and  now  prayed  congress  for  its  interven 
tion.  Blount  of  North  Carolina  declared  that  only  when 
it  was  "  proved"  that  these  men  were  free,  could  congress 
consider  the  petition.  Sitgreaves  of  Pennsylvania  asked, 
in  reply  to  this,  what  sort  of  proof  was  offered  that  the 
four  negroes  were  not  free.  This  question  received  no  an 
swer.  Smith  of  South  Carolina  and  Christie  of  Maryland 
simply  expressed  their  amazement  that  any  member  what 
ever  could  have  presented  a  petition  of  "  such  an  unheard- 
of  nature."  Swanwick  and  some  other  representatives 
affirmed  that  the  petition  must  be  submitted  to  a  commit 
tee  for  investigation  and  consideration,  because  the  peti 
tioners  complained  of  violation  of  their  rights  under  a  law 
of  the  Union.  No  reply  could  be  made  to  this  and  no 
reply  was  attempted.  This  decisive  point  was  simply  set 
aside,  and  it  was  voted  by  fifty  ayes  to  thirty- three  noes 
not  to  receive  the  petition.1  Congress  acknowledged  by 
this  vote  the  truth  of  the  view  expressed  by  Christie,  that 
under  the  fugitive  slave  law  no  injury  could  happen  to  a 
freeman.  In  order  to  reach  this  result,  Smith  had  pro 
duced  the  customary  impression  by  the  declaration  that  the 
refusal  of  the  demand  made  by  the  representatives  from  the 
southern  states  would  drive  a  "  wedge"  into  the  Union. 
When,  three  years  later,  the  same  question  was  brought 
before  congress  again  by  a  petition  of  the  free  negroes  of 
Philadelphia,  Rutledge  of  South  Carolina  declared  in  even 

1  See  the  debate  in  Deb.  of  Congress,  II.,  pp.  57-60. 


RIttHT    OF    PETITION.  307 

plainer  terms  that  the  south  would  be  forced  to  the  sad 
necessity  of  going. its  own  way.1 

It  was  always  especially  distasteful  to  the  representatives 
of  the  south  to  see  the  crime  of  slavery  brought  before 
congress  by  colored  people.  But  the  whites  who  troubled 
themselves  about  slaves  or  free  colored  persons  had  no  bet 
ter  reception.  Year  after  year  the  Quakers  came  indefat- 
igably  with  new  petitions,  and  each  time  had  to  undergo 
the  same  scornful  treatment.  In  1797,  the  yearly  meeting 
at  Philadelphia  set  forth  some  especial  wrongs  in  a  petition. 
The  most  prominent  place  in  the  document  was  occupied  by 
a  complaint  against  the  law  of  North  Carolina,  which  con 
demned  freed  slaves  to  be  sold  again.  Many  southern  del 
egates  expressed,  in  a  bullying  fashion,  their  scorn  for  the 
tenacity  with  which  these  men  of  earnest  faith  ever  con 
stantly  came  back  again  to  their  hopeless  work.  Rutledge 
and  Parker  demanded  that  the  petition  should  be  laid  "un 
der  the  table."2  Eutledge  even  wished  that  "  a  sharp  re 
proof"  should  be  sent  to  the  petitioners.  But  the  defend 
ers  of  the  right  of  petition  succeeded,  this  time,  in 
having  the  memorial  referred  to  a  special  committee.  No 
attention,  however,  was  paid  to  it  there. 

The  year  before,  Delaware  had  laid  before  congress  a 
memorial  in  regard  to  kidnapping.  In  reply  to  a  question 
put  by  Murray,  Swan  wick  declared  that  the  term  "kid 
napping"  was  to  be  understood  as  referring  both  to  run 
ning  slaves  off  in  order  to  free  them  and  to  the  stealing  of 
free  negroes  in  order  to  sell  them  as  slaves.3  Although 
congress  was  asked  to  take  action  in  this  case  by  a  slave 
state,  yet  the  representatives  from  the  rest  of  the  south 

1  Deb.  of  Congress,  II.,  p.  443. 

*  Ibid,  II.,  pp.  183, 185.    The  proposal  was  applauded.     Christie  and 
Jones  of  Georgia  repeated  it  in  1800  on  a  similar  occasion.    Ibid,  II., 
p.  439. 

*  Yet  it  appears  from  an  utterance  of  J.  Nicholas  of  Virginia,  that  it 
was  especially  desired  to  put  an  end  to  the  hunt  after  free  colored  men. 


308          STATE  SOVEREIGNTY  AND  SLAVERY. 

were  not  willing  to  allow  it  to  "  meddle"  in  any  way  what 
ever  with  matters  concerning  slavery,  since  the  power  to 
do  so  might  be  afterwards  used  against  slaveholding  inter 
ests.  "W.  Smith  affirmed  that  slavery  was  a  "purely  mu 
nicipal"  affair.  Representatives  from  the  northern  states 
supported  this  view  from  different  motives.  Coit  of  Con 
necticut  asserted  that  "  the  laws  of  the  different  states  were 
amply  sufficient"  to  stem  the  evil.  On  his  motion,  and 
by  forty-six  to  thirty  votes,  the  question  was  postponed 
in  such  a  way  that  it  could  not  come  before  the  house  again. 
The  assurance  given  by  the  states  most  concerned  that 
their  laws  could  not  suffice  for  this  purpose,  especially 
since  they  could  have  no  jurisdiction  whatever  on  the  wa 
ter,  received  no  attention,  although  it  was  generally  admit 
ted  that  the  evil  existed  to  a  marked  extent. 

In  all  the  cases  mentioned,  the  tactics  of  the  representa 
tives  of  the  slaveholding  interest  were  the  same  and  they 
maintained  them  unchanged  up  to  the  last.  If  congress 
was  urged  to  act  in  any  way  which  did  not  please  them, 
then  slavery  was  always  a  "  purely  municipal  affair."  Then 
the  literal  interpretation  of  the  constitution  was  insisted 
upon;  every  constructive  power  of  congress  was  declared 
to  be  inadmissible;  and  it  was  thus  stripped  of  all  power, 
since  no  authority  over  slavery,  except  in  regard  to  the 
importation  of  slaves,  was  directly  granted  it.  But  if  the 
act  of  congress  was  in  their  interest,  then,  just  as  steadily, 
exactly  the  opposite  path  was  pursued.  Then  was  heard 
the  reasoning:  the  southern  states  would  never  have  rati 
fied  the  constitution  if  complete  security  in  regard  to 
slavery  had  not  been  promised  them;  all  interests  should 
have  equal  rights  and  equal  claims  to  the  protection  of  the 
Union.  And  from  the  first  instant  a  sufficient  number  of 
members  from  the  north  clasped  hands  with  the  south  to 
make  the  laws  a  mere  nose  of  wax  in  the  hands  of  the  latter. 
So  the  slaveholding  interest  found  it  as  easy  to  carry 


SLAVERY   RECOGNIZED   IN    TREATIES.  309 

through  its  own  demands  as  to  reject  the  demands  of  its 
opponents. 

December  22,  1789,  North  Carolina  ceded  the  territory 
claimed  by  her  to  the  Union.  The  deed  of  cession  stipulated 
ten  conditions, — among  them  "  that  no  regulations  made 
or  to  be  made  by  congress  shall  tend  to  emancipate  slaves." 
April  2,  1790,  congress  accepted  the  cession  without  any 
discussion.1  April  2,  1802,  Georgia  ceded,  in  a  similar 
way,  her  western  territory,  and  in  doing  so  imposed  the 
condition  that  the  ordinance  of  1787  should  be  valid  there 
in,  in  all  its  parts,  "  except  only  the  article  which  forbids 
slavery."2  That  congress  accepted  the  cessions  in  this 
form  without  even  an  attempt  to  make  a  change  in  the 
conditions,  is  the  more  remarkable,  because  in  this  case  the 
constitution  can  well  be  relied  upon.  The  constitution 
declares  that  "  congress  shall  have  power  to  dispose  of  the 
territory  and  all  the  property  belonging  to  the  United 
States, and  to  make  all  necessary  rules,  and  regulations  for 
the  same."3  This  clause  is  quite  absolute  and  peremptory. 
Congress  had  also  unquestionably  a  right,  if  it  seemed  good 
to  it,  to  legalize  slavery  in  the  territories,  but  it  could  not 
bind  itself  and  all  future  congresses  (for  this  was  what  the 
states  which  made  the  cessions  wished  to  have  publicly  un 
derstood)  to  a  limitation  of  its  constitutional  powers. 

In  the  same  year  that  congress  took  into  the  possession 
of  the  United  States,  under  the  conditions  already  given, 
the  western  territory  of  North  Carolina,  the  treaty  power 
had  already  been  used  in  favor  of  the  slave-holders.  The 
irony  of  fate  willed  that  this  should  be  the  first  treaty  to 
be  completed  under  the  new  constitution.  August  7,  1790, 
a  treaty  with  the  Creek  Indians  was  agreed  upon  in  New 

1  Stat.  at  Large,  I.,  pp.  106-109. 

9  In  Little,  Brown  and  Co.'s  edition  of  the  statutes  at  large,  which  I 
used,  the  deed  of  cession  and  its  acceptance  by  congress  are  not  given. 
In  Bioren  and  Duane's  edition  they  may  be  found  in  vol.  I.,  p.  488. 

•Art.  IV.,  Sec.  3,  §2. 


310  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY    AND   SLAVERY. 

York.1  By  its  terms  the  Creeks  bound  themselves  to  de 
liver  up  the  slaves  who  had  fled  to  them  from  Georgia,  and 
to  hold  the  Seminoles,  who  lived  in  Spanish  Florida,  to  the 
same  duty.  That  the  president  and  senate  had  the  right 
to  insert  in  a  treaty  stipulations  in  favor  of  the  slavehold 
ers,  cannot  be  questioned,  since  the  treaty  power,  according 
to  the  provisions  of  the  constitution,  is  unlimited.  But  a 
duty  to  do  so  could  under  no  circumstances  exist,  since 
slavery  was  only  an  institution  of  the  individual  states,  but 
not  of  the  United  States.  The  Union  therefore  made  it 
self  a  direct  accomplice  in  the  crime  of  slavery,  when  it 
voluntarily  used  its  power  in  behalf  of  the  specific  interests 
of  the  slaveholders.  If,  in  regard  to  the  slavery  compro 
mises  of  the  constitution,  it  should  be  boldly  affirmed  that 
so  far  as  the  Union  was  concerned,  slavery  was  only  a  rec 
ognized  fact,  with  which  it  had  nothing  to  do,  yet  this  was 
now,  at  least,  no  longer  true.  According  to  the  constitu 
tion,  treaties  are  "  the  supreme  law  of  the  land."  Such 
treaty  stipulations  practically  recognized  slavery  as  an  in 
stitution,  in  behalf  of  which  the  legislative  power  of  the 
Union  should  be  used. 

Three  years  later  this  happened  in  a  much  more  direct 
way.  Mention  has  already  been  made  of  the  clause  of  the 
constitution  which  provides  that  persons  bound  to  service 
or  labor  who  flee  into  another  state  shall  not  be  released 
from  their  service  or  labor,  as  the  result  of  any  law  or 
regulation  whatever  of  this  state,  but  shall  be  delivered 
up  upon  the  demand  of  the  person  to  whom  the  service  or 
labor  is  due.  This  clause  thus  limited  the  legislative 
power  of  the  states,  and  laid  upon  the  states  an  obligation.2 


1  Stat.  at  Large,  VII.,  p.  35. 

9  This  view  is  in  opposition  to  the  decision  of  the  supreme  court  of 
the  United  States.  In  the  case  of  Prigg  vs.  Commonwealth  of  Penn 
sylvania  it  is  declared  that  "the  clause  is  found  in  the  national  constitu 
tion,  and  not  hi  that  of  any  state.  It  does  not  point  out  any  state  func 
tionaries  or  any  state  action  to  carry  its  provisions  into  effect.  The 


FUGITIVE-SLAVE   LAW.  311 

Action  by  congress  on  this  matter  was  not  demanded,  at 
least  not  immediately.  Yet  in  1793  it  passed,  of  its  own 

states  cannot  therefore  be  compelled  to  enforce  them,  and  it  might  well 
be  deemed  an  unconstitutional  exercise  of  the  power  of  interpretation 
to  insist  that  the  states  are  bound  to  provide  means  to  carry  into  effect 
the  duties  of  the  national  government  nowhere  delegated  or  entrusted  to 
them  by  the  constitution.  On  the  contrary,  the  natural,  if  not  the  neces 
sary,  conclusion  is  that  the  national  government,  in  the  absence  of  all 
positive  provisions  to  the  contrary,  is  bound,  through  its  own  proper 
departments,  legislative,  judicial,  or  executive,  as  the  case  may  require, 
to  carry  into  effect  all  the  rights  and  duties  imposed  upon  it  by  the 
constitution."  Peters,  Rep.,  XVI,,  pp.  615,  616;  Curtis,  XIV.,  p.  424. 
But  it  is  a  fundamental  doctrine  of  American  constitutional  law,  which 
has  never  been  questioned,  that  "  the  constitution  of  the  United  States 
is  a  part  of  the  law  of  every  slate."  (Chief  justice  Taney  said  in  the 
same  case :  "  And  the  words  of  the  article  which  direct  that  the  fugi 
tive  shall  be  delivered  up  seem  evidently  designed  to  impose  it  as  a 
duty  upon  the  people  of  the  several  states  to  pass  laws  to  carry  inf/o 
execution  in  good  faith  the  compact  into  which  they  thus  solemn 
ly  entered  with  each  other.  The  constitution  of  the  United  States,  and 
every  article  and  clause  in  it,  is  a  part  of  the  law  of  every  state  in  the 
Union,  and  is  the  paramount  law."  Peters,  Rep.,  XVI.,  p.  628 ;  Curtis, 
XIV.,  p.  435.)  It  repeatedly  applies  directly  to  the  states,  as  well  in 
prohibition  (Art.  I.  Sec.  10.)  as  in  command  (Art.  I.  Sec.  4,  §  1).  it  can 
not  be  inferred  from  the  simple  fact  that  the  clause  is  in  the  constitution 
of  the  Union,  that  it  does  not  bind  the  states  to  perform  a  direct  action, 
but  the  decision  of  the  supreme  court  is  supported  only  by  this  fact. 
The  clause  is  not  expressed  with  especial  clearness,  but,  judged  by  the 
usual  meaning  of  the  words,  it  unquestionably  applies  much  more 
directly  to  the  states  than  to  the  federal  powers.  However  great  weight 
I  generally  give  to  Story's  reasoning,  I  cannot  in  this  case  find  any 
sound  argument  in  his  work  against  my  view  that  the  states  were  not 
only  allowed,  but  obliged,  to  provide,  of  their  own  motion,  until  the 
passage  of  a  federal  law,  a  means  by  which  the  rights  given  the  slave 
holders  by  this  clause  could  be  secured.  This  does  not  contradict  the 
broader  and  evidently  just  decision  of  the  supreme  court  of  the  United 
States,  that  congress  had  the  right,  and  that  it  was  its  eventual  duty,  to 
regulate  this  question  by  a  federal  law,  which  would  then  evidently 
and  eo  ipso  set  aside  all  the  state  laws  concerning  the  matter.  Art.  I., 
Sec.  8,  §  4  (the  provision  concerning  a  bankrupt  law)  is  a  proof  that 
the  constitution  recognizes  rights  which  congress  may  or  may  not  use, 
and  which  belong  to  the  individual  states  until  it  sees  fit  to  use  them. 
The  same  fundamental  fact  seems  to  me  applicable  also  to  duties. 


312         STATE  SOVEREIGNTY  AND  SLAVERY. 

motion,1  a  fugitive-slave  law.2  In  the  house  of  representa 
tives  the  bill  was  passed  by  48  votes  against  7,  and,  as  it 
seems,  without  any  debate  worth  mentioning.3  The  vote 
on  this  truly  barbarous  law  shows  what  claim  colored  peo 
ple  had  to  human  rights;  how  much  truth  there  was  in 
the  exaggerated  complaint  that  hard  fate  imposed  the  curse 
of  slavery  upon  the  land;  and  how  terribly  earnest,  not 
only  at  the  south,  but  in  the  congress  of  the  UnioL,  the 
"  legal  presumption"  of  the  slavery  of  every  colored  per 
son  was. 

The  law  empowered  the  pretended  owner,  or  hit,  agent, 
to  bring  the  alleged  fugitive  "  before  any  magistrate,4  of 
a  county,  city,  or  town  corporate,"  in  order  to  obtain  a 
decision  which  ordered  the  return  of  the  fugitive  to  the 

r^ 

state  or  territory  from  which  he  had  escaped.  The  su 
preme  court  of  the  United  States  afterwards  acknowledged 
that  doubt  might  be  cast  upon  the  constitutionality  of  this 
provision.  It  declared  that  state  magistrates  could  use 
the  authority  thus  entrusted  to  them  by  congress  when 


Only  here  the  freedom  of  action  of  congress  is  limited  by  time.  It 
eeases  as  soon  as  a  decisive  cause  makes  the  conditional  duty  an  un 
conditional  one. 

1  In  order  to  escape  the  reproach  of  inexactness  the  history  of  this  law 
must  be  given  somewhat  more  in  detail.  The  immediate  cause  of  it 
was  a  message  of  Washington.  This  was  due  to  the  governor  of  Penn 
sylvania,  who  reclaimed  a  criminal  who  had  fled  to  Virginia.  The 
expression  used  in  the  text  is  therefore  so  far  justified  that  complaint 
had  not  been  made  of  an  ineffectual  reclamation  of  a  fugitive  slave. 

"  Approved  by  the  president  Feb.  12.  Statutes  at  Large,  L,  pp.-  302-305. 

*  Deb.  of  Congress,  I.,  p.  417.    It  is  not  apparent  what  the  motives  of 
the  seven  representatives  (among  them  two  from  slave  states)  who  voted 
in  the  negative  were. 

*  Bouvier,  Law  Dictionary,  II.,  p.  86,  defines  "magistrate"  as  "  a  pub 
lic  civil  officer  invested  with  some  part  of  the  legislative,  executive,  or 
Judicial  power  given  by  the  constitution;  in  a  narrower  sense  this  term 
includes  only  inferior  judicial  officers,  or  justices  of  the  peace."    I 
know  of  no  judicial  decision  in  which  the  meaning  of  magistrate  in 
this  connection  is  exactly  stated. 


DISREGARD    OF    HUMAN    EIGHTS.  313 

they  were  not  prevented  from  doing  so  by  state  laws.1  But 
this  niay  well  be  doubted.  Congress  certainly  could  not 
oblige  these  state  magistrates  to  use  the  powers  given 
them,  inasmuch  as  in  their  capacity  as  magistrates  it  could 
impose  no  duties  whatever  upon  them.  The  voluntary 
use  of  the  power,  with  the  silent  consent  of  the  states, 
therefore  appears  possible  only  under  the  fiction  that  con 
gress  made  all  the  state  magistrates  mentioned  in  this  law 
federal  magistrates  for  certain  defined  cases.  Yet  this  for 
mal  reasoning  is  the  least  reproach  which  can  be  brought 
against  the  law.  Legally^  the  decision  of  the  question 
whether  the  fugitive  was  a  runaway  slave  was  not  in  the 
least  prejudged  by  the  permission  given  to  take  him  back; 
but  actually  his  fate  was  thereby  sealed  in  nearly  every 
case.  That  which  is  dearest  to  man  was  made  subject  to 
the  judgment  of  a  single  person,  an  inferior  magistrate. 
This  was  not  only  a  shocking  disregard  of  the  first  prin 
ciples  of  justice,  humanity,  and  freedom,  but  it  was  also  a 
crying  wrong  to  the  spirit  of  the  constitution,  provided,  of 
course  that  the  "legal  presumption"  of  the  slavery  of 
every  colored  person  was  not  already  to  be  found  in  the 
constitution.2  The  Seventh  Amendment  provides:  "In 
suits  at  common  law,  where  the  value  in  controversy  shall 
exceed  twenty  dollars,  the  right  of  trial  by  jury  shall  be 
preserved."  Men  learned  in  the  law  might  dispute 

1  Prigg  vs.  Commonwealth  of  Pennsylvania,  Peters,  Rep.,  XVI.,  p. 
622;  Curtis,  XIV.,  p.  430. 

*  Judg«  McLean  says  in  the  case  of  Prigg  vs.  Commonwealth  of  Penn 
sylvania:  "  Both  the  constitution  and  the  act  of  1793  require  the  fugi 
tive  trom  labor  to  be  delivered  up  on  claim  being  made  by  the  party 
or  his  agent  to  whom  the  service  is  due,  not  that  a  suit  should  be  reg 
ularly  instituted."  (Peters,  XVI.,  p.  667;  Curtis,  XIV.,  p.  469.)  If 
this  can  be  deduced  from  the  wording  of  the  constitution, — and  there  is 
much  to  be  said  for  this  view  — then,  indeed,  "the  proceeding  authorized 
by  the  law"  must  be  "  summary  and  informal."  In  this  case  each  atro 
cious  provision  of  the  law  becomes  less  of  a  burden  for  congress  and 
more  of  a  burden  for  the  Philadelphia  convention. 


314:  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

whether  the  question  of  freedom  or  slavery  was  "  a  suit 
at  common  law";  slaveholders  might  deny  that  the 
freedom  of  the  colored  person  was  worth  twenty  dollars; 
hut  it  must  shock  the  sound  common  sense  of  every  right- 
thinking  man  that  in  a  land  where  suits  for  anything  worth 
twenty-one  dollars  could  be  brought  on  demand  before  a 
jury,  a  man  could  be  handed  over  to  life-long  slavery  by 
any  village  judge  willing  to  do  so.  And  in  such  a  case 
the  "parole  testimony"  of  the  pretended  master  or  his 
agent,  if  it  seemed  sufficient  to  the  judge,  was  to  suffice 
for  the  award  of  the  "  certificate." 

If  the  law-making  power  of  a  popular  state  unconscious 
ly  plays  in  this  wa^with  the  highest  questions,  then  it 
may  be  interred,  a  priori,  that  an  evil  is  eating  into  the 
political,  social  and  moral,  yes,  into  each  and  all  of  the 
ways  of  life  of  the  people, — an  evil  which  leads  the  nation 
to  inevitable  death,  unless  it  frees  itself  from  it  betimes 
with  knife  and  hot  iron. 

If  the  whole  responsibility  and  guilt  rested  upon  con 
gress,  as  Americans  usually  say  and  write,  then  all  the 
preceding  facts  would  be  of  little  worth  for  the  history  of 
democracy  in  the  United  States.  But  outside  of  America, 
it  is  not  so  easy  to  forget  that  congress  is  not  independent 
of  the  people.  If  the  representatives  of  the  north  could 
voluntarily  and  with  impunity  serve  the  peculiar  interests 
of  the  slaveholders,  then  the  population  of  the  north  must 
have  been,  at  least  to  a  great  extent,  indifferent  to  the 
rights  and  interests  of  persons  of  color.  And  this  is  ex 
actly  the  complaint  which  can  be  brought  against  the  rep 
resentatives  of  the  north  in  congress.  They  had  not  yet 
sunk  into  submissive  servants  of  the  slavocracy.  When, 
as  in  the  compromises  of  the  constitution  concerning  slav 
ery,  the  political  interests  of  the  northern  states,  that  is,  of 
the  white  population  of  the  north,  were  concerned,  then 
the  south  always  had  to  fight  a  hard  fight;  but  when  ques 
tions  of  humanity,  questions  which  directly  concerned  only 


NORTHERN    SLAVE-TRADERS.  315 

persons  of  color,  were  reviewed,  then  it  was  allowed  to 
carry  its  point  almost  without  opposition.  The  moral  ab 
horrence  of  slavery  was  at  no  time  great  enough  to  hinder 
the  participation  of  northerners  in  the  blackest  crimes  of 
slavery. 

As  early  as  1785,  Hopkins  complained  that  "  some  New 
England  states  and  other  states"  had  again  begun  to  im 
port  slaves  from  Africa.  Such  extraordinary  prices  were 
paid  for  negroes  in  the  West  Indies  and  some  southern 
states,  "  for  instance,  in  South  Carolina,"  that  the  evil 
would  soon  be  as  great  as  before  if  it  were  not  checked 
without  delay.1  After  the  adoption  of  the  constitution, 
the  complaint  was  often  repeated.  In  1800,  Wain  of 
Pennsylvania  declared  in  congress  that  the  slave-trade  was 
carried  on  in  great  part  by  Rhode  Island,  Boston  and 
Pennsylvania.2  In  1804,  Bard  of  Pennsylvania  repeated 
the  same  complaint  in  a  much  sharper  form.3  And  no  one 
denied  the  fact,  for  it  was  too  publicly  known.  When  an 
attack  was  made  in  congress  upon  slavery,  the  representa 
tives  of  the  southern  states  were  always  ready  with  the  sneer 
ing  suggestion  that  the  assailants  should  sweep  in  front  of 
their  own  doors;  and  in  truth,  the  dirtiest  business 
connected  with  slavery  was  carried  on  in  the  north.  Any 
excuses  designed  to  palliate  this  proved  reproach  could  be 
brought  forward  with  less  weight,  since  there  were  already 
delegates  from  the  north  who  justified  the  slave-trade  with 
an  insolent  boldness  that  could  not  be  surpassed  by  the 
South  Carolinians  themselves.4 

1  Goodell,  Slavery  and  Anti-slavery,  p.  122. 

8  Deb.  of  Congress,  II.,  p.  438. 

1  Deb.  of  Congress,  III.,  p.  132. 

4  Brown  of  Rhode  Island  said  in  1800:  "He  was  certain  that  this 
nation  having  an  act  against  the  slave-trade  did  not  prevent  the  expor 
tation  of  a  slave  from  Africa.  He  believed  we  might  as  well,  therefore, 
enjoy  that  trade,  as  to  leave  it  wholly  to  others.  It  was  the  law  of  that 
country  to  export  those  whom  they  held  in  slavery — who  were  as  much 
slaves  there  as  those  who  were  slaves  in  this  country — and  with  as 


316  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND   SLAVERY. 

The  single  practical  result  which  could  be  rightly  de 
duced  from  the  undeniable  fact,  was  evidently  the  pressing 
necessity  of  struggling  against  it  with  the  greatest  energy. 
A  great  part  of  the  northern  representatives  wished,  in 
deed,  to  go  as  far  as  the  constitution  then  allowed  them. 
But  the  representatives  of  some  of  the  southern  states, 
which  wished  a  farther  importation  of  slaves,  acted  as  if 
the  north  was  deprived  by  that  fact  of  any  moral  justifica 
tion  for  acting  against  their  wishes  in  this  respect.  They 
carried  their  point,  at  least  so  far  that  congress  did  not  for 
a  long  time  express,  even  indirectly,  its  disapprobation. 
The  attempt  was  repeatedly  made  to  impose  a  tax  of  $10 
upon  every  slave  imported.  South  Carolina's  repeal  of 
her  prohibition  of  the  importation  was  the  main  cause  of 
this.  The  representatives  of  that  state  did  not  venture  to 
defend  this,  but  sought  only  to  excuse  it.  Lowndes  ex 
plained  that  the  continual  violation  of  the  prohibition 
could  not  be  prevented,  and  that  it  had  therefore  been 
judged  better  to  legalize  what  would  at  any  rate  exist,  than 
to  accustom  citizens  to  such  a  disregard  of  the  law.1  The 
rest  of  the  members  of  the  house  of  representatives  were 
unanimous  in  their  condemnation  of  the  legislature  of 
South  Carolina.  But  yet  there  were  manifold  obstacles 
against  giving  official  expression  to  this  judgment,  by  vot 
ing  the  tax.  Some  affirmed  that  congress  would  thus  give 
its  sanction  to  the  importation  of  slaves,  and  that  the  men 
engaged  in  the  trade  would  at  once  claim  its  protection; 

much  right.  The  very  idea  of  making  a  law  against  this  trade  which 
all  other  nations  enjoyed,  and  which  was  allowed  to  be  very  profitable, 
was  ill  policy.  He  would  further  say  that  it  was  wrong  when  consid 
ered  in  a  moral  [ !]  point  of  view,  since  by  the  operation  of  the  trade 
the  very  people  themselves  much  bettered  their  condition.  It  ought  to 
be  a  matter  of  national  policy,  since  it  would  bring  in  a  good  revenue  to 
our  treasury."  Deb.  of  Congress,  II.,  p.  475.  Rutledge  expressed  the 
game  views,  but  even  he  shrank  from  stating  them  with  such  shameless 
nakedness.  Ibid,  II.,  p.  476. 
1  Deb.  of  Congress,  III.,  p.  129. 


IMPORT   OF   SLAVES  FORBIDDEN.  317 

others  wished  to  draw  no  national  revenue  from  such  an 
unclean  source;  others  contested  the  justice  of  the  tax, 
because  it  would  fall  only  upon  one  state;  and  still  others 
affirmed  that  the  representatives  of  the  opposite  views  had 
almost  a  majority  in  the  South  Carolina  legislature  and 
that  they  would  certainly  renew  the  prohibition  soon,  if 
congress  would  but  show  a  little  patience.  But  the  weight 
iest  objection  was  that  it  would  be  malicious,  unjust  and 
imprudent  to  thus  point  out  one  state  of  the  Union  and 
to  formally  invite  the  world  to  condemn  it.  South  Caro 
lina  was  therefore  uselessly  given  two  years'  respite  before 
the  house  of  representatives  voted  the  tax  of  $W.1  If  the 
interest  of  the  northern  slave  states  had  not  in  this  case 
agreed  with  the  wish  of  the  north,  the  opposition  of  the 
minority  might  have  even  now  met  with  scant  success. 

It  was  also  due  to  this  circumstance  that  in  the  follow 
ing  year  the  importation  of  slaves  was  completely  forbid 
den  by  an  unanimous  vote  of  congress,  from  January  1, 
1808, — in  fact,  from  the  very  day  from  which  congress  had 
the  right  to  forbid  it.2  No  opposition  was  attempted,  be 
cause  it  was  recognized  as  bootless,  and  no  one  was  will 
ing  to  uselessly  incur  the  odium.  The  unanimous  vote  is 
placed  in  the  right  light  only  by  the  negotiations  and  con 
clusions  on  the  details  of  the  question. 

The  struggle  was  next  renewed  in  the  disposition  to  be 
made  of  negroes  smuggled  into  the  country.  According  to 
the  bill  as  it  was  submitted  to  the  house,  these  were  to  be 
forfeited  to  the  United  States.  The  opposition  to  this  was 
mainly  confined  to  delegates  from  the  north.  Their  ob 
jection  was  that  this  would  be  a  direct  recognition  of 
slavery,  since  the  United  States  would  thus  actually  become 
slave-traders  themselves.  As  the  bill  was  framed,  this 
could  be,  of  course,  only  a  technical  consideration.  The 

1  Jan.  22, 1806.    Deb.  of  Congress,  III.,  p.  391. 

*  The  act  was  approved  by  the  president,  March  2, 1807.  Stat.  at  L,, 
II.,  pp.  426-430. 


318  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY    AND    SLAVERY. 

clause  referred  to  the  provisions  of  a  certain  tax  law,  and 
Pitkin  of  Connecticut  objected,  that,  according  to  this,  the 
forfeited  negroes  must  be  sold  at  public  auction  to  the 
highest  bidder,  and  that  at  least  half  what  they  brought 
would  flow  into  the  treasury  of  the  United  States.1  But 
Quincy  was  of  the  opinion  that  congress  could,  and,  as  he 
did  not  doubt,  would,  "  devise  means  to  make  them  use 
ful  members  of  society,  without  any  infringement  of  the 
rights  of  man."2  But  if  the  very  most  zealous  defenders 
of  the  slaveholding  interests  expressed  themselves  decid 
edly  in  favor  of  this  provision,  this  was  due  not  at  all  to 
any  consideration  for  the  "  rights  of  man,"  but  only  to  the 
supposition  that  the  negroes  would  be  sold  as  slaves.3  The 
opposition  was  therefore  justified  in  not  yielding.  But 
it  saved  thereby  only  a  beggarly  appearance.  On  the 
motion  of  Bidwell  of  Massachusetts,  the  disposition  to  be 
made  of  the  smuggled  negroes  was  left  entirely  to  the  leg 
islatures  of  the  different  states  and  territories.  Quincy 
had  asked  whether  they  were  not  thereby  "  made  slaves  as 
absolutely  as  by  a  vote  of  the  house?" 

Although  this  was  not  simply  a  question  of  policy,  but 
one  which  involved  a  principle,  the  debate  over  it  was 
marked  by  a  tone  of  policy.  The  discussions  concerning 
the  punishment  of  the  smugglers  were  not  free,  however, 
from  the  violence  and  bitterness  which  were  usually  shown 
at  every  mention  of  slavery.  According  to  Tallmadge  of 
Connecticut,  the  crime  of  the  slave-trade  should  be  consid 
ered  as  "  felony."  The  representatives  of  the  south  op 
posed  to  the  utmost  the  imposition  of  the  death  penalty, 
which  was  demanded  by  a  part  of  the  northern  delegates 
as  the  only  effectual  means  of  prevention.  Negative  ex- 

1  Deb.  of  Congress,  III.,  p.  496. 

8  Ibid,  III.,  p.  499. 

8  Macon  of  North  Carolina  asserted  that  the  matter  was  simply  a 
"  Commercial  question."  He  said :  "  It  is  in  vain  to  talk  of  turning 
these  creatures  loose  to  cut  our  throats." 


SLAVEHOLDING    SENTIMENT.  319 

perience  favored  this  view,  then  and  thereafter;  all  other 
punishments  failed  to  put  an  end  to  the  trade.  But, 
on  the  other  side,  it  was  agreed  that  it  was  probable  that 
the  threat  of  the  death  penalty  would  also  be  fruitless.  It 
is  an  old  teaching  of  experience  that  the  effectiveness  of  a 
law  which  fixes  penalties  depends  much  less  on  the  great 
ness  of  the  penalty  than  on  the  certainty  of  its  infliction. 
Relying  on  this,  the  opponents  of  the  clause  urged  that  in 
the  southern  states,  which  were  practically  alone  concerned 
in  the  matter,  the  law  would  remain  a  dead  letter.1  These 
arguments  were  striking,  but  they  opened  a  dismal  vista 
into  the  future  which  awaited  the  land,  if  men  went  on 
treating  the  slavery  question  in  the  way  they  had  up  to  this 
time.  Early  of  Georgia  said:  "  I  should  like  to  know  how 
the  fear  of  death  will  operate  on  a  man  who  is  bound  with 
his  slaves  to  a  country  where  he  knows  the  punishment 
will  not  be  enforced.  He  will  be  bound  to  a  country  where 
the  people  see  slaves  every  hour  of  their  lives;  where  there 
is  no  such  abhorrence  of  the  crime  of  importing  them,  and 
where  no  man  dare  inform.  My  word  for  it, — I  pledge  it 
to-day  and  I  wish  it  may  be  recollected, — no  man  in  the 
southern  section  of  the  Union  will  dare  to  inform.  It 
would  cost  him  more  than  his  life  is  worth.  ...  A  large 

O 

majority  of  the  people  in  the  southern  states  do  not  con 
sider  slavery  as  a  crime.  They  do  not  believe  it  immoral 
to  hold  human  flesh  in  bondage.  ...  1  will  tell  the 
truth.  A  large  majority  of  people  in  the  southern  states 
do  not  consider  slavery  as  even  an  evil."2  If  the  majority 
of  the  southern  people  were  of  this  opinion  and  if  the 
number  of  the  northern  politicians  who  prided  themselves, 
with  Brown  of  Rhode  Island,  on  supporting  "  the  rights 

1  Clay  of  Pennsylvania  asserted  that  the  death  penalty  could  not  be 
carried  out,  even  in  his  state.  Yet  his  colleagues  did  not  fully  agree 
with  him  in  this,  for  it  had  been  proposed  by  Smilie  of  Pennsylvania. 

a  Deb.  of  Congress,  III.,  p.  501.  Holland  of  North  Carolina  re-affirmed 
this  statement  in  all  ita  essential  parts. 


320  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND   SLAVERY. 

and  the  property"  of  the  slaveholders,  as  if  they  were 
themselves  slaveholders,  increased;1  then  the  importation 
of  slaves  was  not  needed  in  order  to  quickly  make 
the  Union  a  slavocratic  republic  in  the  full  sense  of  the 
word;  .then  there  was  no  need  of  buying  a  single 
negro  more  in  Africa,  for  the  time  must  surely  come 
when  men  would  be  declared  crazy  if  they  did  not  repeat 
the  words  which  Sedgwick  of  Massachusetts  (!)  had  med 
as  early  as  1795 :  "  To  propose  an  abolition  of  slavery  in 
this  country  would  be  the  height  of  madness.  Here  the 
slaves  are,  and  here  they  must  remain;"2  and  then  the  law 
which  threatened  the  importer  of  slaves  with  deatH 
must  become  a  mockery.  Early  had  accompanied  th 
statements  already  quoted  with  the  noteworthy  commen 
tary  that  in  the  south  "  thinking  men  feared  in  the  distan 
future  evil,  unmeasurable  evil,  from  slavery."  The  hope 
lessness  of  seeing  the  penalty  fully  enforced,  and  unquea 
tionably  in  great  part  also  the  conviction  expressed  b} 
Lloyd  that  the  punishment  was  out  of  proportion  to  the 
crime,  left  the  advocates  of  the  death  penalty  in  a  minority 
ot  ten  votes.3  Other  causes  also  may  have  contributed  to 
their  downfall.  The  Union  would  have  pronounced  a 
peculiar  judgment  upon  itself  if  it  had  now  punished  the 
importation  of  slaves  with  death  after  it  had  in  its  funda 
mental  law  expressly  forbidden  congress  to  prohibit,  dur 
ing  twenty  years,  their  importation.  The  bill  in  its  final 
form  condemned  the  importer  of  slaves  to  an  imprison 
ment  of  not  less  than  five  and  not  more  than  ten  years,  and 
a  fine  of  not  less  than  $1,000  and  not  more  than  $10,000. 
Yet  this  measure  of  punishment  did  not  especially  har 
monize  with  the  confident  expectation  that  the  slave  states 
would  sell  the  forfeited  negroes,  to  the  advantage  of  their 


1  Deb.  of  Congress,  II.,  p.  438. 
8  Ibid,  I.,  p.  559. 
» Ibid,  III.,  p.  502. 


INTERIOR   SLAVE   TRADE.  321 

treasuries.1  And  it  scarcely  harmonized  with  the  permis 
sion  to  carry  on  the  slave  trade  within  the  Union  as 
before.'' 

1  See  Goodell,  Slavery  and  Anti-slavery,  pp.  261,  262.  Attorney-Gen 
eral  Wirt  said  in  1820,  in  an  opinion  on  this  law:  "Should  they  have 
been  turned  loose  as  free  men  in  the  state  ?  The  impolicy  of  such  a 
course  is  too  palpable  to  find  an  advocate  in  any  one  who  is  acquainted 
with  the  condition  of  the  slaveholding  states."  Opinions  of  the  At- 
torneys  General,  I.,  p.  451. 

9  The  senate  bill  had  also  forbidden  this  interior  trade.  The  house 
struck  out  the  clause,  but  the  senate  refused  to  agree  to  the  amendment 
A  committee  of  conference  then  arranged  that  only  the  "shipping  of 
slaves  in  vessels  of  less  than  forty  tons,  with  the  intention  of  selling 
them"  should  be  forbidden.  Both  houses  agreed  to  this.  The  clause 
in  the  senate  bill  was  evidently  within  the  power  of  congress,  for  the 
constitution  gives  it  authority  "  to  regulate  commerce  .  .  .  among 
the  several  states."  (Art.  I.,  Sec.  8,  §  3.)  It  is  an  interesting  tact  that 
Henry  Clay,  relying  upon  the  same  argument  which  the  Federalists 
had  used  against  him  and  his  party  in  the  embargo  controversy,  declared 
it  to  be  inadmissible  that  the  power  here  spoken  of  should  be  deduced 
from  this  clause.  In  his  speech  of  Feb.  7, 1839,  on  the  abolition  peti 
tions,  he  says :  "  I  deny  that  the  general  government  has  any  authority 
whatever  from  the  constitution  to  abolish  what  is  called  the  slave  trade. 
.  .  .  The  grant  in  the  constitution  is  of  a  power  of  regulation  and  not 
prohibition."  (Clay,  Speeches,  II.,  p.  407.)  Chief-justice  Taney  says 
in  Groves  vs.  Slaughter :  "  In  my  judgment,  the  power  over  this  subject 
is  exclusively  with  the  several  states ;  and  each  of  them  has  a  right  to 
decide  for  itself  whether  it  will  or  will  not  allow  persons  of  this  descrip 
tion  to  be  brought  within  its  limits  from  another  state,  either  for  sale  or 
for  any  other  purpose ;  and  also  to  prescribe  the  manner  and  mode  in 
which  they  may  be  introduced  and  to  determine  their  condition  and 
treatment  within  their  respective  territories ;  and  the  action  of  several 
states  upon  this  subject  cannot  be  controlled  by  congress,  either  by  vir 
tue  of  its  power  to  regulate  commerce  or  by  virtue  of  any  other  power 
conferred  by  the  constitution  of  the  United  States."  (Peters,  Rep.,  XY., 
p.  508 ;  Curtis,  XIV.,  p.  148.)  This  is  not.  however,  the  j udgment  of  the 
court,  but  only  Taney 's  personal  judgment.  The  striking  out  of  the 
clause  from  the  senate  bill  must  unquestionably  be  considered  as  an  in 
direct  sanction  of  slavery  by  congress.  But  the  bill  as  it  was  finally 
agreed  upon  and  signed  by  the  president,  that  is,  the  law,  contained  a 
very  direct  sanction,  since  it  "  authorized"  the  slave  trade  under  certain 
conditions.  Section  9  provides  that  the  captain  of  a  ship  of  over  forty 
tons,  who  has  negroes  and  mulattoes  on  board,  "  shall,  previous  to  the 
21 


322  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

From  a  political  point  of  view,  another  side  of  the  slav 
ery  question,  which  had  already  been  a  subject  of  debate 
for  some  years,  but  had  hitherto  attracted  comparatively 
little  attention,  was  infinitely  more  important  than  the 
methods  of  punishing  importers  of  slaves.  Mason's  decla 
ration  in  the  Philadelphia  convention  that  the  west  was 
beginning  to  wish  for  slaves,  in  order  to  cultivate  its  bound 
less  stretches  of  land,  had  found  its  justification.  Since 
1802,  the  territory  of  Indiana  had  been  working  upon  con 
gress  to  induce  it  to  suspend  for  a  term  of  years  the  pro 
hibition  imposed  by  the  ordinance  of  1T87.  At  first  the 
request  was  unconditionally  rejected.  Later,  however,  it 
was  favorably  reported  upon  by  different  committees  of 
both  houses  of  congress.  But  it  g6t  no  farther,  before  the 
opponents  of  the  request  gained  the  upper  hand  in  the  ter 
ritory  itself.  Yet  for  full  five  years  it  remained  an  open 
question,  despite  the  ordinance  of  1787,  whether  the  north 
west  would  be  saved  to  free  labor.1 

As  early  as  1798,  the  question  had  been  decided  in  favor 
of 'slavery  for  the  Mississippi  territory.  In  March  of  that 
year,  the  house  of  representatives  took  under  consideration 
the  organization  of  the  territorial  government.  It  had 
been  moved  that  the  ordinance  of  1787  should  be  allowed 
to  come  into  force  there  also,  with  the  single  exception  of 
the  prohibition  of  slavery.  Thatcher  of  Massachusetts,  the 
most  determined  champion  of  freedom  on  every  occasion, 
wished  to  strike  out  this  excepting  clause.2  He,  as  well  as 
Gallatin,  expressly  claimed  for  congress  the  power  of  for- 

departure  of  such  ship  or  vessel,  make  out  and  subscribe  duplicate  man 
ifests  of  every  such  negro,  mulatto  or  person  of  color  .  .  .  and  shall 
deliver  such  manifests  to  the  collector  of  the  port  .  .  .  whereupon 
the  said  collector  or  surveyor  shall  certify  .  .  .  with  a  permit  .  .  . 
and  authorizing  him  to  proceed  to  the  port  of  his  destination." 

1  Compare  Deb.  of  Congress,  III.,  pp.  383,  406,  503,  519,  550,  551.  For 
the  later  attempts  to  introduce  slavery  into  Illinois,  see  Ford,  History  ol 
Illinois,  p.  50,  seq. 

«  Deb.  of  Congress,  II.,  p.  221 


MISSISSIPPI    ABANDONED    TO    SLAVERY  323 

bidding  slavery  in  all  the  territories.1  Not  a  single  voice 
was  raised  against  the  justice  of  this  claim,  and  it  was  just 
as  little  urged  that  the  conditions  on  which  Georgia  had 
ceded  the  territory  forbade  the  exercise  of  the  power  in 
this  especial  case.2  Only  reasons  of  expediency  and  equity 
were  made  use  of  against  Thatcher's  proposition.  Nicholas 
affirmed  that  it  was  not  the  part  of  congress  to  try  to  make 
one  part  of  the  Union  happier  than  the  other.  He  said 
that  the  south  should  not  be  made  to  bear  the  evil  of  slav 
ery  alone,  but  that  the  possibility  of  arriving  at  a  general 
emancipation  by  scattering  its  slaves  over  wider  stretches 
of  country  should  be  offered  it.  Despite  the  untenable- 
ness  of  these  objections,  Thatcher's  proposition  received 
only  twelve  votes.3 

These  "  signs  of  the  times''  were  not  wholly  without 
effect  upon  the  north.  Here  and  there  was  a  person  who 
understood  how  to  read  them  in  their  full  meaning,  and 
they  kept  awake  in  a  strong  minority  the  old  jealousy  and 
the  old  distrust  of  the  south.  But  only  a  very  few  recog 
nized  the  fact  that  the  slavery  question  was  the  pivot  about 

1  Deb.  of  Congress,  II.,  p.  223. 

*  For  the  first  time  in  1808,  Bibb  and  Troup  claimed,  on  another  oc 
casion,  that  congress  did  not  have  the  right  to  alter  the  conditions  ac 
cepted  by  the  earlier  congress  without  the  consent  of  Georgia.  (Deb. 
of  Congress,  IV.,  pp.  42,  44,  46.  Compare  also  p.  324.)  Poindexter,  a 
delegate  from  the  territory  of  Mississippi,  urged  in  opposition  to  this: 
"  It  was  decided  at  the  last  session  by  both  houses  that  the  United  States 
had  a  right  to  rule  the  territory  without  the  consent  of  Georgia.  The 
constitution  of  the  United  States  says  that  congress  shall  *  have  power  to 
dispose  of  and  make  all  needful  rules  and  regulations  respecting  the 
territory  or  other  property  belonging  to  the  United  States.'  Can  an  ar 
gument  arising  from  the  exercise  of  this  power  supersede  the  right  of 
exercising  the  power  expressly  delegated  by  the  constitution  itself?  Cer 
tainly  not."  (Deb.  of  Congress,  IV.,  p.  43.)  Yet  only  seven  months 
later,  Poindexter  defended  the  claim  made  by  Bibb  and  Troup.  (Ibid, 
IV.,  p.  141.)  This  is  one  of  many  instances  of  the  way  in  which  not 
only  arguments  but  convictions  have  been  "cheap  as  blackberries" 
among  distinguished  American  politicians. 

1  Deb.  of  Congress,  II.,  p.  224. 


324:  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

which  the  fate  of  the  Union  would  revolve  for  decades. 
The  prohibition  of  the  importation  of  slaves  completely 
lulled  to  sleep  the  fears  in  regard  to  this,  which  had  occa 
sionally  appeared  with  fitting  vigor.  Men  congratulated 
themselves  that  they  were  again  leading  the  world  on  the 
way  of  freedom  and  true  humanity,  and  then  they  turned 
more  indifferently  and  more  thoughtlessly  every  day  from 
the  real  question,  for  they  honestly  thought  that  they  had 
bound  up  the  arteries  of  the  institution,  and  that  they 
might  therefore  trouble  themselves  no  more  about  it.1 
Since  1794  one  an ti -slavery  society  after  another  had  given 
up  its  activity.2  And  those  who  worked  on  indefatigably 
henceforth  had  often  to  bitterly  complain  that  they  no 
longer  found  in  the  public  any  sympathy  with  their  efforts.3 
For  a  full  decade,  slavery  could  grow  in  breadth  and  depth 
without  any  opposition  worth  speaking  of.  There  was 
only  a  rare  mention  of  it  now,  either  in  the  press  or  in  the 
debates  of  congress,  and  then  mostly  in  an  indifferent  way. 
All  sorts  of  questions  had  to  be  treated  which  were  in  the 
closest  connection  with  it  and  some  of  which  sprang  di 
rectly  from  it,  but  one  had  to  go  back  laboriously  to  their 
inception,  in  order  to  find  out  this  hidden  interconnection. 
The  slaveholding  interest  knit  mesh  after  mesh  in  the  net 
in  which  it  sought  to  entangle  the  Union,  but  men  did  not 
or  would  not  see  this.  It  was  permitted  to  conceal  its  real 

1  "  Owing  to  this  mistaken  expectation  of  the  act  of  1808  [1807]  abol 
ishing  the  slave  trade,  the  attention  of  philanthropists  was  in  a  great 
measure  withdrawn  from  the  subject  of  slavery  for  ten  years  or  more." 
May,  Some  Recollections  of  our  Anti-slavery  Conflict,  p.  6. 

1  In  1833,  the  abolition  society  of  Pennsylvania  complained  that 
"  since  that  time  we  have  seen  one  after  another  discontinue  its  labors 
until  we  were  left  almost  alone."  Wilson,  I.,  p.  125,  and  elsewhere. 
Compare  Clay,  Speeches,  II.,  p.  400. 

*  In  1809,  the  same  society  complained  that  "  hitherto  the  approving 
voice  of  the  community  and  the  liberal  interpretation  of  the  laws  have 
smoothed  the  path  of  duty  and  promoted  a  satisfactory  issue  to  our  hu 
mane  exertions.  At  present,  however,  the  sentiments  of  our  fellow-citi 
zens  and  the  decisions  of  our  courts  are  less  auspicious." 


GEOWTH  OF  THE  SLAVE  TRADE.          325 

aims,  and  even  when  it  scorned  to  do  this,  no  obstacles  were 
laid  in  its  way.  The  embers  left  by  the  earlier  struggles 
seemed  glimmering  into  nothingness.  Men  covered  them 
up,  but  not  with  ashes, — with  materials  that  kept  the  fire 
down,  but  made  it  burn  with  so  much  the  greater  heat. 

If  the  prohibition  of  the  importation  of  slaves  had  been 
the  only  or  even  the  main  reason  of  this  apathy,  the 
latter  could  not  have  long  continued.  The  slave  trade  was 
a  too  enticing  business  to  be  completely  given  up,  as  long 
as  no  examples  whatever  were  made  of  offenders  against 
the  law  which  forbade  it.  Yet  the  federal  government  did 
nothing  to  suppress  it  and  the  importation  therefore  quick 
ly  assumed  greater  proportions.  Ignorance  could  not  be 
pleaded  as  an  excuse,  for  there  were  certain  magistrates  who 
kept  a  watchful  eye  on  the  evil  and  conscientiously  in 
formed  the  administration.  But  their  reports  remained 
unconsidered.1  The  regular  station  for  slaveships  at 
Amelia  Island  was  of  course  finally  broken  up,  but  there 
was  no  interference  until  the  evil  had  become  altogether 
too  great.  The  lawless  folk  settled  there  were  engaged, 
besides,  in  smuggling  and  in  mischief  of  every  sort.  It 
remains  therefore  an  open  question,  how  far  their  disper 
sion  is  to  be  ascribed  to  the  aid  which  they  gave  the  slave 
holders.2  The  prior  conduct  of  the  executive  as  well  as  of 
congress  does  not  favor  the  view  that  the  main  reason  of 
the  interference  is  to  be  sought  just  in  this.  As  early  as 
1813,  the  Pennsylvania  anti-slavery  society  had  called  the 
attention  of  congress  to  the  fact  that  American  ships  were 

1  Jay,  Misc,  Writ.,  p.  278,  seq.,  gives  a  number  of  verbatim  extracts 
from  such  reports. 

3  Monroe  says,  in  his  message  of  Dec.  2, 1817 :  "  The  island  [was]  made 
a  channel  for  the  illicit  introduction  of  slaves  from  Africa  into  the  Uni 
ted  States,  an  asylum  for  fugitive  slaves  from  the  neighboring  states  [ !] 
and  a  port  for  smuggling  of  every  kind."  States.  Man.,  I.,  pp.  398,  399. 
Compare  the  message  of  Jan.  4, 1818;  Deb.  of  Congress,  VI.,  p.  19  and 
Niles'  Reg.,  II.,  p.  93;  X.,  p.  400;  XIII.,  pp.  12,  28,47,62,  78,  221,  296; 
XIV.,  p.  100. 


326          STATE  SOVEREIGNTY  AND  SLAVERY. 

engaged  in  the  slave  trade  under  foreign  flags.1  Congress 
referred  the  memorial  to  a  committee  and  the  slave-traders 
went  on  with  their  business.  By  degrees  the  trade  was 
pursued  with  such  impudent  boldness  that  wider  circles 
began  to  shake  off  the  lethargy.  Anti-slavery  petitions 
were  again  presented  to  congress,  and  especially  after  1818, 
in  greater  numbers  than  ever.  From  the  midst  of  the 
supreme  court  of  the  United  States  came  the  complaint 
that  the  crime  was  not  checked,  although  the  president  had 
been  authorized  to  use  ships  of  war  for  that  purpose.2 
Joseph  Story,  one  of  the  greatest  ornaments  as  a  man  and 
as  a  judge  .of  the  highest  court  of  the  Union,  repeatedly 
exhibited  to  the  grand  jury  of  his  circuit,  and  thereby  to 
the  whole  nation,  the  horrible  picture  of  facts  which  lay 
behind  the  veil  of  the  stringent  penal  law.3  In  congress 
itself,  it  was  not  denied  that  there  was  cause  for  the  com 
plaints.  Southern  members  estimated  the  number  of  ne 
groes  smuggled  into  the  country  every  year  at  from 
thirteen  thousand  to  fifteen  thousand.  But  in  the  same 
year  the  registrar  of  the  treasury  officially  informed  con 
gress  that  the  records  of  the  department  did  not  show  a 

1  Deb.  of  Congress,  IV.,  pp.  7,  14.  See  also  Niles'  Reg.,  V.,  p.  334. 
Since  Spain  and  Portugal  still  allowed  the  slave  trade,  the  flags  of  these 
two  powers  were  especially  used. 

3  Law  of  March  3, 1819.    Stat.  at  L.,  III.,  p.  532. 

3  In  one  of  these  warnings  (1819)  it  is  declared :  "We  have  but  tco 
many  melancholy  proofs  from  unquestionable  sources,  that  it  [the  slave 
trade]  is  still  carried  on  with  all  the  implacable  ferocity  and  insatiable 
rapacity  of  former  times.  Avarice  has  grown  more  subtle  in  its  eva 
sions  ;  it  watches  and  seizes  its  prey  with  an  appetite  quickened  rather 
than  suppressed  by  its  guilty  vigils.  American  citizens  are  steeped  up 
to  their  very  mouths  (I  scarcely  use  too  bold  a  figure)  in  this  stream  of 
iniquity.  They  throng  to  the  coasts  of  Africa,  under  the  stained  flags  of 
Spain  and  Portugal,  sometimes  selling  abroad  their  'cargoes  of  despair' 
and  sometimes  bringing  them  into  some  of  our  southern  ports,  and 
there,  under  the  forms  of  the  law,  defeating  the  purposes  of  the  law  it 
self,  and  legalizing  their  inhuman,  but  profitable,  adventures.  I  wish  I 
could  say  that  New  England  and  IStew  England  men  were  free  from 
this  deep  pollution."  Life  and  Letters  of  J.  Story,  I.,  p.  340. 


THE    SLAVE    TRADE   IS    DECLARED    PIRACY.  327 

single  forfeiture  under  the  law  of  180T.1  In  view  of  tliese 
facts,  the  assertion  that  the  federal  government  honestly 
and  to  the  full  extent  of  its  power  tried  to  enforce  the  law, 
is  laughable.  As  long  as  it  was  unwilling  to  do  so,  each 
added  vigor  of  the  penal  laws  only  served  still  more  to 
throw  dust  in  the  eyes  of  the  nation  and  of  the  world  in 
regard  to  the  true  state  of  things.  If  the  suspicion  that 
the  federal  government  willfully  did  this  was  not  justified, 
it  was  nevertheless  near  the  truth. 

In  the  tenth  article  of  the  treaty  of  Ghent,  England  and 
the  United  States  pledged  themselves  to  their  "  best  en 
deavors"  to  bring  about  the  "  entire  abolition"  of  the  slave 
trade,  because  it  was  "  irreconcilable  with  the  principles  of 
humanity  and  justice.'52  Taking  this  article  as  a  basis, 
Senator  Burrill  of  Rhode  Island  moved,  in  January,  1818, 
the  appointment  of  a  committee  for  the  consideration  of 
the  question  whether  it  was  advisable  to  enter  into  treaties 
with  other  powers  in  order  to  attain  this  end.  The  mo 
tion  was  adopted  by  a  majority  of  one.3  But  the  minority, 
which  made  great  use  of  Washington's  warning  against 
"  entangling  alliances,3'  finally  carried  its  point.  The 
advances  of  England  in  the  following  year  received  no  at 
tention.  Congress  gave  satisfaction  to  public  opinion  and 
its  own  conscience,  when,  about  a  -year  later,  it  declared 
the  slave  trade  to  be  piracy.4  How  far  the  enforcement  of 

'Jay,  Misc,  Writ.,  p.  281. 

*  Stat.  at  Large,  VIII.,  p.  223. 

8  Bee  tlie  debate  in  Deb.  of  Congress,  VI.,  pp.  11-19. 

4  Law  of  May  15, 1820.  Stat.  at  L.,  III.,  p.  600.  Magrath,  United 
States  judge  for  the  district  ot  South  Carolina,  decided,  in  The  United 
States  vs.  Corrie,  that  only  the  individual  crimes  enumerated  in  the  law 
were  piracy,  and  that  the  slave  trade  was  not.  Kent's  Comm.,  I.,  p. 
196.  When  England,  in  1823,  again  entered  into  negotiations,  the  Uni 
ted  Slates  made  it  a  condition  of  united  effort,  that  the  slave  trade  should 
be  declared  piracy  by  international  law.  It  is  possible  to  be  of  the 
opinion  that  too  much  was  asked  for  the  sake  of  obtaining  nothing,  for, 
according  to  the  English  law,  the  slave  trade  was  not  piracy.  Yet  par- 


328  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

this  law  was  to  be  expected  could  be  inferred  from  the  fact 
that  courts,1  congress,2  and  president8  had  refrained  from 
enforcing  the  earlier  and  milder  law  whenever  the  oppor 
tunity  of  making  an  example  under  it  was  offered  them. 

The  zeal  with  which  congress  continued  to  increase  the 
severity  of  the  laws  against  the  slave  trade  from  1807  on, 
was  connected  with  another  question,  which  contributed 
greatly  to  the  strengthening  of  the  slaveholding  influence. 
If,  in  earlier  times,  the  further  importation  of  slaves  had 
been  contrary  to  the  interest  of  northern  slave  states,  this 
was  now  still  more  the  case.  This  fact  alone  preserved 
their  representatives  from  the  accusation  that  they  were 
playing  parts  in  a  treacherous  comedy  by  voting  for  the 

liament  passed  an  act  to  that  effect,  and  a  treaty  signed  at  London, 
March  13, 1824,  was  sent  to  "Washington  for  ratification.  The  senate, 
after  long  delays,  and  only  when  urged  by  the  president,  decided  the 
question,  but  first  mutilated  the  treaty  to  such  an  extent  that  it  was  made 
entirely  worthless.  England  rejected  it  in  this  form, but  did  notecase 
from  her  efforts  until  Henry  Clay,  at  that  time  secretary  of  state,  ex 
pressed  the  opinion  that  it  "  appears  unnecessary  and  impolitic  to  con 
tinue  the  negotiations," 

1  The  collector  of  Mobile  advised  the  secretary  of  the  treasury,  No 
vember  15,  1818,  that  three  slave  ships  had  been  seized,  "but  this  was 
owing  rather  to  accident  than  any  well-timed  arrangement  to  prevent 
the  trade."  And  in  a  later  letter,  he  says:  "  The  grand  jury  found  true 
bills  against  the  owners  of  the  vessels,  masters  and  supercargos,  all  of 
whom  have  been  discharged,  why  or  wherefore  I  cannot  say,  except  that 
it  could  not  be  for  want  of  proof  against  them."  Jay,  Misc.  Writ, 
p.  281. 

9  In  April,  1820,  the  house  of  representatives  released  to  three  persons 
the  fine  imposed  on  them  for  importing  slaves,  so  far  as  the  United  States 
were  competent  to  do  so  under  the  laws.  The  pretense  for  this  was  that 
these  were  house  servants,  and  the  violators  of  the  law  had  been  assured 
upon  inquiry  of  an  American  consul  that  such  slaves  could  be  im 
ported.  Deb.  of  Congress,  VI.,  pp.  573,  574. 

*  A  slave  trader  by  the  name  of  Lacoste  was  condemned  in  Boston  in 
1820  to  three  years  imprisonment  and  three  thousand  dollars  fine. 
Monroe  gave  him  a  full  pardon  at  the  beginning  of  1822,  although  the 
slave  trade  had  in  the  meantime  been  declared  to  be  piracy.  Niles* 
Reg.,  XXII.,  p.  114. 


THE    COLONIZATION    SOCIETY.  329 

laws  supplementing  the  act  of  1807.  But  the  consider 
ations  brought  forward  at  that  time  against  the  imposition 
of  the  death  penalty  would  now  have  had  still  greater 
weight  with  them,  if  they  had  not  had  reason  just  at  this 
moment  to  act  as  if  they  had  resolved  in  sober  earnest  to 
take  some  thorough  steps  towards  a  radical  and  comprehen 
sive  struggle  against  the  evil.  In  January,  18 IT,  Eandolph 
laid  before  the  house  of  representatives  a  petition  of  the 
"  colonization  society,"  founded  at  "Washington,  December 
28,  1816,1  which  asked  congress  to  aid  its  plan  for  coloniz 
ing  free  negroes  in  some  part  of  Africa.2  The  plan  of 
organizing  such  a  society  had  originated  in  Yirginia,  and 
its  first  beginnings  dated  back  to  the  time  of  the  revolu 
tion.  Early  in  the  19th  century,  it  began  by  degrees  to 
obtain  a  more  fixed  form.3  The  cause  of  this  was  the 
growing  fear  of  slave  insurrections  which  might  be  excited 
by  free  negroes.4  A  considerate  reception  had  already  been 
assured  to  the  petition  by  the  fact  that  a  number  of  the 
first  men  of  the  slave  states  were  among  the  founders  of 
the  society,5  and  the  legislature  of  Yirginia  had  passed, 
a  short  time  before,  a  formal  resolution,  with  the  same  object 
in  view.8  In  the  house  of  representatives  the  request  was 
referred  at  the  suggestion  of  Randolph  to  a  committee,  which 
submitted  a  report  February  II.7  The  committee  did  not 

1  Niles'  Reg.,  XI.,  p.  296. 
a  Ibid,  XI.,  p.  355. 

•  See  Jefferson's  Works,  IV.,  pp.  419-422,  442-444;  V.,  pp.  563-565. 

4  Such  fears  had  been  entertained  even  before  the  close  of  the  18th 
century.  See  Gibbs,  Mem.  of  Wol.,  I.,  pp.  482,  486, 496;  Jeff.,  Works, 
IV.,  pp.  196, 422.  Randolph  said  in  a  speech  of  Dec.  10, 1811 :  "  Within 
the  last  ten  years,  repeated  alarms  of  insurrection  among  the  slaves; 
some  of  them  awful  indeed.  .  .  I  speak  from  facts  when  I  say  that 
the  night-bell  never  tolls  for  fire  in  Richmond  that  the  mother  does  not 
hug  the  infant  more  closely  to  her  bosom."  Garland,  Life  of  J.  Ran- 
dolph,  I.,  pp.  294,  295. 

*  Bushrod  Washington,  Henry  Clay,  John  Randolph,  R.  Wright,  etc. 
6  Niles'  Reg.,  XI.,  p.  275. 

'  The  report  is  printed  in  Niles'  Reg.,  XII.,  p.  103. 


330  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY    AND    SLAVEKY. 

consider  it  proper  that  the  house  should  at  once  pass  final 
resolutions,  but  recommended  that  the  president  should  be 
authorized  "  to  consult  and  negotiate"  with  all  foreign  pow 
ers  for  the  "entire  and  immediate  abolition  of  the  traffic  in 
slaves ;  and  also  to  enter  into  a  convention  with  the  govern- 
ment  of  Great  Britain  for  receiving  into  the  colony  of  Sierra 
Leone  such  of  the  free  people  of  color  of  the  United  States 
as,  with  their  own  consent,  shall  he  carried  thither."  This 
double  recommendation  met  with  the  full  approval  of  the 
colonization  society.1  Yet  the  house  came  to  no  definite 
conclusion.  At  the  next  session  the  question  again  came 
under  consideration.  By  a  law  of  March  3,  1819.  against 
the  slave  trade,  the  president  was  empowered  to  issue  the 
necessary  orders  for  transporting  illegally  imported  negroes 
back  to  Africa.2  This  decision  was  recognized  as  an  ap 
proval  of  the  colonization  plan,  and  was  therefore  very 
helpful  to  the  society.  Besides  this,  the  latter  got  a  con 
siderable  money  subsidy  from  the  treasury  of  the  Union; 
for  Monroe,  who  had  been  in  favor  of  the  plan  since  the 
beginning  of  the  century,  construed  the  law  just  mentioned 
in  a  way  that  was  more  than  liberal.  The  government  was 
far  removed  from  making  the  cause  of  the  society  its  own, 
but  it  showed  such  an  interest  in  it  that  the  propagandism 
among  northern  philanthropists  was  thereby  powerfully 
aided. 

Both  the  petition  of  the  society,  in  which  it  explained  its 
aims,  and  its  constitution  were  framed  in  the  most  discreet 
way.  It  did  not  pretend  to  labor  for  the  abolition  of  slav 
ery.  The  press  emphatically  declared  that  such  an  aim 
would  be  wholly  foreign  to  it,  even  in  the  most  distant  fu 
ture.3  The  only  notice  taken  of  the  slaves  in  the  petition 

1  See  its  address,  Niles'  Reg.,  XVI.,  p.  65. 

3  Stat.  at  Large,  III.,  p.  533. 

*  "  It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  add  that  all  connection  of  this  proposi 
tion  with  the  emancipation  of  slaves,  present  or  future,  is  explicitly 
disclaimed."  Niles'  Reg.,  XI.,  p.  296. 


FAILURE    OF    COLONIZATION.  331 

was  to  argue  that  emancipation  was  hindered  by  the  in 
crease  in  the  number  of  free  negroes  then  resident  in  the 
country.  But  u  humanity"  was  rung  in  with  such  dexter 
ity,  in  the  statement  of  the  motives  and  views  of  the  orig 
inators  of  the  plan,  that  the  north  was  actually  of  the 
opinion  that  here  a  way  had  been  found  by  which  the  na 
tion  could  gradually  rid  itself  of  slavery.  It  was  thought 
that  the  process  would  ,be  in  this  wise:  By  the  departure 
of  the  free  negroes,  the  weightiest  objections  of  humane 
slaveholders  against  freeing  their  slaves  would  be  removed, 
and  emancipation  and  the  transportation  of  the  emanci 
pated  would  thenceforth  keep  pace  with  one  another  until 
the  United  States  would  be  completely  rid  of  their  colored 
population.  But  in  this  reckoning  no  account  whatever 
was  taken  of  the  true  disposition  of  the  slaveholders. 
Even  Jefferson  now  began  to  doubt  the  illusions  concern 
ing  slavery,  which  he  had  all  his  life,  -entertained.1  But 
under  all  circumstances,  the  plan  would  have  been  an  ab 
surdity.  This  was  so  plain  that  even  from  the  first  instant 
there  were  persons  who  gave  the  proof  of  it  in  sober  facts 
and  figures.2  The  number  of  slaves  was  already  much 
more  than  a  million.  Even  if  all  the  emancipated  ones 
would  consent  to  be  transported,3  and  if  as  many  slaves 
were  freed  every  year  as  could  be  transported  and  colon 
ized,  yet  the  growth  of  the  slaves  through  natural  increase 
must  constantly  far  exceed  their  decrease  by  colonization.4 

'Jeff.,  Works,  VII.,  p.  58. 

1  See  the  article  in  Niles'  Reg.,  XIII.,  pp.  82, 177. 

'  It  had  been  expressly  guaranteed  that  their  voluntary  consent  should 
be  obtained. 

4  Up  to  the  eighteenth  year  of  the  existence  of  the  society  (Jan.  1, 
1835)  eight  hundred  and  nine  emancipated  slaves  had  been  taken  to 
Africa,  a  number  which  equals  the  natural  growth  of  the  slave  popula 
tion  in  five  and  a  half  days.  (Jay,  Misc.  Writ.,  p.  80.)  It  is  easy  to  see 
from  this  what  would  have  been  accomplished  in  the  course  of  the  "cen 
tury"  within  which  the  society  promised  to  rid  the  country  of  all  its 
negroes.  African  Repository,  I.,  p.  217;  IV.,  p.  344;  and  elsewhere. 


332  STATE    SOVEKEIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

But  figures  prove  nothing  to  a  man  who  will  not  be  con 
vinced.  A  more  kindly  and  humane  way  to  get  rid  of  the 
terrible  evil  could  not  be  easily  devised,  and  therefore  men 
believed  in  the  possibility  of  the  plan. 

The  slave  states  in  which  the  project  originated  indulged 
in  no  illusions.  They  knew  exactly  what  they  wished  and 
laughed  in  their  sleeve  at  seeing  the  philanthropists  of  the 
north  fall  so  readily  into  the  trap.1  A  bait  thrown  out  by 
the  founders  of  the  society  was  the  gaining  of  Africa  to 
the  Christian  religion  and  western  civilization  by  means  of 
the  settlement  of  the  negroes  there.  But  yet  they  seized 
every  opportunity  to  brand  free  colored  persons  as  the  ref 
use  of  the  population,  whose  departure  could  not  be  too 
dearly  bought  by  any  sacrifice.2  At  the  same  time,  the 
colonization  society  protested  that  its  object  was  not  in  any 
sense  the  elevation  of  free  persons  of  color.3  What  its 
"humanity"  was,. is  clearly  shown  by  this,  and  its  true 
aims,  too,  could  be  inferred  from  this  without  difficulty. 
Moreover,  it  made  no  secret  of  them.  Randolph  had  de- 

1  It  is  certain  that  there  were  victims  among  the  victimizes.  The 
brutal  energy  with  which  the  "  voluntary  consent"  of  the  free  negroes 
to  their  transportation  was  wrung  from  them  is  proof  of  this.  See,  on 
this  point,  Jay,  Misc.  Writ.,  pp.  50-58.  A  Florida  slaveholder  wrote  in 
a  book  entitled  A  Treatise  on  the  Patriarchal  System  of  Society:  "  Col. 
onization  in  Africa  has  been  proposed  to  the  free  colored  people,  to  for- 
ward  which,  a  general  system  of  persecution  against  them,  upheld  from 
the  pulpit,  has  been  legalized  throughout  the  southern  states." 

9  On  one  page  of  a  speech  delivered  by  Henry  Clay,  in  1827,  are  the 
following  sentences :  "  They  will  carry  back  to  their  native  soil  the  rich 
fruits  of  religion,  civilization,  law  and  liberty.  .  .  Of  all  classes  of 
our  population,  the  most  vicious  is  that  of  the  free  colored.  .  .  Every 
emigrant  to  Africa  is  a  missionary  carrying  with  him  credentials  in  the 
holy  cause  of  civilization,  religion  and  free  institutions."  (Speeches, 
L,  p.  282.)  This  is  an  example  of  the  logic  of  slavocratic  Democrats. 
See  Wilson,  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Slave  Power  in  America,  I.,  p. 
213;  Jay,  Misc.  Writ.,  pp.  22-24. 

8  The  society  said,  in  one  of  its  addresses:  "The  moral,  intellectual 
and  political  improvement  of  free  people  of  color  within  the  United 
States  are  objects  foreign  to  the  power  of  the  society." 


COLONIZATION   AS   AN   AID   TO   SLAVERY.  333 

clared,  in  the  first  meeting  for  the  organization  of  the 
society,  that  it  "  must  tend  essentially  to  make  slave  prop 
erty  safe."  With  every  year,  not  only  did  this  show  itself 
more  plainly,  but  it  was  also  roundly  stated  that  the  so 
ciety's  true  aim  was  in  fact  the  purification  of  the  land 
from  the  pest  of  the  free  colored  population  in  order  to  give 
increased  security  to  slavery.1  The  time  came  when  men 
of  the  north  who  could  not  entertain  the  idea  of  a  com 
promise  between  slavery  and  freedom,  laid  the  hypocrisy  and 
falsehood  of  the  colonization  plan  so  naked  in  the  light 
of  day  that  it  could  scarcely  claim  the  dignity  of  a  farcical 
interlude  in  the  terrible  tragedy,  which  hastened  with  giant 
steps  towards  its  issue.  But  for  a  long  time  the  upright 
philanthropists  and  friends  of  freedom  in  the  north  were 
lured  on  false  paths.  It  was  this  and  not  the  number — 
scarcely  worth  mentioning — of  free  negroes  who  were  taken 
over  to  Africa,  which  made  the  colonization  swindle  of 
such  priceless  worth  to  the  slavocracy.  Such  a  piece  of 
Don  Quixoterie  has  never  been  indulged  in,  in  more  bitter 
earnest,  and  especially  by  such  men.  It  would  not  have 
been  possible  if  political  thought  had  not  already  begun 
severely  to  feel  the  baleful  influence  of  slavery. 

While  law  after  law  was  passed  against  the  African 
slave  trade,  and  no  words  could  be  found  which  condemned 
it  sharply  enough,  the  interior  slave  trade  constantly  as- 

1  Clay  denied  this,  but  in  the  same  speech  he  said :  "  Any  project  .  .  . 
by  which,  in  a  material  degree,  the  dangerous  element  in  the  general 
mass  can  be  diminished  or  rendered  stationary,  deserves  deliberate  con 
sideration,"  and  "  the  execution  of  its  [the  society's]  scheme  would  aug 
ment  instead  of  diminishing  the  value  of  the  property  [that  is,  the 
slaves]  left  behind."  Speeches,  I.,  pp.  275,  283.  Webster  himself  said 
in  his  notorious  speech  of  March  7, 1850 :  "  If  Virginia  and  the  south 
see  fit  to  adopt  any  proposition  to  relieve  themselves  from  the  free  peo 
ple  of  color  among  them,  or  such  as  may  be  made  free,  they  have  my 
full  consent  that  the  government  shall  pay  them  any  sum  out  of  the  pro 
ceeds  of  that  cession  [the  western  territory]  which  may  be  adequate  to 
the  purpose."  Webster,  Works,  V.»  p.  364. 


334  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

sumed  greater  dimensions  and  a  more  shocking  form. 
And  a  centre  of  this  trade  was  the  capital  of  the  country. 
Not  in  the  darkness  of  night  and  against  the  law  did  the 
traders  conduct  their  business.  They  paid  out  their  blood- 
money  for  permission  to  carry  on  their  trade;  the  papers 
were  filled  with  their  advertisements;  and  from  the  win 
dows  of  the  capital  long  trains  of  fettered  slaves  on  their 
way  to  the  sugar  and  cotton  plantations  of  the  south  could 
be  seen.  And  behind  those  windows  the  white  men  of 
the  republic  spoke  oracularly  of  the  rights  of  man  and  of 
freedom.  The  scene  was  so  disgraceful  that  a  Virginian — a 
slaveholder,  whose  body  quivered  with  rage  when  he  thought 
he  saw  the  slightest  attempt  to  infringe  upon  the  "rights" 
of  the  slaveholders — held  up  the  shame  before  the  eyes  of 
congress  in  words  of  thunder.  John  Randolph's  long 
finger,  the  terror  of  all  the  little  and  sinful  spirits  in  the 
house  of  representatives,  was  pointed,  not  at  a  single  vic 
tim,  but  at  all  congress,  and  it  might  have  been  thought 
that  he  wished  to  let  his  shrill  voice  scream  his  words  into 
the  conscience  of  the  whole  country  when,  on  March  1, 
1816,  he  moved,  after  a  scathing  philippic,  the  appoint 
ment  of  a  committee  which  should  inquire  whether  "  the 
inhuman  and  illegal  traffic  in  slaves"  was  carried  on  in 
the  district,  and  report  whether  any,  and  if  so,  what  means 
could  be  used  to  put  a  stop  to  it.1  No  one  ventured  to 
refuse  the  demand.  Randolph  himself  was  named  chair 
man  of  the  committee.  His  report  contained  a  crowd  of 
facts  which  justified  only  too  fully  his  complaints;  but  he 
submitted  no  resolution,  and  the  whole  thing,  like  all 
earlier  complaints  against  slavery,  was  simply  placed  upon 

1  Debi  of  Congress.  V.,  p.  609.  This  haughtiest  of  the  slave-barons, 
who  declared  that  he  "would  never  weaken  the  form  of  the  contract  be 
tween  the  owner  and  the  slave,"  asserted:  "  It  is  not  necessary  that  we 
should  have,  here  in  the  very  streets  of  our  new  metropolis,  a  depot  for 
this  nefarious  traffic,  in  comparison  with  which  the  traffic  from  Africa 
to  Charleston  or  Jamaica  was  mercy — was  virtue." 


FEDERAL  RECOGNITION  OF  SLAVERY.        335 

record.  The  tragic  comedy  was  the  richer  for  one  scene, 
and  that  by  no  means  the  worst. 

When  it  was  to  the  interest  of  the  slaveholders  to  take 
an  active  part,  men  were  not  satisfied  with  fruitless  resolu 
tions.  In  the  first  article  of  the  treaty  of  Ghent,  slaves 
were  enumerated  among  the  things  which  were  to  be  re 
stored.  During  the  fulfillment  of  the  treaty  a  strife  arose 
over  the  question  whether  only  the  slaves  found  in  the 
places  occupied  by  the  English,  or  also  those  who  had  fled 
to  their  ships  or  their  armies,  were  to  be  understood  as 
comprised  under  this  provision.  The  Americans  claimed 
all  these  slaves,  while  the  English  would  deliver  up  only 
the  first-named  class.  Negotiations  on  this  point  were 
carried  on  for  twelve  years.  By  its  incomparable  tenacity 
the  American  government  wrung  from  three  conventions 
a  decision,  the  final  result  of  which  was  the  payment  of 
$1,204,000.  The  owners  of  the  escaped  slaves  made  a 
good  profit  out  of  this.  After  they  had  received  the 
settled  average  value  of  the  runaways,  with  twelve  years"  in 
terest,  there  still  remsisec.  a  surplus,  which  was  also 
shared  among  them.  It  is  not  easy  to  see  how  the  federal 
government  could  more  clearly  recognize  the  slaves  as 
property  which,  like  all  other  property,  must  be  protected 
by  the  whole  power  of  the  Union.  But  yet  the  old  prin 
ciple  that  slavery  was  only  a  municipal  institution,  of 
which  the  Union,  as  such,  knew  nothing,  was  adhered  to. 

A  long  time  before  this  matter  was  settled  the  govern 
ment  had  employed  the  armed  power  of  the  Union  in 
Florida  in  the  interest  of  the  slaveholders.  The  aboli 
tionists  afterwards  often  asserted  in  their  zeal  that  the 
contests  of  many  years'  duration  which  were  here  fought 
were  only  a  slave-hunt,  and  that  the  final  acquisition  of 
the  territory  was  only  for  the  sake  of  increasing  the  do 
mains  of  slavery.  The  assertion  is  as  little  justified  in 
this  case  as  in  that  of  Louisiana.  From  the  beginning  of 
the  century  the  United  States  had  eyed  the  Floridas  with 


336  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND   SLAVERY. 

a  longing  due  to  political  and  very  cogent  reasons.  In 
consequence  of  the  violation  of  rights  guaranteed  to  the 
United  States  in  New  Orleans  the  house  of  representatives 
appointed  a  committee  in  1803  to  prepare  a  report  on  the 
propriety  and  possibility  of  annexing  Florida.  This  com 
mittee  came  to  the  conclusion  that  "  New  Orleans  and 
the  Floridas  must  become  a  part  of  the  United  States, 
either  by  purchase  or  by  conquest."1  This  report  was  fol 
lowed  by  no  practical  result,  until,  on  account  of  European 
troubles,  Spanish  embarrassments  offered  a  favorable  op 
portunity  therefor.  A  resolution  and  act  of  Jan.  15, 1811, 
empowered  the  president  "  under  certain  contingencies" 
and  "with  a  due  regard  to  the  safety"  of  the  United  States, 
to  take  "temporary"  possession  of  the  territory  east  of 
Perdido  and  south  of  Georgia.2  In  accordance  with  this 
act,  Madison  had  West  Floiida  occupied.  His  secretary 
of  state,  Monroe,  in  response  to  the  "  solemn  protest"  of 
the  English  ambassador  against  this  step,  justified  it  by 
asserting  that  West  Florida  belonged  to  the  Louisiana 
territory  ceded  by  France,  but  at  the  same  time  took  the 
ground  that  the  demands  for  indemnification  which  the 
United  States  had  against  Spain  were  a  sufficient  justifica 
tion  of  the  occupation.8  These  claims  had  to  serve,  after 
wards,  as  a  justification  for  the  attack  upon  East  Florida.4 
In  the  following  year  the  territory  as  far  as  Pearl  river 
was  formally  united  with  Louisiana,  and  that  from  Pearl 
river  to  Perdido  with  the  Mississippi  territory.  The 
house  of  representatives  wished  to  also  authorize  the  presi 
dent  to  take  possession  of  East  Florida,  but  the  senate 
rejected  the  bill  on  account  of  the  critical  condition  of 
the  country.  During  the  war  with  England  Mobile  also 
fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Americans,  and  the  possession 

1  files'  Reg.,  III.,  p.  52. 

1  Statutes  at  Large,  III.,  p.  471. 

1  See  the  correspondence  in  files'  Reg.,  I.,  pp.  187-189. 

4  Niles'  Reg.,  I.,  pp.  189, 190. 


THE   S15MINOLE   WAK.  337 

of  West  Florida  was  thereby  completely  assured  to  them; 
but,  on  the  other  hand,  they  had  to  evacuate  East  Florida- 
All  these  steps,  as  well  as  the  temporary  occupation  of 
Pensacola  by  Jackson,  had  no  connection  whatever  with 
the  slavery  question.  The  latter  was  considered  for  a  long 
time  only  as  an  interest  pertaining  peculiarly  to  Georgia 
and  scarcely  worth  notice.  And  it  was  not  until  after  the 
end  of  the  war  that  it  was  brought  into  prominence  by  a 
curious  occurrence. 

In  November,  1812,  a  committee  of  the  legislature  of 
Georgia  expressed  its  views  very  freely  concerning  the 
action  of.  the  federal  senate  in  refusing  its  approval  to  the 
bill  of  the  house  of  representatives,  which  authorized  the 
president  to  occupy  East  Florida.  The  committee  consid 
ered  this  policy  "  inexplicable"  and  "  subversive  of  the 
safety  and  tranquillity  of  this  section  of  the  United  States.'* 
These  words  contained  the  clue  to  the  peculiar  interest 
which  Georgia  had  in  the  question.  For  a  long  time,  the4 
fugitive  slaves  of  Georgia  found  an  asylum  among  the  In 
dians  of  Florida.  This  "  evil"  was  so  severely  felt  that  the 
state  was  constantly  urging  upon  the  federal  government, 
that  it  should  redress  it  by  acquiring  the  territory.  The 
complaints  were  not  without  effect.  Secretary  of  war 
Crawford  ordered  general  Jackson,  March  15,  1816,  to  no 
tify  the  commandant  at  Pensacola  of  the  fact  that  a  fort 
which  had  been  built  at  Appalachicola,  during  the  war,  by 
the  Englishman  Nichols,  was  occupied  by  Indians  and 
negroes,  who  enticed  slaves  to  flee  from  the  territory  of  the 
United  States.  If  the  commandant  refused  to  interfere, 
then  the  fort  was  to  be  seized,  provided  this  could  be  done 
without  the  authorization  of  congress.  Before  the  com 
mand  reached  Jackson,  he  had  already,  on  his  own  responsi 
bility,  sent  general  Gaines  against  the  fort,  with  the  orders 
"  to  advise  the  governor  of  Pensacola  of  your  [his]  inroad 

1  Niles'  Reg.,  III.,  p.  259. 
22 


338  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY   AND   SLAVERY. 

into  the  territory,  and  with  its  expressed  object,  to  destroy 
these  lawless  banditti."  Gaines  charged  Colonel  Clinch 
with  the  execution  of  the  command.  The  latter  took  some 
gunboats  with  him.  During  the  bombardment,  which  was 
preceded,  as  Clinch  affirmed  in  his  dispatches,  by  an  attack 
from  the  negroes,  a  red-hot  ball  flew  into  the  powder  mag 
azine.  Of  the  three  hundred  negroes  and  about  twenty 
Indians,- who,  according  to  the  official  report,  were  in  the 
fort,  two  hundred  and  seventy  were  instantly  killed  by  the 
explosion,  and  the  rest  were  mortally  wounded.1  This 
"  heroic  deed,"  which  was  rewarded  by  congress  in  1818, 
upon  the  motion  of  Pleasant  of  Virginia,  with  a  grant  of 
$5,465,  was  the  beginning  of  the  Seminole  war,  which  cost 
the  United  States  millions  on  millions  and  perhaps  sur 
passed  all  other  Indian  wars  in  ferocity.  And  the  object 
of  the  campaign  which  ended  in  this  heroic  deed  was,  ac 
cording  to  the  official  records,  the  destruction  of  the  refuge 
of  fugitive  slaves  and  the  return  of  the  fugitives  to  their 
rightful  owners.  The  troops  of  the  Union  were  degraded 
into  slave-hunters;  the  victor  of  New  Orleans  and  the  fu 
ture  president  of  the  republic  had  stooped  to  this;  and 
congress  crowned  the  glorious  transaction  by  voting  a  re 
ward.  In  the  heated  debates  which  the  Seminole  war 
excited,  men  shunned  going  back  to  its  first  cause,  although 
the  hunt  for  slaves  continued  to  play  a  leading  part  in  it. 
Only  one  Pennsylvanian  betrayed,  in  an  unguarded  moment, 
how  deeply  slavery  was  entangled  in  the  struggle,  and  he 
defended  the  man-hunting.2  For  the  rest,  men  quarreled 
over  the  question  whether  the  war  had  been  begun  by  the 
Indians,  or  whether  the  latter  had  first  had  reason  to  com 
plain  of  the  injustice  of  the  whites. 


1  The  records  of  these  occurrences  are  in  the  fourth  volume  of  the 
State  Papers,  XIX.  Cong.,  2d  Sess.  An  interesting  report  is  to  be  found 
in  Niles,  XI.,  p.  37. 

9  Baldwin,  Deb.  of  Congress,  VI.,  p.  322. 


WAR. 

So  the  last1  of  the  long  series  of  games  which  had  been 
played  during  the  first  thirty  years  of  the  Union  under 
the  new  constitution,  on  the  white  and  black  chess-board 
of  free  labor  and  slavery,  was  of  a  bloody  character.  The 
stakes  had  been  high  enough,  and  the  north  had  lost  them 
all.  Even  for  its  half- victory  in  the  question  of  slave  im 
portation,  it  had  to  thank  its  league  with  the  northern 
slave  states.  It  would  have  been  contrary  to  human  nature 
if  the  south  had  not,  after  these  successes,  played  the  game 
with  doubled  assurance,  and,  where  possible,  for  doubled 
stakes.  The  stake  and  the  hardihood  of  the  play  increased 
in  the  same  ratio,  as  slavery  swallowed  up  in  the  south 
all  other  interests  and  came  to  be  the  one  interest  on  which 
all  others  were  dependent. 

1 1  call  it  the  last,  because  it  had  the  most  widespread  influence  in 
the  following  period. 


340          STATE  SOVEREIGNTY  AND  SLAVERY. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

THE  ECONOMIC  CONTRAST  BETWEEN  THE  FREE  AND  SLAVE 
STATES.     THE  MISSOURI  COMPROMISE. 

From  the  instant  that  slavery  was  brought  into  connec 
tion  with  the  constitution,  the  south  had  shown  a  feverish 
irritation  as  soon  as  the  "  peculiar  institution"  was  made  a 
theme  of  discussion  in  any  way  whatever.  A  great  part 
of  the  questions  it  called  forth  had  been  settled  only  after 
long  and  heated  struggles.  And  during  these  struggles 
many  a  word  had  fallen  on  both  sides  which  lifted  with 
terrible  certainty  the  veil  of  the  future.  But  yet  all  the 
contests  over  the  slavery  question,  with  the  exception  of 
the  debates  in  the  Philadelphia  convention,  had  been,  so  to 
speak,  mere  incidents.  They  constituted  only  one  element 
of  the  regular  political  order  of  the  day.  "  South"  and 
"  North,"  spoken  in  tones  pregnant  with  meaning,  soon 
became  among  the  most  frequent  expressions  of  politicians. 
But  "  slaveholding"  and  "  free"  states  had  not  yet  become 
political  catch- words.  When  they  had  •  become  such,  and 
when  they  became,  as  they  did  every  day,  more  and  more 
the  keynote  in  all  debates,  fractional  parties  were  formed  on 
both  sides,  but  especially  in  the  north,  which,  appealing  to 
the  olden  time,  protested  against  this  with  increasing  vio 
lence.  Even  since  the  end  of  the  civil  war,  thick  books  have 
been  written  to  prove  that  the  slaveholding  and  free  states 
might  have  peaceably  got  along  with  one  another  till  the  end 
of  time,  if  on  this  side  and  that,  political  short-sightedness, 
fanaticism,  and  dernagogism  had  not  awakened  discord  and 
artfully  kept  it  alive.  The  whole  history  of  the  Union  since 
1787  so  clearly  contradicts  this  view  that  it  can  be  attrib- 


AN   ECONOMIC   CONTRAST.  341 

uted  only  to  moral  enervation.  Luther  and  his  opponents 
could  have  more  easily  remained  true  to  their  argument, 
and  by  keeping  silent,  have  set  a  limit  to  the  reformation 
already  begun,  than  the  contest  in  the  United  States  be 
tween  the  free  and  the  slaveholding  states  could  be  kept, 
by  simply  not  noticing  it,  from  growing  more  violent  every 
day  until  it  finally  culminated  in  an  incurable  breach. 
Even  if  this  mutual  opposition  had  been  only  a  moral  and 
political  one,  there  was  no  possibility  of  mediation  or  rec 
onciliation  between  them  because  it  was  a  question  of  prin 
ciple.  But,  besides  this,  it  was  also  of  an  industrial  nature 
and  was  therefore  of  greater  signification,  since  it  nec 
essarily  influenced  practical  politics  earlier  and  more 
directly. 

Free  labor,  with  unlimited  competition,  makes  the  high 
est  development  and  the  highest  employment  of  individual 
power  the  formative  principle  of  the  collective  life  of  a 
nation.  On  the  contrary,  the  only  means  of  industrial  ad 
vancement  with  slave  labor  is  the  increase  of  the  weight  ol 
the  dead  mass.  The  essence  of  free  labor  is  intensity;  the 
condition  of  existence  for  a  slavocracy  competing  with  free 
labor  is  boundless  expansion.1  Moreover  and  above  all,  in 
the  United  States,  expansion  was  offered  to  the  free  north 

1  During  the  last  five  years  before  the  outbreak  of  the  civil  war,  the 
leading  statesmen  of  the  south  not  only  admitted  this,  but  used  it  as  an 
argument  for  the  justice  of  their  new  demands.  Robert  Toombs  de 
clared,  Jan.  24,  1856,  in  a  speech  at  Boston:  "Expansion  is  as  necessary 
to  the  increased  comforts  of  the  slave  as  to  the  prosperity  of  the  master." 
But  Barringer  of  North  Carolina  laid  the  most  open  statement  before 
the  peace  convention  of  1861.  He  said:  "In  my  opinion  you  will 
never  get  back  the  seceded  states,  without  you  give  them  some  hope  of 
the  acquisition  of  future  territory.  They  know  that  when  slavery  is 
gathered  into  a  cul  de  sac,  and  surrounded  by  a  wall  of  free  states,  it  is 
destroyed.  Slavery  must  have  expansion.  It  must  expand  by  the  ac 
quisition  of  territoiy  which  now  we  do  not  own.  The  seceded  states 
will  never  yield  this  point — will  never  come  back  to  a  government 
which  gives  no  chance  for  the  expansion  of  theii  principal  institution." 
Chittenden's  Report,  p.  340. 


34:2  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND   SLAVERY. 

in  a  high  degree,  and  intensity  of  labor  could  therefore 
come  into  play  only  upon  one  side,  and  that  the  quantita 
tive  one.  The  final  result  in  the  struggle  between  the 
opposing  industrial  principles  would  not,  however,  be  there 
by  changed. 

The  industrial  development  of  the  slave  states  soon  fell 
far  behind  that  of  the  north,  because  this  development  on 
account  of  slavery  continued  to  be  thoroughly  one-sided. 
The  south  remained  essentially  limited  to  agriculture,  and 
this  could  be  carried  on  only  on  a  large  scale,  while  the 
condition  precedent  of  intense  agricultural  industry  is  the 
predominance  of  the  small  and  middle-sized  farm.  But 
slavery  has  an  invincible  tendency  in  favor  of  planta 
tion  industry,  which  suppresses  or  swallows  small  farms.1 

1  According  to  the  census  of  1850  (Compend.,  p.  170),  in  the  southwest 
the  average  size  of  landed  properties,  including  the  farms  and  the  so- 
called  "patches"  of  the  cottagers  who  owned  a  few  slaves,  was  two  hun 
dred  and  seventy-three  acres.  Cotton  plantations  were  seldom  less  than 
four  hundred  acres.  According  to  De  Bow,  the  first  class  of  slavehold 
ers,  those  owning  from  fifty  slaves  up,  altogether  numbered  in  all  the 
slave  states  only  seven  thousand  nine  hundred  and  twenty-nine.  The 
majority  of  the  cotton  planters,  who  owned  from  ten  to  twenty -five  slaves, 
lived,  according  to  Olmstead,  in  great  indigence  (The  Cotton  Kingdom, 
I.,  p.  18.  Compare  also,  II.,  p.  233).  De  Bow — an  authority  who  can 
not  well  be  doubted  when  the  misfortunes  of  the  slave  states  are  the 
subject  of  discussion — writes:  "  But  what  would  be  his  [the  hearer's] 
surprise,  when  told  that  so  far  from  living  in  palaces,  many  of  these 
[cotton]  planters  dwell  in  habitations  of  the  most  primitive  construc 
tion,  and  these  so  inartificially  built  as  to  be  incapable  of  defending  the 
inmates  from  the  winds  and  rains  of  heaven;  that  instead  of  any  artis- 
tical  improvement,  this  rude  dwelling  was  surrounded  by  cotton-fields, 
or  probably  by  fields  exhausted,  washed  into  gullies  and  abandoned." 
Resources  of  the  South  and  West,  II.,  p.  113.  The  same  authority 
writes:  "I  am  satisfied  that  the  non-slaveholders  far  outnumber  the 
slaveholders,  perhaps  by  three  to  one.  In  the  more  southern  portion  of 
this  region  [the  southwest],  the  non-slaveholders  possess  generally  but 
very  small  means,  and  the  land  which  they  possess  is  almost  universal 
ly  poor,  and  so  sterile  that  a  scanty  subsistence  is  all  that  can  be  derived 
from  its  cultivation,  and  the  more  fertile  soil,  being  in  the  hands  of  the 
slaveholders,  must  ever  remain  out  of  the  power  of  those  who  have 
none."  II.,  p.  106. 


SOUTHERN    SOCIETY.  343 

The  great  planter  gave  the  tone  to  industrial  life.  He 
abandoned  himself,  in  great  part,  to  the  finer  enjoyments 
of  life,  leaving  the  control  of  the  plantation  to  the  overseer, 
who,  as  a  rule,  paid  attention  only  to  the  greatness  of  the 
crop,  since  this  was  usually  looked  upon  as  a  measure  of 
his  capacity  arid  served  also  as  the  measure  of  his  remuner 
ation.  In  most  cases  the  soil  was  systematically  exhausted. 
The  surplus  yield  was  laid  out  when  necessary  in  new 
lands,  but  especially  in  new  slaves;  for  wealth  was  esti 
mated  according  to  the  number  of  slaves,  and  social  posi 
tion  depended,  in  certain  respects,  upon  this  also.  The 
price  of  slaves  rose  more  quickly  than  their  value.  He 
who  had  fewest  slaves  suffered  most  on  this  account,  as 
well  as  from  the  lack  of  means  of  exchange.  His  labor 
power  was  only  sufficient  to '  wring  from  the  ground  what 
was  needed  for  the  acquisition  of  the  barest  necessaries. 
There  was  no  spur  to  emulation,  for  the  great  planter  stood 
too  far  above  him,  and  a  moderate  advance  brought  with  it 
no  increase  of  the  enjoyments  of  life  which  could  exercise 
a  marked  influence  upon  him.  If  he  was  especially  indus 
trious,  and  if  fortune  smiled  tipon  him,  he  aped  the  large 
planter  and  like  him  devoted  his  savings  to  the  purchase 
of  new  slaves.  Production  was  increased  without  any  in 
crease  in  comfort.  What  was  considered  as  the  growth  of 
wealth  was  really,  in  great  part,  only  an  increase  of  the 
laboring  population,  together  with  an  increasing  destruc 
tion  of  capital.  The  south  lived  almost  exclusively  by 
agriculture,  and  with  every  decade  the  price  of  land  fell 
farther  behind  its  price  in  the  north,  a  country  much  less 
richly  endowed  by  nature.1 

1  According  to  the  census  of  1850  the  average  price  of  an  acre  in 
Virginia  was  $8,  and  in  Pennsylvania,  her  next-door  neighbor,  $25. 
The  same  remarkable  difference  in  price  appeared  in  the  slave  states 
themselves,  where,  in  different  sections,  the  proportion  between  the 
slaves  and  the  free  populatiou  was  notably  different.  Thus  Olnistead 
found  that  the  price  of  an  acre  in  the  northwestern  portions  of  Virginia, 


344:  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY   AND   SLAVERY. 

And  recompense  for  this  in  other  branches  of  industry 
was  utterly  lacking.  Manufacturing  on  a  great  scale 
found  no  footing  in  the  peculiarly  slave  states,  and  could 
find  none.1  The  capital  of  the  section  was  monopolized 
by  agriculture.  Manufacturing  industry  did  not  accord 
with  the  longing  for  aristocratic  leisure  which  must  char 
acterize  the  free  population  in  a  community  which  owes  its 
specific  industrial  character  to  slave  labor.  The  natural 
resources  of  the  section  had  to  oifer  quite  extraordinary 
advantages  to  foreign  capital  before  the  latter  would  ven 
ture  to  try  to  overcome  the  difficulties  which  an  industrial 
system  founded  on  slavery  laid  in  the  way  of  every  great 
industrial  undertaking.  Skilled  labor  was  more  difficult 
to  get  there  than  anywhere  else.  The  slaves  could  not  be 
trained  to  it.  Since  they  did  not  enjoy  the  fruits  of  their 
labor  they  labored  only  under  the  impulse  of  fear.  The 
constant  conscientious  watchfulness  which  is  the  first 
requisite  for  a  successful  factory-hand  could  not  be  got 
under  the  lash.  There  was,  indeed,  no  lack  of  free  work 
men,  but  in  every  respect  they  were  far  behind  the  work 
men  of  the  free  states.  The  demoralizing  influence  of 
the  scorn  entertained  for  labor  showed  itself  especially  up- 

where  the  proportion  was  1 :  15,  was  above  $7.75,  and  in  the  other  coun 
ties,  where  the  proportion  was  1 :  2  2-10,  was  only  $4.50.  The  Cotton 
Kingdom,  I.,  p.  114. 

1  Other  conditions  being  the  same,  the  manufacture  of  a  raw  material 
will  always  be  carried  on  in  the  neighborhood  where  the  material  is 
produced.  The  tendency  of  both  sections  to  the  development  of  manu 
factures  can  best  be  compared  in  the  case  of  the  cotton  manufacture. 
According  to  the  report  submitted  June  30,  1855,  by  R  C.  Morgan  and 
A.  Shannon  to  the  secretary  of  the  treasury,  this  represented,  in  1820,  in 
the  slave  states,  a  value  of  $885,008,  and  in  the  free  states  of  $4,048,549 ; 
in  1860  it  had  reached  in  the  slave  states  $9,367,  331,  and  in  the  free 
states  $52,501,853.  All  the  manufactures  of  the  south  represented,  in 
1850,  the  value  of  $93,362,202,  and  those  of  the  north  $347,748,612. 
Kettell,  Southern  Wealth  and  Northern  Profits,  p.  55.  The  number  ot 
persons  engaged  in  manufacturing  was,  according  to  the  census  of  1850, 
in  the  slave  states  151,944,  and  in  the  free  states  807,125. 


LABOB  AND   POPULATION.  345 

on  them.  Moreover,  the  independent  artisan,  whose  work 
foims  the  natural  basis  of  a  healthy  general  industry, 
had  only  a  precarious  existence  in  the  slave  states.  The 
possibility  and  necessity  of  a  division  of  labor  stand  in  a 
certain  relation  to  the  density  of  population.1  It  was  there- 


1  At  the  end  of  the  revolutionary  war  the  population  of  the  southern 
states  was  about  1,600,000  souls.  Their  area  was  128,000,000  acres. 
There  were  therefore  about  eighty  acres  per  head.  By  1860  the  popula 
tion  of  the  slave  states  had  increased  to  12,000,000,  and  their  territory 
embraced  nearly  540,000,000  acres,  about  forty-five  acres  per  head. 
While  the  population  had  increased  in  the  proportion  of  1 :  7.5,  the  area 
of  slavery  had  been  extended  in  the  proportion  of  1 :  4.5.  Carey  (The 
Slave  Trade,  Domestic  and  Foreign,  p.  99,  seq.)  gives  a  series  of  author, 
ities  from  the  slave  states  in  support  of  the  fact  that  in  those  states  the 
ground  was  rapidly  used  up,  and  soon  completely  exhausted,  so  that  the 
population  either  grew  poor  or  had  to  exchange  their  old  abandoned 
homes  for  new  stretches  of  virgin  soil.  He  then  says  (p.  102) :  u  When 
>,.,.  .  they  [men]  separate  from  each  other  the  greater  is  the  tendency 
to  a  decline  in  the  value  of  land,  the  less  is  the  value  of  labor,  and  the 
less  freedom  of  man.  Such  being  the  case,  if  we  desire  to  ascertain 
the  ultimate  cause  of  the  existence  of  the  domestic  slave  trade,  it  would 
seem  to  be  necessary  only  to  ascertain  the  cause  of  the  exhaustion  of 
the  land."  This  cause  is  commonly  and  quite  wrongly,  he  says,  sought 
in  slavery;  for  in  the  northern  states  "exactly  the  same  exhaustion"  [?] 
of  the  soil  takes  place.  "  It  is  not  slavery  that  produces  exhaustion  of 
the  soil,  but  exhaustion  of  the  soil  that  causes  slavery  to  continue" 
(p.  105).  He  then  estimates  the  products  of  the  slave  states  in  1850 
at  $300,000,000  and  those  of  the  free  states  at  $1,250,000,000,  and  con- 
tinues :  "  The  difference  is  caused  by  the  fact  that  at  the  north  artisans 
have  placed  themselves  near  to  the  farmers,  and  towns  and  cities  have 
grown  up,  and  exchanges  are  made  more  readily,  and  the  farmer  is  not 
to  the  same  extent  obliged  to  exhaust  his  land,  and  dispersion  goes  on 
more  slowly.  .  .  .  With  each  step  in  the  process  of  coming  to- 
gether'at  the  north,  men  tend  to  become  more  free;  whereas  the  disper 
sion  of  the  south  produces  everywhere  the  trade  in  slaves  of  which  the 
world  complains,  and  which  would  soon  cease  to  exist  if  the  artisan 
could  be  brought  to  take  his  place  by  the  side  of  the  producer  of  food 
and  cotton.  .  .  (p.  115).  Upon  whom,  now,  must  rest  the  responsi 
bility  for  such  a  state  of  things  as  is  here  exhibited  ?  Upon  the  planter. 
He  exercises  no  volition.  He  is  surrounded  by  coal  and  iron  ore,  but 
the  attempt  to  convert  them  into  iron  has  almost  invariably  been 
followed  by  ruin.  He  has  vast  powers  of  nature  ready  to  obey  his  will, 


346  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY    AND    SLAVERY. 

fore  exceedingly  limited  in  the  slave  states.  The  market 
for  manufactured  articles  outside  of  the  few  great  cities 
had  such  a  wide  range  that  the  needed  competition  unfor 
tunately  could  not  be  built  up.  Not  only  were  the  con 
sumers  too  widely  scattered,  but  their  absolute  number 
was  too  small.  The  great  landowners  numbered  only  a 
few  thousand,  and  their  demand  for  luxuries  could  be  easily 
and  cheaply  supplied  by  importation.  The  planters  of  the 
second  class  usually  tasted  according  to  their  means  the 
luxurious  enjoyment  which  their  rich  exemplars  allowed 
themselves,  and  lived,  for  the  rest,  in  the  self-satisfied  con- 
yet  dare  lie  not  purchase  a  spindle  or  a  loom  to  enable  him  to  bring 
into  use  his  now  waste  labor  power,  for  such  attempts  at  bringing  the 
consumer  to  the  side  of  the  producer  have  almost  invariably  ended  in 
the  impoverishment  of  the  projector,  and  the  sale  and  dispersion  of  his 
laborers."  According  to  Carey  the  blame  for  this  falls  upon  England 
and  those  who,  by  supporting  free  trade  tendencies,  have  aided  her 
efforts  to  make  herself  the  '•  sole  workshop  of  the  world"  for  all  man- 
ufactured  and  industrial  articles.  Space  does  not  allow  me  to  make 
further  extracts,  but  it  is  worth  while  to  answer  the  reasoning  of  this 
famous  politico-economist,  inasmuch  as  this  will  be  an  excellent  proof 
of  the  view  developed  in  the  text.  What  he  wishes  to  prove  is  opposed 
to  this.  Carey  wholly  forgets  one  fact,  and  this  one  fact  turns  all  his 
arguments  against  himself.  The  commercial  policy  of  the  United 
States  has  not  been  different  for  the  two  sections,  but  precisely  the  same 
for  the  whole  country.  Whether  it  has  been  good  or  bad,  in  either  event 
under  it  countless  towns  and  cities  have  grown  up  in  the  north ;  manu 
facturing  and  industry  1mm  struck  root;  the  population  has  grown 
denser;  "  anvil  and  loom"  have  "  taken  their  places  beside  the  plough 
and  the  rake";  while  all  this  has  not  happened  at  the  south,  if  it 
"could"  not  happen  at  the  south,  as  Carey — and  rightly  indeed — affirms; 
if  all  attempts  to  bring  it  about  ended  with  the  ruin  of  the  projector,— 
the  reason  for  this  must  be  sought  elsewhere.  But  this  reason  can 
be  found  only  in  slavery,  for  slave  labor  and  free  labor  was  the  only 
difference  which  influenced  the  industrial  institutions  and  the  industrial 
policies  of  the  two  sections.  It  cannot  be  denied  that  the  exhaustion  of 
the  soil  and  the  consequent  "dispersion"  of  the  population,  tended  to 
make  the  free  whites  of  the  south  ever  more  and  more  the  slaves  of 
slavery.  Cause  and  effect  were  here,  as  they  so  often  are,  entangled  with 
each  other  in  such  a  way  that  each  influenced  the  other,  so  that  each 
appeared  both  as  a  cause  and  as  an  effect. 


MANUFACTURES   AND   TRADE.  347 

tentment  of  an  idle  semi-civilization.  The  mass  of  the 
small  slaveholding  landowners  and  of  the  poor  artisans 
was  the  most  sorrowful  social  product  which  the  history  of 
civilized  nations  has  to  show,  an  aristocratic  proletariat 
which,  both  from  its  lack  of  culture  and  its  arrogance, 
was  terrible  material  in  the  hands  of  a  self-seeking  aristoc 
racy  and  of  politicians  greedy  for  power.  Partly  poverty 
and  partly  savagery  allowed  manufacturing  industry  to 
find  no  market  here  for  anything  save  the  most  necessary 
tools,  articles  of  clothing,  small  arms,  and  the  whisky  flask. 
Finally,  the  slaves,  with  the  exception  of  the  house-slaves 
of  the  wealthy,  figured  among  the  consumers  of  manu 
factured  articles  only  as  users  of  agricultural  implements 
and  of  the  coarse  stuffs  which  served  to  cover  their  naked 
ness.1 

The  wholesale  trade  was  mainly  in  the  hands  of  northern 
merchants.  In  all  contests  with  the  north,  the  right-bower 
of  the  southern  politicians  was  the  fact  that  the  profit 
yielded  by  the  export  of  southern  raw  products  to  Europe 
and  the  import  of  European  manufactured  goods  to  the 
south  fell  to  the  north.  As  threats  of  secession  became  the 
staple  seasoning  of  political  debates,  the  taunt  was  contin 
ually  thrown  out  that  the  shopkeeping-spirit  of  the  north 
would  think  twice  before  it  drove  the  south  to  separation 
and  so  deprived  itself  of  the  profit  which  the  great-hearted 
south  allowed  it  to  make.  Retail  business  languished  un 
der  the  conditions  which  held  down  all  handicraft.  Com- 

1  The  Lynchburg  Virginian  said :  "  Dependent  upon  Europe  and  the 
north  for  almost  every  yard  of  cloth,  and  every  coat,  and  boot,  and  hat 
we  wear;  for  our  axes,  our  scythes,  tubs  and  buckets, — in  short,  for 
everything  except  our  bread  and  meat ! — it  must  occur  to  the  south  that 
if  our  relations  with  the  north  should  ever  be  severed— and  how  soon 
they  may  be,  none  can  know  (may  God  avert  it  long!) — we  would,  in  all 
the  south,  not  be  able  to  clothe  ourselves.  We  could  not  fell  our  forests, 
plough  our  fields,  or  mow  our  meadows.  In  fact,  we  would  be  reduced 
to  a  state  more  abject  than  we  are  willing  to  look  at  even  prospective- 
ly."  Quoted  by  Olinsted,  The  Cotton  Kingdom,  II.,  p.  366. 


34:8  STATE   SOVEKEIGNTY    AND    SLAVERY. 

mercial  life  was  confined,  far  more  than  at  the  north,  to  a 
few  places,  and  commerce  could  therefore  exercise  its  civil 
izing  influences  only  on  a  much  smaller4  scale  than  there.1 

The  population  of  the  slave  states  therefore  lacked  that 
manifold  interlinking  of  interests  which  goes  on  develop 
ing  forever  in  a  community  that  rests  on  a  moral  basis.  In 
the  free  states,  indeed,  the  social  extremes  constantly  be 
came  farther  apart,  but  the  transitions  from  one  social 
stratum  to  the  other  were  unnoticed  and  the  whole  com 
munity  was  an  organism  which  not  only  grew  outwardly, 
but  was  continually  developing  within.  In  the  south,  on 
the  contrary,  society  ever  became  more  distinctly  divided 
into  three  separate  classes — the  ruling  great  land  owners; 
the  less  wealthy  slaveholders,  who  had  no  leisure  for  in 
tensely  active  participation  in  political  life  and  neither 
leisure  nor  inclination  for  self-culture;  and  the  free  rab 
ble.  The  foundation  of  the  whole  structure  was  formed  by 
the  slaves,  who  had  no  social  standing.2  Of  course  there 
was  no  lack  of  connecting-links,  but  they  were  not  numer 
ous  and  important  enough  to  exercise  a  determining  influ 
ence.  The  character  of  the  political  and  social  life  of  the 
south  was  determined  by  the  natural  three-fold  division  of 
society  which  grew  out  of  slavery. 

The  consequences  of  this  peculiar  arrangement  of  social 
circumstances  were  the  more  destructive,  the  more  the  po 
litical  institutions  assumed  a  purely  democratic  character, 
for  in  just  this  proportion  the  whole  politico-social  system 
was  based  on  a  broader  lie.  All  class-government  is  de 
moralizing,  and  the  ruling  class  is  so  much  the  more  de 
moralized  the  more  its  mastery  is  merely  a  matter  of  fact 

1  According  to  the  census  of  1850,  commerce,  trades  and  mining  em 
ployed  180,334  persons  in  the  slave  states  and  456,863  in  the  free  states. 

a  In  this  general  estimate,  I  have  had  in  mind  the  state  of  things  in 
the  regular  plantation-states.  In  the  so-called  border  states  there  were 
manifold  and  not  unimportant  modifications.  Their  kind  and  degree 
as  well  as  their  political  significance,  will  be  hereafter  discussed. 


AN    ARISTOCRATIC   PROLETARIAT.  349 

and  not  grounded  in  law,  for  then  the  disproportion 
between  power  and  lawfully-imposed  duty  is  so  much  the 
greater.  The  careful  preservation  of  democratic  appear 
ances  was  so  much  of  a  necessity  that  the  ruling  class  did 
not  appreciate  how  far  the  democracy  had  become  an  empty 
appearance.  It  was  no  conscious,  naked  lie,  when  the 
Pinckneys,  Lowndes,  Calhoun,  Cobb,  Davis  and  others 
praised  the  slave  states  as  the  chief  stronghold  of  political 
freedom.  Men  of  this  sort  do  not  consciously  lie  to  them 
selves  for  generations.  The  insolent  compassion  with 
which  the  role  of  Cinderella  was  assigned  to  the  free  states 
bore  the  unmistakable  stamp  of  unfortunate  conviction. 
It  sounds  absurd,  and  yet  it  was  true,  that  just  because  the 
multitude  followed  them  blindly,  the  leaders  honestly 
thought  that  the  south  was  inspired  by  that  earnest  spirit 
of  freedom  which  was  ascribed  to  the  fathers  of  the  re 
public.1  The  multitude  had  an  undeniable  right  to  make 
its  will  the  determining  element,  and  it  followed  its  leaders 
on  the  path  on  which  their  safety  lay  and  which  they 
looked  at,  from  their  standpoint,  not  without  reason,  as  the 
path  to  freedom.  And,  in  fact,  the  multitude  applauded 
them  the  more  loudly,  the  greater  demands  they  made  in 
the  interest  of  their  own  safety.  The  wider  the  chasm 
between  the  mass  and  the  great  planter  became,  so  much 
the  more  deeply  the  former,  relying  on  the  fact  of  equal 
political  rights,  intoxicated  itself  with  a  ludicrous  belief  in 
political  equality,  and  thought  that  the  inevitable  result  of 
this  was  an  equality  of  interests.  There  was  no  sober  in 
vestigation  of  the  question  how  far  the  facts  justified  this 
view,  because  the  multitude  blindly  confused  power  and 
freedom.  It  was  precisely  the  poorest,  and  from  every 

1  Yet  I  do  not  mean  by  this  to  say  that  the  aristocracy  had  no  eye 
whatever  for  the  degradation  of  the  city  and  country  proletariat.  When 
it  considered  the  circumstances  of  the  south  by  themselves,  and  not  in 
comparison  with  those  of  the  north,  it  was  fully  aware  of  this.  The 
expression  "white  trash"  originated,  not  in  the  north,  but  in  the  south. 


350  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

point  of  view  the  most  abject,  whites  who  found  the  great 
est  satisfaction  for  their  self-love  in  the  thought  that  they 
were  members  of  the  privileged  class.  He  who  wished  to 
span  the  broad  gulf  which  separated  them  from  the  slaves 
(who  had  no  rights)  or  was  suspected  of  entertaining  this 
wish,  was  their  deadly  enemy,  for  he  threatened  to  expose 
them  in  all  their  neediness,  defenseless  and  naked;  he  dis 
puted  their  "  right"  to  the  beggarly  pomp  that  was  due 
only  to  the  deeper  degradation  of  others  ;  and  he  there 
fore  trespassed  upon  their  "  freedom."  Attempts  to  show 
that  the  first  cause  of  their  material,  spiritual  and  moral 
needs  lay  in  this  deeper  degradation  of  others,  could  not  be 
made.  And  if  they  could  have  been,  they  would  have  re 
mained  without  result. 

"When  slavery  had  once  become  a  controlling  interest, 
a  change  for  the  better  could  not  come  except  by  means 
of  a  powerful  impulse  from  without.  There  were  no  ele 
ments  within  which  could  make  an  opposition  to  it  of  any 
weight  whatever.  The  natural  advantages  of  the  section 
invited  the  immigration  of  fresh  elements  with  sound 
moral,  industrial,  and  political  views;  but  the  paralyzing 
curse  on  every  effort  prevented  any  especial  result  from 
this  cause.  Slavery  became  more  and  more  of  a  Chinese 
Wall,  which  separated  the  south  from  the  rest  of  the  civil 
ized  world.  Safety  demanded  that  the  comparatively 
small  number  of  immigrants  should  be  forced  by  moral 
pressure  to  swim  with  the  stream.  If  this  pressure  did 
not  at  least  impose  silence  upon  them,  then  men  soon 
ceased  to  limit  themselves  to  moral  suasion.  And  yet  at 
every  moment  the  fact  made  itself  felt  that  modern  civili 
zation  is  not  the  peculiar  possession  of  different  nations, 
but  has  a  universal,  world-embracing  character.  The  re 
sult  of  this  was  a  growing  violence  and  brutality  in  the 
efforts  to  resist  its  influence.  Everything  was  considered 
in  reference  to  the  "  peculiar  institution,"  and  therefore 
hostile  distrust  of  everything  was  felt,  because  this  insti- 


THE   COTTON   GIN.  351 

tution  was  in  ever  sharper  contradiction  with  the  spirit  of 
the  age.  Slavery  in  the  CJnited  States  showed  itself  each 
day,  to  civilization,  as  more  and  more  clearly  the  greatest 
piece  of  theft  of  all  time,  and  the  slavocrats,  like  a  com 
mon  thief,  began  to  fear  the  rustling  of  every  leaf. 

The  reconciling  and  healing  power  of  time  had,  in  this 
case,  to  be  put  to  shame.  North  and  south  had  to  ever 
go  farther  apart,  since  their  opposition  in  all  the  points  al 
ready  mentioned  was  a  natural  result  of  their  different  in 
dustrial  systems. 

These  systems  had  to  develop  themselves,  and  as  they 
did  so  their  results  had  to  be  more  keenly  felt,  and  the 
sectional  separation  had  to  become  more  sharply* marked. 
This  explains  the  frightful  rapidity  with  which  the  contest 
narrowed  down  to  u  either — or."  If  the  industrial  devel 
opment  of  both  sections  had  been  less  rapid,  then  the 
Union  would  probably  be  divided  to-day  into  slave  and 
free  states. 

The  unexpectedly  speedy  development  of  the  industrial 
system  of  the  slave  states  was  the  result  of  a  single  inven 
tion.  Cotton  was  exported  from  the  United  States  for  the 
first  time  in  1791.1  It  is  apparent  from  art.  XII.  of  the 
treaty  negotiated  by  Jay  with  England,  that  cotton  was 
not  then  known  to  Jay  as  an  article  of  export.  It  had 
already  become  evident  that  some  of  the  southern  states 
were  especially  adapted  to  the  cultivation  of  cotton.  Up 
to  this  time  the  plant  had  not  been  cultivated  on  a  greater 
scale  only  because  the  separation  of  the  seed  involved  too 
much  labor.  The  cotton  gin,  invented  by  Eli  "Whitney  in 
1793,  cured  this  misfortune.  While  a  man  could  then 
make  ready  for  the  market  only  one  pound  per  day,  the 
cotton-gin  cleaned  three  hundred  and  fifty  pounds  a  day. 
As  soon  as  the  worth  of  this  invention  had  been  tested  by 
experience  the  cultivation  of  cotton  received  a  tremendous 

1 19,200  Ibs.  Webster,  Works,  V.,  p.  388.  Compare  Hamilton's  Report 
on  Manufactures,  Dec.  5, 1791.  Ham.,  Works,  III.,  pp.  272-275. 


352  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

impulse.  As  early  as  1800,  19,000,000  pounds,  worth 
$5,726,000,  were  exported.  By  1824  the  export  had  in 
creased  to  142,369,663  pounds,  worth  $2 1,947,40 1.1  This 
sudden  gigantic  development  of  the 'new  branch  of  indus 
try  involved  a  corresponding  increase  of  the  demand  for 
labor,  that  is,  a  corresponding  increase  in  the  price  of 
slaves.2  The  vague  dreams  of  emancipation,  in  which  the 
people  of  the  northern  slave  states  indulged  during  the 
first  years  under  the  new  constitution,  had  a  realistic 
basis.  Slave  labor  proved  to  be  so  unsatisfactory  that  men 
began  to  think  about  the  possibility  of  a  time  when  it 
would  become  a  mere  consumer  of  capital.  The  emanci 
pation  of  slaves  became  more  common  because  it  demand 
ed  only  a  small  sacrifice.  The  invention  of  the  cotton-gin 
altered  these  circumstances  at  a  blow.  The  demand  for 
slaves  could  no  longer  be  satisfied,  although  the  northern 
slave  states — especially  Virginia  and  Maryland — at  once 
devoted  themselves  to  slave-breeding.3  In  this  way  cotton 

.  '  Compare  the  statistical,  tables  of  the  products  and  exports  of  the 
south,  completed  to  1860,  in  Kettell,  Southern  Wealth  and  Northern 
Profits,  p.  21.  Kettell  does  not  give  his  authorities.  Compare  also  the 
somewhat  different  views  of  Kapp,  Geschichte  der  Sklaverei,  p.  107. 

2 1  have  not  been  able  to  find  trustworthy  statistical  data  on  this 
point.  Kapp's  statement  (p.  108)  that  the  whole  slave  property  was  es 
timated,  in  1790,  at  $10,000,000  and  in  1820  at  $1,200,000,000,  certainly 
rests  on  an  error.  According  to  the  census  of  1790  the  number  of  slaves 
in  the  southern  states  was  657,047.  By  that  of  1820  it  was  1,524,580. 
The  average  price  of  a  slave,  when  children  and  the  old  were  reckoned, 
would  then  have  been  in  the  earlier  years  about  $15,  and  in  the  later 
ones  about  $780.  The  first  sum  is  evidently  too  low  and  the  last  is 
probably  too  high.  The  Virginia  Times,  in  1836,  estimated  the  average 
value  of  the  negroes  exported  out  of  the  state  at  $600  per  head.  (Niles' 
Reg.,  LI.,  p.  83.)  Kettell,  p.  130,  estimates  the  value  of  the  slaves  in 
1798  at  $200.  and  in  1815  at  $250  per  head. 

3  In  1829,  in  the  Virginia  convention,  Mercer  estimated  the  value  of 
the  slaves  annually  exported  from  that  state  at  $1,500,000.  Deb.  of 
Cong.,  p.  99.  In  Alabama  the  value  of  the  slaves  imported  from  the 
northern  slave  states  from  1833  to  1837  was  estimated  at  $10,000,000. 
Jay,  Misc.  Writ.,  p.  267. 


COMPARATIVE  DEVELOPMENT.  353 

culture  became  a  profitable  pursuit  for  those  slave  states 
that  were  not  especially  fitted  for  it.  The  whole  south 
saw  the  most  brilliant  future  before  it.  It  thought  itself 
sure,  not  only  of  unmeasured  wealth,  but  also  of  political 
mastery.  If  the  north,  despite  the  efforts  of  the  New 
England  states,  had  hitherto  steadily  followed  the  leader 
ship  of  the  south,  how  could  it  emancipate  itself  from  it 
when  the  cotton  culture,  to  which  no  limits  seemed  to  be 
set,  should  have  reached  its  full  development?  In  the  de 
bate  over  the  Missouri  question  McLane  of  Delaware 
thought  he  could  safely  prophesy  a  more  speedy  develop 
ment  for  the  south  than  the  north,1  and  the  latter  by  no 
means  threw  back  the  assertion  as  nonsensical  rhodomon- 
tade.  Roberts  of  Pennsylvania  admitted  its  probability, 
and  used  it  for  a  justification  for  the  refusal  to  extend  the 
slavery  area.2 

On  a  superficial  view  this  idea  might  seem  justified. 
The  north  only  recovered  slowly  from  the  blows  of  the 
Revolutionary  war.  Nothing  happened  which  could  give 
its  development  a  sudden,  mighty  impulse,  and  the  embar 
go  policy  of  the  Republican  party,  as  well  as  the  war  of 
1812,  put  brakes  on  its  progress.  But  this  lagging  of  the 
north  behind  the  south  was  only  in  appearance.  Compari 
son  of  the  population  of  the  two  sections  was  the  only 
thing  needed  in  order  to  show  this.  As  yet  there  was  no 
noticeable  immigration  into  the  northern  states,  and  yet 
the  south  was  farther  outstripped  each  year.  The  indus 
trial  development  of  the  north  struck  its  roots  deep  into 
the  ground,  so  that  a  stem  of  hitherto  unknown  dimensions 
could  shoot  out  from  them  in  course  of  time;  in  the  south, 
on  the  other  hand,  the  stem,  under  hot-house  pressure, 
burst  into  luxurious  foliage,  but  the  roots  lay  on  the  sur 
face  and  withered  away.  The  population  of  the  two  sec- 

1  Deb.  of  Cong.,  VI.,  p.  861. 
•  Ibid,  VI.,  p.  492. 

23 


354:  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

tions,  according  to  the  first  four  censuses,  was  as  follows. 

1790  1800  1810  1820 

North 1,968,455        2,684,625        3,758,820        5,132,372 

South 1,961,327        2,621,300        3,480,994        4,522,224 

This  slower  increase  of  population  in  the  south  was  mainly 
due  to  two  causes.  The  slaves'  impulse  of  self-preserva 
tion  was  subject  to  the  control  of  the  masters.  Food, 
clothing,  shelter,  the  kind  and  amount  of  labor, — these  de 
pended  solely  on  the  will  of  the  masters.  Although,  as  a 
general  rule,  interest  demanded  the  longest  possible  pres 
ervation  of  the  living  capital,  yet  evidently,  in  both  big 
and  little  things,  less  care  would  be  shown  for  the  slaves 
than  the  free  workmen  of  the  north  showed  for  themselves. 
As  the  slaves  produced  less  than  the  free  laborers,  the 
cost  of  supporting  them  had  to  be  much  less  in  order 
that  their  labor  should  pay.  But  less  care  involved 
a  greater  death-rate.  Moreover,  a  good  share  of  the 
best  plantation  districts  was  exceedingly  unhealthy,  and 
for  this  reason  too  the  consumption  of  human  life  was 
quite  peculiarly  great.1  In  this  section,  men  partly  came 
to  the  conviction,  through  experience,  that  interest  de 
manded,  not  the  longest  possible  preservation  of  the  negro, 
but  the  greatest  possible  use  of  his  strength  during  a  shorter 
time.  This  conviction  was  naturally  acted  upon.2  The 

1  According  to  the  report  of  the  secretary  of  the  treasury  of  Jan.  19r 
1831,  the  number  of  deaths  on  the  sugar  plantations  of  Louisiana  ex- 
eeeded  the  births  by  two  and  one-half  per  cent.  According  to  an  article 
in  the  New  Orleans  Argus  in  January,  1830,  the  loss  of  Louisiana  plant- 
ers  on  the  negroes  imported  from  more  northern  states  amounted  to 
twenty-five  per  cent.  This  statement  may  be  exaggerated,  but  that  the 
death-rate  among  this  class  of  slaves  must  have  been  very  great  is  plain 
from  the  fact  that  in  the  advertisements  of  slaves  offered  for  sale,  accli 
mated  negroes  play  a  great  part.  Jay,  Misc.  Writ.,  p.  272. 

3  According  toGiddings,  the  negroes  imported  from  the  slave-breeding 
states  to  the  cotton  plantations  remained  capable  of  work,  on  an  average, 
only  seven  years.  A  convention  of  slaveholders  in  South  Carolina  came, 
after  careful  discussion,  to  the  conclusion  that  it  was  most  profitable  for 
the  masters  to  use  up  the  slaves  within  this  time.  Giddings,  Speeches, 
p.  142. 


POPULATION.  355 

business  of  the  slave-breeders  increased  all  the  more,but  the 
artificial  impulse  which  they  gave  to  the  speedy  increase 
of  the  slave  population  could  not  keep  pace  with  the  natural 
forces  which  caused  the  extraordinarily  rapid  increase  ot 
the  population  in  the  free  states.  The  difference  was  not 
at  first  very  marked,  but  it  grew — especially  after  immi 
gration  into  the  northern  states  began  to  assume  significant 
proportions — in  geometrical  progression. 

This  difference  in  the  increase  of  the  population  of  the  two 
sections  was  of  the  greatest  significance  for  their  power  in  the 
federal  legislature,  since  the  representation  in  the  lower 
house  of  congress  was  decided  according  to  the  number  of 
people.  Since,  moreover,  in  making  up  the  representation, 
five  slaves  were  reckoned  as  only  equal  to  three  white  men, 
the  difference  of  representation  in  favor  of  the  north  was 
much  greater  than  the  difference  in  the  absolute  number  of 
people.  The  absolute  increase  of  the  slave  population  of  the 
southern  states  from  1790  to  1820  was  867,533,  but  this 
amounted  to  only  520,520  as  far  as  representation  was  con 
cerned.  In  1820,  the  total  slave  population  of  1,524,580 
souls  counted  as  a  represented  population  of  914,748.  In  this 
year,  while  the  real  difference  between  the  populations  of 
the  two  sections  was  610,148,  the  difference,  considered 
from  the  point  of  view  of  representation,  amounted  to 
1,219,980.  The  representation  of  the  two  sections  in  the 
lower  house  of  congress  until  the  rearrangement  in  accord 
ance  with  the  census  of  1830  was  as  follows: 

Before  the  first  census       1790  1800  1810  1820 

North ...35  57  77  104  138 

South .30  53  65  79  90 

In. these  figures  it  was  written,  clear  as  day,  that  the 
slave  states  would  have  to  yield  the  mastery  of  affairs  to 
the  north  soon  and  forever,  if  they  could  not  find  in  some 
other  place  a  counterpoise  to  the  north's  growing  power 
in  the  house  of  representatives.  Threats  and  other  politi 
cal  acto  of  every  sort  and  of  all  manner  of  duplicity  might 


356  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND   SLAVERY. 

for  a  while  hold  a  sufficient  number  of  northern  .  ipreseii 
tatives  under  their  control,  but  in  the  long  run  this  was 
impossible,  for  the  northern  people  had  to  come  to  believe 
that  they  were  being  driven  by  their  politicians  in  direct 
opposition  to  their  material  interests.  But  the  political  mas 
tery  of  the  slave  states  was  an  essential  condition  for  the 
continued  existence  of  slavery  in  the  Union.  The  south 
had,  then,  to  pay  especial  attention  to  the  senate.  In  this 
body,  representation  was  independent  of  the  population. 
It  could  not  only  paralyze  every  action  of  the  house  of 
representatives,  but  it  had  besides  this  several  especial 
privileges  of  the  weightiest  character.  As  long  as  the 
slaveholders  controlled  an  equal  number  of  states,  so  long 
was  the  equality  of  power  maintained,  as  far  as  it  possibly 
could  be.  And  wherever  the  south  had  raised  the  question 
of  slavery  in  any  way,  it  was  now  practically  certain  that 
there  the  slaveholding  interest  would  be  the  ruling  one,  for 
it  had  the  whole  power  of  the  section  behind  it,  since  self- 
preservation  made  it  necessary  for  the  south  to  form  in  solid 
phalanx  in  its  support.  This  gives  the  key  to  the  stubborn 
tenacity  and  passionate  energy  with  which  the  south  for 
three  years  fought  out  the  Missouri  struggle  and  all  the 
later  contests  in  behalf  of  the  extension  of:  slave  territory. 
The  outer  history  of  the  struggle  between  the  two  sec 
tions  over  Missouri  can  not  be  followed  out  here  in  all  its 
different  phases.1  The  facts,  a  knowledge  of  which  is  nec- 

1  It  can  be  found  in  Kapp,  Lunt,  Giddings,  Wilson,  and  in  many  other 
easily  attainable  books.  Neumann's  Darstellung  (II.,  p.  324,  seq.)  should 
not  be  used,  since  the  most  essential  facts  are  wrongly  judged.  He 
turns  matters  around  wrong  end  foremost,  in  a  laughable  way,  since  he 
makes  the  Missouri  question  appear  as  an  appendix  to  the  organization 
of  Arkansas  as  a  territory.  March  16,  1818,  a  petition  was  presented  to 
the  house  of  representatives  from  inhabitants  of  Missouri,  who  asked 
permission  for  that  territory  to  form  a  state  constitution  in  order  to  be 
admitted  as  a  state.  This  petition,  with  others  of  similar  contents,  was 
referred  to  a  committee  which  brought  in  a  bill  April  3.  But  it  was  not 
until  Dec.  1C,  1818,  that  a  committee  was  appointed,  on  the  motion  of 


THE    MISSOURI    LIMITATION.  357 

essary  in  order  to  judge  of  the  position  of  both  parties,  the 
character  of  the  constitutional  questions  involved,  and  the 
consequences  of  the  final  issue,  can  be  concentrated  into  a 
few  words. 

In  February,  1819,  the  house  of  representatives  went 
into  committee  of  the  whole  over  the  admission  of  Mis 
souri  as  a  state.  The  recommendation  of  the  committee 
provided  in  the  ordinary  manner  what  was  necessary 
to  this  end.  Tallmadge  of  !N"ew  York  moved  the 
amendment  that  the  admission  should  be  made  dependent 
on  the  two  following  conditions:  prohibition  of  the  fur 
ther  introduction  of  slaves,  and  emancipation  of  all  the 
slave  children  born  after  the  admission  as  soon  as  they 
reached  the  age  of  twenty-five.  This  motion  gave  life  to 
the  whole  strife,  and  the  idea  embraced  in  it  remained  the 
essence  of  the  strife  until  the  decision  of  its  most  impor 
tant  points.  The  majority  of  the  house  of  representatives 
voted  to  make  the  admission  of  Missouri  as  a  state  depen 
dent  upon  such  a  limitation  of  her  power  in  regard  to 
slavery;  but  the  majority  of  the  senate  decided  against 
this.  Both  houses  insisted  on  their  respective  resolves,  and 
congress  adjourned  without  coming  to  any  final  decision. 
When  the  question  again  came  up  in  the  next  session  the 
opponents  of  the  so-called  "  Missouri  limitation"  found 

Robertson  of  Kentucky,  to  consider  the  propriety  of  organizing  Arkan 
sas  as  a  territory  by  itself.  (Compare  Deb.  of  Congress,  VI.,  pp.  122, 
222.)  It  is  a  much  weightier  fact  that  Neumann  puts  the  north  in  a 
thoroughly  false  light,  in  that  he  makes  Tallmadge  bring  in  a  motion 
"  according  to  which  precautions  should  be  taken  for  the  emancipation 
of  the  slaves  already  living  in  the  territory."  Tallmadge  and  his  com 
panions  affirmed  on  numberless  occasions,  in  the  debate,  that  they  had 
never  had  the  intention  of  interfering  with  the  right  of  property  in  the 
slaves  already  living  there,  and  their  opponents  often  used  this  to  re 
proach  them  with  inconsistency.  On  p.  327,  the  author  makes  the 
strangest  statements  about  the  growth  of  population  of  the  two  sections 
and  the  relation  which  the  growth  of  representation  had  to  this,  etc. 
These  short  notes  may  serve  as  a  further  reason  for  the  opinion  already 
expressed  concerning  the  thoroughness  and  reliability  of  this  work. 


358 


STATE    SOVEREIGNTY    AND    SLAVERY. 


themselves  materially  aided  by  a  new  circumstance.  Maine, 
which  had  hitherto  been  a  district  of  Massachusetts,  ap 
plied  for  admission  as  an  independent  state.  The  major 
ity  of  the  senate  coupled  together  the  Maine  and  Missouri 
bills,  and  so  put  before  the  majority  of  the  house  the  al 
ternative  of  admitting  Missouri  without  any  limitation,  or 
denying,  for  the  present,  the  admission  of  Maine.  The 
house  was  not  yet  ready  to  acknowledge  itself  so  easily 
beaten.  Neither  earlier  nor  later  has  a  struggle  been 
fought  out  in  congress  in  which  the  majorities  of  both 
houses  have  stood  by  the  decision  once  arrived  at  with  such 
stiff-neckedness.  The  close  of  the  session  constantly  drew 
nearer,  and  an  agreement  seemed  farther  off  than  ever. 
The  whole  country  was  in  a  state  of  feverish  excitement. 
At  the  last  moment,  in  the  night  between  the  second  and 
third  of  March,  1820,  free  labor  and  the  principle  of  na 
tionality  yielded  to  slaver j  and  the  principle  of  state  sov 
ereignty.  If  the  matter  had  affected  Missouri  alone, 
the  defeat  would  have  been  of  comparatively  small 
practical  significance;  but  two  principles  had  been  given 
up,  and  these  two  principles  involved  the  weal  and  woe 
of  the  republic. 

The  statesmen  of  the  south  had  always  pursued  the  sly 
policy  of  accusing  the  north  of  narrow-hearted  and  selfish 
policy  and  of  claiming  for  themselves  a  lofty  ideal  stand 
point,  from  which  they,  impelled  by  brotherly  love  and  in 
born  nobility,  were  ready  to  carry  self-renunciation  to  the 
verge  of  folly,  but  could  not  yield  an  iota  of  the  demands 
of  the  right  for  the  sake  of  all  the  whole  world  could  offer. 
This  rough  mask  was  good  enough  to  serve  as  a  pretext,  not 
only  for  putting  forward  the  most  unjust  demands,  but  also 
for  declaring,  in  the  same  breath,  with  sublime  shame- 
lessness,  that  the  interest  of  the  south  demanded  such  and 
such  a  thing,  and  that  tlie  north  must  t£wefore  comply 
with  it,  whether  or  no.  In  the  straggle  r:  rer  Missouri, 
Brown  of  Kentucky  repelled,  ii>  hull'A^t  nomj  <rf  language. 


MISSOURI   AND   MAINE.  359 

as  a  pitiful  and  lying  insinuation,  the  statement  that  the 
south  was  paying  any  attention  to  the  "balance  of  power"; 
he  had  been  "alarmed"  by  such  thoughts;  the  inexorable 
demands  of  justice  and  intelligence  were  alone  in  ques 
tion.1  It  was  foolish  to  twit  the  north  with  such  phrases, 
after  the  south  had  reached  its  end  by  the  unnatural  al 
liance  of  the  Maine  and  Missouri  bills.  Smith  of  South 
Carolina  had  roundly  declared  in  the  senate  that  consent 
to  the  admission  of  Missouri  without  limitation  "  must" 
be  given  before  Maine  could  be  let  in.2  Clay  had  spoken 
just  as  plainly  in  the  house,3  and  no  one  had  pretended 
that  the  union  of  the  two  bills  was  only  a  harmless  whim 
of  the  senate.  It  would  have  been  unreasonable  to  make 
Maine  suffer  because  the  north  wished  to  curtail  the  "con 
stitutional  rights"  of  Missouri.  The  matter  was  intelligible 
only  on  the  supposition  that  it  compelled  a  bargain  which, 
as  the  south  affirmed,  gave  equal  chances  to  both  sections. 
We  should  do  injustice  to  the  political  insight  of  the  states 
men  of  the  south,  if  we  admitted  that  they  really  looked  at 
the  bargain  in  this  way.  Hardin  of  Kentucky4  and  Tucker 
of  Virginia5  openly  explained :  "  We  are  struggling  for 
our  political  existence."6 

The  south  by  no  means  limited  itself  to  a  discussion  of 
the  mere  question  of  law,  but  brought  forward  a  crowd 
of  pleas  in  justification.  It  was  asserted  that  the  Louis 
iana  territory,  to  which  Missouri  belonged,  had  been  ob 
tained  at  the  cost  of  the  whole  Union,  and  that  it  would 

1  Deb.  of  Cong.,  VII.,  p.  103. 
8  Ibid,  VI.,  p.  383. 

•  Ibid,  VI.,  pp.  472,  474. 
4  Ibid,  VI.,  p.  499. 

•  Ibid,  VI.,  p.  559. 

8  John  Randolph  wrote :  "  They  [Arche,  Mason,  and  himself]  deter 
mined  to  cavil  on  the  ninetieth  part  of  a  hair  in  a  matter  of  sheer  right, 
touching  the  dearest  interests,  the  life  blood  of  the  southern  states." 
Garland,  Life  of  J.  Randolph,  II.,  p.  128. 


360  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

therefore  be  unjust  to  deprive  the  inhabitants  of  half  the 
Union  of  the  "colonization  right";  but  this  would  evi 
dently  be  the  case  if  they  were  forbidden  to  take  their 
property  with  them.  It  was  said,  on  the  other  hand,  that 
slavery  would  present  an  impassable  wall  to  immigration 
from  the  north.  Where  labor  bears  the  stamp  of  shame 
the  free  laborer  cannot  turn  his  steps.  But  how  could 
there  be  hesitation  when  the  choice  was  to  be  made  be 
tween  the  exclusion  of  slavery  or  free  labor?  The  Union 
should  be  a  nursery  of  freedom,  and  not  a  breeding-place 
for  slavery.  The  south  itself  declaimed  with  the  greatest 
pathos  over  the  curse  of  slavery.  "Was  it  not,  then,  a  self- 
evident  duty  to  preserve  the  land  from  any  extension  of 
the  curse? 

The  last  part  of  this  argument  was  repelled  with  great 
decision  by  the  majority  of  southern  members.  They  af 
firmed  that  when  it  was  proposed  to  allow  the  importation 
of  slaves  from  Africa  or  from  any  foreign  country,  the 
south  would  be  first  and  most  earnest  in  protesting  against 
it  But  by  compliance  with  the  wish  expressed  by  the 
south,  the  slave  population  of  the  Union  "  would  not  be 
increased  by  a  single  soul."  Ever  and  ever  again  it  was 
\mrmed  with  Jefferson  in  his  old  age :  "  All  know  that 
permitting  the  slaves  of  the  south  to  spread  into  the  west 
.  .  .  will  increase  the  happiness  of  those  existing, and 
by  spreading  them  over  a  larger  surface  will  dilute  the  evil 
everywhere  and  facilitate  the  means  of  getting  rid  of  it — an 
event  more  anxiously  wished  by  those  on  whom  it  presses 
than  by  the  noisy  pretenders  to  exclusive  humanity."1  The 

1  Jefferson's  "Works,  VII.,  p.  194.  In  the  same  letter,  he  curtly  de 
clares  :  "  It  is  not  a  moral  question,  but  one  merely  of  power."  Yet  he 
was  not  willing  to  admit  that  the  south  was  fighting  merely  for  the  bal 
ance  of  power.  In  another  letter  he  writes :  "  The  Missouri  question 
is  a  mere  party  trick.  The  leaders  of  Federalism,  defeated  in  their 
schemes  of  obtaining  power  by  rallying  partisans  to  th*  principle  oi 
monarchism,  .  .  .  have  changed  their  tack  and  thro\vtr  out  another 


DILUTING    SLAVERY.  361 

north  had  to  let  its  "  pretended  humanity  "  be  thrown  into 
its  face,  as  an  impudent  lie.  Instead  of  lightening  the  lot 
of  the  unfortunate  slaves,  it  wished,  said  southern  men,  to 
hedge  them  into  a  fixed  territory,  where  they  must  infalli 
bly  "perish  of  hunger  and  want"  in  the  course  of  time.1 
It  was  not  difficult  for  the  representatives  of  the  north  to 
overthrow  this  dishonest  as  well  as  weak  reasoning.  The 
assertion  that  the  number  of  slaves  would  not  be  increased 
by  the  extension  of  the  slave  territory — said  Roberts — is 
plainly  false,  because  the  extension  of  the  market  must  re 
sult  in  an  increase  of  price,  and  the  latter  must  give  a 
strong  impulse  towards  increasing  the  supply  of  slaves.8 
Moreover,  it  is  a  known  law  that  when  the  means  of  sub 
sistence  increase,  an  increase  of  population  takes  place. 
These  reasons  were  so  convincing  that  Barbour  of  Virginia3 
and  Pinckney  of  Maryland4  could  not  but  recognize  their 
validity.  Yet  despite  this,  just  as  before,  speech  upon 
speech  was  piled  up  on  the  theme  that  an  extension  of  the 
evil  would  be  a  "dilution"  and,  therefore,  a  mitigation 
of  it. 

After  these  reasons  for  justification,  the  treaty  of  pur 
chase  with  France  was  brought  in  as  a  legal  objection 
against  the  limitation.  Art.  III.  read:  "The  inhabitants 
of  the  ceded  territory  shall  be  incorporated  in  the  Union 
of  the  United  States  and  admitted  as  soon  as  possible,  ac 
cording  to  the  principles  of  the  federal  constitution,  to  the 
enjoyment  of  all  the  rights,  advantages  and  immunities  of 
citizens  of  the  United  States;  and  in  the  meantime  they 

barrel  to  the  whale."  Works,  VI.,  p.  180.  From  another  point  of  view, 
as  we  shall  see,  he  recognized  with  perfect  clearness  the  tremendous 
range  of  the  question. 

1  The  Baptist  churches  of  Missouri  "  protested"  against  the  limita 
tion,  and  "  warned"  congress  "  in  the  name  of  humanity"  not  to  adopt 
it  Niles'Reg.,  XVII.,  p.  210. 

*  Deb.  of  Congress,  VI.,  p.  433. 

1  Ibid,  VI.,  p.  429. 

4  Ibid,  VI.,  p.  441. 


362  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY    AND    SLAVERY. 

shall  be  maintained  and  protected  in  the  free  enjoyment  of 
their  liberty,  property  and  the  religion  which  they  pro 
fess."1 

The  south  sought  to  deduce  from  this  article  the  im 
possibility  of  obliging  Missouri  to  free  the  children  born 
of  slaves,  after  her  admission  into  the  Union,  as  soon  as  they 
reached  their  twenty-fifth  birthday,  because  this  would  in 
fringe  upon  the  right  of  property  guaranteed  by  the  treaty 
to  the  masters.  This  was  denied  by  the  champions  of  the 
limitation,  because  it  was  against  natural  right  and  sound 
common  sense  to  recognize  in  the  master  an  endless  right 
of  property  in  the  yet  unborn  descendants  of  his  slaves. 
It  was  just  as  little  possible  to  use  the  assurance  "  of  all 
the  rights,  advantages  and  immunities  of  citizens  of  the 
United  States"  as  an  argument  against  the  limitation. 
Slavery  existed  only  through  municipal  law;  as  a  citizen  of 
the  United  States,  no  one  had  the  right  to  hold  slaves.2 

The  opponents  of  the  limitation  found  a  further  ground 
ill  the  provision  of  the  treaty  that  the  inhabitants  of  the 
Louisiana  territory  should  be  admitted  to  the  full  enjoy 
ment  of  the  rights  of  citizens  "  as  soon  as  possible."  It 
was  affirmed  that  Missouri  now  had  the  necessary  number 
of  inhabitants  to  organize  as  a  state,  and  that  therefore, 
according  to  the  treaty,  her  admission  must  follow  without 
delay. 

Despite  the  evident  absurdity  of  this  objection,  the  exhaus 
tive  debates  over  it  must  be  reviewed,  because  constitutional 
questions  of  deep  significance  were  touched  upon  in  them. 

If,  on  one  side,  the  expression  "  as  soon  as  possible"  was 

1  Stat.  at  L.,  VIII.,  p.  203. 

'M'Lane,  of  Delaware  said:  "  As  such,  as  citizens  of  the  United 
States,  the  right  to  possess  slaves  is  unquestionable."  (Deb.  of  Congress, 
VI ,  p.  362.)  This  assertion  was  so  bold  that  it  was  not  made  party  doc 
trine.  But  men  sought  to  attain  the  same  end  by  a  thorough  trick. 
They  "  proved"  that  the  states  had  the  right  of  allowing  or  forbidding 
slavery,  and  then  argued  with  bold  misuse  of  language,  as  if  they  had 
spoken  not  of  states,  but  of  "  citizens  of  the  United  States." 


POWERS    OF    CONGRESS.  363 

emphasised,  upon  the  other,  emphasis  was  laid  upon  the 
phrase  "  according  to  the  principles  of  the  federal  consti 
tution.  "  These  certainly  did  not  require  exclusive  attention 
to  the  population  of  a  territory.  What  they  required 
in  the  case  now  before  us,  congress  had  to  discover  and 
decide  for  itself;  only  it  could  not  delay  admission  without 
a  reason.  But  even  if  a  more  sweeping  duty  could  be  in 
ferred  from  the  clause  of  the  treaty  quoted,  yet  it  is  unde 
niably  true  that  congress  could  not  be  further  bound  by 
any  sort  of  stipulation.  Treaties  are,  indeed,  according  to 
the  constitution,  "  the  supreme  law  of  the  land,"  but  only 
so  far  as  they  do  not  stand  in  opposition  to  the  constitu 
tion  itself.1  President  and  senate,  to  whom  the  treaty 
power  is  confided  by  the  constitution,  could  not,  by  their 
one-sided  action,  curtail  the  constitutional  powers  of  con 
gress.  Whether  this  has  been  done  in  a  given  case,  is  not 
simply  a  question  for  the  supreme  court  to  decide.  The 
three  branches  of  the  government  are  co-ordinate, 
and  each  of  them,  therefore,  has  the  right  to  decide  inde 
pendently  concerning  the  extent  of  its  constitutional  power. 
The  first  part  of  the  argument  was  absolutely  unanswer 
able,  and  if  the  rest  may  perhaps  be  questioned,  yet  it 
could  not  be  readily  contradicted  by  the  party  which  passed, 
April  7,  1796,  a  resolution  which  claimed  for  the  house  of 
representatives  the  right,  in  all  cases  in  which  its  co-opera 
tion  was  necessary  for  the  accomplishment  of  treaty  stip- 

1  Compare  Story,  Comm.,  §§  1836-1841.  "The  stipulations  in  a  treaty 
between  the  United  States  and  a  foreign,  power  are  paramount  to  the 
provisions  of  a  constitution  of  a  particular  state,  or  the  confederacy." 
Lessee  of  Harry  Gordon  vs.  Kerr  et  al,  Washington  Circuit  Court  Rep., 
I.,  p.  322;  Stat.  at  L.,  VIII.,  p.  3.  According  to  this  the  senate  and 
president  could  overthrow  the  whole  constitution.  The  treaty  power  is 
created  by  the  constitution.  It  is  therefore  subordinate,  and  not  supe 
rior,  to  it.  The  constitution  can  not  give  its  creatures  the  right  to  arbi 
trarily  destroy  it. 


364  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

illations,  to  deliberate  and  determine  on  the  "expediency" 
of  the  stipulations.1 

These  justifications  and  the  treaty  were  brought  forward 
by  the  slaveholders  and  their  comrades  only  as  props  for 
their  position.  They  were  neither  able  nor  willing  to  rest 
the  decision  of  the  question  of  law  upon  any  other  ground 
than  that  of  the  constitution.  "We  must  do  the  south  the 
justice  to  admit  that  in  this  struggle  over  constitutional 
questions  it  did  not  indulge  in  the  verbal  quibbling  which 
became  more  and  more  the  rule  in  such  debates.  It  placed 
itself  openly,  and  without  any  duplicity,  on  the  broadest 
basis  upon  which  it  could  take  position.  It  denied  to  con 
gress  the  least  shadow  of  right  to  make  the  admission  of 
a  territory  as  a  state  of  the  Union  dependent  upon  any 
conditions  whatever.  This  view  was  not  based  upon  cer 
tain  clauses  of  the  constitution,  but  on  the  nature  of  the 
Union — that  is,  on  state  sovereignty.2  Pindall  of  Virginia 
stripped  off  all  the  vagueness  which  had  hitherto  envel 
oped  the  definition  of  this  expression,  and  with  a  rigorous 
logic  drew  from  it  the  last  consequence,  which  was  first 
recognized  as  a  fundamental  party  belief  when  formulated 
with  the  same  rigor  many  years  after  this  by  the  state- 
rights  men;  he  explained  the  federal  constitution  as  an 
"  international  compact."8  On  this  basis  the  whole  argu 
ment  for  the  general,  as  well  as  the  specific,  cases  can  be 
condensed  into  four  short  sentences:  The  federal  govern 
ment  has  only  the  powers  granted  it  by  the  sovereign 
states;  newly  admitted  states  become  members  of  the 
tTnion  with  equal  rights;  no  other  grants  of  power  can 
therefore  be  demanded  from  them  than  those  voluntarily 


1  Del},  of  Cong.,  I.,  pp.  696,  702.  When,  in  1816,  the  same  question 
came  up  again,  the  house  of  representatives  abandoned  these  preten 
sions,  but  the  position  it  took  did  not  contradict  the  doctrine  developed 
in  the  text  in  any  way  whatever. 

•  Deb.  of  Cong.,  VI.,  p.  361,  and  in  many  other  places. 

« Ibid,  VI.,  p.  527. 


THE   ADMISSION    OF    NEW    STATES.  365 

made  bj  the  thirteen  original  states,  and  exactly  stipulated 
in  the  constitution;  no  one  affirms  that  the  thirteen  orig 
inal  states  gave  up  the  right  to  decide  whether  slavery 
should  be  permitted  or  forbidden  within  their  boundaries. 

On  the  other  side,  the  principle  of  nationality  was  by 
no  means  used  with  equal  decision  in  opposition  to  this 
extreme  particularism.  The  general  reasoning  had  more 
of  a  moral  than  a  legal  character.  Men  went  back  to  the 
principles  of  the  Declaration  of  Independence,  and  appealed 
to  the  clause  of  the  constitution  according  to  which  "  the 
United  States  shall  guarantee  to  every  state  a  republican 
form  of  government."1  The  elucidation  of  the  question 
from  these  two  points  of  view  was  not  worthless,  but  so 
far  as  the  decision  of  pending  legal  questions  was  con 
cerned,  it  was  irrelevant.  The  Declaration  of  Indepen 
dence  was  no  binding,  legal  instrument,  and  slavery  could 
not  legally  be  regarded  as  in  opposition  to  a  republican 
form  of  government,  since  it  existed  in  most  of  the  states 
as  a  fact  recognized  by  the  federal  constitution,  and  even 
cared  for  therein  by  positive  provisions.  Search  was  there 
fore  made  for  a  constitutional  provision  from  which,  in 
other  ways,  the  legal  right  could  be  inferred,  first,  to  im 
pose  conditions  upon  the  admission  of  states  to  the  Union, 
and  second,  to  impose  just  the  condition  now  under  dis 
cussion. 

In  regard  to  the  general  right,  reliance  was  placed  upon 
the  fact  that  Ohio,  Louisiana,  Indiana,  and  Illinois  had 
been  admitted  under  certain  conditions,  without  any  oppo 
sition  being  made  to  this  from  any  side.  Even  in  the 
Missouri  bill,  then  under  discussion,  other  conditions  had 
been  inserted  with  the  approval  of  the  same  members  of 
congress  who  now  wished  to  deny  the  existence  of  the 
right.2  Moreover,  this  right  was  undoubtedly  conferred 

1  Art  IV.,  Sec.  4. 

•  An  amendment  submitted  by  Taylor  was  adopted,  which  forbade 
the  state  to  tax,  for  five  years,  the  lands  of  soldiers.  Deb.  of  Cong.,  VI., 
p.  352.  Compare  Statutes  at  Large,  III.,  pp.  547, 548,  Sec.  4  and  Sec.  6. 


366  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

in  art.  TV.,  sec.  3,  §1,  of  the  constitution:  "New  states 
may  be  admitted  by  congress  into  this  Union."  This  does 
not  impose  a  duty  upon  congress,  but  grants  a  right  which 
it  can  use  in  accordance  with  its  discretion. 

The  opponents  of  the  limitation  tried  to  escape  from 
these  precedents  by  every  sort  of  possible  pretext.  They 
paid  especial  attention  to  the  constitutional  provision. 
Pinckney  of  Maryland  made  the  keenest  argument  on  this 
question.1  He  admitted  without  reserve  that  congress 
could  reject  an  application  for  admission  into  the  Union, 
but  contended  just  as  unreservedly  that*froin  this  the  right 
to  attach  conditions  to  the  granting  of  the  application 
could  not  be  inferred.  The  doctrine  that  the  powers  ot 
the  Union  consisted  only  of  those  "  expressed"2  has  never 
been  more  recklessly  followed  out  to  the  verge  of  absolute 
absurdity  than  in  this  debate.  But  Pinckney,  who,  de 
spite  his  unbearable  pomposity  of  language,  was  a  sharp- 
witted  lawyer,  saw  himself  compelled  to  choose  this  course. 
State  sovereignty  did  not  suffice  to  maintain  the  position 
already  taken  even  if  the  other  absurdity  had  been  admit 
ted  that  a  territory  which  wished  to  become  a  state  became 
possessed  of  full  state  sovereignty  by  merely  expressing 
this  wish.  Directly  from  this  "  sovereignty"  the  right 
could  be  deduced  to  conclude  a.  treaty  with  the  Union 
through  congress,  or,  if  this  expression  falls  short  of  the 
truth,  to  impose  certain  conditions  upon  the  proposal.  If 
.this  should  be  denied,  then,  too,  the  right  of  congress  to 
make  such  proposals,  that  is,  to  conclude  such  a  treaty, 
must  also  be  denied. 

All  the  state-rights  men  would  not  go  as  far  as  Pinckney. 
Some  of  them  laid  especial  emphasis,  in  their  argument, 
upon  another  idea.  They  affirmed  that  it  would  be  use 
less  to  burden  the  territory  with  a  condition,  because  the 

1  Deb.  of  Cong.,  VI.,  p.  440. 

*  I  speak  here  only  of  this  one  side  of  the  argument ;  another  side  of 
it  will  be  discussed  later. 


LIMITATIONS   OF   STATE    POWEB.  367 

sovereign  state  would  not  be  bound  by  it.  Quite  consist 
ently  they  then  farther  affirmed  that  the  states  formed  out 
of  the  northwestern  territory  and  admitted  under  the  anti- 
slavery  provision  of  the  ordinance  of  1787,  were  free  to 
legalize,  at  any  moment,  the  introduction  of  slavery. 

On  this  question,  which  involved  the  fundamental  prin 
ciples  of  the  whole  constitutional  law  of  the  United  States, 
the  defenders  of  the  limitation  were  not  all  of  the  same 
opinion,  and  they  entirely  failed  to  grasp  its  whole  range. 
Roberts  wished  to  have  the  prohibition  declared  "  absolute 
and  irrevocable."1  Otis  thought  it  laughable  that  a  duty, 
without  undertaking  which  the  territory  could  not  become 
a  state,  and  which  was  not  to  take  effect  until  the  instant 
when  it  did  become  a  state,  could  yet  lose  its  binding 
force  because  the  territory  had  become  a  state.2  Taylor 
did  not  consider  the  assertion  of  the  state-rights  men  as 
correct,  but  expressly  declared  that  he  would  be  in  favor  of 
the  restriction  in  the  opposite  case,  because  the  desired 
end  would  be  reached  by  its  moral  influence.3  Others  ap 
proached  the  difficult  question  with  still  greater  foresight. 
Yet  not  one  rejected  the  claim  that  had  been  made  on  the 
ground  that  it  was  clearly  and  certainly  in  direct  contra 
diction  to  the  fundamental  law  of  the  Union.  As  a  terri 
tory — and  this  was  now  commonly  recognized — Missouri 
was  absolutely  under  the  legislative  control  of  congress. 
If  her  admission  as  a  state  was  made  subject  to  such  a 
condition,  then  the  state  of  Missouri  found  itself  confront 
ed  by  a  federal  law  in  full  force,  which  might  be  eventu 
ally  declared  unconstitutional  by  the  supreme  court  of  the 
United  States,  but  upon  which  the  state  could  in  no  way 
lay  its  hand.  The  "  holiness  of  treaties,"  the  "  sacredness 
of  compacts,"  etc.,  to  which  men  appealed,4  were  not 

1  Deb.  of  Cong.,  VI..  p.  389. 
8  Ibid,  VI.,  p.  418. 

•  Ibid,  VI.,  p.  838. 

*  Ibid,  VI.,  p.  353,  and  in  many  other  places. 


368  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

needed  to  prove  this, — always  supposing  that  the  separate 
states,  as  far  as  they  came  in  question,  had  not  the  right 
to  decide  concerning  the  constitutionality  of  federal  laws, 
to  decide,  that  is,  whether  they  were  laws. 

The  debate  over  the  other  question,  whether  a  provision 
could  be  found  in  the  constitution  which  especially  author 
ized  the  prohibition  of  slavery  in  a  state  about  to  be  ad 
mitted,  is  of  little  importance  in  constitutional  history, 
inasmuch  as  it  was  only  a  wrangling  about  words.1  There 
was,  moreover,  no  need  whatever  of  any  special  authority, 
if  the  general  power  was  maintained.  This  was  the  kerne] 
of  the  whole  strife.  The  fundamental  question  of  the 
nature  of  the  Union  was  contained  in  it  and  only  in  con 
nection  with  this  could  the  strife  between  slavery  and  free 
labor  come  to  a  decisive  result. 

From  the  nature  of  the  Union,  then,  an  argument  was 
drawn  which  the  reasons  advanced  in  behalf  of  the  limita 
tion  shook,  but  cquld  not  overthrow.  Charles  Pinckney 
affirmed  with  great  keenness  that  the  constitution  author 
ized  the  admission  of  new  states  "  into  this  Union,"  that  is, 
into  the  Union  as  it  then  was.2  He  went  on  to  say  that  it 
was  an  undeniable  fact  that  the  rights  of  the  thirteen  orig 
inal  states  under  the  constitution  had  been  absolutely  equal. 
!N"o  one  will  deny  that  the  constitution  could  never  have 

1  It  was  made  a  matter  of  discussion  whether  the  words  "  importa 
tion"  and  "  migration"  in  the  clause  which  in  negative  form  gave  con- 
gress  the  right  to  prohibit  the  foreign  slave-trade  from  1808,  were  synony 
mous.  Charles  Pinckney  (Deb.  of  Congress,  IV.,  p.  534),  recalling  his 
participation  in  the  deliberations  of  the  Philadelphia  convention,  af 
firmed  that  "  migration"  was  understood  to  refer  only  to  "free  whites." 
Madison,  however,  declared  in  a  letter  written  Nov.  27, 1819,  to  J.  Walsh 
that  both  words  were  used  as  meaning  exactly  the  same  thing.  The 
superfluous  "  migration"  had  been  used  instead  of  "  importation"  for 
precisely  the  same  reason  that  caused  the  avoidance  of  the  word  "  slave." 
However  this  may  be,  it  seems  to  me  that  there  cannot  be  the  slightest 
doubt  that "  migration"  was  used  for  "  importation"  and  was  not  under 
stood  as  "  migration  from  one  state  into  another." 

*  Deb.  of  Congress,  VI.,  p.  440. 


EQUALITY   OF   THE   STATES.  369 

coine  ill  to  being  if  this  had  not  been  the  case.  It  is  there 
fore  110  longer  this,  but  a  substantially  different,  Union  if 
the  members  of  it  are  to  have  different  rights.  That  the 
thirteen  original  states  had  and  have  to-day  the  right  to 
forbid  or  allow  slavery,  will  not  be  questioned.  If  this 
right  is  taken  away  from  newly- admitted  states,  then  the 
Union  evidently  consists  no  longer  of  equal  members.  But 
if  congress  has  the  power  to  deprive  newly-admitted  states 
of  a  substantial  right  belonging  to  the  original  states,  it 
can  do  the  same  thing  with  other  rights.  No  boundary 
can  be  drawn,  if  the  principle  is  once  admitted.  The  as 
surances  that  congress  would  never  wish  to  impose  other 
essential  limitations  are  worthless.  Since  the  majority  of 
the  house  of  representatives  is  now  of  the  opinion  that  the 
prohibition  of  slavery  is  demanded  by  the  well-being  of 
Missouri  as  well  as  of  the  whole  Union,  a  future  congress 
may  be  of  the  same  opinion  in  regard  to  any  other  prohi 
bition  whatever.  The  principle  of  choice  is  introduced 
into  a  fundamental  constitutional  question.  It  must  tend 
to  change  the  harmonious  formation  of  the  Union  into  a 
chaotic  confusion. 

It  was  not  wholly  without  reason  that  the  slaveholders 
and  state-rights  men  declared  that  a  comparison  between 
the  slavery-limitation  and  the  other  conditions  which  had 
been  laid  upon  newly-admitted  states  was  not  possible. 
From  the  beginning  the  latter  had  either  been  self-evident 
or  had  concerned  relatively  unimportant  questions,and  had 
bound  the  states  concerned  only  for  a  certain  time;  but  this 
was  permanent,and  concerned  a  right  that  could  be  consid 
ered,  without  doubt,  as  a  fundamental  one.  It  was  indeed  said 
that  the  slavery  limitation  did  not  really  withdraw  a  "  fun 
damental  right,"  but  rather  did  away  with  a  "  fundamental 
wrong."  But  the  constitution  had  left  to  the  original 
states  the  right  of  tacitly  letting  the  fundamental  wrong 
stand  as  a  "  right"  or  of  making  it  one.  If  several  states 
made  no  use  of  this  prerogative,  and  if  the  facts  of  every 
24 


370  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY  AND   SLAVERY. 

day  showed  it  to  be  more  than  a  destructive  fiction  that 
slavery  was  a  "  purely  municipal  institution,"  yet  this  did 
not  change  the  positive  right.  Slavery  ate  into  the  life- 
marrow  of  the  whole  Union ;  therefore  not  only  considera 
tions  of  morality,  but  the  highest  self- interest  of  the  Union, 
demanded  the  absolute  prohibition  of  its  further  extension. 
But  morality  and  self-interest  could  not  do  away  with  the 
fact  that  the  whole  constitution  rested  upon  the  foundation 
of  the  equality  of  the  members  of  the  Union,  and  that  the 
original  members  had  full  freedom  of  action  in  regard  to 
this  particular  question. 

The  unconquerable  obstacle  can  be  expressed  in  a  single 
sentence: — the  fact  could  not  be  done  away  with  that  the 
Union  was  composed  of  free  and  slave  states — that  is,  the 
fact  could  not  be  done  away  with  that  the  attempt  had  been 
made  to  construct  out  of  heterogeneous  elements  not  only 
a  harmonious,  but  a  homogeneous,  whole. 

Arguments  could  not  bring  the  question  any  nearer  to  a 
solution.  After  the  differences  of  principle  between  the 
two  parties  had  been  clearly  established,  the  debates  served 
only  to  excite  passion.  The  slaveholders  sought  more  than 
ever  to  make  a  bridge  of  threats  upon  which  they  could 
cross  to  their  goal.1  It  is  said  that  Randolph  proposed  to 
Clay  to  abandon  the  house  to  the  northern  members  and 
that  Clay  actually  gave  the  project  serious  consideration.2 

Missouri  herself  took  an  extremely  arrogant  position. 
When  Taylor  moved,  Dec.  16,  1819,  to  defer  the  considera 
tion  of  the  bill  until  the  first  Monday  in  February,  1820, 
Scott,  the  delegate  of  the  territory,  objected  that  Missouri 

1  Even  in  brutality  of  expression,  a  marked  advance  was  made.  Thus, 
for  instance,  Colton  of  Virginia  said  :  "  He  [Livermore  of  .New  Hamp- 
shire]  is  no  better  than  Arbuthnot  or  Ambrister  and  deserves  no  better 
fate."  (Deb.  of  Congress,  VI.,  p.  351.)  Arbuthnot  and  Ambrister  had 
been  sentenced  to  death,  under  martial  law,  by  Jackson  on  account  of 
their  alliance  with  the  Seminoles. 

"Garland,  Life  of  Randolph,  II.,  p.  127;  Colton,  Life,  Correspon 
dence,  and  Speeches  of  Henry  Clay,  II.,  p.  26$. 


IMPORTANCE    OF    THE    MISSOURI    CONTEST.  371 

would,  in  this  case,  go  on  and  organize  a  state  government 
without  waiting  any  longer  for  leave  from  congress.1  And 
this  threat  of  the  territorial  delegate  against  the  whole 
Union  was  not  punished  as  a  piece  of  laughable  insolence. 
Reid  of  Georgia  declared  that  Missouri  would  "indignant 
ly  throw  off  the  yoke"  and  "laugh  congress  to  scorn."2 
Tyler  of  Yirginia,  the  future  president,  asked  what  would 
be  done  if  "Missouri  sever  [herself]  from  the  Union?"3 
And  Jefferson,  the  ex-president,  expressed  the  fear  that 
Missouri  would  be  "  lost  by  revolt."4  However  serious  or 
little  serious  these  threats  and  expressions  of  fear  were 
intended  to  be,  it  may  yet  be  inferred  from  them  how  high 
the  slaveholders  and  state-rights  men  estimated  the  strength 
of  the  Union.  They  had  a  truer  idea  of  the  nature  and 
the  range  of  the  question  than  their  opponents.  It  was  a 
really  true  prophecy  when  Cobb  of  Georgia  cried  out: 
"  You  are  kindling  a  fire  which  all  the  waters  of  the  ocean 
cannot  extinguish;  it  can  be  extinguished  only  in  blood."5 
But  indeed  the  prophecy  was  verified  only  because  ever 
and  ever  again  representatives  of  the  north  were  found 
who  paid  the  price  upon  which  dear  peace  apparently  de 
pended. 

During  the  whole  struggle  the  decision  had  depended 
only  upon  a  few  votes,  for  a  number  of  northern  represen 
tatives  had  voted,  from  the  beginning,  with  the  south. 


1  Deb.  of  Cong.,  IV.,  p.  469;  Colton,  Clay,  I.,  p.  278. 
1  Ibid,  VI.,  p.  490. 

•  Ibid,  VI.,  p.  551. 

4  Jeff.,  Works.,  VII.,  p.  148.  Even  the  state  legislatures  took  a  lively 
part  in  the  strife.  As  a  general  rule  the  agitation  was  much  more 
vigorous  in  the  north  than  in  the  south.  The  northern  legislatures, 
and  with  them  that  of  Delaware,  expressed  themselves  in  very  decided 
resolutions  against  the  extension  of  the  slave  area.  The  house  of  dele 
gates  of  the  Virginia  legislature,  on  the  other  hand,  passed  resolutions 
containing  the  expressions  "  bound  to  interpose"  and  "  resist."  Niles' 
Reg.,  XVII.,  pp.  343,  344, 

*  Deb.  of  Cong.,  VI.,  pp.  351,  372. 


372  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY  AND   SLAVERY. 

That  it  was,  nevertheless,  so  long  before  the  south  obtained, 
bj  threats  and  worse  means,  the  necessary  number  of  votes, 
1  is  a  plain  proof  that  an  independent  and  honorable  spirit 
was  then  much  more  common  among  northern  politicians 
than  later.  The  restriction  was  finally  stricken  out  by  a 
majority  of  only  three  votes.1 

The  results  of  this  defeat  were  immense;  but  still  more 
fraught  with  evil  was  the  second  defeat  which  the  north 
suffered  at  the  same  time,  and  almost  indeed  without  a 
struggle.  This  question  has  often  been  treated  in  connec 
tion  with  the  first,  but  it  was  not  only  actually  indepen 
dent  of  it,  but  essentially  different  from  it,  as  a  matter 
both  of  constitutional  law  and  practical  politics. 

Since  only  the  northern  part  of  the  Missouri  territory 
was  to  be  organized  as  a  state,  the  southern  part,  the  so- 
called  Arkansas  district,  had  to  receive  a  territorial  govern 
ment  of  its  own.  When  the  bill  concerning  this  came  up 
for  discussion  in  the  house,  Taylor  proposed  an  amend 
ment  in  regard  to  slavery  like  the  one  which  Tallmadge 
had  brought  up  in  the  case  of  Missouri.  In  committee  of 
the  whole  the  amendment  was  rejected  by  eighty  to  sixty- 
eight  votes.  In  the  house  it  had  a  somewhat  better  fate. 
The  first  part,  which  forbade  the  further  introduction  of 
slaves,  was  rejected  by  seventy-one  to  seventy  votes;  but 
the  second  part,  which  freed  slave  children  born  in  the 
territory  upon  their  twenty-fifth  birthday,  was  adopted  by 
seventy-five  to  seventy-three  votes.  With  the  help  of 
parliamentary  rules,  however,  the  question  was  brought 
once  more  before  the  house.  By  the  casting  vote  of  the 
speaker,  Clay,  the  bill  was  referred  back  to  the  committee, 
and  on  the  same  day,  in  accordance  with  its  report,  the 
previously  adopted  amendment  was  rejected  by  eighty-nine 
to  eighty-seven  votes.2 

The  attempt  to  lay  hand  upon  the  peculiar  institution 

1  Ninety  against  eighty-seven. 

8  See  all  the  votes  in  Deb.  of  Cong.,  VI.,  pp.  363-366. 


ARKANSAS.  373 

in  tins  territory  was  regarded  by  the  slaveholders  as  an 
especial  bit  of  spitefulness,  because  Arkansas  was  consid 
ered  as  belonging  to  the  peculiar  domain  of  the  south. 
This  opinion  influenced  some  northern  representatives, 
and  to  it  the  easy  victory  of  the  south  is  to  be  ascribed. 
The  arguments  brought  forward  on  both  sides  of  the  de 
bate  were  the  same  as  in  that  over  Missouri,  only  the  con 
stitutional  question  was  not  raised.  Taylor  of  New  York 
laid  stress  upon  the  fact  that  the  "  sovereignty"  of  con 
gress  over  the  territories  was  "  full  and  undisputed."1 
M'Lane,  indeed,  did  not  unconditionally  admit  that  con 
gress  could  forbid  slavery  in  the  territories,  but  he  could 
only  allege  in  justification  of  his  doubt  that  the  territories 
would  become  states  in  time.2  But  when  Taylor  after 
wards  expressed  his  conviction  that  no  member  of  the 
house  doubted  the  power  of  congress  to  do  this  thing,  then 
neither  M'Lane3  nor  any  other  member  of  the  house  in 
terposed  any  objection,  and  some  leading  slaveholders  ex 
pressly  admitted  the  right.4  The  thing  was  considered,  as 
Taylor  plainly  expressed  it,  only  as  "  a  question  of  policy." 
And  yet  the  victory  of  the  south  was  so  easy.  This  must 
be  closely  looked  at  in  connection  with  the  stiff-necked 
strife  over  Missouri,  if  we  are  to  rightly  judge  the  position 
of  the  north  at  this  time  in  regard  to  slavery.  When  the 
territorial  question  soon  after  this  came  up  again  in  anoth 
er  and  much  more  important  form,  not  a  blow  was  struck 
for  the  universally  recognized  right  and  for  the  uncondi 
tional  supremacy  of  free  labor. 

The  eighth  section  of  the  Missouri  act  of  March  6,  1820, 


1  Deb.  of  Cong.,  VI.,  p.  358. 

*  Ibid,  VI.,  p.  362. 

*  In  the  Missouri  debate  he  declared  afterwards :  "  I  admit  it  [the 
power  to  give  laws  to  a  territory]  to  be  plenary,  so  long  as  it  remains 
in  a  condition  of  territorial  dependence,  but  no  longer."    Ibid,  VI.,  p. 
613. 

4  Ibid,  VI.,  p.  341,  and  elsewhere. 


374  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND   SLAVERY. 

provided  "  that  in  all  that  territory  ceded  by  France  to  the 
United   States,  Tinder  the  name  of  Louisiana,  which  lies 
north  of  36°  30'  north  latitude,  not  included  within  the 
limits  of  the  state  contemplated  by  this  act,  slavery  and 
involuntary  servitude     .     .     .  shall  be,  and  is  hereby,  for 
ever  prohibited."1     This  was  the  second  half  of  the  so- 
called  Missouri  compromise,  and  the  responsibility  for  its 
adoption  does  not  wholly  rest  upon  a  few  weak  or  venal 
delegates  from  the  north.     Only  five  northern  members 
voted  against  it.2    The  north  thus  gave  its  approval  by  an 
overwhelming  majority  to  the  division  of  the  territories 
between  free  labor  and  slavery.  It  was  indeed  only  declared 
that  slavery  should  not  be  allowed  north  of  36°  30',  but  this 
was  self- evidently  equivalent  to  saying  that  south  of  this 
line  no  hindrance  would  be  put  in  the  way  of  the  slave 
holders.     The  first  suggestion  of  such  a  compromise  was 
made  by   M'Lane  in   February,   1819,   and  he   then   ex 
pressly  declared  that  the  territories  should  be  "  divided" 
between  the  free  and  slave  states.3     It  was  never  afterwards 
denied  that  this  was  a  fair  interpretation  of  the  com  promise. 
The  action  of  the  northern  members  can  be  justified  from 
no  point  of  view.     Even  in  mitigation  of  their  fault,  it  can 
only  be  alleged  that,  when  they  had  decided  to  make  a  bar 
gain,  the  one  agreed   upon  seemed  not  disadvantageous, 
provided  men  did  not  look  beyond  the  present  time.    The 
Louisiana  territory — according  to  the  boundaries  set  to  it 
by  the  United  States — was  divided  into  two  nearly  equal 
parts  by  the  line  of  36°  30'.     But  while  the  Missouri  ques 
tion   was  still  pending,  an  agreement  was  reached   with 
Spain  concerning  the  boundary  line  by  which  a  great  part 
of  the  southern  half  was  lost  to  the  United  States. 

How  far  the  north  soothed  itself  with  the  hope  that  the 

1  Stat.  atL.,  III.,  p.  548. 

*  Deb.  of  Cong.,  VI.,  pp.  570,  571.    Benj.  Adams,  Allen  and  Folger  of 
Massachusetts,  Buffum  of  New  Hampshire,  and  Gross  of  New  York. 
•Ibid, VI.,  pp.359,  863. 


THE    LINE    OF    36°   30'.  375 

utmost  bounds  of  slavery  had  now  been  definitely  and  per 
manently  fixed,  cannot  be  decided.  But  it  needed  no  won 
derfully  great  political  insight  in  order  to  know  that  the 
slaveholders  would  sooner  or  later  bend  every  nerve  in  or 
der  to  make  this  hope  an  illusion.  If  they  did  not  yet 
oppose  the  right  of  congress  to  forbid  slavery  in  the  ter 
ritories,  yet  they  showed  themselves  prepared  to  question 
it  whenever  circumstances  demanded  such  action.  Khea 
of  Tennessee  had  already  used  the  word  "  unconstitution 
al."1  Smyth  of  Yirginia  went  much  straighterto  the  goal 
when  he  remarked,  in  relation  to  the  constitutional  provis 
ion  for  the  territories:  "This  clause  speaks  of  the  territory 
as  property,  as  a  subject  of  sale.  It  speaks  not  of  the 
jurisdiction."2  Yet  the  clearest  utterance  was  that  of  the 
fact  that  the  most  violent  opposition  to  the  "Missouri 
line"  came  from  slaveholders.  No  less  than  thirty-seven 
southerners  voted  with  the  five  northern  members  against 
this  part  of  the  compromise.8 

If  men  thought  these  signs  worthy  of  no  further  atten- 

1  Ibid,  VI.,  p.  366.  It  is  evident  from  later  discussions  that  he 
must  have  used  the  expression  in  relation  to  the  division  of  the  terri 
tories  by  a  fixed  line. 

*  Ibid,  VI.,  p.  487. 

3  This  fact  was  the  foundation  of  the  later  assertion  of  the  south  that 
the  compromise  was  a 'northern  and  not  a  southern  measure.  The  asser 
tion  was  not  wholly  ungrounded,  if  it  was  substantially  false.  Benton, 
the  first  senator  from  the  new  state,  writes:  "This  *  compromise'  was 
the  work  of  the  south,  sustained  by  the  united  voice  of  Mr.  Monroe's 
cabinet,  the  united  voices  of  the  southern  senators  and  a  majority  of  the 
southern  representatives.  .  .  This  array  of  names  shows  the  Missouri 
compromise  to  have  been  a  southern  measure,  and  the  event  put  the 
seal  upon  that  character  by  showing  it  to  be  acceptable  to  the  south." 
Thirty  Years  View,  L,  p.  8.  Oowninshield  of  Massachusetts  said,  in 
1861,  at  the  so-called  peace  convention:  "Southern  men  forced  the 
measure  upon  the  north.  The  few  northern  men  who  voted  for  it  were 
swept  out  of  their  political  existence  at  the  election  which  followed  its 
passage."  (Chittenden's  Report,  p.  318.)  If  this  is  to  be  applied  to 
those  who  voted  for  the  "  Missouri  line,"  then  the  assertion  has  no  his 
torical  foundation  whatever. 


376  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND   SLAVERY 

tion,  because  the  United  States  had  at  that  time  no  further 
territorial  possessions,  they  understood  very  badly  the  his- 
tory  of  the  Union  and  of  slavery  up  to  that  time.  Expe 
rience  had  already  shown  that  the  politics  of  the  United 
States  was  not  a  pastoral  idyl.  As  Louisiana  and  Florida 
had  been  acquired,  a  hand  might  be  stretched  out  towards 
other  territory.  Circumstances  offered  any  number  of  al 
luring  opportunities.  And  if  new  acquisitions  were  ever 
made  in  southern  latitudes,  the  slave  states  would  doubt 
less  claim  that  the  Missouri  line  was  self-evidently  binding 
in  respect  to  these  too.  The  north  might  thenceforth  for 
ever  oppose  the  soundness  of  this  logic  and  depend  upon 
constitutional  rights;  the  fact  still  remained  that  it  had 
been  indirectly  stipulated  in  a  solemn  compact  by  the  almost 
unanimous  consent  of  the  northern  representatives  that  in 
a  certain  territory  south  of  a  certain  line  slavery  should  be 
allowed,  whether  or  not  congress  forbade  it.  That  the 
south  knew  how  to  use  such  facts  had  already  been  suffi 
ciently  shown.  As  surely  as  a  slave  territory  became  a 
slave  state,  so  surely  no  veto  of  congress  could  hereafter 
prevent  the  existence  of  slavery  "  in  this  Union"  in  a  state 
or  territory  lying  south  of  36°  30'. 

The  south  had  allowed  itself  to  pursue  a  purely  idealistic 
policy,  where  European  relations  were  concerned,  but  where 
the  interest  of  the  slaveholders  was  touched  upon,  it  had 
followed  from  the  beginning  a  policy  that  was  not  only 
realistic  in  the  highest  degree,  but  wise.  It  took  good  care 
to  demand  everything  forthwith.  What  it  needed  at  the 
moment  satisfied  it  for  the  moment.  It  propped  the 
planks  securely  and  then  shoved  them  just  so  much  farth 
er  that  it  could  safely  take  the  next  step  when  it  became 
necessary.  It  had  done  this  at  present,  and  was  therefore 
contented  for  the  present.  Up  to  this  time  the  free  states 
had  always  been  one  more  in  number  than  the  slave  states. 
Now  the  latter  got  Alabama  and  Missouri  into  the  Union, 
and  the  former  only  Maine.  The  balance  of  power  in  the 


A    GEOGRAPHICAL    PRINCIPLE.  377 

senate  was  therefore  full}7  established.  Their  territorial 
possessions  were,  in  the  meantime,  ample;  Florida,  just 
acquired  from  Spain,1  Arkansas  and  the  rest  of  the  southern 
part  of  the  Louisiana  territory  balanced  for  a  while  the 
northwest,  which,  as  Charles  Pinckney  wrote,  had  been 
inhabited  until  now  only  by  wild  beasts  and  Indians.  Why 
express  alarm  now  over  things  which  could  become  reali 
ties  only  after  the  lapse  of  many  years?  But  it  did  not 
follow  from  this  that  alarm  should  never  be  expressed 
over  them.  Reid  of  Georgia  had  already  asked  why  a 
partition  line  should  not  be  drawn  between  the  two  sec 
tions  "  to  the  Pacific  Ocean."2 

Until  the  time  came  when  the  Missouri  compromise 
could  no  longer  be  considered  as  the  "  final  issue"  of  the 
question  whether  the  territories  and  the  new  states  should 
belong  to  slavery  or  free  labor,  it  was  permanently  fixed. 
"What  M'Lane  praised  as  the  simplest  and  therewith  the 
happiest  means  of  permanently  adjusting  the  controversy, 
Jeiferson  rightly  recognized  as  the  most  destructive  part 
of  the  whole  unfortunate  compromise.  April  3,  1820,  he 
wrote  to  "W.  Short:  "The  coincidence  of  a  marked  prin 
ciple,  moral  and  political,  with  geographical  lines,  once 
conceived,  I  feared  would  never  more  be  obliterated  from 
the  mind;  that  it  would  be  recurring  on  every  occasion 
and  renewing  irritations,  until  it  would  kindle  such  mutual 
and  mortal  hatred  as  to  render  separation  preferable  to 
eternal  discord.  I  have  been  among  the  most  sanguine  in 
believing  that  our  Union  would  be  of  long  duration.  I 
now  doubt  it  much."3  This  was  a  truly  statesmanlike 
idea.  If  it  could  have  given  the  text  for  the  half  of  the 
speeches  which  were  delivered  in  favor  of  the  prohibition 

1  Feb.  22, 1819.  Stat.  at  L.,  VIII.,  p.  252,  seq.  The  ratification  of  the 
treaty  by  the  United  States  was  not  given  until  Feb.  19, 1821. 

*  Deb.  of  Cong.,  VI.,  p.  502. 

'  Jeff.,  Works,  VII.,  p.  158.  Compare  also  the  letter  to  Holmes  of 
April  22, 1820,  VII.,  p.  159. 


378  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

of  the  further  importation  of  slaves,  the  fate  of  the  Union 
would  perhaps  have  had  a  wholly  different  turn.  Up  to 
this  time  the  division  of  the  Union  into  two  sections  had 
been  only  a  fact:  henceforth  it  was  fixed  by  law.  In  inter 
nal  politics  no  question  of  cardinal  importance  could  arise 
in  which  the  opposition  of  the  two  industrial  principles 
did  not  play  a  greater  or  less  part.  And  in  all  such  ques 
tions  the  law-making  power  stood  not  only  before  a  num 
ber  of  states,  but  before  two  geographically  divided  groups 
of  states.  Each  of  the  two  groups  inevitably  constantly 
consolidated  more  and  more;  and  the  more  they  consoli 
dated  the  more  the  Missouri  line  lost  its  imaginary  char 
acter.  For  the  first  time  there  was,  in  the  full  sense  of 
the  term,  a  free  north  and  a  slaveholding  south.  "  Politi 
cal  prudence,"  as  it  was  hyper-euphemistically  called, 
might  lead  one  to  oppose  this  with  the  strength  of  de 
spair;  but  all  political  artifices  were  put  to  shame  by  the 
power  of  facts.  Even  the  last  resource,  the  erasure  of  the 
black  line  from  the  map  by  another  law  and  by  judicial 
decisions,  remained  without  effect;  the  line  was  etched  too 
deeply  into  the  real  ground.  Only  one  .thing  could  erase 
it,  and  this  one  thing  was  the  destruction  of  the  gloomy 
power  that  had  drawn  it.  From  the  night  of  March  2, 
1820,  party  history  is  made  up,  without  interruption  or 
break,  of  the  development  of  geographical  parties. 

This  was  what  was  really  reached  when  men  breathed 
free,  as  if  saved  from  a  heavy  nightmare.  The  little  and 
cowardly  souls  congratulated  themselves  that  the  slavery 
question  had  been  buried  for  ever,  and  yet  men  never 
shook  themselves  free  from  the  Missouri  question. 

The  strife  was  kindled  again  by  a  clause  of  the  constitu 
tion  of  Missouri,  by  which  the  legislature  was  obliged  to 
pass  laws  against  the  entry  of  free  colored  persons  into  the 
state.  The  north  declared  that  this  clause  infringed  upon 
the  constitutional  provision,  according  to  which  "  the  citi 
zens  of  each  state  shall  be  entitled  to  all  privileges  and 


CITIZENSHIP   OF    FREE    NEGROES.  379 

immunities  of  citizens  in  the  several  states."1  The  slave 
holders  affirmed  that  free  blacks  were  not  to  be  considered 
as  citizens  uin  the  sense  of  the  constitution."  The  north 
ern  congressmen  opposed  to  this  the  fact  that  free  blacks 
were  citizens  in  some  northern  states,  and  that  the  clause 
in  question  spoke  of  "  citizens  of  every  state."  The  de 
bate  was  finally  lost  in  endless  arguments  over  the  mean 
ing  of  the  words  "  citizens"  and  "  citizens  of  the  United 
States,"  without  reaching  any  result. 2 

1  Art.  IV.,  Sec.  2.    Art.  IV.  of  the  articles  of  confederation  contained 
the  same  provision,  except  that  in  it  the  common  expression  "  all  free 
inhabitants"  was  used. 

2  The  discussion  of  this  question  more  in  detail  belongs  to  the  second 
part  of  this  work.    I  will  here  refer  only  to  Bates,  On  Citizenship,  and 
to  Livermore,  Opinions  of  the  Founders  of  the  Republic  on  Negroes  as 
Slaves,  as  Citizens,  and  as  Soldiers,  and  will  remark  that  in  the  same 
year  in  which  the  question  was  discussed  in  congress  Attorney-general 
Wirt  gave  an  opinion  in  which  he  says :  "  I  am  of  the  opinion  that  the 
constitution,  by  the  description  of  *  citizens  of  the  United  States,'  in- 
tended  those  only  who  enjoyed  the  full  and  equal  privileges  of  white 
citizens  in  the  state  of  their  residence."    Opinions  of  the  Attorneys-Gen 
eral,  I.,  p.  507.  Wirt  was  a  skillful  jurist,  but  in  this  argument  bis  reason 
ing  is  not  only  weak  in  the  highest  degree,  but  also  illogical.    In  Bou- 
vier's  Law  Dictionary,  I.,  p.  275,  is  the  statement  that  the  constitution  of 
the  United  States  "  does  not  authorize  any  but  white  persons  to  become 
citizens  of  the  United  States."    This  can  be  understood  in  no  other 
way  than  that  the  constitution  contains  a  clear  provision  to  this  effect, 
while  in  fact  the  only  grounds  for  the  assertion  are  some  judicial  dicta 
and  decisions,  which  must  be  a  stain  on  the  annals  of  the  United  States 
forever,  and  from  every  point  of  view.    Such  a  statement  in  a  thorough 
ly  scientific  work  is  simply  inexcusable,  for  either  the  choice  of  expres 
sions  is  made  with  inexplicable  carelessness,  or  party  politics  has  crept 
into  the  book.    It  may  also  be  noted  that  the  edition  of  the  Law  Dic 
tionary  which  I  used  was  dated  1872,  while  in  1868  the  14th  amend 
ment  was  adopted,  in  which  it  is  provided:  "All  persons  born  or  nat 
uralized  in  the  United  States,  and  subject  to  the  jurisdiction  thereof, 
are  citizens  of  the  United  States  and  of  the  states  wherein  they  reside." 
The  editor,  Childs,  is,  indeed,  not  to  be  blamed  for  failing  to  take  notice 
of  this  amendment.    The  edition  is  actually  that  of  the  year  1867,  and 
the  date  1872  is  only  a  mercantile  trick,  which  is  only  too  often  resorted 
to  by  American  booksellers. 


380  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

The  discussion  of  the  question  of  law  from  other  points 
of  view  was  also  fruitless.  The  slaveholders  and  state- 
rights  party  argued  that  not  only  were  similar  laws  against 
free  blacks  in  existence  in  other  states,  but  that  even  in 
free  states  there  were  excluding  laws,  which  concerned 
white  citizens,  and  were  doubtless  unconstitutional,  if  this 
reproach  could  rightly  be  brought  against  the  constitution 
of  Missouri.1  These  assertions  were  partly  well  founded, 
but  it  did  not  follow  from  this  that  the  clause  was  not  in 
consistent  with  the  federal  constitution. 

As  little  tenable  were  the  arguments  by  which  it  was 
attempted  to  prove  the  uselessness  of  any  objection  to  this 
clause  by  congress.  If  it  is  unconstitutional — so  the  argu 
ment  ran — then  it  is  eo  ipso  null,  and  the  decision  of  the 
supreme  court  of  the  United  States  will  give  it  that  effect. 
The  overwhelming  answer  to  this  was  that  the  clause,  de 
spite  its  abstract  worthlessness,  would  actually  be  in  force 
until  it  had  been  declared  unconstitutional.  Moreover, 
congress  could  not  impose  upon  the  judiciary  the  responsi 
bility  which  the  spirit  of  the  constitution  placed  upon  it; 
to  it  belonged  the  right  of  admitting  new  states,  and  upon 
it,  therefore,  rested  the  duty  of  deciding  in  such  cases 
whether  the  conditions  had  been  fulfilled  which  were  nec 
essary  in  order  to  make  admission  possible. 

Although  these  points  were  of  slight  importance  in 
comparison  to  those  decided  at  the  previous  session,  the 
debates — which  lasted  some  weeks — were  not  less  violent. 
The  main  reason  of  this  was  the  well-known  wish  of  a 
minority  in  the  house  to  use  this  opportunity  to  overthrow 
the  compromise.  The  slaveholders  therefore  did  not  ven 
ture  to  insist  upon  the  alternative  of  an  unconditional  ad- 
mission  of  the  state  or  an  unconditional  rejection  of  the 
constitution  that  had  been  submitted.  The  senate  first 
showed  a  disposition  to  find  a  middle  course.  This  gave 

1  Compare  Deb.  of  Cong.,  VI.,  p.  672,  seq. 


THE   FINAL    COMPROMISE.  381 

Clay  an  opportunity  to  lead  back  again  into  the  path  of 
compromise  the  house,  which  had  already,  thanks  to  the 
members  hostile  to  compromise,  rejected  a  motion  to  strike 
out  the  offensive  clause.  The  two  houses  finally  agreed  to 
allow  the  state  admission,  provided  its  legislature  "  by  a 
solemn  public  act  shall  declare  the  assent  of  the  said  state 
to  the  fundamental  condition"  that  a  right  should  never 
be  deduced  from  this  clause  to  pass  a  law  and  that  a  law 
should  never  be  passed  "  by  which  any  citizen  of  either  of 
the  states  in  this  Union  shall  be  excluded  from  the  enjoy 
ment  of  any  of  the  privileges  and  immunities  to  which 
such  citizen  is  entitled  under  the  constitution  of  the  United 
States."1  The  legislature  complied  with  this  condition  and 
therewith  the  Missouri  conflict  ended. 

Three  constitutional  questions — two  of  them  of  cardinal 
importance — had  been  discussed.  Men  had  fought  shy  of 
all  three  for  the  moment,  and  for  this  reason  the  origin 
ators  of  the  compromise  claimed  that  they  had  postponed 
the  decision  to  the  Greek  calends.  From  a  legal  point  of 
view,  only  one  positive  result  had  been  reached,  and  this 
was  on  a  point  concerning  which  no  legal  question  existed. 
The  northern  majority  had  indirectly  renounced  the  right 
of  congress  to  forbid  slavery,  as  far  as  the  territory  lying 
south  of  the  line  of  36°  30'  was  concerned,  and  it  had 
agreed  to  this  renunciation,  because  the  southern  minority 
had  renounced,  on  its  side,  its  claims  to  having  the  ques 
tions  of  law  involved  decided  now  in  its  favor, — provided 
its  concrete  demands,  which  it  based  upon  its  interpreta 
tion  of  the  constitution,  were  complied  with. 

This  was  the  true  nature  and  the  substance  of  the  "com 
promise"  which  gave  Henry  Clay  the  first  claim  to  t!ie 
proud  name  of  "the  great  peace- maker." 

I8tat.atL.>m.,p.645. 


382  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 


CHAPTEK  X. 

DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  ECONOMIC  CONTRAST  BETWEEN  THE 
FREE  AND   SLAVE  STATES. 

The  Missouri  compromise  produced  no  change  in  party 
relations.  Monroe  was  re-elected  president  by  all  the  elec 
toral  votes  except  one.1  The  "  era  of  good  feeling,"  which 
had  begun  to  dawn  just  after  the  end  of  the  war  with  Eng 
land,  now  really  commenced.  The  people,  wearied  by  the 
feverish  excitement  of  the  last  years,  abandoned  politics  to 
the  politicians, and  the  latter  had  to  content  themselves 
with  routine  business,  since  there  was,  for  the  moment,  no 
burning  question  and  no  noteworthy  opposition.  But  as 
yet  a  peace  had  not  been  made;  only  a  truce  had  been  con 
cluded.  New  questions  appeared,  which  sprang  from  the 
self-same  roots  as  the  earlier  ones.  Their  germs  could  be 
traced  back  to  the  first  year  of  the  existence  of  the  new 
constitution  and  their  development  had  kept  pace  with  the 
industrial  development  of  the  country.  If  their  full  im 
portance  was  not  yet  appreciated,  this  could  be  partly  as 
cribed  to  purely  accidental  circumstances  and  it  was  partly 
due  to  the  fact  that  the  opposition  of  principles  in  the  in 
dustrial  life  of  the  two  sections  was  less  and  less  under 
stood  as  it  assumed  a  concrete  form  in  the  different  indus 
trial  regions.  A  little  while  therefore  elapsed  before  the 
party  programmes  became  clear,  and  meanwhile  the  parties 
became  more  and  more  geographical  ones.  This  time  of 
transition  was  rich  in  strange  transmutations  in  party- 
relations.  Leading  statesmen  changed  their  positions  in 
the  most  barefaced  manner. 

1  Deb.  of  Cong.,  VI.,  p.  706. 


THE   NATIONAL   DEBT.  38 6 

During  the  first  presidency  of  Madison,  the  bank  ques 
tion  again  arose,  although  it  was  still  partially  clad  in  the 
old  party  robe  which  it  was  soon  to  lose  entirely.  The 
national  bank  called  into  life  by  Hamilton,  in  1791,  pre 
sented  a  petition  for  the  renewal  of  its  twenty-year  char 
ter.  Since  the  Republicans,  who  had  not  yet  lost  their 
old  dislike  of  the  institution,  formed  the  majority  of  con 
gress,  the  request  was  refused.  At  the  moment  the  govern 
ment  did  not  need  the  support  of  the  bank;  the  cry  against 
the  "  monopoly  of  the  money-aristocracy  and  the  specula 
tors"  could  reckon,  now  as  twenty  years  before,  upon  a 
favorable  reception  with  the  masses;  numerous  capitalists 
were  only  waiting  until  this  dangerous  competition  should 
be  taken  out  of  the  way  in  order  to  start  banks  under  state 
charters;  and  the  constitutional  objections  brought  forward 
in  1791  were  again  vigorously  urged,  especially  by  Clay.1 
The  reasons  were  too  many  for  the  influence  of  the  bank  to 
overcome. 

In  three  years,  the  picture  had  completely  changed.  One 
of  the  most  effectual  means  which  the  Republicans  used 
in  the  struggle  against  the  Federalists  had  been  the  con 
stant  cry  against  high  taxes.  When  they  came  into  power 
they  had  to  pay  some  attention  to  this  in  their  financial 
management  and,  owing  to  the  general  prosperity,  they 
could  easily  do  this  without  causing  any  immediate  dam 
aging  results.  After  the  embargo -policy  had  begun  to 
weigh  heavily  upon  the  whole  industrial  life  of  the  nation, 
the  weak  points  of  the  new  financial  system  were  soon  ap 
parent.  The  system  itself,  moreover,  was  not  so  different 
from  that  of  Hamilton  as  the  earlier  utterances  of  Jeffer 
son  and  his  secretary  of  the  treasury,  Gallatin,  might  have 
led  people  to  suppose.  The  war  destroyed  the  plan.  The 
reproach  of  the  Federalists  that  a  contest  with  the  greatest 
maritime  power  of  the  world  had  been  entered  into  wholly 

1  Deb.  of  Cong.,  IV.,  pp.  279,  seq.,  and  811. 


384  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

without  preparation  was  truer  from  no  point  of  view  than 
from  that  of  the  finances.  The  heavier  capitalists,  who 
could  have  made  the  more  important  contributions,  be 
longed  for  the  most  part  to  the  dissatisfied  states  of  the 
northeast,  and  the  Republican  party  did  not  dare  to  vote 
taxes  which  would  have  laid  the  financial  strength  of  the 
country  under  heavy  contributions,  for  fear  of  injuring  its 
popularity.  So  the  government  laboriously  slipped  along 
from  month  to  month  by  means  of  small  loans,  which  were 
placed  only  with  the  greatest  difficulty,  by  the  issue  of 
treasury  notes,  and  by  other  palliatives.  All  government 
securities  quickly  depreciated,  gold  and  silver  constantly 
became  more  scarce,  paper  money  more  abundant  and 
more  worthless,  and  the  credit  of  the  nation  was  smaller 
every  day.  The  country  was  rich  all  the  while,  but  the 
government  was  rapidly  approaching  bankruptcy. 

Under  these  circumstances  the  project  of  a  national 
bank  was  again  brought  before  congress  by  the  petition  of 
!N"ew  York.  Eppes,  the  son-in-law  of  Jefferson,  brought 
in  a  report  as  chairman  of  the  committee  on  ways  and 
means,  Jan.  10,  1814,  which  denied  to  congress  the  power 
u  to  create  corporations"  within  the  limits  of  the  states 
without  their  consent.1  This  was  the  first  change  in  the 
party's  position  on  the  constitutional  question.  The  orig 
inal  Republican  doctrine  was  that  congress  could  create  no 
corporations  at  all.  Calhoun  at  once  sought  to  take  ad 
vantage  of  this  first  breach  made  by  the  English  cannon 
in  the  party  principles.  He  moved  the  appointment  of  a 
committee  to  consider  the  propriety  of  founding  a  national 
bank  in  the  District  of  Columbia.2  The  motion  was 
agreed  to  without  opposition,  but  the  matter  ended  there. 

Late  in  the  summer  of  the  same  year  affairs  took  a  new 
turn.  After  the  capture  of  Washington  (August  24),  all 
the  banks  incorporated  by  the  states,  with  the  exception  of 

1  Deb.  of  Cong.,  V.,  p.  122. 
1  Ibid,  V.,  p.  171. 


385 

those  of  New  England,  suspended  specie  payments.1  The 
fearful  confusion  of  all  financial  affairs  which  resulted 
from  this  bore  hard  upon  the  treasury.  The  secretary  of 
the  treasury,  Dallas,  declared  in  a  report  of  Oct.  17,  1814, 
to  the  committee  of  ways  and  means:  "The  monied  trans 
actions  of  private  life  are  at  a  stand,  and  the  fiscal  opera 
tions  of  government  labor  with  .extreme  inconvenience. 
It  is  impossible  that  such  a  state  of  things  should  be  long 
endured."  And  the  sum  and  substance  of  his  reasoning 
was  that,  "  after  all,"  a  national  bank  was  the  "  only  effi 
cient  remedy."2  At  the  end  of  the  report  he  touched  upon 
the  constitutional  question,  and  came  to  the  conclusion 
that  "discussion"  must  cease  and  "decision"  become 
"absolute";  that  the  judgment  of  a  congress  must  be 
recognized  as  settling  the  question;  and  that  a  national 
bank  was  "  necessary  and  proper  for  carrying  into  execu 
tion  some  of  the  most  important  powers  constitutionally 
vested  in  the  government."  The  man  who  had  said,  in 
1791  or  1798,  that  a  member  of  a  Republican  cabinet 
would  ever  use  such  language,  would  have  been  looked  up 
on  as  crazy.  The  crown  was  set  to  this  change  of  parts, 
however,  by  the  accompanying  provisions:  The  capital  of 
the  bank  was  to  be  fixed  at  $50,000,000;  the  United  States 
were  to  subscribe  $20,000,000  of  this;  the  bank  was  to  be 
obliged  to  loan  the  United  States  $30,000,000;  of  the 
fifteen  directors,  five,  the  president  among  them,  were  to 
be  named  by  the  president  of  the  United  States;  the  bank 
was  not  to  be  taxed,  except  on  its  real  estate,  by  the  gen 
eral  government  or  the  different  states ;  the  obligation  of 
redeeming  its  notes  with  specie  was  not  to  exist,  but  other 
means  were  to  be  tried  in  order  to  prevent  their  deprecia- 

1  See -the  details  in  Ingersoll,  Second  War  between  the  United  States 
and  England,  II.,  p.  251. 

»  Life  and  Writings  of  A.  J.  Dallas,  p.  236.    Annals  of  XIII.  Con 
gress,  p.  1285. 

25 


386  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY    AND    SLAVERY. 

tion.1     Even  Hamilton  would  scarcely  have  ventured  to 
lay  such  a  plan  before  congress. 

Congress  at  once  took  the  proposal  under  consideration. 
Dallas  urged  speedier  action,  while  he  laid  bare  the  whole 
financial  misery  of  the  government,  without  regard  to 
consequences.  In  a  second  report  of  Nov.  27  he  said: 
"The dividend  on  the  funded  debt  has  not  been  punctually 
paid ;  a  large  amount  of  treasury  notes  have  already  been 
dishonored;  and  the  hope  of  preventing  further  injury  and 
reproach  in  transacting  the  business  of  the  treasury  is  too 
visionary  to  afford  a  moment's  consolation.  .  .  .  Thus 
public  opinion,  manifested  in  every  form  and  in  every 
direction,  hardly  permits  us,  at  the  present  juncture,  to 
speak  of  the  existence  of  public  credit;  and  yet  it  is  not 
impossible  that  the  government,  in  the  resources  of  its 
patronage  and  its  pledges,  might  find  the  means  of  tempt 
ing  the  rich  and  the  avaricious  to  supply  its  immediate 
wants.  But  when  the  wants  of  to-day  are  supplied,  what 
is  the  new  expedient  that  shall  supply  the  wants  of  to-mor 
row?"2  Jan.  17,  1815,  Dallas  summed  up  his  accounts, 
and  showed  that  "  pressing"  demands  of  the  previous  year, 
amounting  to  $13,186.929,  must  be  satisfied,  and  that 
there  were  no  means  provided  for  doing  so.3  In  the  house 
of  representatives  Hanson  of  Maryland  illustrated  this 
general  statement  by  giving  some  particulars.  He  affirmed 
that  in  the  state  department  the  bills  for  writing  materials 
could  not  be  paid;  that  the  government  "  was  obliged  to 
borrow  pitiful  sums  which  it  would  disgrace  a  merchant 
of  tolerable  credit  to  ask  for" ;  that  the  paymaster  could 
not  satisfy  bills  for  thirty  dollars,  etc.4  Grosvenor  of 
New  York  added  that  $40,000,000  of  national  paper  was 

1  Life  and  Writings  of  Dallas,  pp.  238,  239. 

1  Ibid,  pp.  245,  246. 

« Ibid,  p.  265. 

'•  Deb.  of  Cong.,  V.,  p.  380. 


BANK    DEBATES.  387 

in  the  market,  and  that  it  had  sunk  from  eighty  to  sixty-five 
per  cent.1 

The  necessity  of  creating  some  means  of  help  in  almost 
any  way  was  plain  to  see  from  these  facts.  Yet  the  de 
bates  of  congress  spun  out  endlessly.  Some  Democrats 
remained  true  to  the  old  party  doctrine,  and  denied  the 
right  of  congress  to  call  into  life  a  corporation  of  any  sort 
whatever.2  With  the  great  mass  of  the  Democrats,  as 
well  as  of  the  Opposition,3  the  only  question  was  over  the 
details  of  the  bill. 

In  the  first  weeks  of  the  new  year  the  two  houses  of 
congress  finally  agreed  upon  a  bill.  Madison  sent  it  back 
to  the  senate,  Jan.  30, 1815,  with  his  veto,  expressly  stating 
that  he  "waived"  the  constitutional  question.4 

Three  weeks  later  the  administration  was  freed  from  its 
most  pressing  needs  by  the  close  of  the  war;  but  the  de 
plorable  condition  of  the  finances5  and  the  disturbance 
of  foreign  exchanges  still  continued,  and  men  knew  no 
way  of  extricating  themselves  from  the  difficulty,  except 
by  the  establishment  of  a  national  bank.  Madison,  in  his 
message  of  Dec.  5,  1815,  recommended  congress  to  once 
more  take  the  question  into  consideration.6  Calhoun,  too, 
brought  in  a  bill,  Jan.  8,  1816,  and  defended  it,  Feb.  26, 
in  a  very  long  speech.7  He  did  not  touch  upon  the  con 
stitutional  question,  because,  as  he  said,  it  would  be  "  use 
less  consumption  of  time"  to  discuss  that  any  further. 
Clay  took  a  prominent  part  in  the  debates  and  warmly 
supported  the  establishment  of  a  bank.  He  justified  him- 

1  Ibid,  VM  p.  383. 

»  Ibid,  V.,  pp.  369,  401. 

1  Webster,  Works,  III.,  pp.  35-48. 

4  Statesman's  Manual,  I.,  p.  323. 

6  "  Gold  and  silver  have  disappeared  entirely.  .  .  .  Since  1810  or 
1811  the  amount  of  paper  in  circulation  had  increased  from  eighty  or 
ninety  to  two  hundred  millions."  Calhoun,  Works,  II.,  pp.  155, 158. 

8  Statesman's  Manual,  I.,  p.  330. 

'  Calhoun,  Works,  II.,  pp.  153-162. 


388  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY    AND    SLAVERY. 

self  for  this  by  saying  that  "  the  force  of  circumstances  and 
the  lights  of  experience"  had  made  him  see  "the  necessity" 
of  attributing  to  congress  this  "  constructive  power."1 
Both  houses  agreed,  at  the  end  of  three  months,  upon  a 
bill,  and  on  April  10  it  received  Madison's  approval,2  al 
though  in  1791  he  had  questioned  the  power  of  congress,8 
and  in  1799,  in  his  report  to  the  legislature  of  Virginia, 
had  mentioned  the  incorporation  of  the  bank  as  one  of  the 
examples  of  the  usurping  tendencies  of  the  federal  govern 
ment.4 

The  second  national  bank  was  also  a  purely  Democratic 
creation,  and  the  most  noted  Democrats  had  most  to  do 
with  it.  Necessity  is  the  mother,  not  only  of  invention, 
but  also  of  the  interpretation  of  constitutions.  Three  years 
later,  the  supreme  court  of  the  United  States  gave  an  unan 
imous  decision  in  favor  of  the  constitutionality  of  a  na 
tional  bank.5  Yet  the  bank  question  once  more  raised  a 
fearful  storm.  In  this,  indeed,  the  two  sections  were  not 
opposed  to  each  other,  but  the  economic  differences  came 
straightway  into  play,  and  the  result  was  the  strengthening 
of  the  power  of  the  slaveholding  aristocracy.  But  this 
last  and  most  heated  struggle  belongs  to  a  later  period. 

Of  much  greater  and  especially  of  much  more  permanent 
importance  was  the  question  of  so-called  internal  improve 
ments,  that  is,  the  question  whether  and  how  far  the  federal 
government  was  empowered  to  undertake  or  to  aid  the 
construction  of  roads  or  canals,  the  improvement  of  rivers 
and  harbors,  and  the  like.  Even  before  the  adoption  of 
the  constitution  of  1787,  negotiations  had  taken  place  be 
tween  different  states,  in  regard  to  undertakings  of  this 

1  Deb.  of  Cong ,  V.,  pp.  622,  623.    Compare  Benton's  note,  V.,  p.  627. 
•  Stat.  at  L.,  III.,  p.  266. 
1  Deb.  of  Cong.,  I.,  pp.  274,  seq.,  306. 
4  Elliot,  Deb.,  IV.,  p.  550. 

?  M'Culloch  vs.  the  State  of  Maryland.  Wheaton's  Rep.,  IV.,  p.  442; 
Curtis,  IV.,  p.  432. 


INTERNAL    IMPROVEMENTS.  389 

sort  which  would  be  to  their  mutual  advantage.  Madison 
pointed  out  in  the  Federalist  (JNo.  XIY.)  how  greatly  the 
Union  would  be  strengthened  in  the  future  in  this  way, 
and  prophesied  a  rapid  advance  in  this  respect.  Under 
the  two  first  presidents,  however,  the  fulfillment  of  these 
prophesies  was  impossible,  because  bringing  order  out  of 
the  financial  confusion  absorbed  every  exertion.  During 
the  administration  of  Jefferson,  the  idea  was  again  brought 
up,  and  the  building  of  the  so-called  Cumberland  road  was 
undertaken.  But  soon  after  the  embargo-policy  and  the 
war  with  England  turned  the  public  attention  and  the  na 
tional  revenues  to  other  affairs.1  It  was  not  until  the 
beginning  of  the  third  period  of  the  history  of  the  Union 
that  internal  improvements  became  a  fixed  question,  which 
occupied  a  permanent  and  prominent  place  in  all  political 
programmes.  Up  to  this  time,  and  for  some  time  after, 
practically  only  one  view  prevailed,  and  this  was  that  it 
was  desirable  or  quite  necessary  to  develop  a  comprehen 
sive  and  systematic  activity  in  this  application  of  the 
federal  resources.  Jefferson,  in  his  message  of  Dec.  2, 1806, 
directed  the  attention  of  congress  to  this  point;2  Madison 
came  back  to  the  question,  as  Calhoun  said,  "  every  year,"3 
and  even  Monroe  favored  the  idea,  although  he  drew  the 
boundaries  of  its  practical  application  vaguely  and  narrow 
ly.4  The  only  question  was  whether  congress  already  had 
the  necessary  power,  or  whether  it  was  necessary  to  first 
give  this  to  it,  by  an  amendment  of  the  constitution.  All 
the  three  presidents  named  held  the  latter  view.  The  fact 
that  they  came  from  a  slave  state  had  no  influence  on  this. 
They  were  "  strict  constructionists,"  that  is,  they  found  in 
the  constitution  no  "  express"  grant  of  the  right,  and 
therefore  thought  that  it  could  not  exist.  In  the  part  of 

1  Compare  Deb.  of  Congress,  V.,  p.  676. 
*  Statesman's  Mann.,  I.,  p.  191. 
'  Ibid,  I.,  pp.  332,  335. 
4  Ibid,  I.,  pp.  402,  491. 


390  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

the  message  already  mentioned  which  touched  upon  this 
point,  Jefferson  seems  to  have  flatly  denied  the  right. 
Madison  had  not  yet  wholly  given  up  the  position  defended 
by  him  in  1796,1  but  it  is  impossible  to  say  exactly  how 
firmly  he  still  held  to  it.  In  his  message  of  Dec.  3,  1816, 
he  spoke  expressly  of  the  "  existing  powers"  of  congress 
which  needed  only  "  enlargement",2  and  yet,  on  March  3, 
1817,  he  vetoed  an  appropriation  for  the  Cumberland  road, 
on  constitutional  grounds,  without  pointing  out  how  far 
the  "  existing  powers"  reached  and  wherein  congress,  in 
this  particular  case,  had  exceeded  them.3  He  spoke  quite 
clearly  on  this  point,  that  the  consent  of  the  states,  within 
whose  limits  internal  improvements  were  to  be  undertaken 
by  the  Union,  could  not  supply  the  needed  constitutional 
power.4  Monroe  seems  to  have  had  exactly  the  opposite 
opinion  on  this  point.5  His  view  is  still  more  hard  to  as 
certain  than  Madison's,  although  he  sketched  it  in  his  veto 
message  of  May  4,  1822,  in  tedious  detail.  In  this  mes 
sage  he  affirms  that  the  building  of  the  Cumberland  road 
had  been  "  originally  commenced  and  so  far  executed  .  .  . 
under  the  power  vested  in  congress  to  make  appropria 
tions,"  but  that  the  present  bill  contained  provisions  which 
could  not  be  justified  by  that  power.  Clay,  however,  de 
clared  it  absolutely  inadmissible  to  appeal  to  this  particular 
right,  because  the  appropriation  of  money  was  a  result,  not 
a  cause.  Monroe's  message  contains  a  long  argument, 
which  is  wholly  based  upon  this  view.6  It  is  difficult  to 


1  See  Niles'  Reg.,  XL.?  p.  208. 

2  "  I  particularly  again  invite  their  attention  to  the  expediency  of  ex 
ercising  their  existing  powers  and,  where  necessary,  of  resoling  to  the 
prescribed  mode  of  enlarging  them,  in  order  to  effectuate  a  r^mprehen- 
sive  system  of  roads  and  canals."    Statesman's  Manual,  I.,  j  ''35. 

8  Deb.  of  Cong.,  V.,  p.  721. 
4  Compare  Clay,  Speeches,  I.,  p.  69. 
•    6  See  Statesman's  Manual,  I.,  p.  491. 
•  Statesman's  Manual,  I.,  p.  515,  seq. 


CONGRESSIONAL    QUIBBLING.  391 

see  where  lie  found  the   reconciliation  of  the  two  directly 
contrary  views. 

At  the  same  time,  very  vague  ideas  prevailed  in  congress 
on  the  constitutional  question.  Its  discussion  was  marked 
by  the  same  narrow  legal  spirit  which  had  dictated  Monroe's 
message  and  which  now  reasoned  in  circles  and  quibbled 
over  words.  The  house  of  representatives,  in  1818,  took 
refuge  behind  the  right  of  making  appropriations.  It  de 
cided,  March  14,  by  ninety  to  severity -five  votes,  that  con 
gress  could  "  appropriate  money"  for  the  construction  of 
roads  and  canals,  but  voted  down,  by  eighty-four  to  eighty- 
two  votes,  a  resolution  that  it  had  the  right  to"  construct" 
post  and  military  roads,  and — by  eighty-three  to  eighty-one 
votes — that  it  could  "  construct"  canals  for  military  pur 
poses.1  As  soon,  however,  as  men  tore  themselves  loose 
from  the  literal  reading  of  the  constitution,  a  freer,  more 
statesmanlike  method  of  thought  came  into  play.  It  was 
infinitely  petty  to  raise  a  constitutional  question  at  first 
and  then  to  crawl  out  of  the  difficulty  by  the  shallowest 
excuses;  but  the  main  point  was  that  the  majority  of  con 
gress  was  always  thereafter  prevailed  upon  to  make  appro 
priations  for  internal  improvements  of  national  importance. 
The  quibblers  were  overwhelmed  with  such  a  flood  of 
arguments  appealing  to  sound  common  sense  that,  despite 
all  their  eiforts,  they  remained  steadily  in  the  minority. 
Clay  asked  whether  the  federal  aims  of  the  government 
could  be  reached  in  any  other  way  than  by  the  use  of  the 
federal  resources.  They  could  not  answer,  and  it  thrust 
aside  all  their  hair-splitting  objections.  It  was  proved  to 
them,  by  a  multitude  of  examples,  how  greatly  the  essen- 
'tial  ends  of  the  Union  had  already  suffered,  simply  because 
the  resources  of  the  Union  had  not  been  earlier  applied  in 
this  way.  And  it  was  farther  argued,  with  unanswerable 
logic,  that  their  principles  gave  every  state  the  right  and 

1  Deb.  of  Cong.,  VI.,  pp.  121, 122. 


STATE    SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

the  might  to  make  the  attainment  of  the  main  ends  of  the 
Union  impossible.  Despite  the  superfluity  of  spiritless 
bits  of  subtlety  which  were  brought  forward  at  every  suc 
ceeding  session  of  congress,  the  strife  finally  came  to 
depend,  in  every  instance,  upon  the  simple  question  whether 
in  the  certain  case  a  certain  sum  of  money  should  be  voted 
by  congress.  This  was  so  plainly  the  only  solution  of  the 
cpestion,  at  once  intelligent  and  corresponding  to  the  press 
ing  demands  of  circumstances,1  that  even  the  three  presi 
dents  who  denied  the  constitutional  right  signed  a  great 
number  of  bills,  which  had  no  other  end  save  the  appro 
priation  of  moneys  for  internal  improvements.2 

The  most  decided  champions  of  the  right  and  the  most 
zealous  defenders  of  its  extended  use  belonged  to  the  young 
states  of  the  west.3  The  development  of  these  states  would 
necessarily  remain  far  behind  their  capacity  for  develop 
ment  unless  the  general  government,  by  constructing 
canals  and  roads  and  regulating  river-courses,  gave  a  strong 
impulse  to  immigration  and  created  a  profitable  market  for 
their  products.  Their  own  resources  were  not  sufficient  as 
yet  for  great  undertakings,  and,  moreover,  the  proportionate 
co-operation  of  several  states,  needed  in  most  cases,  would 
have  been  an  almost  insuperable  obstacle.  But  sufficient 
means  of  communication  became,  every  year,  a  more 
pressing  necessity.  Even  the  lower  classes  of  the  population 
began  to  see  that  these  must  be  created,  even  if  this  in- 

1  In  response  to  repeated  recommendations  to  lay  a  constitutional 
amendment  before  the  states,  the  majority  pertinently  answered  that 
they  had  no  reason  for  doing  so,  since  they  did  not  doubt  that  congress 
already  had  the  right.  See  the  short  but  excellent  discussion  of  the 
constitutional  question  in  Kent,  Comm.,  I.,  pp.  283-284. 

•Jefferson's  presidency:  Stat.  at  Large,  II.,  pp.  180,  359,  397  (three 
different  appropriations),  524;  Madison's:  II.,  pp.  555,  661,  669,  671, 
730,  820;  III.,  pp.  206,  282,  315,  318,  377;  Monroe's  ;  III.,  pp.  412,426, 
480,  500,  560,  563,  605,  634,  728,  779;  IV.,  pp.5,  6,  23,  33,  71,  83,  94, 101, 
124,  128,  132,  135,  227.  See  also  IV.,  pp.  83,  151. 

*  Deb.  of  Cong.,  VI.,  p.  450;  Clay,  Speeches,  I.,  pp.  182,  183. 


THE    ERIE    CANAL.  393 

/•olved,  at  the.  beginning,  great  sacrifices  of  money.  The 
completion  of  the  Erie  canal  contributed  greatly  to  open 
the  eyes  of  the  masses  to  this  fact.  DeWitt  Clinton  had 
experienced  the  greatest  hostility  and  unmeasured  mockery 
on  account  of  the  work  which  has  made  his  name  immor 
tal.  Now,  not  only  was  its  feasibility  proved,  but  under 
its  influence  wildernesses  were  converted  into  fruitful,  cul 
tivated  lands  with  magical  rapidity.  These  and  many 
other  less  striking  experiences  imbued  the  west  with  an 
enthusiasm  for  internal  improvements,  which  afterwards 
brought  it  into  peculiar  discord  with  party  orthodoxy. 
When  the  Democratic  party  split  in  two,  it  was  sharply 
afiirmed — though,  indeed,  the  assertion  was  scarcely  justi 
fied  by  the  facts — that  Jackson  and  Adams  took  substan 
tially  different  positions  on  the  question  of  internal  im 
provements.  Jackson  was  praised  by  the  majority  of  his 
supporters,  because  he  had  given  a  strong  check  to  the 
reckless  mischief  of  the  work  of  this  sort  carried  on  under 
Adams.  But  Missouri,  which  supported  Jackson  with 
spirited  enthusiasm,  declared  with  triumphant  joy  that 
this  was  a  wholly  groundless  calumny,  since  more  had  been 
spent  upon  internal  improvements  during  the  first  two 
years  of  Jackson's  presidency  than  during  the  whole  of 
Adams's  administration.1 

At  first,  the  leading  statesmen  of  the  south  went  hand 
in  hand  with  the  west.  Calhoun  urged,  in  1816,  a  plan  for 
constant  and  systematic  action,  on  the  part  of  the  general 
government,  for  the  improvement  of  the  means  of  inter 
communication.  On  his  motion,  a  committee  was  ap 
pointed  in  order  to  investigate  whether  it  was  advisable  to 
devote  the  revenue  derived  by  the  government  from  the 
national  bank  to  this  end.  December  23,  1816,  he  re 
ported  a  bill,  corresponding  to  this  motion,  which  was 


1  See  N lies'  Reg.,  XL.,  p.  58  and  XLIL,  p.  79.    During  Adams's  ad. 
ministration,  $2,083,331,  and  in  1829  and  1830,  $2,501,590. 


394          STATE  SOVEREIGNTY  AND  SLAVERY. 

passed  by  eighty- six  to  eighty-four  votes.1  Lowndes  took  a 
similar  position.  In  the  vote  of  March  14, 1818,  thirty  south 
ern  representatives  openly  declared  their  "belief  in  the  right 
to  appropriate  money  for  the  construction  of  roads  and  ca 
nals.  Moreover,  in  December,  1824,  Johnston  of  Louisiana 
submitted  a  resolution  in  favor  of  the  right  to  make  internal 
improvements.2  Only  by  slow  degrees  was  it  clearly  seen 
that  this  question  too  tended  to  a  geographical  consolida 
tion  of  parties,  although  this  tendency  could  never  be  fully 
carried  out.  The  northwestern  slave  states,  in  which  slave- 
industry  was  not  the  sole  master,  were  deeply  interested  in 
having  the  general  government  help  them  to  a  closer  union 
with  the  eastern  and  southern  seaboard  states.  The  north 
east  long  remained,  in  part,  in  a  cautious  and  even  suspi 
cious  position.  It  had  the  least  need  of  federal  aid  and  had 
not  yet  so  wholly  outgrown  its  old  jealousy  of  the  west  as 
to  clearly  see  how  greatly  the  industrial  development  of 
the  west  would  be  to  its  advantage.  Moreover,  the  princi 
ple  of  state  rights  played  a  part  in  this  question  among  the 
politicians  who  sought  to  make  their  way  by  servility  to 
wards  the  south.  Thus,  Yan  Buren  brought  in  resolutions 
in  December,  1825,  which  opposed  the  right  of  congress  to 
construct  roads  and  canals  and  favored  the  introduction  of 
an  amendment  to  the  constitution  which  should  define  the 
limits  of  the  congressional  prerogatives  in  this  respect  in 
such  a  way  as  should  "  effectually  protect  the  sovereignty 
of  the  respective  states,"  and  should  insure  to  every  state  a 
more  exact  proportional  part  of  the  sums  voted  for  internal 
improvements.3 

In  the  south  proper  and  in  the  remaining  slave  states,  in 
which  the  slaveholding  interest  was  supreme,  a  sectional 
opposition  to  the  whole  system  developed  itself  very 

1  Deb.  of  Congress,  V.,  pp.  676,  682,  711 ;  Calkoun,  Works,  II.,  pp. 
186-197. 

»  N  lies'  Reg.,  XXVII.,  p.  270. 
»  Deb.  of  Congress,  VIII.,  pp.  364,  365. 


8OTJTHEEN   OPPOSITION.  395 

strongly  in  course  of  time.  The  simplicity  and  crudeness 
of  their  industrial  methods  did  not  let  them  feel  sufficiently 
the  need  of  a  great  network  of  means  of  intercommunica 
tion.  They  were  always  glad  to  see  the  improvement  of 
their  harbors  and  of  their  rivers,  by  which  the  products  of 
the  west  reached  them,  undertaken  by  the  federal  govern 
ment,  but  yet  the  conviction  curtly  expressed  by  a  Louis 
iana  congressman  as  early  as  1817:  "Louisiana  wants  no 
roads!"1  steadily  gained  ground.  If  they  did  not  wish  to 
go  as  far  as  this,  they  declaimed  against  the  injustice  with 
which  everything  was  lavished  upon  the  north,  while  the 
south  went  empty-handed  away.2  That  the  facts  gave  not 
the  slightest  support  for  these  complaints  made  no  differ 
ence.3  The  south  never  asked  for  facts  when  its  presumed 
interests  demanded  that  it  should  wail  over  the  tyranny  ot 
the  north.  The  legal  grounds  for  the  opposition  were 
found,  of  course,  in  state  rights,  but  as  a  general  rule  this 
doctrine  was  kept  within  comparatively  narrow  limits. 
Yet  the  legislature  of  Virginia  suffered  itself  once  (1826) 
to  be  carried  away  so  far  as  to  declare,  by  a  verbatim  quota 
tion  of  the  decisive  sentences  in  the  resolutions  of  1T98 
and  1T99,  that  the  increase  of  duties  for  the  purpose  of 
protecting  home  industries  and  the. passage  of  acts  "  pre 
paratory  to  a  general  system  of  internal  improvements" 
were  "  unconstitutional."4 

When  the  Jacksonian  wing  of  the  Republican  party 
came  into  power,  the  Opposition  thought  its  time  had  come. 

1  Deb.  of  Cong.,  V,  p.  710. 

8  The  Charleston  Mercury  of  Feb.  20,  1830,  said :  "The  uniform  prac 
tice  of  that  system  proves  that  the  south,  so  far  from  partaking  equally, 
has  been  totally  excluded,  and  that  the  system  itself  has  been  wholly 
used  as  an  engine  for  the  oppression  of  the  south  and  the  enrichment  of 
the  north."  Niles'  Reg.,  XXXVII I.,  p.  255. 

1  See  Niles'  Reg.,  XXXVI,  p.  168,  and  XXXV1IL,  p.  255,  where  there 
is  an  exact  statement  of  how  much  of  the  sums  voted  for  internal  im 
provements  up  to  the  end  of  1828  fell  to  each  state. 

4  Ibid.,  XXX.,  p.  38. 


396  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

This  hope  seemed  justified  when  the  president  vetoed  the 
Maysville  road  bill.  But  it  soon  appeared  that  Jackson 
only  laid  claim  to  the  right  to  decide  in  each  particular 
case  whether  or  not  the  matter  was  properly  a  "  national" 
undertaking  and  whether  the  use  of  federal  resources  was 
"  expedient."1  The  constitutional  question  did  not  pro 
gress  an  inch.  The  strife  continued  with  varying  violence, 
but  one  internal  improvement  after  another  was  under 
taken,  and  the  system  was  constantly  pushed  farther  and 
farther. 

The  industrial  contrasts  of  the  free  and  slave  states 
entered  much  more  directly  into  the  tariff  struggle  than 
into  the  questions  of  a  national  bank  and  internal  improve 
ments.  In  modern  civilized  countries  free  trade  and  pro 
tection  have  fought  an  almost  constant  battle,  which  dates 
much  farther  back  than  the  origin  of  the  North  American 
republic.  Here  it  began  independently  of  slavery,  as  it  has 
continued  since  the  abolition  of  slavery.  But  yet  the 
thirty-year  tariff  war  (1816-1846)  finds  its  explanation 
only  in  the  form  given  by  slavery  to  the  industrial  circum 
stances  of  the  south.  It  is,  in  fact,  "  the  expression  of 
the  struggle,  in  the  sphere  of  economics,  between  freedom 
and  slavery."2  All  the  great  questions  upon  which  the  in 
ner  contests  of  the  republic  from  1789  to  1861  were 
fought  did  not  have  their  origin  in  slavery;  but  it  was 
jlavery  which,  in  this  as  in  all  the  others,  made  parties 
Coincide  with  geographical  sections.  « 

The  necessity  of  a  common  commercial  law  and  of  as 
sured  national  revenues,  which  could  be  most  easily  raised 
by  duties,  had  given  the  strongest  impulse  to  the  call  of 
the  convention  at  Philadelphia.  One  of  the  first  ques 
tions,  then,  that  came  before  congress  for  action  was  the 
regulation  of  duties  on  imports.  The  preamble  to  the 


1  Compare  N  lies'  Reg.,  XL.,  p.  106. 

*  Kapp,  Geschichte  der  Sklaverei,  p.  171. 


THE   TARIFF.  397 

bill  signed  by  the  president  July  4,  1789,  provided  that 
the  customs  and  other  taxes  were  to  serve  "  for  the  en 
couragement  and  protection  of  manufactures."1     Repeated 
reference  was  made  in  the  debate  to  this  side  of  the  ques 
tion.     Fitzsimmons  of  Pennsylvania  demanded  protection 
for  the  makers  of  tallow  candles.     Hartley,  of  the  same 
state,  expressed  himself  as  generally  in  favor  of  protective 
duties,  and  Madison  recognized  the  justice  of  the  demand 
to  a  certain  degree.     Clymer  of  Pennsylvania   went  far 
thest,  and  declared  that  the  protection  of  home  industries 
by  duties   was   a    "political   necessity."     On   the   other 
hand,  Bland  of  Virginia,  and  especially  Tucker  of  South 
Carolina,  demanded  that  in  deciding  upon  duties  only  the 
revenue  to  be  obtained  should  be  considered,  because  under 
a  protective  system  all  are  taxed  for  the  benefit  of  a  few. 
Partridge  and  Ames  paid  especial  attention  to  the  shipping 
interest,  and  opposed  the  taxation  of  hemp  and  rope.2     Here 
the  party-grouping  of  the  next  five-and-twenty  years  ia 
already  indicated.     Madison  expressed  his  especial  satis 
faction  over  the  fact  that  no  geographical  division  had  be 
come  noticeable;3  he  said  that  it  was  plain  that  different 
views  about  the  propriety  of  a  protective  policy  prevailed 
in  all  parts  of   the  Union.     The  constitutional  question 
was  not  once  raised.     But  then  at  least  no  one  thought  of 
taxing  imported  wares  simply  for  the  purpose  of  protect 
ing  existing  American  manufactories  from  foreign  compe"- 
tition,  or,  indeed,  for  the  sake  of  making  it  possible,  for 
the  first  time,  to  establish  American  manufactories.     Men 
only  wished  to  see  the  duties  necessitated  by  the  needs  of 
the  treasury  laid  in  such  a  way  that  they  would  actually 
serve  to  encourage  American  industry.     A  large  majority, 
at  the  moment,  wished  that  this  should  be  done.     Hamil 
ton  was  directed  by  the  house  of  representatives  to  prepare 

1  Statutes  at  Large,  I.,  p.  24. 

•  Deb.  of  Cong.,  I.,  pp.  25,  26,  27, 35,  36. 

'  Deb.  of  Cong.,  I.,  p.  55. 


398         STATE  SOVEREIGNTY  AND  SLAVERY. 

a  report  upon  "  the  means  of  promoting  such  [manufac 
tures]  as  would  render  the  United  States  independent  of 
foreign  nations  for  military  and  other  essential  supplies."1 
Hamilton  prefaced  his  long  report  with  the  remark  that 
the  propriety  of  a  protective  tariff,  in  the  sense  already 
given,  was  now  "  pretty  generally  admitted,"  and  then 
defended  the  view  himself  with  great  ability.2 

During  the  war  with  England,  the  question  assumed  a 
new  phase.  Thanks  to  the  European  war  troubles,  the 
American  shipping  business,  which  was  mainly  in  the 
hands  of  "New  Englanders,  received  a  great  impulse,  until 
the  embargo  policy  began  to  lay  fetters  on  its  further  de 
velopment.  Manufacturing  industry,  which  quickly  re- 
vived  when  the  war  closed  the  European  sources  of  supply, 
offered  a  certain  compensation  for  this.  The  financial 
difficulties  of  the  government  had  already,  in  1812,  com 
pelled  a  doubling  of  all  the  customs,  with  a  further  tax  of 
ten  per  cent,  on  goods  imported  in  foreign  ships.3  In 
order  to  make  this  heavy  imposition  seem  more  endurable 
to  the  discontented  New  England  states,  they  were  com 
forted  with  assurances  that  this  proviso  was  to  give  an  im 
pulse  to  their  own  peculiar  industry.4  The  prophecies  of 
the  comforters  proved  true,  but  only  as  long  as  the  abnor 
mal  state  of  things  continued.5  The  end  of  the  Napoleonic 
wars  and  the  peace  of  Ghent  threatened  the  ship-owners 
as  well  as  the  manufacturers  with  speedy  ruin.  The  seas 

1  Dallas'  report  of  Feb.  12,  1816.    Niles'  Reg.,  IX.,  p.  441. 

9  Ham.,  Works,  III.,  p.  192. 

8  Statutes  at  Large,  II.,  p.  ?68. 

4  Webster,  Works,  III.,  p.  230. 

6  Randolph  wrote,  Dec.  15,  1814,  to  a  New  Englander:  "  Of  all  the 
Atlantic  states  you  have  the  least  cause  to  complain.  Your  manufac 
tures  and  the  trade  which  the  enemy  has  allowed  you  have  drained  us 
of  our  last  dollar."  Garland,  Life  of  Randolph,  II.,  p.  60.  Inghain 
of  Pennsylvania  estimated,  in  1816,  the  capital  invested  in  manufactures 
within  the  last  eight  or  ten  years  at  $100,000,000.,  Debates  of  Congress, 
V.,  p.  628. 


TARIFF    OF    1816.  399 

were  again  free  to  all  ships,  and  England  threw  an  over- 
supply  of  goods  upon  the  American  market,  in  order  to 
destroy  the  home  competitors  before  they  acquired  a  firm 
footing.  Congress  was  therefore  overwhelmed  with  peti 
tions  for  aid  from  persons  engaged  in  manufacturing  pur 
suits,  who  complained  the  more  earnestly  because,  accord 
ing  to  the  law  of  July  1, 1812,  the  double  duties  were  to 
cease  one  year  after  the  conclusion  of  peace.  The  failure 
of  many  manufacturers  gave  proof  that  the  young  indus 
tries  could  really  be  maintained  only  by  artificial  aid.  But 
this  could  scarcely  be  given  without  sadly  interfering  in 
many  ways  with  the  interests  of  the  ship-owners.  The 
!N"ew  England  states  were  therefore  at  odds  with  one  an 
other  on  the  tariff  policy  to  be  followed.  In  New  Hamp 
shire  and  in  Massachusetts,  to  which  Maine  then  belonged, 
the  shipping  interest  prevailed ;  in  Rhode  Island  and  Con 
necticut  the  manufacturing  interest.  The  agricultural 
states  held  fast  to  the  latter.  The  south  wavered,  for  it 
had  not  yet  learned  to  see  that  slave  labor  and  manufactur 
ing  on  a  large  scale  exclude  each  other. 

Under  these  circumstances  a  sort  of  compromise  was 
brought  about  in  1S16.  The  report  of  secretary  of  the 
treasury  Dallas  emphatically  advocated  protection  to  home 
industry  by  high  duties,  especially  in  the  case  of  those 
goods  which  could  be  produced  in  sufficient  quantity  in 
the  United  States.1  He  wished  to  see  the  goods  which 
would  be  produced,  beyond  question,  in  the  United  States 
subjected  to  a  light  revenue  tax,  and  those  which  must  be 
in  the  main  imported  placed  under  medium  duties.  The 
bill  which  was  introduced  by  Lowndes  of  South  Carolina, 
as  chairman  on  the  committee  on  ways  and  means,  adopted 
this  classification,  but  in  general  agreed  with  the  funda 
mental  theory  that  the  raising  of  revenue  should  be  the 
leading  principle  in  the  calculation  of  the  duties.  The 

1  Niles'  Reg.,  IX.,  pp.  43&-441 


400  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND   SLAVERY. 

principle  of  protection  was  only  incidentally  recognized 
here.  The  makers  of  cotton  and  woolen  wares,  who  had 
been  the  especial  subjects  of  congressional  care,  had  to 
satisfy  themselves  with  a  duty  of  twenty -five  per  cent., 
which  was  to  be  lowered  to  twenty  in  three  years.  It  is 
characteristic  of  the  position  of  parties  at  that  time  that 
Calhoun  appeared  as  a  champion  of  protective  duties,  es 
pecially  in  reference  to  cotton  and  woolen  manufactures.1 
He  was  of  opinion  that  "  things  naturally  tend  at  this 
moment"  to  the  "introduction  of  manufactures."2  Web 
ster  stood  up  for  the  opposite  side.  Louisiana  demanded 
protection  for  the  sugar  planters.8 

This  compromise  satisfied  nobody.  The  agitation  for 
higher  duties  was  at  once  begun  again.  The  tariff  adopted 
by  the  house  of  representatives  in  1820,  but  rejected  by 
the  senate,  bore  the  mark  of  an  undisguised  protective 
system.  The  ship-owning  states  took,  in  part,  the  position 
they  occupied  in  1816.  Whitman  of  Massachusetts  was 
among  the  most  violent  opponents  of  protection.4  In  all 
things  else  parties  had  evidently  already  neared  the  posi 
tion  which  they  finally  occupied.5  The  south  had  gained 
clearer  views  of  its  interests,  and  the  young  west  strove 
for  the  leadership  on  the  side  of  protection.  Yet  Henry 
Clay,  the  father  of  the  so-called  "  American  system," 
still  showed  some  foresight  in  his  expressions.  He  was  on 
his  guard,  lest  manufacturing  should  be  given  unreason 
able  encouragement  by  protective  duties.6 

Defeat  did  not  discourage  the  protectionists,  but  rather 
spurred  them  on  to  redoubled  activity.  Other  causes, 
which  were  in  great  part  of  a  purely  personal  nature,  con- 

1  Calhoun,  Works,  II.,  pp.  163,  164;  Deb.  of  Cong.,  V.,  p.  040. 

*  Calhoun,  Works,  II.,  p.  169. 

8  Debates  of  Congress,  V.,  p.  632. 

*  Clay,  Speeches,  I.,  p.  158. 

*  See  Niles'  Reg.,  XVIII.,  p.  169. 

*  Clay,  Speeches,  I.,  p.  155. 


TARIFF  STRUGGLE  OF  1824.  401 

tributed  to  split  the  Republican  (Democratic)  party  into 
the  Democrats1  and  the  National  Republicans  (Whigs),  but 
the  tariff  was  the  leading  political  question  for  a  series  of 
years.  The  load  which  had  weighed  down  all  industrial 
life  during  the  last  few  years  put  a  priceless  means  of  agi 
tation  into  the  hands  of  the  protectionists.  Under  the 
leadership  of  Clay  they  availed  themselves  of  this  with 
such  dexterity  that  Monroe  yielded  to  their  pressure,  and 
recommended,  in  his  messages  of  Dec.  2,  1822  and  Dec. 
2,  1823,  a  revision  of  the  tariff  in  behalf  of  protection.2 
Strengthened  in  this  wise,  the  protectionists  again  began 
the  fight  in  1824.  Its  character  was  from  the  first  mark 
edly  different  from  that  of  the  earlier  debates.  The  con 
stitutional  question,  which  had  hitherto  been  raised  quite 
incidentally  and  in  the  form  of  doubts,  was  now  sharply 
urged.  The  constitution  gives  congress  simply  the  power 
"to  lay  and  collect  taxes"  and  "to  regulate  commerce 
with  foreign  nations."3  Nowhere  in  the  instrument  is 
there  a  limitation  or  any  sort  of  qualification  in  regard 
to  duties,  except  that  they  must  be  the  same  for  the  whole 
Union.  The  party  which  had  such  an  abhorrence  of  every 
"  construction"  of  the  constitution  and  of  all  "  derived 
powers"  saw  itself,  therefore,  again  obliged  to  use  the  art 
of  construing  in  a  really  wondrous  manner,  in  order  to 
settle  the  legal  question.4  The  right  of  taxation,  they 
affirmed,  had  only  been  granted  to  congress  in  order  to 
obtain  the  money  needed  for  the  legitimate  aims  of  the 
government.  To  levy  a  tax  for  any  other  purpose,  or  to 

1  The  official  name,  so  to  speak,  of  the  party  had  been,  up  to  this 
time,  Republicans. 

•  Statesman's  Manual,  I.,  pp.  448,  458. 
'Art.  I.,  Sec. 8,  §§1,3. 

*  As  far  as  this  was  concerned  Madison  stood  unconditionally  with 
the  protectionists.    Niles*  Reg.,  XLIIL,  Suppl.,  pp.  33-37.    Jefferson 
took  practically  the  same  ground  in  his  reports  on  the  fisheries  (Feb.  1, 
1791)  and  on  the  limitations  of  trade  (Feb.  23, 1793).    Compare  also,  his 
letter  to  Dr.  Leiper,  Jan.  21, 1809,    Works,  V.,  p.  416,  seq. 


402  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY    AND    SLAVERY. 

fix  a  customs  duty  imposed  for  such  a  purpose  in  any 
other  way  than  that  dictated  by  an  exclusive  consideration 
of  the  needs  of  the  treasury,  was,  they  said,  beyond  the 
power  of  congress.  The  first  condition  precedent  to  the 
Union,  the  equality  of  all  its  members,  would  be  over 
thrown  if  all  were  burdened  for  the  benefit  of  a  few.  It 
would  be  madness  to  authorize  congress  to  fatten  northern 
manufacturers  on  the  life-blood  of  the  south. 

This  was  the  real  party-cry  and  it  was  now  uttered  in 
all  distinctness  for  the  first  time.  Randolph  called  atten 
tion,  with  natural  boastfulness,  to  the  fact  that  Massachu 
setts,  now  as  at  the  time  of  the  Revolution,  stood  side  by 
side  with  Yirginia  in  the  cause  of  freedom.  And  besides 
Massachusetts,  Maine  and  New  Hampshire  went  with  the 
south.1  But  yet  it  was  the  fashion  to  decry  the  protective 
system  as  an  attempt  of  selfish  New  England,  and  the 
south  sought  to  monopolize  the  role  of  the  maltreated  vic 
tim.  Randolph  dwelt  with  bitter  satisfaction  upon  the  fact 
that  the  south  stood  together  in  solid  phalanx.2  Of  course, 
the  geographical  division  of  parties  was  not  precisely  in 
accordance  with  his  view.  Clay  himself  represented  a 
state  which  is  commonly  spoken  of  as  belonging  to  the 
south.  The  inhabitants  of  the  plantation  states3  were  of 
course  to  a  man  opponents  of  protection,  and  this  was  amply 
sufficient  to  give  the  strife  the  hatefulness  and  perilousness 
of  a  sectional  struggle.  They  were,  indeed,  still  half  in 
doubt  whether  every  possibility  ot  manufacturing  develop 
ment  had  been  taken  away  from  them  by  slavery,  but  they 
appreciated  the  fact  that  they  had  no  sort  of  manufactures, 
and  showed  no  inclination  whatever  to  venture  upon  man- 


1  Deb.  of  Cong.,  VIII.,  pp.  10,  16.    Webster,  Works,  III.,  p.  229. 

*  "  I  bless  God  that  in  this  insulted,  oppressed  and  outraged  region, 
we  are,  as  to  our  counsels  in  regard  to  this  measure  but  as  one  man ; 
that  there  exists  on  the  subject  but  one  feeling  and  one  interest." 
of  Cong.,  VIII.,  pp.  10,  15. 

1  The  sugar  and  indigo  planters  always  formed  an  exception. 


DEFEAT    OF    THE    SOUTH.  403 

ufacturing  enterprises.  They  had  only  their  staple  ex 
ported  articles  and  depended  for  every  other  thing  upon 
the  rest  of  the  world.  They  could  therefore  obtain  no 
direct  compensation  for  the  heavy  burdens  of  a  protective 
tariff,  and  they  either  wholly  failed  to  recognize  the  indi 
rect  advantages  which  accrued  to  the  whole  Union  from 
the  protective  system,  according  to  its  champions,  or  con 
sidered  them  of  a  worth  which  could  bear  no  sort  of  com 
parison  with  the  burden  of  taxation.  They  rightly  under 
stood  that  the  promises  of  a  speedy  lessening  of  the  load 
would  only  be  fulfilled  when  their  opponents  reconciled 
themselves  to  a  partial  abandonment  of  their  main  princi 
ple.  The  latter  evidently  thought  nothing  of  their  own 
promises.  Tyler  of  Yirginia  had  foretold,  as  early  as  1820, 
that  the  manufacturers  would  have  to  come  back  again  and 
again  with  increased  demands.1  This  explains  the  sharp 
ness  of  speech  noticeable  from  the  first  in  the  debates  of 
the  representatives  of  the  plantation  states.  They  held  it 
necessary  to  use  at  once  the  threat  of  a  full  enforcement  of 
state  sovereignty  as  a  radical  check  to  all  displeasing  meas 
ures  of  the  general  government.  Randolph  spoke  with 
more  than  customary  emphasis  of  "the  might"  of  the 
south  and  reminded  his  hearers  that  under  every  constitu 
tion  "  by  an  unwise  exercise  of  the  powers  of  the  govern 
ment,  the  people  may  be  driven  to  the  extremity  of  re 
sistance  by  force."2  Such  pregnant  words  had  been  let 
fall  in  congress  too  often  to  frighten  the  majority  of  mem 
bers,  as  long  as  it  was  not  known  whether  there  lay  behind 
the  words  an  earnest,  determined  will.  The  bill  passed 
both  houses,  in  the  lower,  indeed,  by  only  one  hundred  and 
seven  to  one  hundred  and  two  votes,  and  in  the  senate  by 
twenty -five  to  twenty-one.8 

1  Deb.  of  Cong.,  VI.,  p.  617. 
'  Ibid,  VIII.,  p.  11. 

3  Benton,  Thirty  Years'  View,  L,  p.  84;  compare  Niles'  Reg.,  XXVI., 
p.  113. 


404         STATE  SOVEREIGNTY  AND  SLAVERY. 

The  plantation  states  used  this  scanty  majority  as  a  con 
vincing  answer  to  the  accusation  of  the  protectionists  that 
the  south  sought  to  overthrow,  by  threats,  the  highest  fun 
damental  principle  of  a  republic,  the  rule  of  the  majority. 
In  a  political  organization  of  the  peculiar  composition 
of  the  Union,  they  objected,  it  is  not  only  imprudent,  but 
unjust,  to  allow  a  majority  of  half  a  dozen  votes  to  be  suf 
ficient  to  decide  a  question  of  this  nature  and  of  such  deep 
significance,  when  the  separation  of  economic  interests  is 
so  sharply  marked  by  a  geographical  line.  There  was 
truth  and  important  truth  in  both  views;  but  interest  was 
so  overpowering  on  both  sides  that  men  were  incapable  of 
a  sober  consideration  of  the  just  complaints  of  their  op 
ponents.  The  battle  continued  and  assumed  a  still  more 
bitter  and  critical  character,  inasmuch  as  the  manufacturing 
interest  began  to  identify  itself  with  the  National  Republi 
cans  or  Whigs.  Before  this,  the  protectionists  had  always 
brought  forward  their  demands  at  the  time  of  the  presi 
dential  election,  and  now  their  leaders  sought  to  fully 
entwine  it  with  this  question,  in  which,  every  four  years, 
all  the  passion  and  the  hate  of  American  party  politics  are 
summed  up.  Both  parties  were  carrying  on  the  agitation 
among  the  masses  of  the  people  with  energy  and  system, 
when  the  request  of  the  woolen  manufacturers  and  wool- 
growers  for  more  effective  protection  gave,  in  1828,  an 
impulse  to  a  new  protectionist  revision  of  the  tariff.  South 
Carolina  and  Georgia  formed  the  extreme  wing  of  the 
anti-tariff  party,  while  Webster,  now  in  league  with  Clay, 
stood  at  the  head  of  the  protectionists.  Webster  justified 
his  desertion  to  the  other  camp  by  explaining  that  the 
adoption  of  the  tariff  of  1824  had  given  the  country  to  un 
derstand  that  the  protective  system  was  to  be  the  permanent 
policy  of  the  nation;  New  England  had  guided  itself  by 
this  decision  and  was  now  obliged  to  demand  protection 
for  the  manufactures  which  had  arisen  in  consequence  of 


THE   TARIFF    AND   SLAVERY.  4:05 

this.1  This  justification  was  not  adapted  to  weaken  the 
opposition  of  the  plantation  states.  Whether  or  not  the 
protective  system  had  been  recognized  as  the  permanent 
policy  of  the  country,  they  could  only  lose  by  giving  up. 
According  to  their  views  of  the  working  of  the  system, 
they  were,  as  Hamilton  of  South  Carolina  expressed  it, 
"  coerced  to  inquire  whether  we  can  afford  to  belong  to 
[such]  a  confederacy."2  They  could  not  shut  their  eyes  to 
the  fact  that  they  were  going  backwards,  in  an  economic 
sense,  despite  the  increasing  demand  for  cotton  and  their 
other  staple  products,  and  they  painted  their  own  decline 
in  the  most  glaring  colors,  because  they  ascribed  it  wholly 
to  the  tariff  and  the  other  features  of  the  economic  policy 
of  the  general  government.3  This  was  the  way  to  handle 
the  theme  in  order  to  drive  the  southern  people  to  frenzy, 
for  if  this  assertion  was  true,  they  were  practically  given 
the  alternative  of  putting  an  end  at  any  cost  and  by  all 
means  to  that  policy  or  of  abandoning  themselves,  with 
torpid  resignation,  to  inevitable  ruin.  But  yet  these  com 
plaints  of  the  retrogression  of  the  south  gave  the  north  a 
trump  card,  which  it  did  not  fail  to  play.  Not  the  tariff — 
said  the  northerners — lets  "  the  fox  house  himself  where  the 
hearthstones  of  your  fathers  stood":  it  is  slavery  that  has 
turned  fields  which  bore  rich  fruit  twenty  and  thirty  years 
ago  into  deserts.  In  the  heat  of  the  conflict,  many  a  word 
slipped  from  southern  lips  which  proved  the  justice  of  this 
reproach.4  But  for  the  very  reason  that  this  was  well 
founded,  it  kindled  the  strife  to  a  more  fiery  glow,  so  that 
slavery  was  again  directly  pointed  out  as  the  demon  which 
sowed  discord  between  north  and  south. 


1  Webster,  Works,  III.,  pp,  228-247. 

*  Deb.  of  Congress,  X.,  p.  112. 

» Niles'  Reg.,  XXXV.,  p.  205 ;  Benton,  Thirty  Years'  View,  I.,  pp.  98, 
99,  and  in  many  other  places. 

*  See  the  eighth  paragraph  in  the  protest  of  the  legislature  of  South 
Carolina.    Niles'  Reg.,  XXXV.,  p.  309. 


406  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

The  loss  of  the  greater  part  of  those  who  had  been  up  to 
this  time  its  allies  in  the  north  made  the  defeat  of  the 
south  a  certainty  if  its  opposition  was  managed  in  the  same 
way  as  in  1824.  The  representatives  of  South  Carolina 
therefore  labored  to  bring  about  common  action  by  all  the 
anti-tariff  states  in  accordance  with  a  definite  programme. 
The  discussions  in  their  meetings  for  counsel  showed  that 
matters  must  come  to  a  decided  crisis  if  everything  went 
according  to  their  wishes.1  Hamilton,  the  future  governor 
of  South  Carolina,  already  weighed  the  possibility  of  an 
attempt  to  execute  the  law  by  force,  and  declared  that  the 
idea  of  a  man's  really  thinking  of  this  was  "  an  absurdity 
not  to  be  heard  of."  No  conclusions  could  be  arrived  at, 
and  still  less  was  it  possible  to  succeed  in  forming  a  com 
mon  plan  of  operations  with  the  other  members  who  were 
of  the  same  general  opinions. 

A  part  of  the  press  outdid  even  the  members  of  congress 
in  the  violence  of  its  opposition  as  well  as  in  the  scope  of 
its  projects.  Thus  the  Southron  and  the  Columbia  Tele 
scope,  for  example,  advised  the  calling  of  a  congress  of  the 
Opposition  states,  an  idea,  the  meaning  of  which  was  gen 
erally  recognized,  but  which  had  to  be  dropped  because 
discontent,  at  any  rate  in  Georgia,  had  reached  such  a  height 
that  the  extreme  proposals  of  South  Carolina  might  have 
been  agreed  to.2  There  was  also  no  lack  of  moderate  coun 
sels  on  the  part  of  the  press — counsels  which  condemned 
all  unconstitutional  opposition.3 

The  legislatures  took  up  the  matter.  The  South  Caro 
lina  legislature  did  so  most  vigorously.  Protests  were  the 
order  of  the  day.  Every  member  considered  himself  bound 
to  introduce  a  series  of  resolutions  which  strove  to  outdo 

1  Compare  the  declarations  called  forth  from  different  memhers  by 
the  Hayne-Mitchel  debate.  Niles'  Reg.,  XXXV.,  pp.  183-185, 199-203. 

*  Ibid,  XXXIV.,  pp.  300,  301. 

8  Compare  the  numerous  extracts  in  Niles'  Reg.,  XXXIV.,  pp.  352- 
356. 


PRACTICAL    NULLIFICATION.  407 

each  other  in  bitterness.1  Passionate  speeches  were,  more 
over,  made  at  meetings  in  different  districts,  at  banquets 
and  on  similar  occasions.  Men  especially  delighted  in 
toasts,  in  which  eloquence  went  far  beyond  the  bounds  of 
good  taste,  and  threats  extended  to  the  farthest  limits  of 
the  "  moral  high  treason"  so  greatly  blamed  a  short  time 
before. 

The  terrible  earnestness  of  all  these  demonstrations  lay 
in  the  theories  of  constitutional  law  upon  which  they  were 
based.  They  rested  wholly  on  the  Virginia  and  Kentucky 
resolutions,  to  which,  indeed,  the  legislature  of  South  Car 
olina  directly  appealed.2  The  Colleton  district  declared: 
"We  must  resist  the  impositions  of  this  tariff  .  .  and 
follow  up  our  principles  ...  to  their  very  last  conse 
quence.''*3  Resolutions  introduced  by  Dunkin  in  the  leg 
islature  gave  the  legal  formula  by  which  this  was  to  come 
to  pass  in  a  way  commensurate,  so  to  speak,  with  the  mat 
ter.  He  demanded  in  this  and  in  all  similar  cases  the 
convocation  of  a  convention  of  the  states  in  order  to  nul 
lify  the  laws  objected  to.4 

Simultaneously,  all  sorts  of  other  means  were  brought 
into  play  in  order  to  nullify  the  tariff  practically  if  not 

legally.     Numerous   leagues   were  formed,  which  bound 

» 

1  A  passage  in  the  resolutions  introduced  by  Cook  in  the  legislature 
of  South  Carolina  deserves  to  be  quoted,  because  it  is  a  sign  of  the 
spirit  in  which  the  radical  wing  of  the  state-rights  party  began  to  look 
upon  the  relation  of  the  states  to  the  federal  government.    It  says: 
"  When  a  state  solemnly  protests  against  an  act  of  congress  because  it 
is  an  usurpation  of  power,  congress  ought  forthwith  to  call  a  convention 
of  the  slates  to  decide  upon  it  and  suspend  its  operation  until  the  sense 
of  the  states  be  taken,  and  if  congress,  on  the  application  of  a  state  or 
states,  should  refuse  to  call  such  conventions,  neglect  to  suspend  ils  op 
eration  or  not  immediately  repeal  the  act  on  the  grounds  of  its  uncon- 
stituti'onality,  it  thereupon  becomes  null  and  void  to  all  intents  and  pur 
poses."    Niles'  Reg.,  XXXV.,  p.  306. 

2  Ibid,  XXXV.,  p.  206. 

3  Ibid,  XXXIV.,  pp.  288,  290. 
«  Ibid,  XXXV.,  p.  305. 


408  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND   SLAVERY 

themselves  not  to  buy  from  the  north  and  west  any  goods 
which  were  protected  by  the  tariff  from  foreign  competi 
tion,  but  instead  to  use  wares  of  native  manufacture.  Even 
in  South  Carolina,  Georgia  and  Alabama,  the  embitterment 
against  the  north  produced  a  momentary  possibility  of 
building  up  a  manufacturing  industry  of  their  own.1  But 
it  had  to  be  admitted  that  it  would  be  at  least  very  doubt 
ful  whether  much  could  be  done  by  individuals  in  this  way, 
and  an  energetic  display  of  state  power  was  therefore  de 
manded.  Prohibitory  duties  were  thought  of  and  other 
projects  were  broached,  which  were  also  in  direct  opposi 
tion  to  the  constitutional  provisions  in  art.  I.,  sec.  10,  §§ 
1  and  2.  It  was  therefore  only  talked  of,  and  this  did  not 
avail  to  crown  the  policy  of  terrorism  with  any  practical 
result.  The  new  tariff  became  a  law  and  the  collection  of 
the  duties  was  nowhere  opposed.  But  the  accomplishment 
of  the  fact  did  not  bring  back  repose  to  the  land.2  The 
outward  alarms  were  weaker  for  a  while,  but  the  agitation 
was  so  much  the  deeper.  It  was  felt  on  both  sides  that  the 
decision  would  come  with  the  next  war.  The  protection 
ists  soon  recognized  the  fact  that  Tyler's  prophecy  was  still 
always  true  and  South  Carolina  prepared  herself  to  test  the 
efficacy  of  her  constitutional  means  of  protection. 

1  Niles'  Reg.,  XXXV.,  pp.  15,  48,  60,  62, 63,  64,  83. 
1  Part  of  the  events  mentioned  above  happened  after  the  adoption  of 
the  tariff. 


SECRET    WORKINGS   OF    SLAVERY.  409 


CHAPTEK  XL 

THE  PANAMA    CONGRESS.     GEORGIA    AND    THE    FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT. 

After  the  Missouri  compromise,  the  slavery  question  ap 
parently  slept  for  some  years.  Its  intimate  alliance  with 
the  tariff-struggle  was  only  understood  by  slow  degrees, 
and  other  problcmsj  which  would  have  brought  forward  the 
opposing  principles  and  interests  involved  in  it,  did  not 
crop  out  for  the  moment.  The  politicians  felt  no  inclina 
tion  to  artificially  create  such  problems.  There  were,  in 
deed,  Catilines  in  the  south  even  now,  but  they  were  not  of 
such  extraordinary  talents  that  they  would  have  ventured 
to  play  with  this  fire,  when  its  ravaging  strength  had  just 
been  so  powerfully  shown.  The  justification  of  the  com 
plaints  which  became  so  current,  later,  among  all  parties  and 
were  already  becoming  loud  here  and  there,  that  the  apple 
of  discord  had  again  been  thrown  among  a  people  longing 
for  rest  by  ambitious  men,  fanatics  and  demagogues,  re 
duces  itself,  everything  considered,  to  a  minimum.  The 
best  proof  of  this  is  that  slavery,  despite  the  silent  agree 
ment  of  the  politicians  to  try  to  shun  every  mention  of  it, 
often  suddenly  and  unexpectedly  became  the  determining 
element  in  questions  which  in  and  for  themselves  stood  in 
no  sort  of  relation  to  it. 

The  most  important  instance  of  this  sort,  which  had,  in 
deed,  no  practical  results,  but  sharply  sketched  the  situa 
tion,  happened  at  the  beginning  of  the  presidency  of  the 
younger  Adams. 

As  early  as  1821  the  idea  of  forming  a  close  connection 
between  the  Spanish  colonies  in  Central  and  South  Amer 
ica,  then  engaged  in  revolution,  had  been  suggested  by 


410         STATE  SOVEREIGNTY  AND  SLAVERY. 

Colombia.1  A  few  months  before  their  independence  was 
recognized  by  the  United  States,2  a  treaty  was  negotiated 
between  Colombia  and  Chili  (July,  1822)  in  which  a  con 
vocation  of  a  congress  of  the  new  republics  was  contem 
plated.  "  The  construction  of  a  continental  system  for 
America,"  which  should  "  resemble  the  one  already  con 
structed  in  Europe,"  was  the  apparent  project  of  these 
two  powers.3  The  idea  ripened  very  slowly.  It  was  not 
until  the  spring  of  1825  that  the  meeting  of  the  congress 
in  Panama  was  so  far  assured  that  the  ambassadors  of 
Colombia  and  Mexico  verbally  inquired  of  Clay,  who  was 
then  secretary  of  state  of  the  United  States,  whether  an 
invitation  to  be  represented  at  the  congress  would  be  ac 
ceptable  to  the  president.4  Adams  had  an  answer  sent, 
worded  in  his  own  cautious  way,  to  the  effect  that  he  first 
wished  to  be  informed  concerning  the  topics  agreed  upon 
for  discussion,  the  nature  and  form  of  powers  to  be  given 
to  the  "diplomatic  agents,"  and  the  "organization  and 
method  of  procedure"  of  the  congress.  The  ambassadors 
of  the  two  mentioned  states,  in  their  formal  letters  of  in 
vitation,  gave  very  unsatisfactory  assurances  on  these 
points.5  Clay  referred  to  this  in  his  answers,  but  at  the 

1  Webster,  Works,  III.,  p.  195;  report  of  the  senate  committee  on 
foreign  affairs  of  Jan.  16,  1826;  Niles'  Reg.,  XXX.,  p.  103.    All  the 
documents  referring  to  the  congress  of  Panama,  as  far  as  the  United 
States  are  concerned,  can  be  found  in  the  State  Papers  (Foreign  Rela 
tions)  and  also  in  Niles'  Reg.,  Vol.  XXX.    Part  of  them  are  printed  in 
Elliot,  American  Diplomatic  Code,  II.,  p.  648,  seq. 

2  Monroe  recommended  the  recognition  to  congress  in  a  special  mes 
sage  of  March  8,   1822,   (Elliot,  Diplomatic  Code,  II.,  pp.  640-642; 
compare  also  Adams's  dispatch  of  May  27,  1823,  to  Anderson,  the  am 
bassador  of  the  United  States  in  Colombia)  and  this  was  ratified  by  both 
houses  by  the  almost  unanimous  appropriation  of  the  money  needed 
for  the  creation  of  embassies.    (May  4,  1822,  Statutes  at  Large,  III.,  p. 
678.) 

8  Report  of  the  senate  committee,  Jan.  16,  1826. 
4  .Clay's  report  of  March  14,  1826,  to  the  house  of  representatives. 
*  Salazar  (the  ambassador  of  Colombia)   to  Clay,  Nov.  2,  1825,  and 
Obregon  (the  ambassador  of  Mexico)  to  Clay,  Nov.  3, 1825. 


JOHN    QUINCY    ADAMS.  411 

same  time  declared  that  the  president  had  decided  to  ac 
cept  the  invitation  "  at  once.*" 

"When  the  question  of  sending  representatives  to  the 
congress  came  up  in  the  senate,  and  later  in  the  house,  the 
Opposition  tried  to  make  capital  out  of  this  piece  of  incon 
sistency.  It  was  too  meaningless  in  itself  to  deserve  any 
censure.  Its  interest  was  due  simply  to  the  fact  that  it 
lifted  for  a  moment  the  veil  of  the  future. 

Adams,  both  as  a  statesman  and  as  an  individual,  re 
sembled  his  father  in  many  respects.  He  was  of  an  ear 
nest,  deeply  moral  nature,  and  knew  how  to  stamp  this 
character  upon  his  administration  in  a  degree  which,  com 
pared  with  all  the  following  presidencies,  makes  an  ex 
tremely  favorable  impression.  Political  ambition  was  one 
of  his  most  prominent  characteristics;  but  this  did  not  de 
generate  in  him,  as  it  did  in  his  father,  into  morbid  vanity. 
He  did  not  know  what  the  fear  of  man  meant.  In  the 
struggle  for  the  right  of  petition,  which  he  afterwards 
carried  on  alone  in  the  house  of  representatives  for  a  long 
while,  he  found  a  certain  satisfaction  in  driving  to  frenzy, 
by  his  biting  satire,  the  representatives  of  the  slaveholding 
interest,  who  then  held  almost  absolute  power.  But  his 
scorn  for  all  the  arts  of  demagogues  not  infrequently 
turned  into  rudeness,  and  his  firmness  into  obstinacy;  and 
yet,  at  the  same  time,  under  certain  circumstances,  he  let 
himself  be  influenced  too  much  by  others.  During  his 
long  diplomatic  service  he  had  acquired  a  habit  of  prudent 
examination,  which  sometimes  led,  in  the  more  difficult 
questions,  to  irresolution  and  vacillation.  This  is,  how 
ever,  partly  due  to  the  fact  that  sober,  statesmanlike 
thought  and  idealism  were  not  properly  fused  together  in 
his  nature.  The  former  decidedly  outweighed  the  other; 
but  yet  the  latter  made  itself  felt,  and  not  infrequently  in 
a  destructive  way. 

1  The  answers  are  dated  Nov.  30. 


412  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY    AND    SLAVERY. 

Ingham  of  Pennsylvania  read  in  the  house  of  represen 
tatives  two  newspaper  articles,  which  treated  the  request 
for  participation  in  the  Panama  congress  in  exactly  differ 
ent  ways.  He  stated  that  it  was  as  good  as  certain  that 
the  article  opposing  this  had  proceeded  from  or  been  in 
spired  by  Adams,  and  the  one  in  its  favor  by  Clay.1  He 
gave  no  proof  for  the  assertion.  It  must  therefore  remain 
a  question  whether  his  zeal  in  opposition  did  not  lead  him 
to  put  forward  groundless  suspicions  as  facts.  But  it  may 
be  considered  as  sufficiently  proved  that  Adams  at  first 
looked  on  the  project  much  more  coolly  than  he  did  after 
wards,  and  that  Clay  was  not  without  influence  upon  this 
change  of  opinion. 

Clay  had  rendered  great  services  to  the  young  republics. 
He  had  been  the  most  determined  champion  of  their  affairs 
in  the  United  States.  He  had  at  first  demanded  with 
stormy  energy  that  sympathy  for  them  should  not  exhaust 
itself  in  worthless  words,  but  take  the  form  of  acts.  ~No 
defeat  frightened  him  from  the  field,  and  it  was  largely 
due  to  his  constant  efforts  that  their  independence  had 
been  already  recognized  by  the  United  States  in  the  spring 
of  1822.  His  speeches  on  these  questions  are  among 
the  most  brilliant  productions  of  his  genius.  His  most 
notable  characteristics,  as  well  as  his  greatest  weaknesses, 
appeared  in  them  in  the  clearest  light.  His  enthusiasm 
lifted  him,  with  a  bold  sweep,  to  a  height  from  which 
he  looked  down,  with  compassionate  impatience  upon  the 
petty  politicians  who,  in  their  routine  wisdom,  could  not 
see  the  forest  because  of  the  trees  around  them.  The 
knowledge  that  America  was  an  integral  part  of  one  civi 
lized  world  dawned  in  his  mind.  If  his  agitation  was 
based  on  the  sharp  emphasis  which  he  laid  on  the  opposing 
positions  of  America  and  Europe,  yet  the  fact  does  not  con 
tradict  this  assertion.  Exactly  because  he  did  not,  in  his  poli- 

1  Debates  of  Congress,  IX.,  pp.  198-200. 


413 

tical  reasoning,  lose  sight  of  Europe,  he  strore  for  the  consoli 
dation  of  America  and  insisted  upon  its  peculiar  characteris 
tics  and  its  specific  interests.  The  attempt  of  the  Holy  Al 
liance  to  fetter  together  Europe  in  behalf  of  the  interests  of 
absolute  monarchy  made  it  seem  to  him  desirable,  if  not 
necessary,  to  oppose  to  this  "unholy  league"  a  union  of  the 
states  founded  upon  the  "  American  principle"  of  popu 
lar  sovereignty.  The  authorship  of  this  idea  of  a  solidar 
ity  of  the  interests  of  all  America,  resting  not  only  upon 
the  geographical  proximity  of  states,  but  mainly,  indeed, 
upon  the  identity  of  their  fundamental  political  principles, 
belongs,  not  exclusively,  but  yet  chiefly,  to  Clay.  Accord 
ing  to  his  plan  this  solidarity  of  interests  was  to  assume 
concrete  form  in  the  Panama  congress.  It  would  there  be 
legally  adopted  so  far  as  this  fundamental  political  prin 
ciple  had  obtained  practical  recognition.  From  this  firm 
standpoint  he  hoped  to  see  the  great  plan  he  had  announced 
as  early  as  1820  realized — the  establishment  of  a  "human- 
freedom  league  in  America,"  in  which  "  all  the  nations 
from  Hudson's  Bay  to  Cape  Horn"  should  be  united,  but 
not  simply  for  the  sake  of  remaining  in  permanent  con 
trast  to  Europe,  tortured  by  despots.  He  declared  that 
through  the  power  of  example,  through  its  moral  influence, 
the  American  system  would  ever  extend  farther  and  far 
ther,  so  that  a  point  of  union,  a  haven  for  freedom  and 
lovers  of  freedom,  would  be  formed  upon  the  soil  that  was 
wet  with  the  blood  of  the  Revolutionary  forefathers. 

Friedrich  Kapp  finds  in  these  ideas  the  "  far-seeing 
view  of  a  clever  statesman,"  and  apparently  makes  the 
slaveholders  alone  responsible  for  the  fact  "  that  Clay's 
high  aims  remained  only  pious  wishes."1  The  facts  do 
not,  in  my  opinion,  fully  justify  this  judgment;  too  much 
responsibility  is  laid  upon  the  slaveholders.  Even  with 
out  their  opposition  Clay's  ideas  could  not  have  been 

1  Geschichte  der  Sklaverei,  p.  193. 


414  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY    AND    SLAVERY. 

realized.  Under  the  actual  circumstances  the  ideas  were 
too  clever,  and  so  not  truly  statesmanlike.  No  one  will 
deny  Clay's  gifts  for  statesmanship ;  but  he  yielded  too 
readily  and  too  earnestly  to  the  lead  of  his  vigorous  fancy. 
He  had  to  thank  it  for  many  fruitful  thoughts,  but  it  often 
prevented  his  weighing  the  nature  of  his  plans  and  the 
chance  of  their  realization  with  the  necessary  soberness 
The  vast  extent  and  the  uncivilized  condition  of  the  young 
west,  whose  most  distinguished  representative  he  was, 
mirrored  itse]f  strongly  in  his  thoughts.  He  dazzled  his 
hearers  by  the  splendor  of  his  projects,  won  them  a  hear 
ing  by  his  fiery,  alluring  eloquence,  and  helped  himself 
and  his  followers  over  the  difficulties  in  the  way  by  a  glit 
tering  sketch  of  the  consequences  which  must  result  from 
the  development  of  the  ideas.  His  fancy's  flight  was 
towards  the  sun,  but  it  bore  him  so  high  that  mountains 
and  valleys  began  to  melt  into  a  plain,  and  the  foot  resting 
on  earth  stepped  uncertainly  and  insecurely.  Moreover, 
his  boldness  in  decision  and  action,  when  every-day  cir 
cumstances  created  great  and  momentous  problems  that 
imperatively  demanded  a  thorough  solution,  did  not  cor 
respond  with  his  boldness  in  planning.  At  such  times  he 
could  not  even  entertain  an  energetic  wish  for  a  solution, 
partly  because  he  did  not  subject  the  question  of  its  neces 
sity  to  proper  inquiry,  and  partly  because  traditional 
dogmas  and  a  lack  of  moral  courage  made  him  start  with 
the  supposition  of  its  impossibility.  Bargaining  was 
then  the  sum  of  his  wisdom,  and  his  activity  degenerated 
into  obstinacy  in  chaffering.  An  idealist  who  wasted  the 
best  part  of  his  creative  power  in  impracticable  projects, 
and  a  politician  who  was  an  unsurpassable  master  of  the 
art  of  solving  great  and  unavoidable  problems  by  little 
expedients, — these  are  the  most  notable  traits  in  Clay's 
political  character.  They  do  not  give  his  picture  in  full, 
but  they  mark  the  tendency  of  his  influence  upon  the  fate 


HENRY    CLAY.  415 

of  the  Union.  His  other  qualities  and  achievements  did 
not  lift  him  above  the  level  of  ordinary  politicians. 

In  his  speech  of  March  24,  1818,  "  on  the  emancipation 
of  South  America,"  he  denied  the  justice  of  the  assertion 
that  the  South  Americans  were  too  ignorant  and  too  super 
stitious  "  to  allow  of  the  existence  of  a  free  state."  He 
questioned  the  ignorance,  but  yet  denied  that  ignorance 
necessitated  incapacity  for  self-government.  That,  he  de 
clared,  was  the  doctrine  of  the  throne,  and  conflicted  with 
the  natural  order  of  things.1  The  South  Americans,  he 
said,  "  adopt  our  principles,  copy  our  institutions,  and  in 
many  cases  use  both  the  language  of  our  Revolutionary 
ordinances  and  the  thoughts  therein  expressed."  These 
were  facts,  indeed,  but  this  blind  imitation  of  the  "  great 
example"  surely  pointed  much  more  to  incapacity  than  to 
capacity  for  intelligent  self-government.  If  the  Holy 
Alliance  was  to  be  opposed  by  a  league  of  free  states  of  a 
sort  that  could  exist,  it  was  self- evidently  a  condition  prece 
dent  that  the  members  of  the  league  should  be  in  harmony 
with  the  suppositions  upon  which  the  league  was  to  rest. 
It  was  not  enough  that  they  were  not  ruled  by  kings ;  they 
must  be  in  truth  republicans,  that  is,  must  have  put  the 
theory  of  popular  rule  into  execution  in  a  rational  manner. 
This  was  not  the  case,  to  a  sufficient  degree,  among  the 
younger  free  states.  On  this  account  Clay's  hopes  would 
doubtless  have  remained  beautiful  illusions,  even  if  the 
Opposition  had  not  delayed  the  decision  so  long  that  the 
ambassadors  of  the  United  States  reached  Panama  too  late. 
It  is  another  question  whether  Adams's  more  modest  wishes 
might  not  have  been  partly  fulfilled. 

The  secretary  of  state  had  known  how  to  impart  to  the 
president  something  of  his  own  enthusiasm,  which  let  him 
see  in  the  Panama  congress  the  boundary  stone  of  a  "  new 

1  Clay,  Speeches,  I.,  pp.  89, 90. 


4L6  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY  AND    SLAVERY. 

epoch  of  the  world's  history."1  Adams's  message  to  the 
house  of  representatives  fairly  surpassed  Clay's  effusions 
in  pompous  phrases.  He  doubted  whether  such  a  favora 
ble  opportunity  for  subserving  "  the  benevolent  purposes 
of  divine  providence "  and  dispensing  "  the  promised 
blessings  of  the  Redeemer  of  mankind"  would  again  be 
presented  to  the  United  States  in  centuries.2  With  this 
tasteless  piece  of  declamation,  however,  he  satisfied  his 
artificially -kindled  enthusiasm.  The  message  now  begins 
to  treat,  in  a  measured,  statesmanlike  way,  of  the  ques 
tions  which  the  president  especially  wished  to  see  discussed 
by  the  congress  and  in  regard  to  which  he  thought  the 
attainment  of  advantageous  results  not  impossible.  Ho 
discusses,  first  and  most  thoroughly,  the  conclusion  of  friend 
ly  and  commercial  treaties,  on  the  basis  of  complete  reci 
procity,  on  the  footing  of  the  most  favored  nation,  "  tho 
abolition  of  private  war  upon  the  ocean,"  and  limitations 
of  war-usages,  in  regard  to  contraband-of-war  and  blockade, 
in  such  a  way  as  to  favor  neutral  trade.  After  explaining, 
with  great  minuteness,  his  position  on  the  Monroe  doctrine 
and  the  way  in  which  he  wishes  to  see  it  brought  before 
the  congress  and  treated  by  the  latter,  he  touches  upon 


1  Instructions   of  May  8,    1826   to   the   ambassadors.    Niles'  Reg,, 
XXXVI.,  p.  71. 

*  "  Btft  objects  of  the  highest  importance,  not  only  to  the  future  wel 
fare  of  the  whole  human  race,  but  bearing  directly  upon  the  special  in 
terests  of  this  Union,  will  engage  the  deliberations  of  the  congress  ol 
Panama,  whether  we  are  represented  there  or  not.  Others,  if  we  are 
represented,  may  be  offered  by  our  plenipotentiaries  for  consideration, 
having  in  view  both  these  great  results,  our  own  interests  and  the  im 
provement  of  the  condition  of  man  upon  earth.  It  may  be  that  in  the 
lapse  of  many  centuries  no  other  opportunity  so  favorable  will  be  pre 
sented  to  the  government  of  the  United  States  to  subserve  the  benevolent 
purposes  of  divine  providence,  to  dispense  the  promised  blessings  of 
the  Redeemer  of  mankind,  and  to  promote  the  prevalence,  in  future  ages, 
of  peace  on  earth  and  good  will  to  man,  as  will  now  be  placed  in  their 
power,  by  participating  in  the  deliberations  of  this  congress."  Niles' 
Reg.,  XXX.,  p.  55. 


REASONS    OF    OPPOSITION.  417 

Hayti  and  Cuba  with  diplomatic  prudence,1  and  finally  ex 
presses  the  opinion  that  an  effort  should  be  made  on  the 
part  of  the  United  States  to  obtain  the  recognition  of  "the 
just  and  liberal  principles  of  religious  liberty."2  The  mes 
sage  ends  with  a  sort  of  apology  for  the  exaggerated  hopes 
expressed  in  its  beginning.  Adams  repeated,  indeed,  that 
the  matter  was  one  of  "  transcendent  benefit  to  the  human 
race,"  but  yet  called  the  meeting  of  the  congress  "  in  its 
nature,  a  measure  speculative  and  experimental,"  and  de 
clared  that  it  would  perhaps  be  "  too  sanguine"  to  expect 
the  realization  of  "  all  or  even  any"  of  its  grand  aims. 

If  Clay  reveled  in  Quixotic  allusions  and  if  Adams,  too, 
had  been  drawn  into  his  intoxication,  the  Opposition  in 
both  houses  of  congress  went  just  as  far  on  the  other  side. 
The  zeal  shown  was,  indeed,  in  great  part  a  sham.  The 
Panama  mission  was  not  the  ground  of  the  opposition,  but 
merely  gave  this  the  opportunity  of  introducing  itself  with 
effect  as  an  Opposition  party.3  To  this  was  due  the  bound 
lessness  of  the  attacks  by  which  congressmen  made  them 
selves  still  more  ridiculous  than  the  secretary  of  state  had 
made  himself  by  the  boundlessness  of  his  hopes.  Adams 
rightly  called  the  idea  and  the  plan  "  benevolent  and  hu 
mane."  But  the  Opposition  was  so  crazed  in  its  blind  zeal, 
that,  out  of  policy,  it  had  not  the  slightest  word  of  approval 

1  I  shall  return  to  these  three  points.         '   .  * 

a  Adams  had  already  urged  this  view,  as  secretary  of  state,  in  his  in 
structions  to  Anderson,  May  27,  1823.  (Elliot,  Dip.  Code,  II.,  p.  653.) 
It  appears,  indeed,  from  the  message  that  he  at  first  thought  only  of 
assuring  to  citizens  of  the  United  States  the  free  exercise  of  their  relig 
ion,  which  had  already  been  secured  to  them  in  the  treaties  with  Co 
lombia  and  Central  America. 

a  "An  opposition  is  evidently  brewing.  It  will  show  itself  on  the  Pan 
ama  question."  Webster  to  J.  Story,  Dec.  31,  1825,  Webster,  Priv. 
Corres.,  I.,  p.  401.  Brent  of  Louisiana  said  in  the  house  of  representa 
tives  :  "  Can  an  Opposition  to  the  present  administration  be  so  preju 
diced  as  not  to  see  that  this  measure  recommended  by  the  president  is 
for  the  protection  of  our  southern  interests  ?"  Deb.  of  Congress,  IX., 
p.  105. 

27 


418  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY    AND    SLAVERY. 

for  any  point  whatever  of  the  whole  scheme.  Every  part  of 
it  was  raked  over  the  coals  and  the  most  innocent  portion 
was  held  up  as  the  source  of  sure  destruction.  In  the  senate, 
as  well  as  in  the  house,  a  morbid  conscientiousness  in  the 
fulfillment  of  pretended  neutral  duties  was  displayed.1  All 
proofs  drawn  from  international  law  against  the  alleged 
danger  were  fruitless,  since  men  would  not  be  convinced. 
They  constantly  argued  on  the  supposition  that  represen 
tation  in  the  congress  involved  an  active  participation  in  all 
its  debates  and  decisions.  A  breach  of  neutrality  might 
easily  be  deduced  from  this,  for  Spain  still  maintained  all 
her  claims  to  her  former  colonies,  and  the  latter  had  placed 
upon  the  programme  of  the  congress  different  questions 
directly  relating  to  the  war  with  the  mother  country.  This 
was  carrying  the  dishonesty  of  the  conflict  to  an  extreme. 
From  the  time  of  the  first  informal  negotiations,  it  had 
been  provided  for  and  agreed  to  by  both  sides  at  every  op 
portunity,  and  in  the  most  express  words,  and  it  was  clearly 
understood,  that  the  neutrality  of  the  United  States  was  to 
be  in  no  way  endangered.  Adams  pointed  this  out  in  his 
messages  to  congress  and  added,  moreover,  that  the  partic 
ipation  of  the  representatives  of  the  United  States  was 
"wished"  only  in  those  discussions  which  did  not  bear 
upon  the  war  of  the  other  powers  with  Spain.2 

All  the  other  points  were  treated  in  the  same  way  as 
this.  Adams  brought  forward — what,  in  fact,  did  not  need 
to  be  said  at  all — that  the  congress  would  be  a  simply  "de 
liberative"  assembly.3  But  the  Opposition  demonstrated 

1  Deb.  of  Congress,  VIII.,  pp.  423,  432,  433,  436;  IX.,  p.  168,  passim; 
Niles'  Reg.,  XXX.,  p.  103. 

3  Salazar,  in  his  letter  of  Nov.  2, 1825,  to  Clay,  divides  the  topics  of 
discussion  under  the  heads  (I.)  and  (II.)  into  the  common  concerns  of 
the  war-making  powers  and  the  interests  common  to  them  and  the  neu 
tral  powers. 

8  In  Clay's  instructions  of  May  8,  1826,  to  tfie  ambassadors  is  this 
passage:  u  All  notion  is  rejected  of  an  amphyctionic  council,  invested 
with  power  finally  to  decide  upon  controversies  between  the  American 


THE   HOLY   ALLIANCE.  419 

to  him  that  the  congress  would  have  the  right  to  make 
binding  resolves,  and  stamped  it  as  ignorance  and  folly  to 
let  the  country  be  bound  by  Epigoni  of  unequal  birth. 

Objections  of  this  sort  were  brought  with  especial  em 
phasis,  and  not  without  a  certain  justification,  against  the 
suggestion  of  an  universal  endorsement  of  the  Monroe  doc 
trine,  a  doctrine  that  originated  in  the  same  circumstances 
that  gave  birth  to  the  Panama  congress.  In  July,  1818, 
lord  Castlereagh  told  the  American  ambassador  Rush,  in 
a  conversation  at  the  house  of  the  French  ambassador, 
that  England  had  been  requested  by  Spain  to  mediate,  with 
the  co-operation  of  the  Holy  Alliance,  between  her  and  her 
rebellious  colonies.  Rush  answered  this  revelation  with  the 
declaration  that  the  United  States  would  take  part  in  no 
intervention  for  peace,  "  if  its  basis  were  not  the  indepen 
dence  of  the  colonies."1  In  August,  1823,  Rush  learned 
from  Canning  that  the  Holy  Alliance  was  beginning  to 
seriously  think  of  interfering  in  colonial  affairs  in  favor  of 
Spain.2  England's  position  on  the  question  had  meanwhile 
substantially  changed.  If  Castlereagh  had  been  willing  in 
1818  to  make  the  return  of  the  colonies  under  Spanish 
dominion  the  basis  of  the  attempt  at  intervention,  Welling 
ton  had  by  this  time  used  very  different  language  at  the 
congress  of  Yerona,  and  now  Canning  declared  himself 
ready  to  act  in  direct  opposition  to  the  plans  of  .the  Holy 
Alliance,  provided  he  were  assured  of  the  co-operation  of 
the  United  States.  Rush  at  once  forwarded  these  state 
ments  of  Canning  to  his  government,  which  received  them 

states  or  to  regulate  in  any  respect  their  conduct."  But  hence  Kapp  has 
not  a  happily  chosen  expression  when  he  says  (Gesch.  der  Sklaverei,  p. 
193)  that  Clay  had  in  view  the  creation  of  "  an  American  amphyctionic 
court  to  counteract  the  European  Holy  Alliance."  See,  however,  Deb. 
of  Congress,  VIII.,  p.  649. 

1  Rush,  Report  of  July  81,  1818;  Elliot,  Dip.  Code.,  II.,  pp.  639,  640. 

a  Compare  Rush,  A  Residence  at  the  Court  of  London  from  1819  to 
1825,  II.,  pp.  30-40.  See  also  Rush's  letters  to  Clay  of  June  23, 1827, 
and  February  15, 1842;  Clay,  Priv.  Corresp.,  pp.  165,  467. 


420  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY   AND   SLAVERY. 

with  "  great  satisfaction,"  for,  as  Calhoun,  the  then  secre 
tary  of  war,  afterwards  declared,  the  power  of  the  Alliance 
was  so  great  that  the  United  States  themselves  had  not 
felt  safe  from  its  intermeddling.  Monroe  sent  the  records 
concerning  the  matter  to  all  the  members  of  his  cabinet, 
and  at  th  same  time  asked  Jefferson  for  his  opinion.  The 
latter  answered  that  "  America,  North  and  South,"  as  a 
result  of  its  own  peculiar  interests,  should  also  have  a 
peculiar  political  system,  founded  on  freedom.  It  should 
be  a  leading  principle  of  the  United  States  "  never  to  suffer 
Europe  to  intermeddle  with  cis- Atlantic  affairs."  For  the 
attainment  of  these  ends  the  offered  help  of  England  should 
be  accepted,  even  at  the  risk  of  a  war.1  The  cabinet,  after 
long  and  careful  consideration,  came  to  the  same  opinion. 
Almost  at  the  very  moment  when  Spain  formally  invited 
the  allied  powers  to  a  conference  in  Paris,2  the  president 
announced  in  his  annual  message  of  Dec.  1,  1823,  the  so- 
called  Monroe  doctrine.3  Its  essence  is  contained  in  the 
following  sentences: 

...    "We  declare  that  we  should  consider  any  attempt  [of 

1  "  Our  first  and  fundamental  maxim  should  be,  never  to  entangle  our 
selves  in  the  broils  of  Europe.  Our  second,  never  to  suffer  Europe  to 
intermeddle  with  cis- Atlantic  affairs.  America,  North  and  South,  has 
certain  interests  distinct  from  those  of  Europe,  and  peculiarly  her  own. 
She  should  therefore  have  a  system  of  her  own,  separate  and  apart  from 
that  of  Europe.  While  the  last  is  laboring  to  become  the  domicile  of 
despotism,  our  endeavors  should  surely  be  to  make  our  hemisphere  that 
of  freedom.  One  nation,  most  of  all,  could  disturb  us  in  this  pursuit. 
She  now  offers  to  lead,  aid,  and  accompany  us  in  it.  By  acceding  to 
her  proposition,  we  detach  her  from  the  bands,  bring  her  mighty  weight 
into  the  scales  of  free  government,  and  emancipate  a  continent  at  one 
stroke,  which  might  otherwise  linger  along  in  doubt  and  difficulty.  . 
•'"'•'.  But  the  war  in  which  the  present  proposition  might  engage  us, 
should  that  be  its  consequence,  is  not  her  war,  but  ours.  .  .  .  It  is 
to  maintain  our  principle,  not  to  depart  from  it.  .  .  But  I  am  clearly 
of  Mr.  Canning's  opinion  that  it  will  prevent,  instead  of  provoking, 
war."  Jeff.  Works,  VII.,  pp.  315,  316. 
' 3  Webster,  Works,  III.,  p.  202. 

»  Foreign  State  Papers,  V..  D.  250. 


MONKOE    DOCTRLNE.  4:21 

the  allied  powers]  to  extend  their  system  to  any  portion  of 
this  hemisphere  as  dangerous  to  our  peace  and  safety.  .  . 
With  the  governments  who  have  declared  their  independ 
ence  and  maintained  it,  and  whose  independence  we  have, 
on  great  consideration  and  on  just  principles,  acknowledged, 
we  could  not  view  any  interposition  for  the  purpose  of  op 
pressing  them  or  controlling,  in  any  other  manner,  their 
destiny  by  any  European  power,  in  any  other  light  than  as 
the  manifestation  of  an  unfriendly  disposition  towards  the 
United  States." 

This  declaration  was  received  by  the  people  with  lively 
satisfaction.  It  was  largely  due  to  this,  that  Spain's  prayers 
for  intervention  received  no  attention.  But  now  all 
fears  that  the  Holy  Alliance  would  try  to  put  in  a  word  or 
two  in  the  affairs  of  the  United  States1  had  vanished.  And 
on  this  account  a  very  different  interpretation  was  given 
to  the  Monroe  doctrine.  In  the  letters  of  invitation  from 
Mexico  and  Colombia,  this  question  occupied  a  prominent 
position.  Obregon  referred  to  Monroe's  message  and  said 
that  the  "  only  means"  of  preventing  or  practically  oppos 
ing  the  interference  of  neutral  powers,  was  "  a  previous 
agreement  about  the  method  in  which  each  of  the  congress- 
powers  should  give  its  co-operation."  Salazar  spoke  even 
of  an  "  eventual  alliance,"  and  wished  that  "  the  treaty,  no 
use  of  which  is  to  be  made  until  the  appearance  of  a  casus 
foederis,  may  remain  secret."  Besides  this,  both  the  am 
bassadors  declared  that  the  congress  would  settle  how  all 
possible  attempts  of  European  powers  to  establish  colonies 
on  American  soil  were  to  be  met.  These  were  proposals 
of  a  very  earnest  sort.  The  Opposition  affirmed,  unques 
tionably  with  justice,  that  their  adoption  by  the  United 
States  would  not  be  a  simple  re-affirmation  of  the  Monroe 
doctrine.  The  Opposition  defended  itself  from  the  reproach 
that  it  had  become  indifferent  to  the  cause  of  freedom  in 

1  Clay's  report  of  March  9, 1826,  to  the  house  of  representatives. 


4:22  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

the  rest  of  America;  it  simply  wished,  it  said,  to  preserve 
to  the  United  States  the  freedom  of  choice  and  not  to  bind 
them  to  draw  the  sword  under  all  circumstances  in  behalf 
of  the  other  American  states,  when  European  powers  in 
terfered  in  their  affairs.  The  weak  point  in  the  argument 
of  the  Opposition  was  again  the  assumption  that  the  ful 
fillment  of  the  wishes  of  Col6mbia  and  Mexico  would 
result  simply  from  the  representation  of  the  United  States 
in  the  congress,  without  any  further  action.  Even  in  this 
case,  there  was  no  lack  of  apparent  justification.  Among 
the  documents  which  the  president  sent  in  to  congress  there 
was  a  dispatch  of  Clay  to  Poinsett,  the  ambassador  of  the 
United  States  to  Mexico,  in  which  was  this  passage:  "Only 
about  three  months  ago,  when  Mexico  thought  France  was 
meditating  an  invasion  of  Cuba,  the  Mexican  government 
•at  once  demanded  through  you,  from  the  government  of 
the  United  States,  the  fulfillment  of  the  memorable  pledge 
given  by  the  president  in  his  message  of  December,  1823, 
to  congress."  Clay,  indeed,  explained  the  opinion  here 
expressed,  in  his  report  of  March  29,  1826,  to  the  house  of 
representatives,  by  saying  that  the  United  States  stood 
pledged,  not  to  a  foreign  power,  but  only  to  themselves.1 
But  the  Opposition  naturally  did  not  accept  this  explana 
tion  as  sufficient.  Yet  whatever  the  secretary  of  state 
might  think,  in  any  event  the  view  of  the  president  must 
rule  and  the  latter  had  expressed  himself  so  clearly  that  the 
Opposition  did  not  even  try  to  twist  his  words  from  their 
meaning.  As  secretary  of  state,  he  had  had  a  prominent 
part  in  the  announcement  of  the  Monroe  doctrine  and  had 
steadily  occupied  a  perfectly  consistent  position.  He  would 

1  "If,  indeed,  an  attempt  by  force  had  been  made  by  allied  Europe  to 
subvert  the  liberties  of  the  southern  nations  on  this  continent  and  to 
erect  upon  the  ruins  of  their  free  institutions  monarchical  systems,  the 
people  of  the  United  States  would  have  stood  pledged,  in  the  opinion  of 
their  executive,  not  to  any  foreign  state,  but  to  themselves  f  and  their 
posterity,  by  their  dearest  interests  and  their  highest  duties,  tQ  resist  to 
the  utmost  slich  attempt." 


CLAIMS    OF    THE    SLAVEHOLDERS.  423 

therefore  have  gladly  seen  the  question  brought  before  the 
congress  and  gave  it  to  be  understood  that  he  considered  a 
general  declaration  in  its  favor  as  not  inadvisable.  But  he 
expressly  stated  that  under  no  circumstances  would  any 
pledges  be  entered  into  beyond  the  reciprocal  assurance  of 
the  powers  represented  that  they  would  execute  the  princi 
ples  laid  down  in  the  doctrine,  each  within  its  own  territory 
and  with  its  own  resources.1  So,  on  this  point,  too,  there 
failed  to  be  any  sufficient  reason  for  such  a  violent  opposi 
tion. 

Yet  there  was  no  lack  of  objections  of  practical  signifi 
cance.  In  the  house  of  representatives,  these  were  only 
lightly  touched  upon,  partlybecause  the  northern  members 
of  the  Opposition  party  looked  with  the  greatest  displeasure 
upon  any  vigorous  urging  of  them,  and  especially  because 
only  the  question  of  appropriating  money  to  pay  the  ex 
penses  of  the  mission,  already  decided  upon  in  accordance 
with  the  provisions  of  the  constitution  and  without  the  co 
operation  of  the  house,  came  before  the  latter  body.  The 
Opposition  wished  to  attach  conditions  to  the  appropriation 
which  amounted  to  instructions  given  to  the  president  as 
well  as  to  the  ambassadors,  and  consequently  the  debate 
went  far  beyond  the  proper  bounds.  But  yet  it  had  to  be 
kept  within  certain  limits,  so  that  the  real  cause  of  the 
embittered  struggle,  outside  of  opposition  for  the  sake  of 
opposition,  can  scarcely  be  discovered  in  it.  But  in  the 
senate  it  appeared  so  much  the  more  clearly  that  the  slave- 
holding  interest  was  again  the  cause  of  strife.  There  was 
no  attempt  to  conceal  this.  It  was  proclaimed  in  a  hither 
to  unheard-of  way.  The  slaveholders  simply  stated  that 
they  saw  in  the  congress  peril  to  their  "  peculiar  institu 
tion,"  and  drew  from  this  fact,  in  the  same  conclusive 
way,  the  inference  that  this  must  be  recognized  eo  ipso 

1  See  the  message  of  Dec.  26,  1825,  to  the  senate  and  the  one  of  March 
15,  1826,  to  the  house  of  representatives.  Compare,  also,  the  instructions 
to  the  ambassadors.  Niles'  Reg.,  XXXVI.,  p.  77. 


4:24  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY 

as  an  absolute  veto.  The  municipal  character  of  slavery 
was  wholly  stripped  off,  form  and  substance.  It  appeared 
as  an  independent  power,  which  only  obtained  its  rights 
when  it  dictated  the  domestic  and  foreign  policy  of  the 
Union.  Clay  and  Adams  had  pointed  out  freedom  and 
popular  sovereignty,  in  contradistinction  to  the  absolutistic 
principles  of  the  Holy  Alliance,  as  the  underlying  basis 
of  the  political  and  social  life  "  of  America."  Now  the 
south  affirmed  that  in  reference  to  the  rest  of  America,  as 
well  as  to  Europe,  slavery  must  be  and  remain  the  prime 
motive  of  the  foreign  policy  of  the  United  States.  Who 
ever  cannot  yet  clearly  understand  that  an  "  irrepressible 
conflict"  existed  between  north  and  south  can  learn  much 
from  the  rigorous  logic  with  which  the  southern  senators 
in  this  debate  put  forward  slavery  as  an  impassable  wall 
between  the  United  States  and  the  rest  of  the  world. 

In  the  invitations  to  the  congress  Hayti  was  mentioned, 
a  name  that  had  an  ominous  sound  in  the  southern  states  for 
more  than  thirty  years.  If  they  could  have  blotted  one 
page  out  of  the  book  of  history,  it  can  scarcely  be  doubted 
that  they  would  have  chosen  the  one  which  told  the  story 
of  the  successful  negro  revolution  in  Hayti.  It  was  a  cry 
of  warning,  the  whole  significance  of  which  was  recalled 
to  the  conscience  of  the  slaveholder  by  the  slightest  cause. 
The  thing  which  had  been  done  could  not  be  undone;  but 
men  did  what  they  could, — the  independence  of  Hayti 
did  not  exist  for  the  United  States.  The  commercial 
spirit  of  the  people  would  not  suffer  the  permanent  pro 
hibition  of  the  lucrative  trade  with  the  island;1  but  no  in 
ternational  relation  existed  between  the  two  republics. 

1  At  the  request  of  Napoleon,  expressed  in  an  imperious  tone,  a  law 
of  Feb.  28,  1806  (Statutes  at  Large,  II.,  p.  851)  had  prohibited  all  com 
merce  with  the  island  for  a  year.  The  law  referred,  indeed,  only  to 
places  not  found  in  the  possession  of  the  French ;  but  the  French  rule 
was  actually  broken  everywhere.  The  French  ambassador  had  express 
ly  .based  the  demand  of  the  emperor  on  the  ground  that  this  matter  con 
cerned  "  African  slaves,"  the  dregs  of  humanity. 


HAYTI.  425 

Salazar  touched  lightly  upon  this  in  his  letter  of  invita 
tion,  and  let  it  clearly  appear  that  it  was  his  wish  that 
Hayti  should  be  recognized  as  a  member,  with  equal  rights, 
of  the  American  family  of  nations.  He  admitted  that 
the  question  "  involved  grave  difficulties,"  on  account  of 
"  the  different  way  in  which  Africans  are  looked  upon, 
and  the  different  rights  they  enjoy  in  Hayti,  the  United 
States,  and  the  other  American  states;"  but  expressed  the 
hope  that,  despite  this,  an  understanding  might  be  arrived 
at.  He  imprudently  used  in  this  connection  the  phrase: 
'•This  question  will  be  determined  by  the  congress."1 

Adams  did  not  mention  this  point  at  all  in  his  message 
to  the  senate,  and  in  the  one  to  the  house  he  explained,  in 
a  diplomatically  verbose  and  vague  sentence,  that  the  am 
bassadors  had  been  instructed  to  give  reasons  for  further 
delay  in  the  recognition  of  Hayti  and  "  to  refuse  consent 
to  any  arrangement  whatever  upon  different  principles." 
The  silence  concerning  the  reasons  wfyich  had  hitherto 
hindered  the  recognition  was  scarcely  less  suggestive  than 
the  foaming  rage  which  the  passage  already  quoted  from 
Salazar's  letter  called  forth  in  the  senate. 

The  history  of  the  republics  gave  an  example  which 
was  "  scarcely  less  fatal  than  the  independence  ot  Hayti 
to  the  repose"  of  the  south.  They  had  not  only  copied 
from  the  Revolutionary  records  of  the  United  States  the 
words  "freedom"  and  "equality"  and  "  universal  eman 
cipation,"  but  had  actually  broken  the  chains  of  all  slaves.2 

1  The  word  "determine"  had  been  used  in  the  official  newspaper  of 
Colombia.  See  Debates  of  Congress,  VIII.,  p.  423. 

3  "  With  nothing  connected  with  slavery  can  we  consent  to  treat  with 
other  nations,  and  least  of  all  ought  we  to  touch  this  question  of  the 
independence  of  Hayti  in  conjunction  with  revolutionary  governments, 
whose  own  history  affords  an  example  scarcely  less  fatal  to  our  repose. 
Those  governments  have  proclaimed  the  principles  of  liberty  and  equal 
ity,  and  have  marched  to  victory  under  the  banner  of  '  universal  eman 
cipation.'  You  find  men  of  color  at  the  head  of  their  armies,  in  their 
legislative  halls,  and  in  their  executive  departments."  Hayne,  March 
14,  1826,  Debates  of  Congress,  VIII.,  p.  427. 


426  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

A  discussion  with  them,  therefore,  over  any  question 
whatever  in  which  slavery  was  in  any  way  whatever  in 
volved  was  less  admissable  than  with  any  one  of  the  other 
powers,  for  this  action — and  this  alone — had  made  them 
in  the  eyes  of  the  south  '•  buccaneers,  drunken  with  their 
new-born  liberty."1  This,  however,  was  only  incidentally 
touched  upon.  The  main  thing  was  that  slavery  should  no 
more  be  made,  in  any  way  whatever,  a  subject  of  negotia 
tion  with  other  powers  than  the  rights  of  slaveholders 
should  be  subjected  to  any  sort  of  discussion  inside  of  the 
Union.  It  had  already  been  pointed  out  as  a  mistake  that 
attempts  had  been  made  to  conclude  treaties  with  England 
and  Colombia  for  the  suppression  of  the  slave  trade.2 
"  The  peace  of  eleven  states  in  this  Union  will  not  permit 
.  .'.'  ,  the  fate t  to  be  seen  or  told  that  for  the  murder  ot 
their  masters  and  mistresses  they  [the  slaves  of  Hayti] 
are  to  find  friends  among  the  white  people  of  these  United 
States."  The  whole  question  "is  not  debatable,  neithei 
at  home  nor  abroad,  not  even  in  this  chamber."3  Hayne, 
of  South  Carolina  cried:  "To  call  into  question  our  rights 
is  grossly  to  violate  them;  to  attempt  to  instruct  us  on 
this  subject  is  to  insult  us;  to  dare  to  assail  our  institu 
tions  is  wantonly  to  invade  our  peace.  Let  me  solemnly 
declare,  once  for  all,  that  the  southern  states  never  will 
permit,  and  never  can  permit,  any  interference  whatever 
in  their  domestic  concerns,  and  that  the  very  day  on  which 
the  unhallowed  attempt  shall  be  made  by  the  authorities  of 
the  federal  government  we  will  consider  ourselves  as  driven 
from  the  Union."4  But  there  was  no  need  even  of  an 
unjust  interference.  "  To  touch  [the  question]  anywhere 
is  to  violate  our  most  sacred  rights,  to  put  in  jeopardy 
our  dearest  interests,  the  peace  of  our  country,  the  safety 

»  Deb.  of  Cong.,  VIII.,  p.  456;  Niles'  Reg.,  XXX.,  p.  170. 
8  Ibid,  VIII.,  p.  426. 
*  Ibid,  VIII.,  p.  469. 
«  Ibid,  VIII.,  p.  426. 


HATRED    OF    HATTI.  427 

of  our  families,  our  altars,  and  our  firesides."  And  even 
this  does  not  fully  show  the  terrible  nature  of  the  question. 
Johnston  of  Louisiana  wished  to  see  the  country  repre 
sented  at  the  congress,  but  for  precisely  the  same  reasons 
which,  according  to  the  views  of  Benton,  Hayne,  Berrien 
and  others,  forbade  any  thought  of  such  a  thing.  He 
wished  the  "  South  American  states"  to  be  informed  of 
"  the  unalterable  opinion"  of  the  United  States  that  "  the 
unadvised  recognition  of  that  island  [Hayti]  and  the  pub 
lic  reception  of  their  ministers  will  nearly  sever  our  dip 
lomatic  intercourse,  and  bring  about  a  separation  and 
alienation  injurious  to  both."  "I  deem  it,"  he  continued, 
"of  the  highest  concern  to  the  political  connection  of  these 
countries  to  remonstrate  against  a  measure  so  justly  offen 
sive  to  us,  and  to  make  that  remonstrance  effectual."1 
Hayne,  too,  had  already  demanded  that  "  the  ambassadors 
in  South  America  and  Mexico  should  be  instructed  to 
protest  against  the  independence  of  Hayti."2  These  were 
drastic  illustrations  of  the  old  assertion  that  not  the  blame, 
but  the  compassion,  of  the  world  was  deserved,  because  a 
hard  fate  had  let  the  curse  brought  upon  the  land  by  the 
avarice  of  England  descend  to  the  innocent  children  of 
the  third  and  fourth  generation.  Could  Clay  lay  his  finger 
on  a  resolution  of  the  Holy  Alliance  which  smacked  more 
strongly  of  the  mouldy  barbarism  of  by -gone  centuries? 

If  the  request  for  a  discussion  of  the  independence  of 
Hayti,  which  could  exert  no  sort  of  influence  upon  the 
United  States,  except  by  its  moral  force,  irritated  the  slave 
holders  to  such  a  degree,  they  were  naturally  still  more 

1  Deb.  of  Cong.,  VIIL,  p.  441. 

8  Hamilton  of  South  Carolina  declared  in  the  house  of  representa 
tives  :  "  I  should  avow  what  I  believe  to  be  the  sentiments  of  the  south 
ern  people  on  this  question ;  and  this  is,  that  Haytian  independence  is 
not  to  be  tolerated  in  any  form.  ...  A  people  will  not  stop  to 
discuss  the  nice  metaphysics  of  a  federative  system  when  havoc  and 
destruction  menace  them  in  their  doors." 


4:28  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY 

moved  by  the  fact  that  Cuba  was  threatened,  since  here 
material  interests  of  the  greatest  significance  were  actually 
concerned.  Clay  declared  that  "  even  Spain  has  not  such 
a  deep  interest  in  such  a  multiplicity  of  forms  in  the 
future  fate  of  Cuba,  whatever  that  fate  may  be,  as  the 
United  States."1  The  increasing  weakness  of  Spain  there 
fore  gave  the  administration  the  liveliest  anxiety.  Many 
a  longing  look  had  already  been  cast  by  the  United  States 
upon  the  rich  island  which  commanded  the  Gulf  of  Mexico. 
But  men  did  not  conceal  from  themselves  the  fact  that 
many  weighty  reasons  spoke  against  its  acquisition  and, 
moreover,  did  not  look  upon  the  legal  question  as  a  matter 
of  secondary  importance.  There  was  a  quite  unanimous 
agreement  that,  taken  all  in  all,  the  interests  of  the  United 
States — both  the  general  interests  and  the  special  ones  ol 
the  slaveholder — demanded  the  maintenance  of  the  status 
quo  in  Cuba.  But  this  seemed  seriously  threatened  on 
diiferent  sides.  England  and  France  were  looked  upon 
with  distrust,  especially  the  latter,  because  she  had  already 
sent  a  strong  squadron  into  the  West  India  seas  without 
giving  any  special  reason  for  doing  so.  Colombia  and 
Mexico  had  been  wrapt  up  for  some  time  in  thoughts  of 
invasion.  The  safest  way  to  avoid  these  dangers  was  evi 
dently  to  bring  to  an  end  the  war  between  Spain  and  her 
former  colonies.  In  the  Spring  of  1825  the  United  States 
ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg  was  instructed  to  urge  the 
emperor  to  persuade  Spain  to  give  up  the  hopeless 
struggle.2  The  gist  of  the  instructions  may  be  condensed 
into  the  four  following  sentences:  the  United  States  wish 
no  change  in  the  political  relations  of  Cuba;  they  could 
not  see  with  equanimity  the  island  pass  into  the  possession 
of  any  European  power  whatever;3  the  independence  of 

1  Instructions  of  the  ambassadors  to  the  Panama  congress. 
9  Clay's  dispatch  to  Middleton  of  May  10,  1825. 
8  Compare  also  Clay's  dispatch  of  October  25,  1825,  to  Brown,  United 
States  ambassador  at  Paris. 


CUBA.  429 

Cuba  is  not  desired  by  them,  because  this  could  be  main 
tained  with  difficulty,  and  because  the  struggle  for  it  would 
probably  assume  the  same  terrible  character  that  the  revo 
lution  in  Hayti  did;  the  last-named  reasons,  which  have 
an  especial  weight  on  account  of  the  existence  of  slavery 
in  the  United  States,  apply  equally  to  any  possible  at 
tempts  of  acquisition  made  by  Colombia  and  Mexico. 
These  four  points,  with  the  strongest  emphasis  laid  upon 
the  last,  were  urged  in  all  the  other  official  writings  of  the 
administration  on  this  affair.  The  reasoning  was  only 
varied  to  correspond  with  the  change  of  address,  and  the 
tone  grew  sharper  in  proportion  as  circumstances  devel 
oped. 

After  Nesselrode  had  returned  au  answer  in  the  name 
of  the  emperor,1  which  was  received  at  Washington  as, 
upon  the  whole,  favorable,  and  after  "  the  freeing  of  the 
islands  of  Porto  Rico  and  Cuba  from  the  Spanish  yoke" 
had  been  openly  placed  upon  the  programme  of  the  Pana 
ma  congress,2  Clay  sent  a  new  dispatch  to  Middleton,3 
which  was  intended  to  urge  Russia  to  immediate  action. 
It  had  already  been  declared  that  the  United  States  could 
not  with  equanimity  see  Cuba  pass  into  the  hands  of  a 
European  power.  Now  it  was  directly  declared  that  the 
United  States  would  not  "allow"  and  "permit"  it.  More 
over,  the  position  of  the  country  in  regard  to  Colombia's 
and  Mexico's  plans  of  acquisition  was  more  sharply  de 
fined.  It  was  stated,  first,  that  "  the  president  could  see 
no  just  ground  for  armed  intervention"  if  Spain  should 
obstinately  continue  the  war,  for  invasion  would  then  be 
only  a  "  legal  warlike  operation"  of  the  states  named. 
Yet  this  declaration  was  linked  with  a  significant  condi- 

s  Nesselrode  to  Middleton,  August  25,  1825. 

*  The  words  quoted  are  taken  from  the  programme  already  mentioned, 
published  in  the  official  newspaper  of  Colombia.  In  Salazar's  and 
Obregon's  letters  of  invitation  Cuba  is  not  mentioned. 

3  December  26, 1825. 


430  STATE    SCTVEKEIGNTY   AND   SLAVERY. 

tion.  "  If  these  republics,  contrary  to  all  expectation, 
should  place  arms  in  the  hands  of  one  race  in  order  to  de 
stroy  another;  if  .  .  they  should  countenance  and  en 
courage  excesses  and  actions  which,  on  account  of  our 
proximity,  could  by  infection  endanger  our  repose  and 
safety;  then  the  government  of  the  United  States  might 
feel  obliged  to  interpose."  This  same  conditional  threat, 
in  vaguer  form,  had  already  been  directly  expressed  to 
Spain  before  the  transmission  of  the  first  dispatch  to 
Middleton.  It  had  been  expressly  stated  in  this  that  the 
United  States  did  not  insist  upon  the  stoppage  of  the  war 
"for  the  sake  of  the  new  republics."1  Colombia  and 
Mexico  had  also  been  informed  of  the  wishes  of  the  United 
States;  but  the  somewhat  bitter  mouthful  was  made  more 
pleasant  to  the  taste,  inasmuch  as  a  certain  friendly  tone 
could  be  detected  in  the  diplomatic  expressions,  chosen 
with  the  greatest  prudence.  Dec.  20,  Clay  sent  similar 
notes  to  Salazar  and  Obregon,  in  which  their  respective 
governments  were  requested  to  delay  the  expedition 
against  Cuba,  which,  it  was  said,  was  being  fitted  out  in 
Carthagena  or  elsewhere.  The  main  reason  for  this  re 
quest  was  stated  to  be  that  the  negotiations  undertaken 
with  Russia  for  intervention  in  the  interests  of  peace  had 
some  prospect  of  success. 

But  besides  this,  it  was  also  declared  in  a  very  intelligi 
ble  way  that  under  certain  circumstances  the  United  States 
would  intervene  if  their  wish  were  not  respected.2 

If  a  reproach  could  rightly  be  brought  against  the  ad 
ministration,  it  was  surely  not  that  the  Cuban  question  had 
been  lightly  considered,  or  even  merely  that  the  govern- 

1  Clay's  dispatch  to  Everett,  April  27,  1825. 

3  "  It  would  also  postpone,  if  not  for  ever  render  unnecessary,  all  con 
sideration  which  other  powers  [i.  e.  the  United  States]  may,  by  an  irre 
sistible  sense  of  their  essential  interests,  be  called  upon  to  entertain  of 
their,  duties,  in  the  event  of  the  contemplated  invasion  of  those  islands, 
and  of  other  contingencies  which  may  accompany  or  follow  it." 


THREATS.  43) 

ment  had  not  sought  to  defend  with  circumspection  and 
energy  the  especial  interests  of  the  slaveholders,  which 
were  involved  in  this  question.  Yet  the  '-naiority  of  the 
representatives  of  the  south  were  not  of  this  opinion,  and 
the  small  minority  which  stood  by  the  president  affirmed, 
like  the  rest,  that  circumstances  now  demanded  a  still  more 
energetic  treatment.  On  the  main  question,  majority  and 
minority  were  united.  They  disputed  only  whether  repre 
sentation  in  the  congress,  or  absence  from  it,  would  be 
more  in  accordance  with  their  views.  The  minority 
throughout  the  debate  did  not  fall  behind  the  majority  it 
self  in  the  determination  with  which  it  demanded  the 
thwarting  of  the  plans  of  Colombia  and  Mexico.  If  Hayne 
made  the  declaration  that  the  United  States  would  not 
"permit''  the  'South  American  states  "to  take  or  to  revo 
lutionize"  Cuba,1  and  if  Berrien  wished  "  by  the  blessing 
of  God  and  the  strength  of  our  own  arms  to  enforce  the 
declaration,"2  Johnston  himself  considered  it  as  self-evi 
dent  that  "  threats"  should  be  tried,  if  "  advice"  and  "  re 
monstrances"  did  not  avail.8  All  the  representatives  of 
the  slave  states  were  unanimous  in  thinking  that  the  want 
of  a  sufficient  reason  for  interference  in  case  of  an  inva 
sion,  to  which  Adams  referred,  should  not  control  the 
matter.  With  equal  clearness  the  reasons  for  this  were 
summed  up  in  the  one  phrase:  the  duty  of  self-preserva- 

1  Deb.  of  Cong.,  VIII.,  p.  429. 

2  "  If  our  interest  and  our  safety  shall  require  us  to  say  to  these  new 
republics:  '  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico  must  remain  as  they  are,'  we  are  free 
to  say  it,  yes,  sir,  and  by  the  blessing  of  God  and  the  strength  of  our 
own  arms  lo  enforce  the  declaration,  and  let  me  say,  too,  gentlemen,  these 
high  considerations  do  require  it.    The  vital  interests  of  the  south  de 
mand  it  and  the  United  States  will  be  recreant  from  its  duty,  faithless  to 
the  protection  which  it  owes  to  the  fairest  portion  of  this  Union,  if  it 
does  not  make  this  declaration   and  enforce  it."    Ibid,  VIII.,  p.  456. 

3  "  Advise  with  them — remonstrate— menace  them  if  necessary,  against 
a  step  so  dangerous  to  us,  and  perhaps  fatal  to  them."    Ibid,  VIII.,  p. 
440. 


432  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND   SLAVERY. 

tion.1  Buchanan,  always  a  courtier  of  the  south,  translated 
this  phrase,  which  on  account  of  its  cold  prose  might  have 
produced  little  effect  upon  many  ears,  into  a  striking  pic 
ture.  Cuba,  he  maintained,  would  become  a  terrible  ex 
plosive  powder-magazine  for  the  south,  because  Colombia 
and  Mexico  "  always  marched  under  the  standard  of  uni 
versal  emancipation"  and  "  always  conquered  by  proclaim 
ing  liberty  to  the  slave."2  No  representative  of  the  north 
made  any  objection  to  the  application  of  this  comparison, 
and  none  could  be  made.  The  condition  of  affairs  was 
stated  in  it  with  absolute  clearness,  but  still  no  represen 
tative  of  the  north  stood  up  to  point  out,  in  just  as  curt  a 
phrase,  how  the  south  had  played  fast  and  loose  with  its 
arguments.  Slavery  is  a  domestic  affair  of  the  south;  to 
interfere  with  it  is  to  dissolve  the  Union, — this  was  the  first 
position  of  the  south.  Slavery  is  like  a  powder-magazine, 
which  can  be  fired  as  easily  from  without  as  from  within; 
the  danger  of  this  occurrence  must  lead  the  federal  gov 
ernment  in  the  way  pointed  out  to  it  by  the  south,  which 
alone  understands  the  question, — this  was  its  second  posi 
tion.  The  slaveholding  interest  thus  laid  claim  not  only 
to  be  recognized  as  the  sovereign  power  in  the  state,  but  it 
put  itself  above  the  state. 

As  the  Yirginia  and  Kentucky  resolutions,  since  they 
had  no  immediate  practical  results,  had  been  passed  ovei 
in  favor  of  events  of  the  day,  so  the  Panama  congress  was 
also  forgotten, and  still  more  quickly.  The  administration 
gained  a  formal  victory  in  both  houses,  but  practically  the 
Opposition  had  reached  its  end  by  delaying  the  decision. 
When  the  ambassadors,  of  the  United  States  arrived  in 
Panama,  the  congress  had  already  adjourned  and  the 

1 "  It  is  demanded  of  this  government  by  every  consideration  of  self- 
preservation — the  great  law  of  nature  and  paramount  to  all  other  law— 
by  our  interests  and  by  humanity  [ !]  not  to  suffer  the  present  condition 
of 'Cuba  to  be  altered."  Powell  of  Virginia,  Deb.  of  Cong.,  IX.,  p.  96. 

8  Ibid,  IX.,  p.  142. 


TROUBLE  WITH  GEORGIA.  433 

agreed- upon  reunion  in  Tacubaya  did  not  take  place.  This 
pitiable  end  of  Clay's  illusions  makes  the  long  and  earnest 
debates  in  both  houses  appear  to  superficial  critics  like 
nonsense.  Their  bitter  earnestness  was  recognized  only  af 
ter  long  and  harsh  experience.  The  American  league  of 
the  people  which,  in  opposition  to  the  princes'  league  of 
European  despots,  was  to  be  a  refuge  of  freedom  for  the 
whole  world,  had  indeed  dissolved  into  mist.  Instead  of  a 
formal  protest  against  the  machinations  of  the  Holy  Alli 
ance  and  a  spirited  exhortation  to  enslaved  nations  to 
maintain  unbroken  courage  in  the  holy  struggle  for  right 
and  freedom,  the  world  was  comforted  with  a  sweeping,  un 
reserved  confession  of  faith  of  the  slavocracy,  which  made 
the  slaveholding  interest* the  starting-point,  the  means  and 
the  goal  of  the  national  policy  of  the  only  free  state,  the 
voice  of  which  was  of  weight  in  this  matter.  This,  also, 
had  no  immediate  practical  results.  But,  as  in  the  case  of 
the  state-rights  men  and  the  Virginia  and  Kentucky  reso 
lutions,  so  now  the  slaveholders  had  registered  their  claims. 
This  gave  a  permanent  meaning  to  the  otherwise  absolutely 
fruitless  and  aimless  struggle  over  the  Panama  mission. 

Another  question,  which  also  originated  at  the  begin 
ning  of  Adams's  presidency,  soon  won  a  much  greater 
practical  significance,  although  it  concerned  an  affair  which 
at  bottom  was  only  formally  a  national  one.  When  Georgia, 
on  April  24,  1802,  ceded  to  the  Union  her  western  lands, 
she  did  so  on  the  condition  that  the  United  States  "  as 
soon  as  it  can  be  done  in  a  peaceful  way  and  on  reasonable 
conditions"  should  acquire  for  the  state  the  territories  of 
the  Creeks  and  Cherokees,  which  lay  within  her  borders. 
The  federal  government  had  indeed  acquired  for  Georgia, 
on  repeated  occasions,  certain  stretches  of  lands  from  both 
these  tribes,  but  the  possibility  of  persuading  them  to  a 
voluntary  sale  of  the  whole  territory  constantly  became 
smaller,  for  they  had  become  settled,  and  the  ties  of  civ 
ilized  life  bound  them  every  year  more  firmly  to  the  place. 
28 


434  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

Georgia  therefore  became  anxious  and  impatient,  for  she 
failed  to  feel  confident  that  she,  like  the  free  states,  would 
be  able  to  compel  the  Indians,  by  the  pressure  of  a  higher 
civilization,  to  break  up  their  settlements  and  wander 
farther  into  the  western  wilderness.  A  memorial  of  the 
legislature  in  1819  urged  the  president  to  hasten  the  ful 
fillment  of  the  agreement  of  1802.  It  insisted  that  the 
state  had  a  "  right"  to  the  soil,  but  yet  expressly  asserted 
that  this  right  could  be  realized  only  through  the  federal 
government.1  The  administration  was  entirely  willing  to 
fulfill  its  pledges,  but  the  more  emphatically  Georgia  in 
sisted  upon  this,  the  more  firmly  the  Indians  refused  to 
sell.  A  counsel  of  Creek  chiefs  at  Tuckebachee  declared,  on 
May  25,  1824,  that  the  lands  still  in  their  possession  were 
only  sufficient  for  the  support  of  the  tribe,  and  resolved, 
appealing  to  the  guaranties  given  them  in  all  the  treaties, 
"  on  no  account  .  .  (to)  sell  one  foot"  of  their  land. 
This  resolution  was  to  hold  good  for  all  time  and  was  rec 
ommended  to  the  consideration  of  the  chiefs  in  a  very 
emphatic  way.  "  We  have  guns  and  ropes ;  and  if  any  of 
our  people  should  break  these  laws,  those  guns  and  ropes 
are  to  be  their  end."  On  the  29th  of  October  of  the  same 
year,  a  counsel  of  chiefs  met  again  at  Polecat  Spring, 
passed  a  resolution  of  the  same  tenor,  and  committed  it — 
"  confiding  in  the  magnanimous  disposition  of  the  citizens 
of  the  United  States  to  render  justice"  to  the  Indians — to 
a  newspaper  for  publication,  "  so  that  it  may  be  known  to 
the  world."2 

The  negotiations  with  the  commissioners  of  the  United 

1 "  The  state  of  Georgia  claims  a  right  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  terri 
tory  within  her  limits.  .  .  .  She  admits,  however,  that  the  right  is 
inchoate,  remaining  to  be  perfected  by  the  United  States,  in  the  extinc 
tion  of  the  Indian  title;  the  United  States  pro  hac  vice  as  their  agents." 
Worcester  vs.  State  of  Georgia,  Peters,  Rep.,  VI.,  p.  585 ;  Curtis,  X., 
p.  264. 

"The  resolutions  are  quoted  in  full  in  Niles'  Reg.,  XXVII.,  pp. 
222-224. 


TREATY    OF   INDIAN   SPRINGS.  435 

States,  which  took  place  in  December  at  Broken  Arrow, 
were  therefore  also  without  result.  But  Georgia  was  deter 
mined  not  to  allow  herself  to  be  kept  longer  from  the  rich 
territories  of  the  Indians.  Her  avarice  recognized  no 
Indian  rights  which  were  to  be  respected,  and  the  commis 
sioners  allowed  themselves  to  obtain  in  a  treacherous  way 
what  could  not  be  bought  by  an  honorable  bargain.  A  part 
of  the  chiefs  were  persuaded  to  sign  a  treaty  of  sale  at 
Indian  Springs,  which  was  approvejd,  despite  the  remon 
strances  and  protests  of  the  Indian  agents,1  by  the  senate 
and  the  president  (Adams).2  The  Creeks  declared  that  the 
treaty  was  a  shameful  betrayal  and  fulfilled  upon  the  chiefs 
M'lntosh,  Tustunugge  and  Hawkins  the  law  of  Tucke- 
bachee,  which  imposed  the  penalty  of  death  upon  every 
seller  of  the  tribal  territory.  The  grand  jury  of  Milledge- 
ville  branded  the  deed  as  "  nefarious  murder,"3  although 
the  Creeks  were  unquestionably  justified  in  passing  and 
executing  such  a  law,  by  their  own  customs  as  well  as  by 
their  tribal  status  as  recognized  by  the  treaties.  This  was 
also  the  opinion  of  the  administration,  after  it  had  been 
shown  that  M'lntosh  and  his  fellow-culprits  had  fallen  vic 
tims,  not  to  the  revenge  of  individuals,  but  to  a  resolution 
of  the  chiefs.  Yet  the  occurrence  caused  grave  anxiety, 
for  it  showed  what  opposition  the  fulfillment  of  the  treaty 
would  meet.  The  reckless  and  arrogant  way  in  which 
Governor  Troup,  on  his  own  responsibility,  took  steps  to 
wards  the  expulsion  of  the  Indians,  was  not  adapted  to 
lessen  this  anxiety.  According  to  the  representations  of 
the  Indian  agents,  the  summary  execution  of  the  chiefs 
was  due  in  great  part  to  the  land-survey  ordered  by  the 
governor.  This,  however,  freed  the  agents  from  the  accu 
sation  of  having  incited  the  Indians. 

1  Governor  Troup  to  secretary  of  war  Barbour,  June  3, 1825.    N  lies' 
Reg.,  XXVIII.,  p.  317. 
«Stat.  at  L.,  VII.,  p.  237. 
« Niles'  Reg.,  XXVIIL,  p.  196. 


436  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND   SLAVERY. 

Adams  viewed  the  matter  very  gravely.  He  commis 
sioned  Col.  Andrews  to  investigate  the  complaints  against 
the  Indian  agents,  and  Gen.  Gaines  received  orders  to  sup 
press  any  hostilities  on  the  part  of  the  Indians  and  to  seek 
some  way  in  which  an  understanding  could  be  arrived  at 
with  them.  Both  Andrews  and  Gaines  adopted  a  prudent, 
conciliatory  course  of  conduct  towards  the  governor,  but 
they  were  soon  completely  at  odds  with  him,  since  he  at 
tacked  them  in  a  vulgar  way  in  his  official  papers,  because 
they  did  not  unconditionally  accept  his  views  of  the  state 
of  things,  but  practically  conducted  an  impartial  examin 
ation.  He  not  only  considered  himself  authorized  to  cen 
sure  them,  but  he  defined  in  the  harshest  tone  of  arrogance 
the  limits  of  their  competence.  Every  step  they  took, 
according  to  him,  was  a  usurpation.  His  proof  for  this 
was  a  simple  "  dixi!"  which  found  its  justification  in  the 
"  sovereignty"  of  the  state,  the  embodiment  of  which,  ac 
cording  to  him,  was  the  governor.  The  federal  govern 
ment  was  to  him  a  wholly  foreign  power,  with  which  he 
maintained  "  diplomatic  intercourse."  In  his  letters  to 
Andrews,  Gaines,  and  even  to  the  secretary  of  war,  he 
never  speaks  of  the  federal  government,  but  always  uses 
the  expression  "your  government."  He  does  not  conde 
scend  to  any  discussion  of  the  question  of  his  competence, 
because  he  does  not  even  recognize  the  possibility  of  any 
such  question.  The  sovereign  state  of  Georgia  passes 
sovereign  resolutions  and  the  governor,  responsible  to  her 
alone,  accomplishes  these,  despite  the  protest  of  all  the 
powers  of  the  world.  State  sovereignty  had  never  before 
been  pleaded  in  such  an  unconditional  way  and  with  such 
insolent  boldness.  Yet  the  administration  followed  Troup's 
example  in  this,  that  it  avoided  the  usual  practice  of  con 
sidering  the  matter  from  a  constitutional  standpoint.  It 
went  quietly  on  its  way,  leaving  Troup  to  show  how  far  he 
would  venture  to  make  good  his  pompous  words  by  deeds. 
Secretary  of  war  Barbour  informed  the  governor,  May  18, 


COLLISION   OF   FEDERAL   AND    STATE   AUTHORITIES.      437 

1825,  in  the  politest  way,  that  the  land-survey  ordered  by 
him  could  not  be  permitted.1  There  is  not  the  slightest 
doubt  that  this  prohibition  was  within  the  power  of  the 
federal  government.  The  execution  of  a  treaty  depends, 
self- evidently,  only  upon  the  parties  to  the  treaty,  unless 
the  contrary  is  expressly  provided  in  the  treaty  itself. 
Georgia  was  not  a  party  in  this  case,2  and  therefore  had  no 
initiative  whatever  in  regard  to  the  treaty.  Moreover, 
art.  8  of  the  treaty  set  forth  that  the  Creeks  could  delay 
their  departure  until  Sept.  1,  1826,  and  bound  the  United 
States  to  give  them,  until  then,  the  fullest  protection  of  all 
their  rights.  Thus  even  the  president  had  not  the  right  to 
authorize  the  survey,  without  the  consent  of  the  Indians. 
But  apart  from  all  this,  Georgia  undeniably  had  not  this 
right,  for  section  5  of  the  law  of  March  30,  1802,  concern 
ing  intercourse  with  Indians,  forbade  "  any  citizen"  of  the 
United  States  and  any  "  other  person"  "  to  survey  or  at 
tempt  to  survey"  the  lands  belonging  and  guaranteed  to 
the  Indians,  under  penalty  of  a  fine  of  not  more  than  $1,000 
and  imprisonment  of  not  more  than  twelve  months.8 

Troup  reasoned  otherwise.  On  the  3rd  of  June  he  re 
plied  to  the  secretary  of  war,  "without  troubling  him 
with  the  argument,"  but  simply  "  stating  the  fact"  that 
"on  the  instant  of  the  ratification  the  title  and  jurisdiction 
became  absolute  in  Georgia."4  He  therefore  did  not  doubt 

1 "  I  am  instructed  to  say  to  your  excellency  that  the  president  expects 
from  what  has  passed  as  well  as  from  the  now  state  of  feeling  among 
the  Indians,  that  the  project  of  surveying  their  territory  will  be  aban 
doned  by  Georgia,  till  it  can  be  done  consistently  with  the  provisions  of 
the  treaty."  Niles'  Reg.,  XXVIII.,  p.  317. 

8  Since  the  individual  states  can  conclude  no  treaties,  they  surely  can- 
not  be  parties  to  a  treaty.  Constitution,  Art.  I.,  Sec.  10,  §  1. 

3  Stat.  at  L.,  II.,  pp.  141, 142. 

4  "  On  the  instant  of  the  ratification  the  title  and  jurisdiction  became 
absolute  in  Georgia,  without  any  manner  of  exception  or  qualification 
save  the  single  one  which,  by  the  eighth  article,  gives  to  the  United 
States  the  power  [ !]  to  protect  the  Indians  in  their  persons  and  effects 
against   assaults  upon   either  by  whites  or  Indians."     Niles'  Reg., 


438  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY 

that  Barbour  himself  would  "at  once"  pronounce  it  "un 
reasonable"  to  expect  that  any  attention  should  be  given 
fo  the  "most  extraordinary  request  [!]"  of  the  president; 
postponing  the  surveys  was  not  to  be  thought  of.1 

The  tone  of  this  letter  was  very  far  from  being  "  diplo 
matic."  Troup  himself  confessed  that  he  had  used  "strong 
language,"  but  expressed  the  hope  that  Adams  would  not 
on  this  account  suspect  him  of  attaching  no  importance  to 
the  maintenance  of  the  Union.  He  recognized  this  as  an 
undeniable  duty,  since  other  "  wise  men"  were  "  causing 
the  Union  to  tremble  upon  a  bauble,"  by  "indulging 
their  whims  and  oddities  and  phantasies." 

The  last  sentence  did  not  refer  to  the  affair  then  under 
discussion,  but  to  the  slavery  question.2  Troup  dragged 
this  in  only  because  "  slavery  was  a  harp  with  a  thousand 
strings,  which  every  demagogue  could  play."  The  oppor 
tunity  therefor  was  offered  him  by  a  motion  of  United 
States  senator  King  of  !N  ew  York,  for  devoting  the  revenue 
from  the  sale  of  public  lands,  after  the  extinction  of  the 
federal  debt,  to  the  emancipation  of  slaves  and  the  colon 
ization  of  free  negroes,  and  by  an  opinion  of  attorney- 
general  Wirt,  in  which  the  latter  held  as  unconstitutional 
a  South  Carolina  law  that  provided  for  the  imprisonment 

XXVIII.,  p.  318.  The  passage  in  Art.  8  reads:  "The  United  States 
stipulate  for  their  [the  Indians']  protection  against  the  encroachments, 
hostilities  and  impositions  of  the  whites  and  of  all  others." 

1  "  If  the  president  believes  that  we  will  postpone  the  survey  of  the 
country  to  gratify  the  agent  and  the  hostile  Indians,  he  deceives  him 
self.'* 

*  "  Even  upon  the  subject  of  intensest  interest  to  us,  upon  which  the 
opinions  of  the  president  are  known,  many  allowances  are  made  for  the 
immeasurable  distance  which  separates  us.  ...  The  fearful  conse 
quences  constantly  in  sight  keep  us  in  a  state  of  agitation  and  alarm. 
I  strive  to  stave  them  off;  and  it  is  for  this  that  language  is  employed 
sickening  to  the  heart  and  most  offensive  to  a  vast  portion  of  the  com 
mon  family.  Who  can  help  it  when  they  see  wise  men  engaged  in  a 
playfulness  and  pastime  like  this,  indulging  their  whims  and  oddities 
and  phantasies,  and  causing  this  Union  to  tremble  upon  a  bauble." 


PROPOSED    SOUTHERN    CONFEDERACY.  439 

of  all  free  colored  persons  working  upon  a  ship,  until  the 
ship  left  the  harbors  of  that  state.1  Troup  had  held  up 
both  these  facts  in  his  message  of  May  23,  1825,  as  "  offi 
cious  and  impertinent  intermeddlings  with  our  domestic 
concerns,"  and  had  then  drawn  the  inference  that  "  very 
soon,  therefore,  the  United  States  government,  discarding 
the  mask,  will  openly  lend  itself  to  a  combination  of  fan 
atics  for  the  destruction  of  everything  valuable  in  the 
southern  country."  He  therefore  entreated  the  legislature 
"  most  earnestly,  now  that  it  is  not  too  late,  to  step  forth 
and,  having  exhausted  the  argument,  to  stand  by  [its] 
arms."2 

The  utter  lack  of  reasonable  grounds  for  any  excitement 
whatever  makes  this  language  seem  expressly  designed  to 
introduce  into  the  relations  between  the  general  govern 
ment  and  the  states  the  rowdy  rule  which  had  already  be 
gun  to  creep  into  other  politics.  Yet  it  found  an  echo  in 
the  legislature.  The  committee  to  which  this  part  of  the 
message  was  referred  brought  in  a  report  to  the  (Georgia) 
house  of  representatives,  which  blew  still  more  loudly  in 
the  trumpet  of  rebellion.  It  "  proclaimed  that  the  hour 
is  come,  or  is  rapidly  approaching,  when  the  states  from 
Yirginia  to  Georgia,  from  Missouri  to  Louisiana,  must 
confederate  and,  as  one  man,  say  to  the  Union:  We  will  no 
longer  submit  our  retained  rights  to  the  snivelling  insinu 
ations  of  bad  men  on  the  floor  of  congress,  our  constitu 
tional  rights  to  the  dark  and  strained  constructions  of  de 
signed  [designing?]  men  upon  judicial  benches."  The 
legislature  should  therefore  resolve  that  it  approves,  with 
its  whole  heart,  the  exhortation  of  the  governor  for  the 
people  of  Georgia  to  stand  by  their  arms,  and  that  its 
members  should  "  for  the  support  of  this  determination 

1  Opinions  of  the  Attorneys-General,  I.,  p.  659. 

3  Niles'  Reg.,  XXVIII.,  p.  240.  This  message  contains  the  phrase  so 
often  quoted  later:  "  It  [slavery]  may  be  our  physical  weakness — it  is 
our  moral  strength." 


440  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

.  .  mutually  pledge  to  each  other  [their]  lives,  [their] 
fortunes,  and  [their]  sacred  honor."1  The  astonishment 
and  anger  excited  in  the  other  states  by  this  uncaused  out 
break  of  madness  were  so  great  that  the  legislature  con 
sidered  itself  warned  to  let  the  responsibility  remain 
wholly  on  the  governor  and  its  own  committee.  It  ad 
journed  without  coming  to  any  conclusion  on  the  com 
mittee's  report.  But  it  did  not  leave  the  governor  in  the 
lurch  in  the  struggle  itself.  Troup  urged  this  on  with  all 
his  energy,  although  he  had  to  abandon  the  attempt  to 
foment  a  causeless  quarrel  on  the  slavery  question. 

He  notified  Gaines,  June  13,  that  the  survey  of  the 
lands  would  be  undertaken,  "  disregarding  any  obstacles 
which  may  be  opposed  from  any  quarter."  Gaines  answer 
ed  that  the  Indians  had  already  been  informed  of  the  veto 
laid  by  the  federal  government  upon  this  scheme.  This 
letter  crossed  a  new  one  of  Troup,  in  which  he  informed 
Gaines  that  the  laws  of  Georgia  had  already  been  extended 
over  the  Creek  territory,  and  that  he,  "of  course,"  had  to 
fulfill  them.  On  the  following  day  he  again  sent  a  prolix 
note,  in  which  he  summed  up  the  legal  question  in  the 
well-known  sentence  of  the  Kentucky  resolutions:  "As 
there  exist  two  independent  parties  to  the'  question,  each 
is  permitted  to  decide  for  itself."  He  therefore  had  "only 
to  repeat  that,  cost  what  it  will,  the  line  will  be  run  and 
the  survey  effected."  On  the  same  day  a  letter  left  the 
war  department,  which  notified  the  governor  that  the  ex 
ecution  of  his  scheme  would  be  on  his  own  responsibility; 
the  federal  government  would  not  answer  for  the  conse 
quences.  Troup 's  answer  of  June  25  was  made  up  of  in 
sults  from  the  first  word  to  the  last.  He  insinuated  that 
tne  federal  government  was  inciting  the  Indians  to  let  the 
tomahawk  and  the  scalping-knife  do  their  bloody  work; 
demanded  information  of  the  ultimate  designs  of  the 

1  Niles'  Reg.,  XXVIIL,  pp.  271,  272. 


GEORGIA    BIDES    HER    TIME.  4AL 

government,  in  order  that  Georgia  might  "  guard  and 
fence  herself  against  the  perfidy  and  treachery  of  false 
friends" ;  and  declared  that  he  would  remain  steadfast  in 
his  resolve,  "  of  which  Gen.  Gaines  has  already  had  suffi 
cient  notice."1  Now,  at  last,  the  administration  thought 
the  time  had  come  to  use  language  that  could  not  be  mis 
understood.  July  21,  Troup  was  informed  by  the  war  de 
partment  of  the  "  decision"  of  the  president  that  the 
survey  would  not  be  "allowed."  At  the  same  time  Gaines 
was  instructed  to  use  armed  force  whenever  necessary,  and 
a  copy  of  these  instructions  was  also  sent  to  Troup.2  The 
latter,  who  had  previously  forbidden  both  Andrews  and 
Gaines  to  hold  any  farther  intercourse  with  himself,  now 
seemed  to  wish  to  extend  the  injunction  to  the  war  depart 
ment.  August  7,  he  wrote  directly  to  the  president  a  long 
letter,  full  of  plaints  and  complaints,  which  was  a  real  mas 
terpiece  of  arrogance  and  shamelessness.8  Adams,  he  said, 
must  admit  that  he  "makes  and  breaks  treaties  at  pleasure,"4 
and  he  finally  cited  him  before  the  solemn  judgment 
seat  of  the  "  government  of  Georgia"  to  render  account 
for  his  actions.5  Troup  said  nothing  in  this  letter  about 
considering  himself  bound  by  the  "decision"  of  the  presi 
dent;  but  the  survey  was  postponed.  Yet  he  declared  in 
his  message  of  November  8  to  the  legislature,  that  he  had 
from  the  first  delayed  this  under  protest  only  because  the 

1  This  correspondence  is  given  in  full  in  Niles'  Reg.,  XXVIII.,  pp. 
892-398. 

8  Ibid,  XXVIIL,  p.  412. 
«  Ibid,  XXIX.,  pp.  14-16. 

4  "The  general  [Gaines]  is  correct  in  one  of  his  positions,  and  being 
in  the  right  himself  he  puts  you  in  the  wrong,  and  so  conspicuously 
that  you  stand  on  the  insulated  eminence  an  almost  solitary  advocate 
for  making  and  breaking  treaties  at  pleasure." 

5  *•  Now,  sir,  suffer  me  in  conclusion  to  ask  if  these  things  have  been 
done  in  virtue  of  your  instructions,  expressed  or  implied,  or  by  author 
ity  of  any  warrant  from  you  whatsoever,  and  if  not  so  done  whether 
you  will  sanction  and  adopt  them  as  your  own,  and  thus  hold  yourself 
responsible  to  the  government  of  Georgia." 


442         STATE  SOVEREIGNTY  AND  SLAVERY. 

president  had  expressed  the  intention  of  laying  the  whole 
affair  before  congress.  But  he  remarked,  in  addition  to 
this,  that  he  was  not  willing  to  recognize  by  this  the 
"legality"  of  the  course  of  action  intended  by  the  presi 
dent;  he  only  thought  that  the  "decision"  of  this  ques 
tion  belonged  less  to  himself  than  to  the  legislature  of 
Georgia;  the  latter  was  "yet  free  to  act  upon  the  subject 
as  if  no  measure  had  been  taken  by  the  executive  in  rela 
tion  to  that  reference."1 

The  matter  was  thus  brought  for  a  time  to  a  stand-still. 
The  press  favorable  to  the  administration  praised  the  firm 
ness  of  the  president,  and  claimed  a  complete  victory  for 
him.  The  European  journals,  especially  the  English  ones, 
which  had  followed  the  struggle  with  lively  interest,  had 
to  listen  to  many  a  sneering  remark  about  the  shortsight 
edness  which,  springing  from  their  hostility  to  everything 
republican,  had  already  led  them  to  think  they  saw  the 
United  States  bathed  in  the  blood  of  citizens  and  the 
Union  shattered  forever.2  The  scorn  was  not  undeserved, 
for  if  indeed  Virginia  and  the  Oarolinas  sympathized  with 
Georgia,  yet  they  had  no  idea  of  following  her  angry  gov- 

'Niles'Reg.,XXIX.,p.203. 

2  The  following  noteworthy  passage  is  taken  from  an  article  in  Bell's 
Weekly  Messenger,  on  the  quarrel  between  Georgia  and  the  administra 
tion  :  "  Suppose,  therefore,  that  an  American  civil  war  should  break 
out,  what  will  be  its  probable  issue  ?  The  suitable  answer  to  this 
question  is  to  be  sought  in  a  comparative  estimate  of  the  strength 
of  the  northern  and  southern  states,  and,  very  fortunately,  the  power 
of  the  northern  provinces  so  far  exceeds  that  of  their  southern 
neighbors  as  not  to  leave  the  latter  any  hope  of  a  long  contest.  Add  to 
this  an  immense  advantage  in  favor  of  the  Union.  If  the  federal  gov. 
eminent  finds  itself  pressed,  it  will  only  have  to  pass  a  law  declaring 
the  southern  slaves  all  free,  and  they  will  all  rise  and  join  them  to  a 
man.  The  southern  states  will  then  have  enough  to  do  at  home,  and 
will  be  compelled  to  resort  to  the  protection  of  the  united  government. 
We  know  not,  indeed,  but  that  this  may  be  the  secondary  instrument 
by  which  providence  is  about  to  put  an  end  to  the  system  of  slavery 
in  the  new  continent,  and  in  this  point  of  view  it  may  eventually  lead 
to  the  greatest  good." 


TEOTJP    RE-ELECTED    GOVERNOR.  443 

ernor  as  far  as  it  pleased  him  to  go.  But,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  paeans  of  victory  of  the  administration  party 
were  by  no  means  justified.  The  struggle  was  unques 
tionably  an  illustration,  not  of  the  strength,  but  of  the 
weakness,  of  the  Union.  "Without  expressing  an  opinion 
on  the  question  whether  the  treaty  of  Indian  Springs  had 
been  obtained  by  trickery,  the  senate  agreed  upon  a  new 
treaty,  which  was  much  more  favorable  to  the  Creeks.1 
But  Troup  was  in  no  way  molested  by  congress.  The 
moral  impression  made  upon  the  people  was  therefore  by 
no  means  that  of  a  powerful  maintenance  of  the  federal 
authority  in  opposition  to  the  state-rights  pretensions  of 
Georgia.  It  was  said,  indeed,  that  no  cause  had  been  given 
for  any  action  whatever,  because  hitherto  only  empty 
threats,  without  any  corresponding  deeds,  had  been  in 
dulged  in,  and  because  the  threats  had  been  uttered,  not 
by  the  state,  but  by  a  number  of  "  individuals."  To  re 
gard  the  official  acts  of  a  governor  simply'  as  those  of  aii 
individual,  has  at  least  the  merit  of  novelty.  Moreover, 
it  was  not  true  that  Troup  had  begun  and  carried  on  the 
contest  with  the  administration  wholly  on  his  own  author 
ity;  he  could  say  that  he  only  wished  to  "execute  the 
laws  of  the  state  of  Georgia."  The  majority  of  the  leg 
islature  might  not  go  quite  as  far  as  he  did,  but  it  follow 
ed  so  close  upon  his  heels  that  it  made  not  the  slightest 
effort  to  hold  him  back.  And  the  legislature  was  the  exact 
expression  of  the  popular  feeling.  The  gubernatorial 
election  took  place  in  the  autumn.  The  campaign  was  an 
unusually  violent  one,  and  the  election  was  decided  by 
only  a  few  votes,  but  these  were  in  favor  of  Troup.2  The 
majority  of  the  people  thus  stood  behind  him,  and  his 
message  of  ^November  8  therefore  maintained  all  the  claims 
already  made.3 

1  Jan.  24, 1826.    Statutes  at  Large,  VII.,  p.  268. 

1  He  received  20,545  to  19,857  votes.    Niles'  Reg.,  XXIX.,  p.  216. 

«  Ibid,  XXIX.,  p.  200,  seq. 


444  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

The  new  treaty  with  the  Creeks  was  not  in  the  least  sat 
isfactory  to  Georgia.  The  chiefs  who  negotiated  it  at 
Washington  had  at  first  declared  that  their  powers  did  not 
permit  them  to  extend  the  treaty  to  any  territory  beyond 
the  Chattahoochee.1  Yet  they  finally  allowed  themselves 
to  be  persuaded  to  agree  to  a  further  cession.2  It  was  after 
wards  affirmed  in  the  senate  that  they  had  been  authorized 
to  do  this  from  the  start,  and  had  only  thrown  difficulties 
in  the  way  for  the  sake  of  treacherously  assuring  to  them 
selves  and  their  accomplices  an  undue  part  of  the  purchase 
money.3  This  circumstance  gave  rise  to  violent  attacks 
upon  the  treaty  and  the  administration.  Still  greater  dis 
content  was  excited  because  the  treaty,  unlike  the  one  of 
Indian  Springs,  did  not  stipulate  simply  for  the  cession  of 
the  "whole  territory  lying  within  the  state  of  Georgia." 
The  administration  had  tried  to  transfer  this  article,  un 
changed,  into  the  new  treaty ;  but  the  Creeks  had  obstinate 
ly  refused,  because  the  boundary  line  between  Georgia  and 
Alabama  had  not  yet  been  drawn,  and  they  therefore  would 
not  have  known  at  all  what  they  had  really  ceded.4  Senator 
Berrien  of  Georgia  complained  that  the  state  lost  a  million 
acres  by  the  change  in  the  wording  of  the  treaty,  and  ac 
cused  the  administration  of  having  made  itself  the  "  con 
scious  instrument  of  the  fraud"  which  the  chiefs  planned 
against  their  own  tribesmen.5  Troup  declared,  curtly  and 
arrogantly,  that  he  held  only  to  the  treaty  of  Indian 
Springs,  inasmuch  as  the  rights  gained  by  Georgia  through 
that  could  not  be  taken  away  again.6  The  surveyors  there 
fore  received  orders  to  begin  work  on  the  territory  lying 
west  of  the  boundary-lines  stipulated  for  in  the  treaty  at 

1  Debates  of  Congress,  VIII.,  pp.  583, 587. 

»  See  the  exact  description  of  this  territory  in  Art.  2  of  the  treaty. 

1  Debates  of  Congress,  VIII.,  p.  591,  passim. 

4  Barbour  to  Troup,  JSTov.  27, 1826.    Niles*  Reg.,  XXXI.,  p.  282. 

•  Deb.  of  Cong.,  VIII.,  pp.  583,  588. 

•  Troup  to  Barbour,  Feb.  17, 1827.    Niles'  Reg.,  XXXII.,  p.  16. 


DANGER    OF    CIVIL    WAR.  445 

Washington.  But  the  Indians,  without  inflicting  any  per 
sonal  injury  upon  them,  compelled  them  to  abandon  the 
work  and  appealed  to  the  president  to  protect  the  rights 
guaranteed  them  by  treaty.  Adams,  relying  upon  the  law 
of  1802  already  mentioned,  had  instructions  issued  at  once 
to  the  United  States  attorney  and  marshal  of  Georgia  to 
imprison  the  persons  engaged  in  land-surveys  on  the  other 
side  of  the  boundary  last  agreed  upon  and  to  bring  them 
before  the  proper  courts.  Troup  was  informed  of  these 
instructions  and  was  also  told  that  federal  soldiers  would 
be  sent  to  the  spot,  if  further  interferences  with  the  treaty 
made  this  seem  necessary.1  At  the  same  time  Adams  by  a 
special  message  brought  the  whole  matter  formally  before 
congress.2  He  expressed  therein  his  conviction  that  an 
"  obligation  even  higher  than  that  of  human  authority" 
would  compel  him  to  forcibly  interfere,  if  matters  were 
pushed  to  an  extreme,  but  declared  that  he  would  first  ex 
haust  all  other  means.  The  main  reason  that  he  had  not 
hitherto  used  the  army  was,  he  said,  that  this  would  have 
apparently  led  to  an  armed  collision  with  Georgia,  "which 
would  in  itself  have  inflicted  a  wound  upon  the  Union  and 
have  presented  the  aspect  of  one  of  these  confederate  states 
at  war  with  the  rest."  Adams  was  too  skillful  a  statesman 
and  too  well  informed  in  constitutional  law  to  lightly  use 
any  such  expression  in  an  official  paper  on  an  affair  of  such 
importance.  His  whole  conduct  leaves  no  manner  of  doubt 
that  he  would  have  considered  it  as  rebellion,  if  the  federal 
troops  had  been  forcibly  opposed.  If  he  said  that  Georgia 
would  find  herself  in  such  a  case  engaged  in  a  "  war"  with 
the  other  states,  this  can  be  explained  only  on  the  supposi 
tion  that  he  shunned  using  the  language  of  authority.  It 
would  be  doing  him  injustice  to  suppose  that  he  paid  this 
reverence  to  state  sovereignty  only  out  of  regard  to  Georgia. 
JBut  on  this  very  account  it  can  be  so  much  the  better  in- 

1  See  the  documents  concerning  this.    Niles'  Reg.,  XXXI.,  p.  372 
8  Feb.  5,  1827.    Statesman's  Man.,  II ,  p.  642. 


446  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND   SLAVERY. 

ferred  what  the  relative  strength  of  the  national  idea  and 
of  the  particularistic  tendencies  was  at  that  time,  or  at  least 
how  their  relative  strength  was  estimated  by  leading  states 
men. 

Some  weeks  after  Adams  had  brought  the  matter  before 
congress,  Troup's  answer  to  the  information  that  the  main 
tenance  of  the  treaty-stipulations  would  be,  if  necessary, 
enforced,  was  received.  He  notified  the  secretary  of  war, 
with  the  "  defiance  which  it  [the  secretary's  letter]  merits," 
that  such  an  attempt  would  be  resisted  to  the  uttermost. 
On  the  same  day,  he  had  the  attorney-general  and  the 
solicitors-general  of  Georgia  instructed  to  use  all  "  neces 
sary  and  legal  [?]  measures"  to  free  the  surveyors  who  had 
been  imprisoned  "under  the  authority  of  the  government 
of  the  United  States"  and  to  bring  the  persons  concerned 
in  their  imprisonment  to  trial.  Furthermore,  the  "  major- 
generals  commanding  the  sixth  and  seventh  divisions"  re 
ceived  orders  to  hold  their  troops  in  readiness  "  to  repel 
any  hostile  invasion  of  the  territory  of  this  state."1  In  a 
circular  dated  Feb.  27,  he  informed  the  senators  and  represen  - 
tatives  of  Georgia  of  all  these  steps,  and  at  the  same  time 
sharply  defined  his  position  on  the  constitutional  question 
in  a  few  sentences,  saying  that  "rights  of  sovereignty" 
between  the  states  and  the  United  States  could  not  be  de 
cided  by  the  United  States  supreme  court,  but  must  be 
solved  by  negotiation  until  another  way  of  settlement  was 
provided  in  the  constitution.2 

1  See  the  documents,  Niles'  Keg.,  XXXII.,  p.  16. 

a "  I  consider  all  questions  of  mere  sovereignty  as  matters  for  negotia 
tion  between  the  states  and  the  United  States,  until  the  competent  tribu 
nal  shall  be  assigned  by  the  constitution  itself  for  the  adjustment  ot 
them.  .  .  On  an  amicable  issue  made  up  between  the  United  States 
and  ourselves,  we  might  have  had  no  difficulty  in  referring  it  to  them  as 
judges,  protesting  at  the  same  time  against  the  jurisdiction,  and  saving 
our  rights  of  sovereignty.  .  .  But  according  to  our  limited  concep 
tion,  the  supreme  court  is  not  made  by  the  constitution  of  the  United 
States  the  arbiter  in  controversies  involving  rights  of  sovereignty  be 
tween  the  states  and  the  United  States."  Niles'  Reg.,  XXXII.,  p.  20. 


GEORGIA   WINS.  447 

Adams,  in  his  message,  had  "submitted  it  to  the  wisdom 
of  congress  to  determine  whether  any  further  act  of  legis 
lation  may  be  necessary  or  expedient."  Whatever  hap 
pened  thereafter,  the  president  was  no  longer  alone  respon 
sible  for  it.  If  congress  did  nothing,  if  it  did  not  once 
express  in  plain  language  its  opinion  on  the  whole  matter, 
this  lack  of  action  was  of  course  an  answer  to  the  request 
of  the  president  and  a  child  could  understand  it.  This 
was  what  congress  did.1  The  country  received  this  decis 
ion  with  apparent  indifference.  It  had  scarcely  expected 
any  other,  and  it  brought  to  pass  what  was  generally  de 
sired.  A  great  majority  decidedly  disliked  the  conduct  of 
Georgia  and  especially  of  Troup.  But  people  were  heart 
ily  tired  of  the  affair  and  rejoiced  over  the  prospect  that 
the  painful  strife  would  finally  be  brought  to  an  end.  The 
majority  of  the  states  considered  it  wholly  just  and  proper 
for  the  president  to  try  to  protect  the  rights  guaranteed  to 
the  Indians  by  treaty.  But  to  let  an  armed  collision  occur 
between  a  "  sovereign"  state  and  the  federal  government 
for  the  sake  of  these  rights,  seemed — on  whatever  side  the 
guilt  lay — as  the  climax  of  foolishness  and  criminality. 
The  political  morals  of  the  United  States  were  far  removed 
from  the  point  at  which  legal  pledges  to  Indians  were 
looked  upon  in  the  same  light  as  other  legal  pledges. 
"Whether  or  not  this  could  be  excused,  in  any  event  the 
question,  from  the  standpoint  of  practical  politics,  was  in 
this  case  only  one  of  secondary  importance.  The  main 
point  involved  was  not  the  rights  of  the  Creeks,  but  the 
corner-stone  of  the  legal  foundation  of  the  whole  Union.  It 
is  true  that  there  was  no  danger  that  this  corner-stone 


1  The  senate  passed  a  resolution  which  requested  the  president  to 
exert  himself  in  order  to  extinguish  the  Indian  title.  As  far  as  the 
house  is  concerned,  I  find  in  the  sources  of  information  open  to  me 
mention  only  of  the  reference  of  the  matter  to  a  committee.  I  can  not 
assert  with  certainty  that  a  resolution  was  never  passed,  but  if  so,  it  cer 
tainly  had  no  significance. 


448  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY    AND    SLAVERY. 

would  be  broken  and  shattered  on  the  instant.  But  the 
demand  of  prmcipiis  obsta!  was  again  urged  upon  the 
federal  government  and  in  a  more  pressing  way  than  ever 
before.  The  demand  was  not  fully  met  and  the  children 
and  grandchildren  of  that  generation  had  to  learn  by  ex 
perience  that  in  politics  sins  of  omission  revenge  them 
selves  as  severely  as  sins  of  commission.  Georgia  had  still 
another  thorn  in  her  flesh,  which  was  harder  to  withdraw. 
Since  she  had  now  proved  how  far  she  could  go  unpun 
ished,  she  went  on  in  the  work  without  delay  and  with 
redoubled  boldness. 

Besides  the  Creeks,  about  ten  thousand  Cherokees  still 
lived  within  the  boundaries  of  Georgia.1  Their  territory 
was  in  every  respect  richly  blessed  by  nature,2  and  Georgia 
therefore  had  an  especial  longing  for  it.  But,  although 
they  fell  far  behind  the  Creeks  in  numbers,  it  was  much 
more  difficult  to  deprive  them  of  their  land,  because  they 
had  attained  a  much  higher  degree  of  civilization.  They 
led  a  thoroughly  orderly  life,  successfully  pursued  not  only 
agriculture  but  also  trade,  applied  themselves  with  fortu 
nate  results  to  manufacturing  on  a  small  scale,  and  zeal 
ously  devoted  themselves  to  the  civilization  of  their  race.3 
Of  course  their  civilization  was  not  due  to  their  indepen 
dent  efforts,  but  with  the  aid  of  the  federal  government  and 
of  religious  associations  they  were  attaining  by  degrees  the 
acquirements  of  their  white  neighbors,  without  merging 
their  independent  tribal  existence.  The  surrender  of  their 
own  political  and  social  organization  was  as  unendurable  a 

1  Clay's  speech  on  "  Our  treatment  of  the  Cherokees."  Speeches, 
II.,  p.  249. 

8  See  the  details  in  the  report  of  the  secretary  of  war.  Exec.  Doc.  of 
1835-26,  Doc.  102. 

*  Compare  with  the  report  of  the  secretary  of  war,  the  remarks  of 
judge  Johnson  in  the  case  of  Cherokee  Nation  vs.  State  of  Georgia, 
(Peters,  Rep.,  V.,  p.  21 ;  Curtis,  IX.,  p.  184) ;  Wirt's  letter  to  gov.  Gil- 
mer,  June  4, 1830  (files'  Beg.,  XXXIX.,  pp.  69,  70)  and  Deb.  of  Cong., 
X.  and  XI.,  passim. 


OPPRESSION    OF    THE    CHEKOKEES.  449 

thought  to  them  as  the  exchange  of  their  flourishing  settle 
ments  for  the  wilderness  west  of  the  Mississippi.  They 
therefore  tried  by  all  the  means  within  their  power  to  keep 
the  Creeks  from  ceding  their  lands,  for  they  well  knew  that 
Georgia  could  far  more  easily  present  the  same  alternative 
to  them,  if  she  first  got  rid  of  the  more  powerful  brother- 
tribe.  That  this  was  her  intention,  was  openly  declared  in 
the  messages  of  her  governors  as  well  as  in  her  legislature, 
long  before  the  successful  negotiations  with  the  Creeks. 
As  early  as  the  latter  part  of  1826,  the  legislature  began 
to  pass  laws  intended  to  pave  the  way  for  the  accomplish 
ment  of  this  design.  Thus,  for  instance,  a  law  of  Dec.  26 
deprived  all  Indians  not  acquainted  with  the  English  lan 
guage  of  the  right  to  testify  before  any  state  court.1  As 
soon  as  Adams's  request  to  congress  to  take  steps  against 
the  illegal  assumptions  of  Georgia  had  miscarried  so  pit 
iably,  the  policy  marked  out  by  this  law  was  systematically 
followed,  up.  A  law  of  Dec.  26,  1827,  added  a  part  of  the 
Cherokee  territory  to  the  counties  of  Carroll  and  Dekalb, 
in  order  to  extend  the  criminal  jurisdiction  of  the  state 
over  it.2  The  Cherokees  sent  a  delegation  to  Washington 
which  presented  to  the  president,  through  the  secretary  of 
war,  Feb.  11, 1829,  a  written  protest  against  these  encroach 
ments  upon  the  rights  immemorially  enjoyed  by  them  and 
solemnly  guaranteed  to  them.  Adams,  however,  took  no 
steps  in  the  matter,  because  his  term  of  office  was  to  ex 
pire  in  a  few  weeks. 

With  Adams,  the  unfortunate  Indians  lost  their  last 
stand-by.  He  had  not  only  met  the  assumptions  of  Georgia 
with  promptness  and  with  his  whole  energy,  and  had  there 
by  earned  the  gratitude  of  the  Indians  and  the  whole 
Union,  but  he  had  also  shown  an  upright  zeal  in  preventing 
the  infringement  of  their  guaranteed  rights.  Jackson  can- 


1  Niles'  Reg.,  XXXV.,  p.  43. 
*  Loco  citato. 


4:50  STATE   SOVEBEIGNTY   AND   SLAVERY. 

not,  indeed,  be  accused  of  having  consciously  wronged 
them,  but  in  all  questions  he  considered  the  right  to  be 
what  seemed  right  to  him. 

April  38,  1829,  the  decision  of  the  president  was  an 
nounced  to  the  Cherokees  by  Eaton,  the  secretary  of  war.1 
This  began  by  saying  that  "  there  is  but  a  single  alterna 
tive,  to  yield  to  the  operation  of  those  laws  which  Georgia 
claims,  and  has  a  right,  to  extend  throughout  her  own  lim 
its,  or  to  remove  and  by  associating  with  your  brothers 
beyond  the  Mississippi  to  become  again  united  as  one 
nation."  He  saw  no  other  way,  because  the  right  of  the 
federal  government  to  "  permit  to  you  [the  Indians]  the 
enjoyment  of  a  separate  government  within  the  limits  of  a 
state  and  of  denying  the  exercise  of  sovereignty  to  that 
state,  within  her  own  limits,  cannot  be  admitted."2  Thus 
Georgia  had  nothing  more  to  fear  from  the  federal  execu 
tive,  as  long  as  she  did  not  forcibly  expel  the  Cherokees 
from  their  territory,  but  contented  herself  with  passing  laws 
which  made  the  condition  of  the  Indians,  in  the  strict  sense 
of  the  word,  unendurable. 

Jackson's  decision  caused  the  council  of  chiefs  to  threat 
en  to  punish  every  land-sale  consummated  without  the 
previous  consent  of  the  tribe  with  death.3  Governor 
Carroll  of  Tennessee,  who  had  been  entrusted  by  the  presi 
dent  with  the  negotiations  for  the  acquisition  of  the  terri 
tory,  was  roundly  refused  any  opportunity  for  discussing 
the  question.4  This  decisive  stand  impelled  the  legislature 
of  Georgia  to  make  so  much  the  more  quickly  the  greatest 
use  of  the  "  sovereign  rights"  of  the  state.  Gov.  Forsyth 
had  already  recommended  to  the  legislature,  in  his  message 


1  Niles'  Reg.,  XXXVI.,  pp.  258,  259.  Compare  also  the  report  by  Wiley 
Thompson  of  his  conversation  with  Jackson.  Ibid,  XXXVI.,  p.  231. 

s  Compare  with  this  the  view  expressed  by  Jefferson,  as  secretary  of 
state,  Aug.  10,  1791.  Jeff.,  Works,  III.,  pp.  280-281. 

«  Niles'  Reg.,  XXXVIL,  p.  235. 

4  Ibid,  XXXVII.,  p.  94. 


JACKSON   SUPPORTS   GEORGIA.  451 

of  Nov.  4,  1828,  not  to  longer  delay  (t  the  extension  of  all 
state  laws"  over  the  territory  of  the  Cherokees  especially, 
because  the  whole  tribe,  part  of  which  was  settled  in  the 
neighboring  states,  had  adopted  a  constitutional  form  of 
government.1  The  law  of  Dec.  19,  1829,  carried  this  out, 
for  it  "  annulled  all  laws  and  ordinances  of  the  Cherokees" 
and  cut  up  their  territory  and  attached  it  to  five  counties 
of  the  state.  Moreover,  the  law  forbade  the  emigration  of 
the  Indians  and  the  sale  of  their  lands  and  provided  for 
these  offenses  a  penalty  of  from  four  to  six  years'  impris 
onment  at  hard  labor.2  Eleven  days  before,  Jackson  had 
given  the  whole  country  to  understand,  by  his  annual  mes 
sage,  that  in  his  opinion  Georgia  was  justified  in  taking 
such  measures  from  every  point  of  view.3  Some  months 
afterwards,  congress  gave  an  indirect  approval  of  this  posi 
tion  by  voting  a  large  sum  of  money,  which  the  president 
was  to  use  for  the  "removal"  of  the  Indians.4 

1  Niles'  Reg.,  XXXV.,  p.  222. 

4  The  whole  law,  which  was  one  of  the  most  shameful  pieces  of  op 
pression  in  this  long  dark  chapter  of  American,  history,  is  quoted  in 
Worcester  vs.  State  of  Georgia,  (Peters  VI.,  pp.  525-528 ;  Curtis,  X.,  pp. 
218-221)  and  also  in  Niles'  Reg.,  XXXVIII,  p.  54. 

8  Statesman's  Man.,  I ,  pp.  709,  710. 

4  The  debates  over  this  bill  (Deb.  of  Congress,  X.  and  XI.,  passim) 
are  extremely  interesting  on  account  of  the  preposterously  stupid  soph 
istry  with  which  the  most  reckless  justification  of  the  right  of  the 
strongest  is  clothed  in  the  garb  of  justice  and  even  of  humanity.  Among 
the  northern  representatives  who  spoke  with  the  greatest  emphasis  in 
behalf  of  the  rights  of  the  Indians,  Frelinghuysen  deserves  especial 
mention.  Justice,  however,  demands  the  statement  that  the  condition 
of  things  which  the  Cherokees  wished  for  could  not  be  maintained  in 
the  long  run.  It  seems  to  me  unquestionable  that  they  had  the  right 
on  their  side  when  they  demanded  that  they  should  be  permitted  to  con 
tinue  in  their  independent  political  existence  under  the  protection  and 
the  sovereignty  of  the  United  States.  The  obligation  which  the  latter 
had  undertaken,  in  1802,  in  regard  to  Georgia,  could  not  change  this 
fact,  for  the  right  of  the  Cherokees  was  much  older.  But  a  political 
community  in  the  territory  of  one  or  more  states  of  the  Union,  under 
the  sovereignty  of  the  Union  and  yet  not  constitutionally  in  the  Union, 
— this  was  an  anomaly  which  could  not  last.  The  real  circumstances 


452  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY  AND   SLAVERY. 

Under  these  circumstances  the  only  thing  left  for  the 
Cherokees  to  do  was  to  ask  the  aid  of  the  United  States 
supreme  court.  The  ex-attorn ey-general,  "Wirt,  was  will 
ing  to  plead  their  cause.  His  argument  against  Georgia's 
claim  to  the  power  of  extending  her  jurisdiction  over  the 
Cherokee  territory  was  unanswerable.1  It  was  to  be  as 
sumed  as  certain  that  this  would  also  be  the  view  of  the 
supreme  court,  since  the  latter  had  given  a  decision  some 
years  before,  from  which  the  unconstitutional ity  of  the 
law  of  Dec.  19,  1829,  was  an  inevitable  inference.2  In 
consequence,  however,  of  a  technical  mistake,  the  real 

of  the  case  were  stronger  than  the  stipulated  right.  But  a  juster  and 
more  humane  compromise  between  the  stipulated  right  and  the  de 
mands  of  the  facts  in  the  case  should  have  been  found,  and  would  have 
been,  if  men  had  wished  to  find  it. 

1  Niles'  Reg.,  XXXIX.,  pp.  81-88.  It  is  superfluous  to  enter  more 
into  detail  concerning  the  proof  of  this,  for  one  sentence  suffices  as  a 
justification  of  the  opinion  expressed  in  the  text:  "The  llth  Article 
of  the  treaty  of  Holston  (compare  Statutes  at  Large,  VII.,  p.  41)  con 
tains  an  express  and  decisive  admission  of  the  principle  implied  in  all 
the  treaties  [between  the  United  States  and  the  Cherokees]  throughout 
all  their  provisions,  to  wit.:  that  the  territory  of  the  Cherokees  is  not 
within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  states,  nor  subject  to  their  laws.  This 
treaty  is  recognized  as  in  full  force  by  all  the  subsequent  treaties. 
Georgia,  as  one  of  the  United  States,  is  a  party  to  it,  and  is  estopped  to 
deny  what  she  has  thus  solemnly  admitted." 

9  In  Johnson  and  Graham's  Lessee  vs.  M'Intosh  we  read:  "  If  an  in 
dividual  might  extinguish  the  Indian  title  for  his  own  benefit,  or,  in 
other  words,  might  purchase  it,  still  he  could  only  acquire  that  title. 
Admitting  their  power  to  change  their  laws  or  usages  so  far  as  to  allow 
an  individual  to  separate  a  portion  of  their  lands  from  the  common 
stock,  and  hold  it  in  severally,  still  it  is  a  part  of  their  territory,  and  is 
held  under  them  by  a  title  dependent  on  their  laws.  The  grant  derives 
its  efficacy  from  their  will,  and  if  they  choose  to  resume  it  and  make  a 
different  disposition  of  the  land,  the  courts  of  the  United  States  can  not 
interpose  for  the  protection  of  the  title.  The  person  who  purchases 
lands  from  the  Indians  within  their  territory  incorporates  himself  with 
them  so  far  as  respects  the  property  purchased ;  holds  their  title  under 
their  protection  and  subject  to  their  laws.  If  they  annul  the  grant  we 
know  of  no  tribunal  which  can  revise  and  set  aside  the  proceeding." 
Wheafon,  VIII.,  p.  593;  Curtis,  V.,  p.  516. 


ACTION    OF    THE    SUPKEME    COTJKT.  453 

question  was  not  decided.  In  the  complaint  the  Cherokees 
were  described  as  "  a  foreign  state."  The  court  decided 
that  this  description  did  not  apply  to  them  "  in  the  sense 
of  the  constitution"  and  that  they  therefore  could  not,  as 
a  foreign  state,  bring  a  case  before  the  federal  courts.1  But 
although  their  complaint  was  rejected  for  want  of  juris 
diction,  chief-justice  Marshall,  who  delivered  the  decision 
of  the  court,  took  occasion  to  say  that  in  the  opinion  ot 
the  majority  of  the  judges  the  Cherokees  had  formed  an 
independent  political  community,  with  the  expressly  rec 
ognized  right  of  self-government.2  That  the  bare  dictum 
of  the  judges  would  have  no  sort  of  influence  upon  Georgia 
was  plain  to  see  from  what  had  gone  before.  Wirt  had 
asked  Governor  Gilmer  whether  the  state  would  not  agree, 
as  Virginia  and  Maryland  had  done  under  similar  circum 
stances,  to  submit  the  question,  by  the  free  consent  of  the 
parties,  to  the  supreme  court  of  the  United  States  for  de 
cision.  In  response  to  his  letter,  composed  with  studied 
courtesy,  he  received  an  answer  in  which  Gilmer  proved 
that  Troup  himself  could  find  his  master  in  causeless  in 
solence  and  low  insults.3  It  seemed  as  if  something  worse 
yet  might  be  expected  from  the  state  judiciary.  Judge  Clay 
ton  had  already  declared  to  a  grand  jury,  in  a  violent  po 
litical  harangue,  that  he  should  pay  no  attention  whatever 

1  Cherokee  Nation  vs.  State  of  Georgia,  Peters,  V.,  p.  20;  Curtis,  IX., 
p.  183. 

8  u  So  much  of  the  argument  as  was  intended  to  prove  the  character 
of  the  Cherokees  as  a  state,  as  a  distinct  political  society,  separated 
from  others,  capable  of  managing  its  own  affairs  and  governing  itself, 
has,  in  the  opinion  of  the  majority  of  the  judges,  been  completely  suc 
cessful  They  have  been  uniformly  treated  as  a  state,  from  the  settle 
ment  of  our  country.  .  .  The  acts  of  our  government  plainly  recog 
nize  ike  Cherokee  nation  as  a  state,  and  the  courts  are  bound  by  those 
acts."  Peters,  VM  p.  16;  Curtis,  IX.,  p.  180. 

*  See  the  correspondence  in  Niles'  Reg.,  XXXIX.,  pp.  G9--71.  Gilmer 
even  ^ave  it  to  be  understood  that  Wirt,  if  he  entered  Georgia,  would 
be  brought  to  a  reckoning  for  having  served  as  the  attorney  of  the 
Jhwokees. 


454  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

to  any  command  or  judgment  of  the  United  States  supreme 
court  in  reference  to  the  Cherokee  matter.  Facts  soon 
showed  that  Clayton  had  only  expressed  what  had  long 
since  been  resolved  upon  by  the  governor  and  the  legisla 
ture.  A  certain  George  Tassells  had  committed  a  mur 
der  within  the  territory  of  the  Cherokees.  He  was  brought 
before  the  superior  court  of  the  state  on  this  charge,  was 
found  guilty,  and  was  condemned  to  death.  Before  the 
execution  of  the  sentence  Chief-justice  Marshall  cited  the 
state  by  a  writ  of  error,  issued  in  the  customary  way,  "  to 
show  cause,  if  any  there  be,  why  the  judgment  should  not 
be  corrected."1  The  governor  sent  the  writ  of  the  chief- 
justice  to  the  legislature,  with  an  accompanying  letter, 
in  which  he  declared  that  he  would  not  regard  commands 
of  the  supreme  court  which  interfered  with  the  constitu 
tional  jurisdiction  of  the  state,  and  would  oppose  any  at 
tempt  to  execute  them  with  all  the  means  entrusted  to 
him  by  the  laws  of  the  state.  The  legislature  did  not  lag 
behind  the  governor.  Both  houses  passed  a  series  of  reso 
lutions  to  the  effect  that  the  action  of  the  chief-justice  of 
the  United  States  was  "  a  flagrant  violation  of  the  rights" 
of  the  state;  that  the  governor  and  the  whole  body  of  state 
officials  were  bound  to  pay  no  attention  to  commands 
emanating  from  the  United  States  supreme  court,  which 
were  intended  to  interfere  with  the  execution  of  the 
criminal  law  of  the  state;  that  the  governor  was  bourd  to 

1  The  eleventh  amendment  to  the  constitution  provides  that  "  any 
suit  in  law  or  equity"  brought  by  an  individual  against  a  state  cannot 
be  heard  in  the  federal  courts.  But  the  United  States  supreme  court  had 
decided,  in  1821,  in  Cohens  vs.  Virginia,  that  "  the  defendant  whore- 
moves  [through  a  writ  of  error]  a  judgment  rendered  against  him  by  a 
state  court  into  this  court,  for  the  purpose  of  re-examining  the  question 
whether  that  judgment  be  in  violation  of  the  constitution  or  laws  of  the 
United  States,  does  not  commence  or  prosecute  a  suit  against  the  state, 
whatever  may  be  its  opinion  where  the  effect  of  the  writ  y^ay  be  to  re 
store  the  party  to  the  possession  of  a  thing  which  h->  ^.rnands." 
Wheaton,  VI.,  p.  412;  Curtis,  V.,  p.  105. 


.       THE    SUPREME    COURT    DEFIED.  455 

"  resist  and  repel  any  and  every  invasion,  from  whatever 
quarter,  upo^i  the  administration  of  the  criminal  laws"  of 
the  state,  with  all  the  "  force  and  means"  entrusted  to 
him  by  the  constitution  and  laws  of  the  state;  that  "  the 
state  of  Georgia  will  never  so  far  compromise  her  sover 
eignty  as  an  independent  state,  as  to  become  a  party  to  the 
case  sought  to  be  made  before  the  supreme  court  of  the 
United  States  by  the  wril  in  question";  and  that  the  gov 
ernor  should  acquaint  \]  o  sheriff  of  Hall  county  with 
these  resolutions  as  far  aa  was  "  necessary  to  ensure  the 
full  execution  of  the  laws  i/,  the  case  of  George  Tassels."1 

o 

In  accordance  with  this  notincation  Tassels  was  executed 
December  28,  1830.  This  WAS  the  end  of  the  matter.  It 
might  then  well  be  asked  what  the  "  victory"  that  Adams 
had  won  over  Troup  was  worth.  If  the  structure  of  the 
Union  had  a  keystone,  it  was  unquestionably  the  supreme 
court  of  the  United  States.  This  had  become  a  stumbling- 
stone  to  the  "  sovereign"  state  of  Georgia,  and  she  thrust 
it  aside  contemptuously.  And  tharo  was  not  the  slightest 
attempt  made  to  bring  her  to  a  reckoning  for  this. 

The  further  course  of  the  unequal  strife  between  Georgia 
and  the  Cherokees  needs  not  to  be  followed  out  in  detail 
here.  The  Indians  made  a  passive  resistance  for  several 
years  with  unbroken  courage,  protesting  against  every  new 
exercise  of  oppressive  power,  and  appealing  to  their  un 
deniable  rights  in  the  matter.  Georgia  took  the  less 
notice  of  this  inasmuch  as  Jackson  allowed  even  the  feder 
al  soldiery  to  be  used  in  carrying  out  the  robber-policy.2 

1  Niles'  Reg.,  XXXIX.,  p.  388.  Compare  the  report  of  a  committee 
of  the  Pennsylvania  house  of  March  1,  1809  (Niles'  Reg.,  XLIIL, 
Suppl.,  p.  24),  and  the  answer  of  the  legislatures  of  Georgia  and"  Vir 
ginia  to  the  amendment  proposed  by  Pennsylvania  to  the  constitution. 
(Ibid,  pp.  83,  84,  and  XL II.,  p.  93). 

a  The  raffle  of  the  Cherokee  lands  and  the  prohibition  of  working 
the  gold  mines  contained  in  them  can  be  described  by  no  other  name. 
Compare  Niles'  Reg.,  XXXVIII.,  pp.  828,  404,  405;  XXXIX.,  pp.  106, 
154, 181,  182,  263,  453;  XL.,  pp.  62,  296,  297. 


456  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

"  Magnanimity,  long-suffering,  and  humanity"  did  not 
hinder  Georgia  from  simply  driving  the  poor  Indians  from 
house  and  home  with  the  sabre.  She  left  the  Indian  only 
so  much  of  his  possessions  as  sufficed  to  keep  him  from 
dying  of  hunger.  She  thrust  his  own  laws  aside.  She 
placed  him  under  her  laws,  without  granting  him  a  single 
right.  And  she  harassed  him  and  trampled  upon  him 
whenever  and  however  she  could.1  The  legal  representa 
tives  of  the  "  sovereignty"  of  the  state  developed  a  shock 
ing  brutality  in  this  course.  Patrols  marched  through  the 
whole  territory,  arrested  every  suspected  person,  and  sent 
him  in  chains  fifty  or  a  hundred  miles  away  to  "  head 
quarters"  to  often  set  him  free  at  once  with  curses  and 
threats  because  the  "law"  did  not  authorize  his  imprison 
ment.  Especial  sufferings  were  heaped  upon  the  mission 
aries  who  went  in  the  fulfillment  of  their  duties  from  one 
mission  station  to  another,  without  having  obtained  the 
permission  required  by  the  state  law  and  taken  the  pre 
scribed  oath  to  support  the  constitution  and  laws  of 
Georgia.  It  was  not  enough  to  fetter  their  limbs;  they 
were  chained  by  the  neck  to  the  pack  wagons  of  the  hunters, 
whose  barbarity  almost  surpassed  that  of  the  professional 
slave-drivers.2  A  Presbyterian  missionary  named  Worces 
ter  was  made  to  feel  the  whole  rigor  of  the  law,  although. 
he  had  the  severe  sickness  of  his  wife  to  plead  as  an  ex 
cuse  for  not  having  left  the  territory  within  the  ten  days 
during  which  he  had  been  ordered  to  do  so.  In  accordance 

'"  But  even  to  this  limited  possession  [160  acres]  the  poor  Indian 
was  to  have  no  fee-simple  title;  he  was  to  hold  as  a  mere  occupant  at 
the  will  of  the  state  of  Georgia  for  just  as  long  or  as  short  a  time  as 
she  might  think  proper.  The  laws  at  the  same  time  gave  him  no  par 
ticular  right  whatever.  He  could  not  become  a  member  of  the  state 
legislature,  nor  could  he  hold  any  office  understate  authority,  nor  could 
he  vote  as  an  elector.  He  possessed  not  one  single  right  of  a  freeman." 
Clay,  Speeches,  II.,  p.  257. 

•  Niles'  Reg.,  XL.,  pp.  297,  298,  460-462. 


THE    SUPREME    COUKT   AGAIN    DISOBEYED.  457 

with  tlie  provisions  of  the  law  of  Dec.  22,  1S30,1  he  was 
condemned  to  four  years  imprisonment  at  hard  labor  for 
this  crime.2  This  sentence  brought  the  whole  matter  again 
before  the  United  States  supreme  court,  which  now  in  a 
formal  decision  declared  all  the  claims  made  by  Georgia  on 
the  ground  of  her  "  sovereignty"  to  be  unjustified;  the  law 
of  Dec.  22,  1830,  to  be  unconstitutional;  and  the  sentence 
of  Worcester  to  be  null  and  void.3  Governor  Lumpkin  had 
already  acquainted  the  legislature,  before  the  citation  of 
the  state  to  appear  before  the  United  States  supreme 
court,  with  his  resolve  to  present  a  "  determined  resistance" 
to  such  a  "  usurpation."4  The  decision  of  the  court  did 
not  incline  him  to  change  his  resolve.  He  continued  to 
exhort  the  legislature  and  the  people  to  stand  firm  for  the 
sovereign  rights  of  the  state.  The  state  court  that  gave 
the  annulled  judgment  acted  in  accordance  with  this  posi 
tion.  It  refused  to  grant  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus  and  took 

1  The  law  is  given  in  full  in  Worcester  vs.  State  of  Georgia.    Peters, 
VI.,  p.  521,  seq.;  Curtis,  X.,  p.  215,  seq. 

2  See  the  complete  details  of  the  sentence  in  Niles'  Reg.,  XLI.,  pp. 
174-176.    It  has  a  quite  peculiar  flavor  on  account  of  the  multitude  of 
Bible  texts  to  which  judge  Clayton  appeals. 

3  "  From  the  commencement  of  our  government,  congress  has  passed 
acts  to  regulate  trade  and  intercourse  with  the  Indians.  .  .  All  these  acts, 
and  especially  that  of  1802,  which  is  still  in  force,  manifestly  considei 
the  several  Indian  nations  as  distinct  political   communities,  having 
territorial  boundaries,  within  which  their  authority  is  exclusive,  and 
having  a  right  to  all  the  lands  within  those  boundaries  which  is  not 
only  acknowledged,  but  guaranteed,  by  the  United  States.    .    .    The 
Cherokee  nation,  then,  is  a  distinct  community,  occupying  its  own  ter 
ritory,  \vith  boundaries  accurately  described,   in  which  the  laws  of 
Georgia  can  have  no  force  and  which  the  citizens  of  Georgia  have  no 
right  to  enter  but  with  the  assent  of  the  Cherokees  themselves  or  in  con 
formity  with  treaties  and  with^the  acts  of  congress.    The  whole  inter 
course  between  the  United  States  and  this  nation  is,  by  our  constitution 
and  laws,  vested  in  the  government  of  the  United  States.    The  act  of 
the  state  of  Georgia,  under  which  the  plaintiff  in  law  was  prosecuted, 
is  consequently  void  and  the  judgment  a  nullity."     Peters,  VI.,  pp.  556, 
557,  561 ;  Curtis,  X.,  pp.  240,  243, 244. 

4Niles'Reg.,XLI.,p.313. 


4:58  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY    AND    SLAVERY. 

not  the  slightest  notice  of  the  decision  of  the  supreme 
court.1  Worcester  and  his  companion  Butler  had  still  to 
spend  a  year  of  imprisonment  at  hard  labor,  in  company 
with  common  criminals.  They  were  finally  "  pardoned"  by 
Gov.  Lnmpkin,  partly  because  the  outlook  for  a  solution  of 
the  Cherokee  question,  in  a  way  satisfactory  to  Georgia, 
seemed  to  render  their  further  imprisonment  unnecessary, 
and  partly  because  their  liberation  seemed  desirable  for 
partisan  reasons.2  For  the  insolent  contempt  of  the  au 
thority  of  the  supreme  court,  no  sort  of  satisfaction  was 
given,  and  indeed  no  sort  of  satisfaction  was  demanded. 
Jackson  regarded  this  issue  of  the  struggle  with  indiffer 
ence.  Perhaps  he  even  took  a  quiet,  mean  joy  in  it,  be 
cause  Marshall,  as  he  very  well  knew,  was  a  determined 
opponent  of  his  re-election.3 

Thus  for  the  first  time  the  doctrines  of  state  rights  laid 

o 

down  in  the  Kentucky  resolutions  had  been  fully  carried 
out.  From  the  beginning  Georgia  had  chosen  as  her 
standpoint  the  fundamental  principles  that  the  federal 
authorities  and  the  states,  that  is,  the  state  governments, 
were  "parties"  who  had  no  common  judge  and  that  there 
fore  each  party  must  " decide  for  itself."  And  she — at 
last  indirectly  supported  by  the  federal  executive — had  re 
mained  a  complete  victor. 

1  Niles'  Reg.,  XLII,  p.  78. 

3  Ibid,  XL  IV.,  pp.  359,  360. 

8  Depending  upon  a  statement  of  Q.  N.  Briggs  of  Massachusetts,  who 
was  at  the  time  a  member  of  congress,  Greeley  (The  American  Conflict, 
I.,  p.  100)  relates  that  Jackson  said:  u  John  Marshall  has  made  his  de 
cision;  now  let  him  enforce  it!"  Senator  Miller  of  South  Carolina  said, 
in  1833.  in  the  debute  over  the  so-called  force  bill :  "  No  reproof  for  her 
[Georgia's]  refractory  spirit  was  heard;  oa  the  contrary,  a  learned  review 
of  the  decision  came  out,  attributed  to  executive  countenance  and  fa 
vor."  Niles'  Keg.,  XLIII.,  Suppl.,  p.  141. 


NULLIFICATION.  459 


CHAPTER  XII. 

TIIE  DOCTRINE  OF  NULLIFICATION.  THE  COMPROMISE  BE 
TWEEN  SOUTH  CAROLINA  AND  THE  FEDERAL  GOVERN 
MENT. 

The  pending  presidential  election  had  not  been  without 
influence  upon  the  issue  of  the  tariff  struggle  of  1828, 
and  the  reception  of  the  latter  at  the  south.  The  majority 
of  the  protectionists  was  so  small  that  the  days  of  their 
power  were  probably  numbered,  provided  the  incoming 
administration  should  support  the  opposite  party  with 
energy.  And  the  prospects  of  Jackson,  upon  whom  the  anti- 
protectionists  thought  they  could  safely  count,  grew  better 
every  day.  Moreover,  the  extinction  of  the  national  debt 
was  close  at  hand,  and  the  reasonable  arguments,  as  well 
as  the  declamations,  of  the  south  could  reckon  on  much 
more  willing  hearers  as  soon  as  the  annual  financial  report 
showed  a  regular  surplus.  The  protective  system  was  thus 
deprived  of  all  the  props  which  had  hitherto  done  it  thank 
worthy  service. 

The  Democrats  won  a  more  brilliant  victory  than  they 
themselves  had  expected.  Jackson  -received  one  hundred 
and  eighty-three  electoral  votes  against  only  eighty- three 
for  Adams,  and  Calhoun,  the  irreconcilable  enemy  of  the 
protectionists,  was  chosen  vice-president  by  one  hundred 
and  seventy-one  electoral  votes.1  It  was  next  to  be  dis 
covered  how  far  men  were  justified  in  seeing  in  this  a 
triumph  of  free  trade  principles.2  The  inaugural  address 

1  Debates  of  Congress,  X.,  p.  394. 

8  "  In  New  York,  Pennsylvania,  and  the  west  General  Jackson  has 
been  supported  as  the  firm  friend  of  the  tariff  and  of  internal  improve- 


4:60  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

of  the  new  president  touched  upon  this  point  in  a  vague  and 
extremely  cautious  way.  It  spoke, of  course,  of  "revenue 
duties,"  but  affirmed  that  "  agriculture,  commerce,  and 
manufactures  should  be  equally  favored,"  arid  added  the 
notable  observation  that  "  perhaps  the  only  exception  to 
this  rule  should  consist  in  the  peculiar  encouragement  of 
any  products  of  either  of  them  that  may  be  found  essen 
tial  to  our  national  independence."1  This  declaration  left 
both  parties  unsatisfied.  The  annual  message  was  awaited 
with  keen  expectation.  It  undeceived  the  free  traders  still 
more  completely,  without  giving  the  protectionists  cause 
for  rejoicing.  It  expressed  an  opinion  in  favor  of  a  "modi 
fication"  of  the  tariff,  but  wished  to  see  the  principle  that 
American  products  must  be  enabled  to  compete  with 
foreign  adopted  as  "  the  general  rule  to  be  applied  in 
graduating  the  duties."  In  regard  to  wares  which  were  of 
especial  importance  in  time  of  war,  "  even  a  step  beyond 
this  point"  ought  to  be  taken.2  It  was  only  safe  to  infer 
from  these  sayings  that  Jackson  would  gladly  see  a  re 
duction  of  some  duties;  the  decided  rejection,  on  prin 
ciple,  of  the  whole  protective  system,  which  the  south  had 
wished  and  expected,  could  in  no  way  be  inferred  from  the 
general  sentences  which  inclined  to  every  side  and  said 
nothing  at  all  decisive.  These  passages  left  it  uncertain 
whether  he  had  it  in  view  to  exercise  even  a  moderate 
pressure  upon  the  protectionists.  The  recommendation 
for  the  division  of  the  expected  yearly  surplus  among  the 
states,  in  proportion  to  the  ratio  of  representation,  for  the 
execution  of  internal  improvements,  until  a  comprehensive 
change  of  the  tariff  brought  about  again  an  equality  be- 

inents;  but  in  the  south  he  has  been  as  zealously  sustained,  by  those 
who  deny  the  right  and  constitutionality  of  these  things,  as  being  the 
friend  of  '  southern  interests,'  believed  by  them  to  be  seriously  injured 
by  the  tariff  and  internal  improvement  laws."  Niles'  Reg.,  XXXV.,  p. 
194. 

1  Statesman's  Manual,  L,  p.  696. 

8  Ibid,  II.,  p.  703. 


JOHN   C.x  CALHOTTN.  461 

tween  the  income  and  outgo,  scarcely  pointed  to  this,  es- 
specially  since  he  proposed  that  the  federal  government 
should  be  given  the  necessary  power,  if  it  did  not  already 
possess  it,  by  an  amendment  to  the  constitution. 

Calhonn  considered  this  proposal  as  a  direct  bid  for  the 
favor  of  the  protectionists,  He  had  not  approved  of  the 
extreme  language  used  by  the  meetings  at  Colleton,  Abbe 
ville  and  other  places  after  the  passage  of  the  tariff  of 
1828,  for  he  had  no  hope  that  this  wonld  exert  a  favorable 
influence  upon  the  election,  011  the  issue  of  which  he  meant 
to  make  his  next  plan  of  action  depend.  Without  seeing 
in  Jackson's  election  a  guaranty  for  a  change  of  principle 
in  the  politico-industrial  policy  of  the  country,  he  yet 
hoped  for  so  much  from  it  that  he  favored  delay.1  A 
memorial,  which  thoroughly  discussed,  in  a  quiet  and  firm 
way,  the  economic  as  well  as  the  constitutional  side  of  the 
^question,  seemed  to  him  to  best  correspond  with  the  de 
mands  of  the  moment.2 

Calhoun  was  a  true  son  of  the  soil  from  which  he  sprang, 
and  he  therefore  possessed  in  a  high  degree  the  character 
istic  traits  of  the  Protestant  population  of  the  north  of 
Ireland,  to  which  he  belonged  by  descent, — that  peculiar 
primitive  energy,  in  which  an  enthusiasm  more  idealistic 
than  ideal  is  strangely  linked  with  stubborn  consistency. 
The  blood  flowed  in  his  veins  not  less  hotly  than  in  those 
of  any  other  Carolinian,  but  a  piercing  intelligence  and  a 
soaring  ambition  held  it  sharply  in  check  when  great  ques 
tions  were  to  be  weighed  and  decided.  He  had  not  the 
breadth  of  view  that  characterizes  the  statesman,  but  he 
had  extraordinarily  keen  vision.  From  the  sole  of  his 
foot  to  the  crown  of  his  head  a  speculative  politician,  he 
was  wholly  unaware  of  the  results  to  which  his  policy 

1  Calhoun,  Works,  II.,  p.  215;  VI.,  p.  56. 

8  The  draft  was  adopted,  with  some  alterations,  by  the  legislature  and 
published.  It  is  known  as  the  "South  Carolina  Exposition."  Calhoun, 
Works,  VI.,  p.  1,  seq. 


462          STATE  SOVEREIGNTY  AND  SLAVERY. 

would  inevitably  lead;  but  the  practical  instinct  of  the 
American  race,  and  a  political  activity  extending  over 
many  years,  enabled  him  to  find  ways  and  means  for  bring 
ing  the  burning  questions  of  the  day  to  such  a  solution 
that  he  constantly  brought  his  doctrines  nearer  and  nearer 
to  a  practical  realization.  He  was  not  idealist  enough  to 
delude  himself  with  the  hope  of  an  immediate  accomplish 
ment  of  his  whole  programme,  and  not  to  reconcile  him 
self  to  the  withdrawal  of  half  his  stake  if  it  appeared  that 
he  could  then  win  the  game,  and  must  otherwise  lose  it 
entirely.  But  he  was  enough  of  a  fanatic  to  allow  nothing 
to  interfere  with  his  will,  if  the  choice  between  going  for 
ward  and  a  partial  sacrifice  of  the  principles  of  his  doc 
trines  was  once  set  before  him.  In  such  cases,  he  was 
capable  of  making  "  bend  or  break"  his  motto,  and  this 
not  merely  in  moments  of  the  highest  excitement.  His 
attitude  remained  the  same,  even  when  the  struggle  con- 
tinned  for  years.  If  he  had  been  a  visionary,  whose  sys 
tem  was  built  up  in  the  air,  he  could  scarcely  have  done 
this;  the  material  interests  which  formed  the  broad  basis 
of  his  doctrines  gave  him  the  needed  strength,  yes,  made 
this  course  a  necessity.  The  constitution  and  the  history 
of  its  origin  gave  him  only  the  formal  foundation  for  the 
development  of  the  doctrine  of  state-rights,  and  its  de 
velopment,  with  him  and  with  the  whole  people,  did  not 
rest  upon  a  priori  reasoning.  He  was  originally  by  no 
means  inclined  to  this  opinion.  The  slavery  question  drove 
him  into  the  path,  and  with  the  increasing  development  of 
the  slaveholding  interest  he  followed  it  on  to  the  farthest 
consequences.  By  the  light  of  slavery,  and  in  accordance 
with  the  Jaws  of  logic,  he  worked  out  the  constitutional  law 
of  a  democratic  federative  republic,  and  the  logically  correct 
result  was  a'systematization  of  anarchy.  He  failed  to  rec 
ognize  this  fact,  because  the  doctrine  was  to  him  a  means 
to  an  end,  and  his  whole  political  reasoning  became  in  course 
of  time  so  completely  identified  with  the  prosecution  of 


BREACH    BETWEEN    JACKSON    AND    CALHOIJN.  463 

the  one  aim  that  the  means  became  to  his  mind  its  own 
end.  His  inborn  firmness  and  the  self-reliance  that  had 
been  distorted  into  haughtiness  under  the  influence  of 
slavery  thus  became  obstinacy.  It  was  not  possible  for 
him  to  place  himself  under  the  orders  of  a  leader,  but  the 
one-sidedness  of  his  political  reasoning  and  striving,  and 
especially  the  readiness,  almost  genius,  with  which  he 
mastered  in  an  instant  the  whole  range  of  questions  which 
lay  within  his  narrow  circle  of  View,  made  him  unfit  to  be 
the  leader  of  a  great  party;  at  the  same  time  his  talent  and 
character  marked  him  out  for  the  head  of  a  faction  of  ex 
tremists.  But  a  growing  ambition  kept  his  eyes  fastened 
upon  the  White  House,  which  he  could  never  hope  to  reach 
through  a  faction,  however  devoted  to  him.1 

It  seems  not  improbable  that  the  hope  of  attaining  this 
last  goal  of  his  personal  wishes  so  worked  upon  Calhoun 
that  he  tried,  before  and  immediately  after  the  presidential 
election  of  1828,  to  persuade  his  nearest  party  comrades  to 
greater  moderation.  But  as  long  as  the  tariff  question  was 
not  brought  to  a  satisfactory  issue,  this  remained  the  de 
cisive  factor  of  his  policy.  Jackson's  messages  could  not 
content  him.  As  yet,  no  cause  for  a  breach  between  the 
two  had  been  offered,  but  he  began  to  look  upon  the  presi 
dent  with  distrust  and  resolved  to  break  away  from  him 
rather  than  consent  to  retrogression  on  this  question  for 
reasons  of  party  politics.  The  pursuit  of  his  personal 
wishes  did  not  hinder  this  resolve,  for  he  was  soon  con- 

1  Buchanan  characterizes  Calhoun  as  follows:  "  He  possessed  emi 
nent  reasoning  powers,  but  in  the  opinion  of  many  was  deficient  in 
sound,  practical  judgment.  He  was  terse  and  astute  in  argument;  but 
his  views  were  not  sufficiently  broad  and  expanded  to  embrace  at  the 
same  time  all  tho  great  interests  of  the  country  and  to  measure  them 
according  to  their  relative  importance.  It  was  his  nature  to  concen 
trate  all  his  powers  on  a  single  object,  and  this,  for  the  time  being,  al 
most  to  the  exclusion  of  all  others.  Although  not  eloquent  in  debate 
he  was  rapid,  earnest  and  persuasive."  Buchanan's  Administration 
p.  91. 


464:  STATE   SOVEEEIGNTY   AND   SLAVEEY. 

vinced  that  Jackson  would  not  aid  him  in  their  fulfillment. 
There  had  been  from  the  very  start  a  certain  coolness  in 
the  personal  relations  of  the  two  men,  because  Calhonn 
found  that  in  the  construction  of  the  cabinet  his  friends 
had  not  been  considered  to  the  extent  he  had  expected  and 
claimed,  although  Branch  of  North  Carolina,  the  secretary 
of  the  navy,  Berrien  of  Georgia,  the  attorney- general,  and 
especially  Ingham  of  Pennsylvania,  the  secretary  of  the 
treasury,  belonged  to  his  supporters.1  A  year  later,  Jack 
son  renounced  Calhoun's  friendship  fully  and  for  ever. 
The  cause  of  this  was  the  discovery  of  the  fact  that  Calhoun, 
as  Monroe's  secretary  of  war,  had  expressed  the  opinion 
that  the  general  ought  to  be  brought  to  a  reckoning  for 
his  conduct  in  the  war  against  the  Seminoles.  In  the 
spring  of  1831,  Jackson  deepened  and  strengthened  the 
breach  begun  by  purely  personal  enmity  by  dissolving  his 
cabinet  and  reorganizing  it  out  of  the  fraction  devoted  to 
Yan  Buren,  Calhoun's  old  opponent  and  rival.  Calhonn 
was  fully  aware  that  a  very  great  majority  of  the  party  was 
blindly  devoted  to  Jackson  in  this  conflict  as  well  as  in  all 
other  matters.  Personal  embitterment  and  the  knowledge 
that  he  must  abandon,  for  the  near  future,  every  thought  of 
the  fulfillment  of  his  hopes  for  the  presidency,  put  an  end 
to  the  last  doubts  over  the  position  which  he  now  had  to 
assume.  But  to  ascribe  his  course  thereafter — as  Jackson- 
Democrats  have  often  done — exclusively  or  even  principal 
ly  to  this  motive,  is  simply  ridiculous.  The  role  which 
Calhoun  played  for  more  than  a  generation  in  the  history 
of  the  United  States  should  protect  him  from  being  meas 
ured  with  a  rule  applicable  only  to  a  contemptible  and 
crazy  demagogue.  But  besides  and  above  this,  the  history 
of  the  United  States  is  a  too  significant,  serious  and  in 
structive  chapter  in  the  history  of  the  world  to  be  brought 
into  the  domain  of  trifles  by  the  explanation  of  its  most 

1  Calhoun  had  not  expected  to  see  a  larger  number  of  places  filled 
with  his  friends,  but  he  had  tried  to  have  other  persons  chosen. 


NULLIFICATION    RESOLVED    UPON.  465 

significant  phases  of  development  as  due  to  the  pettiest  and 
most  groveling  impulses  of  single  individuals,  permitted 
by  circumstances  to  play  a  part  in  them. 

Calhonn  had  now  given  up  all  hope  that  the  protective 
system  could  be  destroyed  with  Jackson's  help  in  the  reg 
ular  parliamentary  way.  He  was  not  contented  with  an 
insignificant  reduction  of  particular  duties;  he  held  that 
the  time  had  come  for  a  decisive  step.  His  state  and  him 
self  had  become  so  deeply  involved  that  they  had  to  go 
forward  or  backward.  If  they  submitted  to  the  repetition 
of  the  protest  so  often  recorded  against  the  maintenance  of 
the  status  quo,  they  were  sure  of  the  disgrace  of  mockery. 
It  would  have  come  hard  to  the  unbridled  cavalier  spirits 
of  these  slave-barons  to  bear  this  patiently,  even  if  the  ful 
fillment  of  their  word  would  have  been  sure  and  useless 
self-sacrifice.  But  according  to  their  reasoning  the  pros 
pect  for  a  favorable  result  from  a  bold  advance  was  great 
enough  to  justify  the  venture.  The  apportionment  of 
power  between  north  and  south  became  with  every  year 
more  unfavorable  to  the  latter.  Was  it  not  therefore  given 
wholly  to  the  north  to  decide,  as  long  as  the  question  was 
left  to  congress,  whether,  when  and  how  far  the  complaints 
concerning  the  unequal  pressure  of  the  protective  system 
should  be  heeded?  Must  not  the  other  southern  states  also 
put  this  question  to  themselves?  And  if  they  did  put  it, 
could  they  still  be  willing,  after  the  experience  already  at 
tained,  to  wait  with  "slavish  resignation"  until  the  north 
came  to  a  better  understanding  and  gave  ear  to  the  voice 
of  justice?  They  might  shrink  back  from  the  path  which 
South  Carolina  had  the  courage  to  tread ;  but  would  they 
not  follow  if  they  saw  that  she  reached  the  goal? 

Calhoun  not  only  knew  too  well  the  spirit  of  the  people, 
but  was  himself  too  deeply  impregnated  with  it,  not  to 
consider  the  raising  the  banner  of  revolution  as  a  dubious 
expedient.  Since  the  birth-pangs  of  the  republic  were 
endured,  the  Americans,  with  the  exception  of  single  indi- 
30 


466  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY    AND    SLAVERY. 

viduals,  have  not  fallen  into  the  grave  error  of  considering 
revolutions  as  radical  means  against  political  evils.  Slavish 
reverence  for  the  government  is  foreign  to  an  American; 
it  is  one  of  the  characteristic  and  not  insignificant  traits 
of  political  life  in  the  United  States  that  the  disregard  of 
the  dignity  of  office  often  Violates  the  most  ordinary  rules 
of  courtesy.  But  this  unhealthy  expression  of  the  proud 
consciousness  of  belonging  to  a  democratic  state  is  found, 
as  a  rule,  side  by  side  with  the  much  more  important  feel 
ing,  springing  from  the  same  consciousness,  that  the  laws 
are  not  a  hostile  force,  external  to  the  people,  but  the  ex 
pression  of  its  own  binding  will.  Calhoun  and  his  com 
rades  could  oppose  the  government  without  being  obliged 
to  expect  to  be  personally  branded  on  that  account  as  rebels 
and  to  have  the  whole  nation  against  them.  But  they 
dared  not  rest  their  opposition  upon  reasons  of  justice  and 
expediency.  They  had  to  bring  forward  proof  that  they 
stood  upon  a  positive  right.  If  Calhoun  now  applied  his 
whole  intellectual  strength  to  the  solution  of  this  question, 
he  resorted  to  no  legerdemain.  He  was  not  shallow  enough 
to  think  that  revolutions  could  be  fought  through  by  a 
sophistical  whirl  of  phrases.  It  is  a  much-argued  question 
whether  he  thought  it  possible  that  cannon  and  the  hang 
man  could  speak  the  last  word  in  the  struggle;  but  he 
surely  did  not  think  that  he  could  close  the  mouth  of  the 
cannon  and  cheat  the  gallows  of  its  victim,  while  he  threw 
dust  in  the  eyes  of  the  people  by  using  the  arts  of  logic. 
Of  course  he  wished  to  show  that  South  Carolina  was  just 
ified  in  refusing  allegiance  to  the  federal  government,  but 
he  did  not  wish  to  prove  by  newly-discovered  subtleties 
that  forswearing  the  allegiance  that  was  due — in  other 
words,  a  revolution — was  no  revolution.  The  wish  never 
entered  his  head  to  put  forward  something  new,  for  how 
ever  unanswerable  his  conclusions  might  have  been,  the 
nation  would  have  simply  laughed  himself  and  his  doc 
trines  to  political  death,  if  he  had  pretended  to  have 


"SOUTH    CAROLINA    EXPOSITION."  467 

brought  to  light  from  hitherto  unexplored  and  unknown 
depths  the  proofs  that  a  state  could  legally  annul  the 
federal  authority.  Only  because  he  went  on  a  path  long 
known  and  widely  trod,  could  he  nourish  a  hope  for  success 
and  trust  that,  at  the  worst,  hands  would  not  lightly  be  laid 
upon  him,  however  enraged  and  furious  men  were  over  his 
assertion  that  the  path  did  lead  to  the  goal  he  described. 
He  simply  wished  to  mark  with  milestones  the  whole  road 
from  the  starting  point  to  the  goal  that  had  not  only  been 
often  pointed  out,  but  had  also  been  already  reached,  by 
others,  in  order  that  there  might  be  no  gap  in  the  path  and 
that  the  goal  itself  might  be  made  the  sole  theme  of  future 
discussion.  He  succeeded  in  this  better  than  his  adver 
saries  did  in  proving  their  assertion  that  he  had  sought,  for 
the  gratification  of  his  hate  and  ambition,  to  lead  the  peo 
ple  upon  a  path  of  error  which  no  one  before  him  had  had 
the  shamelessness  and  the  criminal  audacity  to  tread.  The 
writings  in  which  he  sought  the  solution  of  these  problems 
form  the  largest  part  of  the  long  chain  of  practical  com 
mentaries  upon  the  constitution,  which  began  with  the 
Virginia  and  Kentucky  resolutions  and  ended  with  the 
four  years  of  civil  war.  The  "South  Carolina  Exposition," 
already  mentioned,  was  the  introduction  to  them.  The  first 
chapter,  the  "  address  to  the  people  of  South  Carolina,"  is 
dated  at  Fort  Hill,  July  26.1 

Calhoun  begins  with  a  reference  to  the  fact,  seldom 
rightly  estimated,  that  "  the  question  of  the  relation  which 
the  states  and  the  general  government  bear  to  each  other 
is  not  one  of  recent  origin,"  but  that  "  from  the  commence 
ment  of  our  system,  it  has  divided  public  sentiment."2  He 


1  Jenkins,  The  Life  of  J.  C.  Calhoun,  pp.  161-187 ;  first  published  in 
the  Pendlet&n  Messenger.  Compare  Calhoun,  Works,  VI.,  pp.  124-144. 

*  There  are  two  versions  of  this  important  paper.  The  quotations  in 
ihis  passage  are  not  made  from  the  "  address  to  the  people  of  South 
Carolina,"  as  it  appears  in  Calhoun,  Works,  VI.,  pp.  124-144,  but  from 
an  "  address  on  the  relations  of  the  states  and  federal  government," 


468  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND   SLAVERY. 

adopted  as  the  basis  of  his  argument  the  leading  sentence 
in  the  Virginia  resolutions,  and  said:  "The  right  of  inter 
position  thus  solemnly  asserted  by  the  state  of  Virginia, 
be  it  called  as  it  may — state-right,  veto,  nullification,  or  by 
any  other  name, — I  conceive ,  to  be  the  fundamental  prin 
ciple  of  our  system,  resting  upon  facts  historically  as 
certain  as  our  revolution  itself  and  deductions  as  simple 
and  as  demonstrative  as  that  of  any  political  or  moral 
truth  whatever."  From  both  points  of  view,  he  sought, 
then,  proof  for  these  statements.  "  The  great  dissimilarity 
and,  as  I  must  add,  as  truth  compels  me  to  do,  contrariety 
of  interests  in  our  country  .  .  •  .  are  so  great  that  they 
cannot  be  subjected  to  the  unchecked  will  of  a  majority  of 
the  whole  without  defeating  the  great  end  of  government 
and  without  which  it  is  a  curse, — justice."  This  is  the 
real,  broad  foundation  of  his  doctrine  that  the  Union  could 
never  have  been  reared  upon  another  legal  basis  and  could 
never  have  an  assured  foundation  upon  any  other.1  The 
state  governments  are  not,  he  said,  the  federal  government; 
the  states  are  not  subject  to  the  Union.  Jefferson  had  al 
ready  rightly  described  them  as  "  co-ordinate  departments 
of  a  simple  and  undivided  whole,"2  whose  possible  disputes 
on  questions  of  competence — if  an  agreement  could  not  be 
arrived  at — could  be  settled  only  by  a  convention  of  the 
states.  Only  stupidity,  he  declared,  could  raise  the  cry 
that  he  preached  anarchy,  for  here  is  a  court  of  last  resort 

(Works,  VI.,  pp.  59-94)  which  is  dated  at  Fort  Hill,  July  26, 1831,  but 
which  seems  to  be  a  preliminary  draft  of  the  real  "  address."  The 
author  follows  Jenkins's  Life  of  Calhoun.  Translators1  note, 

1  "  Who,  of  any  party,  with  the  least  pretension  to  candor,  can  deny 
that  on  all  these  points  (the  great  questions  of  trade — of  taxation — 01 
disbursement  and  appropriation  and  the  nature,  character  and  power  of 
the  general  government)  so  deeply  important,  no  two  distinct  nations 
can  be  more  opposed  than  this  [the  plantation  states]  and  the  other 
sections  ?»  Calhoun,  Works,  VI.,  p.  134. 

*  Compare  a  "  disquisition  on  government,"  Calhoun,  Works,  I.,  p 
167. 


LEGAL  THEORY  OF  NULLIFICATION,         469 

for  all  cases.  Until  its  decision  had  been  given,  the  states 
which  find  themselves  in  the  minority  must  evidently  be 
in  condition  to  protect  themselves  against  usurpations. 
The  natural  legal  means  is  "nullification,"  that  is,  the 
declaration  that  the  resolves  of  the  majority  are  null  and 
void,  so  far  as  the  states  taking  this  action  are  affected  by 
them.  Nullification  would  self- evidently  be  absolutely 
binding  upon  the  federal  government,  for  the  doctrine  that 
it  can-  insist  with  as  much  right  as  the  respective  states 
upon  its  interpretation  and  try  to  make  it  good,  rests  upon 
the  "  erroneous  assumption  that  the  general  government  is 
a  party  to  the  constitutional  compact."1  It  is  really  only 
the  "  agent,"  which  "  the  sovereign  states"  have  entrusted 
with  the  execution  of  certain  provisions  of  the  compact 
made  by  them.  This  must  apply  to  the  supreme  court  of 
the  United  States  as  well  as  to  the  other  federal  powers, 
for  opposing  principles  do  not  underlie  the  different  parts 
of  the  constitution.  Moreover,  the  supreme  court  does 
not  stand  above  or  outside  of  the  constitution,  but  is  simply 
an  agent  of  the  sovereign  states;  in  political  questions  "its 
incompetency  is  not  less  clear  than  its  want  of  constitu 
tional  authority."2  After  this  exposition  of  his  standpoint 

1  Hayne  had  said  in  his  debate  with  Webster  (Jan.,  1830) :  "  Here,  then, 
is  a  case  of  a  compact  between  sovereigns,  and  the  question  arises,  what 
is  the  remedy  for  a  clear  violation  of  its  express  terms  by  one  of  the 
parties  [that  is,  by  one  of  the  states  or  the  federal  government]  ?"  Elliot, 
Deb.,  IV.,  p.  509.  Webster  said  in  reply:  "The  constitution,  it  is  said, 
is  a  compact  between  states;  the  states,  then,  and  the  states  only,  are 
parties  to  the  compact.  How  comes  the  general  government  itself  a 
party  ?  Upon  the  honorable  gentleman's  hypothesis,  the  general  gov 
ernment  is  the  result  of  the  compact,  the  creature  of  the  compact,  not 
one  of  the  parties  to  it.  Yet  the  argument,  as  the  gentleman  has  now 
stated  it,  makes  the  government  itself  one  of  its  own  creators.  It  mikes 
it  a  party  to  that  compact  to  which  it  owes  its  own  existence."  Web 
ster,  Works,  III.,  p.  343.  Calhoun  thus  wholly  agreed  with  Webster 
on  this  point  and  he  was  unquestionably  much  more  just  to  the  state- 
rights  doctrine  than  Hayne  with  his  logical  opposition. 

9  Compare  a  "  disquisition  on  government."  Calhoun,  Works,  I.,  pp. 
264,  322. 


470  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY    AND    SLAVERY. 

on  the  legal  question,  Calhoun  thoroughly  examined  the 
actual  point  then  under  dispute,  and  came  to  the  practical 
conclusion  that  the  last  moment  had  now  come  when 
"through  the  regular  and  ordinary  process  of  legislation" 
a  change  of  circumstances  for  the  better  could  be  brought 
about;  if  this  momentary  chance  was  not  improved,  then 
the  suffering  section  would  cease  "  to  look  to  the  general 
government  for  relief." 

The  address  was  a  blow  in  the  water  as  far  as  it  was 
directed  against  the  protectionist  party.  A  year  and  a 
half  before,  the  question  of  the  relation  between  the  states 
and  the  federal  government  had  been  thoroughly  argued 
in  the  senate  in  the  debate  over  the  so-called  Foote  resolu 
tion,  which  gave  no  direct  cause  whatever  for  such  a  dis 
cussion.  General  Hayne  of  South  Carolina  maintained 
the  side  of  the  state-rights  men,  and  "Webster  took  up  the 
cause  of  the  opposite  party.  The  whole  country  followed 
this  parliamentary  duel  with  feverish  interest.  The  north 
joyfully  proclaimed  Webster  as  the  victor,  and  the  tone  of 
scant  assurance  with  which  the  south  claimed  the  palm  for 
its  champion  showed  that  it  acknowledged  to  itself  the 
superiority  of  "Webster  in  dialectic  vigor,  in  cutting  repar 
tee,  and  in  the  command  of  language.  Yet  not  the  slight 
est  change  was  made  in  the  matter  under  consideration. 
Talk  and  negotiation  could  not  obstruct  the  march  of  events. 
Calhoun,  too,  naturally  did  not  think  of  convincing  his 
adversaries.  His  arguments  were  mainly  directed  to  his 
own  party,  with  the  view  of  consolidating  it  and  inspiring 
it  with  resolution.  The  announcement  of  his  resolve  to 
bring  his  doctrines  to  practical  accomplishment,  unless  the 
wrongs  of  the  plantation  states  were  forthwith  righted,  was 
of  most  force  with  his  opponents. 

A  few  weeks  afterwards  when,  in  accordance  with  general 
expectation,  the  tariff  question  again  came  before  congress, 
there  were  signs  of  the  beginning  of  a  break  in  the  pro 
tectionist  ranks.  Independently  of  the  political  crisis,  the 


471 

approach  of  which  was  scarcely  credited,  the  belief  in  the 
American  system  had  been  here  and  there  so  far  shat 
tered  that  its  friends  did  not  promise  themselves  the  best 
result  from  the  next  congressional  election.  Even  Clay 
felt  unsafe.  He  himself  brought  in  resolutions  "  for  the 
reduction  and  removal  of  certain  duties."  He  met  with 
violent  opposition  from  part  of  his  own  party,  but  the  be 
lief  that  the  safety  of  the  future  demanded  a  lowering 
of  the  tariff  conquered.1  The  secretary  of  the  treasury 
estimated  the  probable  decrease  of  the  revenue  from  duties 
at  five  million  dollars.  The  plantation  states  not  only 
found  the  amount  too  small,  but  declared  that  the  whole 
reduction  was  a  piece  of  bold  and  insolent  nonsense,  since 
duties  exclusively  for  revenue  had  been  almost  the  only 
ones  reduced;  the  small  decrease  in  the  protective  duties 
was  more  than  counterbalanced,  they  said,  by  the  required 
payment  in  ready  money,  the  shortening  of  the  time  of 
credit,  and  the  change  in  the  comparative  value  of  the 
dollar  and  the  pound  sterling.  South  Carolina  received 
the  taiiff  as  a  sure  declaration  that  the  protective  system 
was  "  the  settled  policy  of  the  country."  Calhoun  now 
exerted  his  whole  influence  to  have  the  die  cast  without 
delay,  and  with  a  firm  hand. 

July  14, 1832,  the  tariff  had  received  the  sanction  of  the 
president^  and  on  August  28  Calhoun  developed  again,  and 
in  a  more  exhaustive  way  than  hitherto,  the  whole  doctrine 
of  the  state-rights  party.2  The  arguments  are  more  sharp 
ly  formulated  than  in  the  address,  the  chain  of  logical  de 
velopment  is  more  firmly  forged,  and  the  final  consequences 
are  stated  with  the  utmost  clearness.  He  takes  as  his 
starting-point  the  fact  that  "  so  far  from  the  constitution 
being  the  work  of  the  American  people  collectively,  no 

1  See  the  tariff,  Statutes  at  Large,  IV.,  p.  583. 

*  He  chose,  this  time,  the  form  of  a  letter  to  Governor-  Hamilton  of 
South  Carolina.  Calhoun,  Works,  VI.,  pp.  144r-193;  Jenkins,  Life  of 
Calhoun,  pp.  1957232. 


472  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

such  political  body,  either  now  or  ever,  did  exist.  .  .  ^ 
From  the  beginning,  and  in  all  the  changes  of  political 
existence  through  which  we  have  passed,  the  people  of  the 
United  States  have  been  united  as  forming  political  com 
munities,  and  not  as  individuals.  Even  in  the  first  stage 
of  existence  they  formed  distinct  colonies,  independent  of 
each  other,  and  politically  united  only  through  the  British 
crown.  In  their  first  imperfect -union,  for  the  purpose  of 
resisting  the  encroachments  of  the  mother  country,  they 
united  as  distinct  political  communities;  and,  passing  from 
their  colonial  condition,  in  the  act  announcing  their  inde 
pendence  to  the  world  they  declared  themselves,  by  name 
and  enumeration,1  free  and  independent  states.  In  this 
character  they  formed  the  old  confederation ;  and  when  it 
was  proposed  to  supersede  the  articles  of  confederation  by 
the  present' constitution,  they  met  in  convention  as  states, 
acted  and  voted  as  states;  and  the  constitution,  when 
formed,  was  submitted  for  ratification  to  the  people  of  the 
several  states;  it  was  ratified  by  them  as  states,  each  state 
for  itself;  each  by  its  ratification  binding  its  own  citizens; 
the  parts  thus  separately  binding  themselves,  and  not  the 
whole  the  parts;  to  which,  if  it  be  added  that  it  is  de 
clared  in  the  preamble  of  the  constitution  to  be  ordained 
by  the  people  of  the  United  States,  and  in  the  article  of 
ratification,  when  ratified,  it  is  declared  'to  be  binding  be 
tween  the  states  so  ratifying,'2  the  conclusion  is  inevit- 

1 "  By  name  and  enumeration."  This  expression  is  not  in  full  ac 
cordance  with  historic  facts.  The  title  of  the  declaration  is  "  A  Dec 
laration  by  the  Representatives  of  the  United  States  in  Congress  As- 
sembled."  At  the  end  are  the  words :  "  The  foregoing  declaration  was, 
by  order  of  congress,  engrossed  and  signed  by  the  following  members.'* 
Then  follows  the  signature  of  the  president,  under  this  the  names  or 
the  states,  and  under  each  state  the  names  of  its  representatives. 

8  This  quotation  is  not  correct.  Article  VII.  of  the  constitution 
reads :  "  The  ratification  of  the  convention  of  nine  states  shall  be  suffi 
cient  for  the  establishment  [not  binding]  of  this  constitution,  between 
the  states  so  ratifying  the  same." 


STATE-EIGHTS   THEORY    OF   THE    CONSTITUTION.  473 

able  that  the  constitution  is  the  work  of  the  people  of  the 
states,  considered  as  separate  and  independent  political 
communities.  .  .  .  The  first  and  .  .  most  impor 
tant  result  [of  these  facts]  is  that  there  is  no  direct  and 
immediate  connection  between  the  individual  citizens  of 
a  state  and  the  general  government.  The  relation  between 
them  is  through  the  state.  ...  It  was  only  by  the 
ratification  [of  the  federal  constitution]  of  the  state  that 
its  citizens  became  subject  to  the  control  of  the  general 
government.  ...  It  belongs  to  the  state  as  a  member 
of  the  Union,  in  her  sovereign  capacity  in  convention,  to 
determine  definitely,  as  far  as  her  citizens  are  concerned, 
the  extent  of  the  obligation  which  she  contracted ;  and  if, 
in  her  opinion,  the  act  exercising  the  power  [in  dispute]  be 
unconstitutional,  to  declare  it  null  and  void,  which  declara 
tion  would  be  obligatory  on  her  citizens."  This  right 
"flows  directly  from  the  relation  of  the  state  to  the  gen 
eral  government  on  the  one  side,  and  its  citizens  on  the 
other."  Its  exercise  is  not  the  abrogation  of  an  act  of  the 
federal  government  by  the  state,  but  by  the  constitution; 
nullification  is  "  the  great  conservative  principle"  of  the 
Union.  "Not  a  provision  can  be  found  in  the  constitution 
authorizing  the  general  government  to  exercise  any  con 
trol  whatever  over  a  state  by  force,  by  veto,  by  judicial 
process,  or  in  any  other  form, — a  most  important  omis 
sion,  designed,  and  not  accidental."  And  the  acturj  state 
of  the  case  corresponds  with  the  right,  for  "  it  would  be 
impossible  for  the  general  government,  within  the  limits 
of  the  states,  to  execute,  legally,  the  act  nullified,  .  .  . 
while  on  the  other  hand  the  state  would  be  able  to  enforce, 
legally  and  peaceably,  its  declaration  of  nullification,"  since 
the  citizens  of  the  state  "would  be  found  in  all  the  rela 
tions  of  life,  private  and  political,  to  respect  and  obey  it; 
and,  when  called  upon  as  jurymen,  to  render  their  verdict 
accordingly,  or,  as  judges,  to  pronounce  judgment  in  con 
formity  with  it."  An  appeal  to  the  United  States  supreme 


474          STATE  SOVEREIGNTY  AND  SLAVERY. 

court  would  be  of  no  use,  for  "what  would  it  avail  against 
the  execution  of  the  penal  enactments  of  the  state,  intend 
ed  to  enforce  the  declaration  of  nullification?  .  .  . 
Beaten  before  the  [state]  courts,  the  general  government 
would  be  compelled  to  abandon  its  unconstitutional  pre 
tensions,  or  resort  to  force;  a  resort,  the  difficulty  (I  was 
about  to  say  the  impossibility)  of  which  would  very  soon 
fully  manifest  itself,  should  folly  or  madness  ever  make 
the  attempt."  Moreover,  the  calling  out  of  the  military 
power  of  the  Union  would  be  wholly  useless,  because  no 
opponents  would  be  found,  for  "  it  would  be  .  .  a  con 
flict  of  moral,  not  physical,  force."  The  legal  relation  be 
tween  the  nullifying  state  and  the  federal  government 
would  be  by  no  means  broken  up.  The  decision  of  one 
concrete  question  between  them  would  simply  be  delayed 
until  the  sovereign  parties  to  the  union  compact  had  de 
liberated  over  it.  If  the  power  of  the  federal  government 
in  question  was  confirmed  by  three-fourths  of  these  parties, 
then  the  suspension  of  its  exercise  caused  by  nullification 
had  reached  its  end>]  Yet  it  is  not  to  be  understood  that 
the  nullifying  state  would  in  every  case  be  unconditionally 
bound  by  such  a  decision.  This  is,  of  course,  the  rule, 
and  the  scope  of  the  rale  is  so  great  that  a  convention  01 
states  may  properly  be  called,  not  only  a  court  of  last 

1  This  gave  one-fourth  of  the  states  the  power  to  deprive  the  federal 
government  of  every  power  entrusted  to  it,  that  is,  to  alter  the  constitu 
tion  at  will.  But,  according  to  Article  V.,  the  constitution  can  be 
amended  only  by  the  consent  of  three-fourths  of  all  the  states.  More 
over,  in  the  case  in  point,  the  "  suspension"  of  the  questioned  power  is 
in  such  flagrant  contradiction  to  another  provision  of  the  constitution 
that  the  state-rights  party  did  not  try  to  dispute  it,  but  pushed  it  aside 
by  appealing  to  their  general  line  of  argument.  Nullification  forbade 
the  collection  of  all  customs,  but  the  constitution  (Article  I.,  Sec.  8,  §  1) 
says:  "All  duties,  imposts,  and  excises  shall  be  uniform  throughout  the 
United  States."  If  the  general  government  was  bound  to  respect  nulli 
fication,  it  was  obliged  by  this  passage  of  the  constitution  to  stop  the 
collection  of  all  customs  in  all  the  other  states,  until  '%the  sovereign 
parties"  decided  between  it  and  South  Carolina. 


RIGHT    OF    SECESSION.  475 

resort,  but  also  a  court  of  final  decision.  But  "  in  the 
case  stated,  should  the  other  members  undertake  to  grant 
the  power  nullified,  and  should  the  nature  of  the  power  be 
such  as  to  defeat  the  object  of  the  association  or  union,  at 
least  as  far  as  the  member  nullifying  is  concerned,  it  would 
then  become  an  abuse  of  power  on  the  part  of  the  prin 
cipals,  and  thus  present  a  case  where  secession  would 
apply;  but  in  no  other  could  it  be  justified,  except  it  be 
for  a  failure  of  the  association  or  union  to  effect  the  object 
for  which  it  was  created,  independent  of  any  abuse  of 
power."  In  this  case  "force  might,  indeed,  be  employed, 
.  .  .  but  it  must  be  a  belligerent  force,  preceded  by  a 
declaration  of  war,  and  carried  on  with  all  its  formalities." 
For  the  seceded  state  "  would  stand  to  them  [the  other 
states]  simply  in  the  relation  of  a  foreign  state,  divested 
of  all  federal  connection,  and  having  none  other  between 
them  but  those  belonging  to  the  laws  of  nations." 

Thus  the  question  of  the  relation  of  the  states  to  the 
government  of  the  Union,  and  to  the  Union  itself,  re 
ceived  its  definite  answer,  on  this  side,  in  this  theory. 
Everything  afterwards  brought  forward  by  the  state-rights 
party  was  only  a  repetition  or  a  more  exact  expression  of 
particular  principles.  Thirty  years  later  the  south  carried 
out  this  programme  piece  by  piece/and  based  its  justifica 
tion  of  its  course,  point  by  point,  upon  this  argument. 

Calhoun  had  not  claimed  the  right  of  nullification  for 
the  state  legislatures.  The  sovereignty  of  the  state  was 
the  one  premise  upon  which  he  built  up,  in  logical  se 
quence,  his  whole  argument;  therefore  an  action  of  the 
state  "  in  its  capacity  as  a  sovereign,"  that  is,  the  decision 
of  a  state  convention,  was  necessary  in  order  to  decide,  in 
a  binding  way,  whether  or  not  the  state  had  trusted  the 
common  agent  of  the  league  of  states  with  a  certain  pow 
er.1  On  this  point,  the  plans  of  the  nullifiers  had  already 

1  Yet  in  the  essay  of  a  later  date,  a  "disquisition  on  government" 
(Works,  I.,  p.  241),  he  says :  "  Nothing  short  of  a  negative,  absolute  or 


476  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND   SLAVERY. 

once  come  to  grief.  A  motion  to  call  a  convention  had 
been  made  in  the-  legislature,  but  it  did  not  receive  the 
necessary  majority  of  two-thirds.  But  the  anti-nullifica 
tion  party,  despite  the  greatest  efforts,  was  no  longer  able 
to  fill  a  third  of  the  seats  in  the  legislature.  Oct.  24,  the 
senate,  by  thirty  to  thirteen  votes,  and  the  house,  by  ninety- 
nine  to  twenty-five,  resolved  to  call  a  convention  on  the 
19th  of  November  at  Columbia.1  The  convention,  which 
contained  members  of  nearly  all  the  influential  families  of 
the  states,  chose  Gov.  Hamilton  as  its  chairman.  A  com 
mittee  appointed  by  him  reported,  through  Gen.  Ilayne,  a 
nullification  ordinance,  which  was  adopted,  Nov.  24,  by  a 
large  majority.2  It  declared  the  tariff  of  May  19,  1828, 
and  that  of  July  14,  1832,  null  and  void;  instructed  the 
legislature  to  pass  the  laws  and  take  the  other  measures 
necessary  for  enforcing  the  ordinance  and  preventing  the 
collection  of  the  duties  imposed  by  the  nullified  laws;  for 
bade  an  appeal  from  the  state  courts  to  the  United  States 
supreme  court  in  suits  in  which  the  authority  of  the  ordi 
nance,  the  binding  power  of  the  laws  passed  in  conse 
quence  of  it  or  the  validity  of  the  nullified  laws  came  into 
question;  commanded  the  state  judges  to  have  their  judg 
ments  executed  without  regard  to  any  such  appeal  and 
to  punish  persons  who  did  appeal  for  contempt  of  court; 
demanded  from  all  the  officials  of  the  state,  under  penalty 
of  instant  dismissal,  an  oath  to  recognize  and  fulfill  the 
ordinance  and  all  laws  passed  in  consequence  of  it;  pro 
vided  that  a  similar  oath  should  be  taken  by  jurors  when 
the  legality  of  the  ordinance  and  of  these  laws  came  into 

in  effect,  on  the  part  of  the  government  of  a  state,  can  possibly  protect 
it  against  the  encroachments  of  the  united  government  of  the  stales, 
whenever  their  powers  come  in  conflict." 

1  Niles'  Reg.,  XLIIL.p.  175. 

"The  ordinance  is  given  in  full  in  Deb.  of  Congress,  XII.,  p.  30; 
Niles'  Reg.,  XLIIL,  p.  219 ;  Benton,  Thirty  Years'  View,  I.,  p.  297 ;  and 
in  many  other  places. 


ORDINANCE    OF    NULLIFICATION.  477 

question;  and  announced  that  every  measure  of  coercion 
on  the  part  of  the  federal  government  would  be  regarded 
"as  inconsistent  with  the  longer  continuance  of  South 
Carolina  in  the ,  Union ;  and  that  the  people  of  this  state 
will  thenceforth  hold  themselves  absolved  from  all  future 
obligation  to  maintain  or  preserve  their  political  connec 
tion  with  the  people  of  the  other  states,  and  will  forthwith 
proceed  to  organize  a  separate  government  and  do  all-other 
acts  and  things  which  sovereign  and  independent  states 
may  of  right  do."  The  convention  then  adjourned  until 
March  in  order  to  await  the  decision  of  congress. 

The  legislature  assembled  November  27.  The  governor 
declared,  in  his  message,1  that  the  ordinance  of  nullification 
had  become  "  a  part  of  the  fundamental  law  of  South  Car 
olina."  The  legal  question  could  no  longer  be  mooted; 
"  it  is  enough  that  she  [South  Carolina]  has  willed  it."  It 
was  now  the  part  of  the  legislature,  he  said,  to  ensure  obe 
dience  to  the  ordinance  by  penal  enactments,  to  define  the 
crime  of  high  treason  against  the  state,  and  to  provide 
everything  that  would  be  necessary  in  case  the  federal 
government  should  seek  to  compel  obedience  to  its  usur- 
patory  laws.  For  the  latter  purpose,  he  asked  for  a 
thorough  reform  of  the  militia  organization  and  the  author 
ization  of  the  enlistment  of  two  thousand  volunteers  for 
the  defense  of  Charleston  and  of  ten  thousand  more  from 
the  rest  of  the  state. 

The  legislature  came  promptly  up  to  all  these  require 
ments.  A  law  gave  the  owners  of  goods  attached  on  ac 
count  of  the  non-payment  of  duties  the  right  to  regain 
possession  of  them  by  a  writ  of  replevin,  that  is,  author 
ized  the  use  of  force,  if  the  goods  were  not  voluntarily 
delivered  to  the  sheriff  by  the  custom-house  officials.2 

1  Niles'  Reg.,  XLIIL,  p.  259. 

*  See  Grundy's  speech  in  the  senate.  Niles'  Reg.,  XLIIL,  Suppl.,  p. 
215.  Compare,  too,  Webster,  Works,  III.,  pp.  491,  492;  Kent,  Connn., 
III.,  pp.  624,  625. 


478 


STATE    SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 


Moreover,  the  sheriff  was  empowered,  in  case  of  refusal,  to 
levy  on  the  private  property  of  the  custom-house  officials 
to  an  amount  double  that  of  the  goods  detained.  "Whoever 
opposed  the  execution  of  this  law  was  to  be  punished  by 
fine  and  imprisonment.  Similar  punishments  were  threat 
ened  against  those  who  lent  their  aid  in  any  way  whatever 
to  the  execution  of  those  judgments  of  the  federal  courts 
which  were  based  on  the  supposition  of  the  efficacy  of  the 
nullified  laws.  Other  laws  prescribed  the  oath  to  support 
the  ordinance  of  nullification  and  gave  the  governor  the 
power  he  asked  to  put  the  state  in  a  condition  for  defense 
and  to  bring  armed  force  into  play  if  it  seemed  at  any  time 
necessary.  Webster  affirmed  that  the  law  first  mentioned 
fell  far  short  of  the  ordinance.1  But  Grundy  summed  up  a 
masterly  analysis  of  it  by  saying  that  South  Carolina  had 
thereby  "  legislated  the  federal  government  out  of  the 
state." 

The  ordinance  of  nullification  put  Jackson  into  a  fury. 
On  December  II,2  he  issued,  as  an  answer,  his  famous 
"  proclamation,"  in  which  he  tried  to  refute  the  nullifica 
tion  doctrine  and  made  known  his  resolve  to  watch  over 
the  full  execution  of  the  law,  in  accordance  with  his  oath 
of  office,  with  all  the  powers  entrusted  to  him  by  the  con 
stitution.  The  proclamation  united  clear  and  genuine 
statesmanlike  reasoning  with  warm  and  tender  pathos.  It 
made  a  deep  impression  at  the  north.8  It  brought  keenly 


1  Webster,  Priv.  Corres.,  I.,  p.  530. 

'This  date  is  given  in  the  Statesman's  Manual,  II.,  pp.  890-903. 
Moreover,  in  the  message  of  Jan.  16,  1833  (Ibid,  II.,  p.  904),  is  the  ex 
pression,  "  My  proclamation  of  the  eleventh  of  December  last."  But 
Benton,  Thirty  Years'  View,  I.,  p.  299 ;  Colton,  Works  of  Henry  Clay, 
II.,  p.  218  ;  Curtis,  Life  of  Webster,  I.,  pp.  433,  465;  Elliot,  Deb.,  IV., 
p.  582 ;  Hunt,  Life  of  Edward  Livingston,  p.  371,  and  all  the  other  works 
which  I  can  recall  to  mind  (except  Partou,  Life  of  Jackson,  III.,  p. 
467),  give  the  date  of  Dec.  10.  I  know  no  explanation  for  this. 

'  Neumann,  Gesch.  der  Ver.  .Staaten,  II.,  p.  499,  says :  "  But  all  the  cred 
it  belongs  to  the  president ;  to  him  alone  belongs  all  the  glory  of  the  in- 


to  the  consciousness  of  the  south  the  miserable,  mongrel 
condition  of  that  section.  The  south  looked  unfavorably 
upon  South  Carolina's  action,  and  was  well  contented  that 
the  reckless,  energetic  man  at  the  head  of  the  government 
promised  to  lead  the  Union  safely  through  this  crisis.  But, 
on  the  other  hand,  South  Carolina  had  only  gone  a  step 
beyond  the  rest  of  the  south  in  the  development,  and  es 
pecially  in  the  practical  application,  of  the  state-rights 
doctrine.  The  unconditional  supremacy  claimed  by  the 
proclamation  for  the  laws  of  the  Union  and  the  promise  of 
their  protection  by  force,  if  necessary,  could  therefore 
gratify  this  section  but  little.1  South  Carolina  was  not 
alone  in  asking  where  Jackson's  swords  and  cannon  were, 
when  Georgia  publicly  and  scornfully  transgressed  the 
laws  of  the  Union.  Why  was  that  now  so  great  a  crime 

disputable  contents  of  the  proclamation  as  well  as  of  its  fiery  eloquence. 
Occasional  improvements  in  the  wording  may  be  due  to  that  master  of 
style,  Edward  Livingston.  There  is,  however,  not  the  slightest  ground 
for  ascribing  the  whole  proclamation  to  Livingston,  as  Hunt  has  done 
in  his  recent  biography,  Life  of  Edward  Livingston."  That  the  un 
cultured  Jackson  was  not  able  to  compose  this  state  paper,  needs  no 
proof.  That  Jackson  should  not  be  without  credit  for  it,  appears  very 
plainly  from  Hunt's  story  (pp.  371-381).  Jackson  gave  it  its  character 
which  is  expressed  in  the  words  so  often  quoted  :  "The  Union  must  and 
shall  be  preserved."  The  remainder  is  surely,  in  the  main,  Livingston's 
work.  Neumann's  authority  is  Parton,  of  whom  he  himself  (II.,  p. 
487)  says:  "The  biographer  of  Jackson  writes  a  novel,  calculated  to 
produce  effect,  and  calls  it  history."  And  Parton's  witness  is  Majoi 
Lewis,  a  friend  and  enthusiastic  admirer  of  Jackson,  to  whom  Parton  is 
indebted  for  endless  masses  of  presidential  "  kitchen-gossip."  Livings 
ton,  whose  name  is  even  now  mentioned  with  great  respect  by  the  great 
est  European  jurists,  does  not  deserve  to  be  put  off  with  the  description 
"  a  master  of  style."  Compare,  moreover,  Neumann,  II.,  p.  471. 

1  Clay  himself  wrote,  Dec.  12,  to  Judge  Brooks:  "As  to  the  procla 
mation,  although  there  are  good  things  in  it,  especially  what  relates  to 
the  judiciary,  there  are  some  entirely  too  ultra  for  me,  and  which  I  can 
not  stomach.  A  proclamation  ought  to  'have  been  issued  weeks  ago 
but  I  think  it  should  have  been  a  very  different  paper  from  the  present, 
which  I  apprehend  will  irritate,  instead  of  allaying  any  excited  feeling." 
Colton,  Works  of  Clay,  II.,  p.  219. 


480          STATE  SOVEREIGNTY  AND  SLAVERY. 

upon  which  the  president  then  looked  with  scarcely  con 
cealed  satisfaction?  Did  not  his  oath  of  office  impose  the 
same  duties  upon  him  then?  Was  the  supremacy  of  a 
tariff-law  of  a  higher  sort  than  that  of  treaties?  Why 
must  a  sovereign  state  now  most  obediently  entreat  the 
United  States  supreme  court  to  inform  it  of  the  limits  of 
its  rights,  when  then  a  state  no  more  sovereign  could  an 
grily  reject  the  decision  of  that  court,  made  in  all  form,  as 
a  revolting  assumption,  without  receiving  even  a  warning 
reproof  from  president  or  congress?  South  Carolina  knew 
that  no  answer  could  be  given  to  all  these  questions,  and 
therefore  did  not  fail  to  put  them.  But  she  was  too  proud 
and  too  prudent  to  look  upon  them  as  the  anchor  which 
held  fast  her  cause.  Calhoun's  "  indubitable  historic  facts'' 
and  his  "  simple  deductions"  from  the  constitution  had  to 
remain  the  ground  upon  which  she  took  her  stand,  if  she 
wished  not  only  to  escape  without  punishment,  but  to  reach 
her  immediate  aim  and  protect  herself  against  all  future 
contingencies. 

Hamilton's  term  of  office  had  meantime  expired,  and  in 
his  stead  Hayne  became  governor  of  South  Carolina.  The 
seat  thus  left  vacant  in  the  United  States  senate  was  given 
to  Calhoun,  who  had  resigned  the  vice-presidency.  In  the 
presidential  election,  the  state  took  only  a  formal  part, 
since  it  supported  the  candidates  of  neither  party.1  All 
this  showed  that  the  nullification  resolution  was  not  simply 
a  piece  of  headstrong  nonsense.  Jackson's  proclamation 
did  not  terrify  the  state.  It  only  made  it  the  more  defiant. 
Its  reading  in  the  legislature  was  accompanied  by  loud 
laughter  and  jesting  commentaries.2  Hayne  was  requested 
by  a  formal  resolution  of  both  houses  to  issue  a  counter 
proclamation.  He  responded  to  the  request  in  a  way 
which  satisfied  even  the  most  embittered  "fire-eaters" 

1  John  Floyd  of  Virginia  and  Henry  Lee  of  Massachusetts  were  the 
men  of 'straw  who  received  the  electoral  votes  of  South  Carolina. 
8  Niles'  Beg,,  XLIIL,  pp.  287,  288. 


.PREPARATION    FOE    WAK.  481 

among  the  nullifiers.1  Jackson's  command  to  the  custom 
house  officials  to  continue  in  the  discharge  of  their  duties  at 
every  risk,  the  mission  of  General  Scott  and  the  appearance 
of  ships  of  war  before  Charleston  were  answered  hy  redoubled 
zeal  in  the  hastening  of  preparations  for  war.  Meanwhile, 
congress  had  again  come  together.  Calhoun's  arrival  was 
waited  for  with  the  greatest  suspense.  The  galleries  were 
filled  to  overflowing  as  he  took  the  oath  to  the  constitution. 
The  firm  repose  with  which  he  did  so  did  not  fail  to  make 
a  deep  impression.  Only  a  few  denied  that  he  was  per 
sonally  a  man  of  the  strictest  morality,  and  it  was  there 
fore  said  that  he  must  be  fully  convinced  of  the  truth  of 
his  doctrine  and  would  not  lightly  abandon  it.  Still  less 
was  it  doubted  that  Jackson  would  fulfill  his  word,  if  South 
Carolina  made  good  her  own  of  February  1.  The  minds 
of  men  were  therefore  heavy  with  care,  for  nearly  all  agreed 
that  bloodshed  might  draw  after  it  the  most  incalculable 
results.  But  yet  an  indefinite  faith  that  the  danger  would 
be  averted  was  discernible  through  the  expression  of  the 
worst  fears.  Deeply  in  earnest  as  both  Jackson  and  South 
Carolina  were,  it  was  nevertheless  to  be  seen  from  the  first 
that  they  would  reciprocally  try  hard  to  avoid  an  armed 
collision.  This  feeling  did  not  easily  gain  possession  of 
the  energetic  soldier  who  had  always  looked  upon  the  pres 
idency  as  the  headship  of  an  army.  But  with  all  his  great 
and  eventful  faults,  he  possessed  the  one  virtue  of  a  true 
patriotism  and  a  warm  feeling  for  the  whole  people.  If 
the  sword  must  be  drawn,  then  it  would  certainly  not  be 
sheathed  again — as  far  as  this  depended  upon  him — until 
South  Carolina's  resistance  had  been  wholly  broken  down, 
even  if  the  whole  Union  had  first  to  be  bathed  in  blood. 
But  with  whatever  soldierly  joy  he  had  fought  against 
England  and  the  Indians,  he  did  not  wish  to  draw  the 
sword  against  his  fellow-citizens,  if  it  could  possibly  be 

1  Niles'  Reg.,  XLIIL,  pp.  308-312. 
31 


482          STATE  SOVEREIGNTY  AND  SLAVERY. 

avoided,  for  he  feared  that  there  would  perhaps  be  need  of 
Jong  and  hard  work  before  quiet  was  again  restored.  If 
congress  and  South  Carolina  agreed,  on  the  basis  of  a 
thorough  and  comprehensive  modification  of  the  tariff,  up 
on  the  conditions  of  a  settlement,  Jackson  certainly  would 
not  refuse  his  consent.  The  limits  of  the  indirect  partici 
pation  in  the  legislative  powers  granted  to  the  president 
by  the  constitution  could  not  rightly  be  so  narrowly  drawn 
by  him  that  he  could  hold  or  declare  himself  unauthorized 
to  veto  a  tariff  bill  because — and  simply  because— it  seemed 
to  him  desirable  to  subject  the  doctrine  of  nullification  to 
the  ordeal  by  fire.  But  Jackson  could  give  his  sanction 
to  a  tariff  modified  in  the  interests  of  free  trade  in  and  for 
itself,  without  yielding  the  slightest  point,  since  he  had 
already  recommended,  since  his  entrance  into  office,  a  mod 
ification  of  the  existing  tariff. 

His  patriotic  care  had  an  influence,  too,  upon  South 
Carolina,  for  it  is  simply  laughable,  from  party  spirit  or 
for  the  sake  of  heightened  dramatic  effect,  to  give  such  a 
view  of  the  strife  that  Calhoun  and  his  comrades  seem  to 
have  lost,  through  ambition,  personal  hatreds,  or  fanati 
cism,  all  national  spirit.  Any  chance  might,  indeed,  have 
let  the  flood  of  passion  break  through  the  dam  of  national 
feeling,  if  it  had  not  been  held  back  by  the  strongest  dic 
tates  of  political  prudence.  The  nullifiers  evidently  con 
sidered  it  practically  almost  impossible  for  the  federal 
government  to  try  to  cut  through  the  knots;  but  their 
judgment  remained  sober  enough  to  let  them  see  that  they 
would  compel  the  government  to  use  force  if  they  first  re 
sorted  to  it.  They  might  perhaps  have  thus  hurled  the 
whole  Union  into  chaotic  confusion,  but  in  no  event  could 
they  have  attained  their  ends.  The  moment  they  removed 
the  question  from  the  domain  of  law  their  cause  was  hope 
lessly  lost.  They  did  not  lose  sight  of  this  for  an  instant. 
The  convention  had  issued,  before  its  adjournment,  an 


ADDRESS   OF   THE   NULLIFIEES.  483 

"  address  to  the  people  of  the  United  States,"1  in  which 
it  expressly  declared  that,  as  far  as  lay  within  the  power 
of  South  Carolina,  matters  would  not  come  to  bloodshed, 
It  announced,  indeed,  on  this  point,  that  this  would  be 
avoided  by  the  secession  of  the  state.2  We  need  not  in 
quire  here  how  far  this  means  would  have  corresponded 
with  the  end  proposed.  The  nullifiers  considered  it  prob 
able,  but  by  no  means  as  indubitable  as  they  pretended, 
that  such  a  solution  of  the  struggle  could  be  brought 
about  without  opposition.3  Then,  too,  they  followed  up 
this  assurance,  which  was,  at  best,  of  only  negative  value, 
with  a  positive  offer.  The  address  explained  that  South 
Carolina  made,  in  this,  "  a  concession,"  and  declared  that 
she  could  only  content  herself  with  the  plan  of  taxation 
she  proposed,  u  provided  she  is  met  in  due  time  and  in  a 
becoming  spirit  by  the  states  interested  in  the  protection 
of  manufactures."  If  this  way  of  proposing  a  compromise 
was  little  adapted  to  make  its  adoption  possible,  the  pro 
posed  tariff  system  itself  was  absolutely  unacceptable  to 
the  manufacturing  states,  and  even  wholly  absurd  in  and 
for  itself.4  Yet  too  much  weight  must  not  be  laid  upon 


1  Niles'  Reg.,  XL  III.,  pp.  231-234. 

8  "  In  order  to  obviate  the  possibility  of  having  the  history  of  this 
contest  stained  by  a  single  drop  of  fraternal  blood,  we  have  solemn 
ly  and  irrevocably  resolved  that  we  will  regard  such  a  resort  [to  mili 
tary  or  naval  force]  as  a  dissolution  of  the  political  ties  which  connect 
us  with  our  confederate  states  ;  and  will  forthwith  provide  for  the  or- 
ganization  of  a  new  and  separate  government." 

8  A  very  considerable  part  of  the  state-rights  party  rejected  the  right 
of  nullification,,  but  acknowledged  that  of  secession.  In  the  legislature 
of  South  Carolina,  Barn  well  Smith  commented  with  especial  sharpness 
on  Jackson's  proclamation,  as  containing  "  the  tyrannical  doctrine 
that  we  have  not  even  the  right  to  secede."  N  lies'  Reg.,  XLIIL,  p. 
283. 

4  "  We  believe  that  upon  very  just  and  equitable  principles  of  taxa 
tion,  the  whole  list  of  protected  articles  should  be  imported  free  of  all 
duty,  and  that  the  revenue  derived  from  import  duties  should  be  raised 
exclusively  upon  the  unprotected  articles,  or  that  whenever  a  duty  is  im- 


484          STATE  SOVEREIGNTY  AND  SLAVERY. 

this.  The  main  thing  was,  that  South  Carolina  had  shown 
her  readiness  to  agree  eventually  upon  a  compromise.  If 
congress  made  no  offers  whatever  in  answer  to  this,  she 
could,  with  at  least  a  certain  appearance  of  justice,  make 
it  responsible  for  the  consequences. 

Jackson  and  the  nullifiers  thus  not  only  sought  each  to 
force  upon  the  other  the  dice-box  for  the  final  cast,  but 
they  met  each  other  with  a  secret  wish  that  it  might  not 
be  grasped  until  congress  had  been  compelled  to  again  take 
part  in  the  play.  The  protectionist  majority  was  thus  put 
in  a  dilemma.  The  extreme  fraction,  belonging  to  the 
New  England  states,  was  not  willing  to  buy  peace  at  all, 
and  especially  not  at  the  cost  of  the  manufacturers.  The 
majority  would  gladly  have  played  the  part  of  spectators.1 
But  inactivity  would  have  imposed  no  less  responsibility 
upon  it  than  a  positive  decision,  and  if  there  was  a  general 
agreement  to  bring  the  tariff  again  under  discussion  it 
was  thereby  already  practically  decided  that  some  sort  of 
compromise  offer  would  be  made  to  South  Carolina.  Such 
a  small  majority  could  not  preserve  an  unbroken  front  in 
such  a  crisis,  after  it  had  been  already  thrown  into  fear  and 
trembling  before  the  crisis  culminated. 

Jackson  had  stated,  in  his  annual  message  of  Dec.  4, 
that  the  needs  of  the  treasury  allowed  a  further  reduction 
of  the  national  income,  and  had  recommended  the  removal 

posed  upon  protected  articles  imported,  an  excise. duty  of  the  same  rate 
should  be  imposed  upon  all  similar  articles  manufactured  in  the  United 
States.  .  .  But  we  are  willing  to  make  a  large  offering  to  preserve 
the  Union ;  and,  with  a  distinct  declaration  that  it  is  a  concession  on 
our  part,  we  will  consent  that  the  same  rate  of  duty  may  be  imposed  upon 
the  protected  articles  that  shall  be  imposed  upon  the  unprotected,  pro 
vided  that  no  more  revenue  be  raised  than  is  necessary  to  meet  the  de 
mands  of  the  government  for  constitutional  purposes,  and  provided, 
also,  that  a  duty  substantially  uniform  be  imposed  upon  all  foreign  im 
ports." 

1  Clay  writes,  Dec.  12, 1832:  "Congress  has  not  been  called  upon,  and  I 
sincerely  hope  it  may  not  be  necessary  to  call  upon  it,  in  this  unfor 
tunate  affair."  Private  Correspondence  of  H.  Clay,  p.  345. 


THE    VERPLANOK    BILL.  485 

of  "  those  burthens  which  shall  be  found  to  fall  unequally 
upon  any  .  .  [of]  the  great  interests  of  the  commu 
nity."1  This  part  of  the  message  had  been  referred  to  the 
committee  on  ways  and  means,  which  reported,  Dec.  27, 
the  so-called  Yerplanck  bill.2  The  bill  went  back  to  the 
tariff  of  1816,  and  put  part  of  the  duties  still  lower  than 
that  had.  Yerplanck  himself  estimated  the  decrease  in 
the  customs  revenue  at  $13,000,000,  compared  with  the 
tariff  of  1828,  and  at  $7,000,000  in  comparison  with  that 
of  1832.  Since  this  reduction  was  to  take  place  in  the 
course  of  two  years,  it  almost  amounted  to  a  complete 
abandonment  of  protection,  and  a  great  part  of  the  manu 
facturing  establishments  would  have  been  hopelessly  ruin 
ed.  Yet  the  protectionists  feared  that  the  bill  would  be 
passed  by  the  house,  and  then  perhaps  also,  although  not 
without  a  hard  struggle,  by  the  senate.3  A  month  before 
such  a  radical  change  would  have  been  held  impossible,  and 
even  now,  despite  nullification,  the  adoption  of  the  bill 
would  not  have  been  feared  if  it  had  not  been  generally 
regarded  as  an  "  administration  bill."  Experience  had  al 
ready  repeatedly  shown  how  terrible  an  influence  Jackson 
could  exercise,  and  the  message  had  already  given  it  to  be 
understood,  clearly  enough,  that  he  was  ready  f,o  go  as  far 

1  btatesmtm's  Manual,  II.,  p.  785. 

8  Verplanck  brought  in  the  report  accompanying  the  bill,  Dec.  28. 
Debates  of  Congress,  XII.,  p.  128. 

3  Webster  wrote,  Jan. 3,  1833, to  W.  Sullivan:  "But  our  more  immi 
nent  danger,  in  my  opinion,  is  that,  seizing  on  the  occasion,  the  anti- 
tariff  party  will  prostrate  the  whole  tariff  system.  You  will  have  seen 
the  bill  reported  by  Mr.  Verplanck.  Great  and  extraordinary  efforts 
are  put  forth  to  push  that  bill  rapidly  through  congress.  It  is  likely 
to  be  finally  acted  upon,  at  least  in  the  house  of  representatives,  before 
the  country  can  be  made  to  look  on  it  in  its  true  character.  On  the 
other  hand,  our  friends  will  resist  it,  of  course,  and  hold  on  to  the  last. 

...  If  the  bill  were  now  in  the  senate,  it  would  not  pass;  but  how 
far  individuals  may  be  brought  over  by  party  discipline  in  the  drill  of 
a  month,  it  is  impossible  to  say."  Webster,  Priv.  Corresp.,  I.,  pp.  523, 
529. 


486  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

as  this.1  Webster  affirmed  that  Jackson  would  have  pre 
ferred  to  coerce  the  nullifiers  without  making  any  conces 
sions  to  them,  and  afterwards  to  modify  the  tariff,  but  that 
his  party  pressed  him  forward,  because  it  feared  the  effect 
of  the  doctrines  developed  in  the  proclamation.2  But  the 
friends  and  admirers  of  the  president  declared  that  he  aided 
the  compromise  bill  by  all  the  means  in  his  power.3  But 
he  did  not  on  this  account  abandon  the  position  taken  in 
the  proclamation.  When  he  learned  how  the  latter  had 
been  received  in  South  Carolina,  he  sent  to  congress  a  mes 
sage4  which  was  couched  in  a  more  moderate  tone,  but 
which  asked  for  the  grant  of  extraordinary  powers.  He 

1  His  argument,  indeed,  inclined  to  both  sides,  but  the  summary  de 
clared:  "  Those  who  have  vested  their  capital  in  manufacturing  estab 
lishments  cannot  expect  that  the  people  will  continue  permanently  to 
pay  high  taxes  for  their  benefit,  when  the  money  is  not  required  for 
any  legitimate  purpose  in  the  administration  of  the  government.  Is  it 
not  enough  that  the  high  duties  have  been  paid  as  long  as  the  money 
arising  from  them  could  be  applied  to  the  common  benefit  in  the  extin 
guishment  of  the  public  debt?"  Yet  he  still  held  fast  to  the  belief  that 
an  exception  should  be  made  in  favor  of  those  things  which  were  abso 
lutely  necessary  for  the  safety  of  the  laud  in  time  of  war. 

8  "  I  do  not  believe  the  president  himself  wishes  the  bill  to  pass.  St 
contra,  I  fancy  he  would  prefer  the  undivided  honor  of  suppressing  nul 
lification  now,  and  to  take  his  own  time  hereafter  to  remodel  the  tariff. 
But  the  party  push  on,  fearing  the  effect  of  the  doctrines  of  the  procla 
mation,  and  endeavoring  to  interpose  and  to  save  Carolina,  not  by  the 
proclamation,  but  by  taking  away  the  ground  of  complaint."  Webster, 
Priv.  Corres.,  I.,  p.  529. 

8  Benton  writes :  "  Many  thought  that  he  ought  to  relax  in  his  civil 
measures  for  allaying  discontent,  while  South  Carolina  held  the  military 
attitude  of  armed  defiance  to  the  United  States, — and  among  them,  Mr. 
Quincy  Adams.  But  he  adhered  steadily  to  his  purpose  of  going  on 
with  what  justice  required  for  the  relief  of  the  south,  and  promoted,  by 
all  the  means  in  his  power,the  success  of  the  bills  to  reduce  the  revenue." 
Thirty  Years'  View,  I.,  p.  308.  On  Jackson's  position  on  the  tariff 
question,  in  the  spring  of  1832,  compare  Reminiscences  of  J.  A.  Ham 
ilton,  p.  243;  see  also  A.  H.  Stephens,  The  War  between  the  States,  I., 
p.  440.- 

*  Jan.  16,  1833.    Statesman's  Man.,  II.,  pp.  904^922. 


THE    FORCE    BILL.  487 

stated  that  he  had  ordered,  from  motives  of  "  precaution," 
the  transfer  of  the  custom-house  from  Charleston  to  Castle 
Pinckney,and  now  wished  to  be  authorized  "  to  alter  and 
abolish  such  of  the  districts  and  ports  of  entry  as  should 
be  necessary  and  to  establish  the  custom-house  at  some 
secure  place  within  some  port  or  harbor  of  such  state."1 
Only  in  case  this  did  not  prove  enough  and  "  in  case  of  an 
attempt  otherwise  to  take  the  property  [attached  for  non 
payment  of  duties]  by  a  force  too  great  to  be  overcome  by 
the  officers  of  the  customs,"  did  he  ask  the  right  to  use  the 
land  and  sea  forces  to  execute  the  law. 

Calhoun  answered  the  message  by  introducing  a  series 
of  resolutions  concerning  the  powers  of  the  federal  gov 
ernment.2  His  whole  theory  of  state  rights  was  therein 
compressed  into  a  few  sentences,  but  the  offensive  word 
"  nullification"  was  not  used.  Yet  he  went  as  far  on  his 
side  as  Jackson  had  on  his.  On  the  main  fact  he  held  fast, 
unterrified,  to  his  position,  but  gave  it  to  be  understood 
that  he  did  not  wish  to  run  the  risk  of  the  danger  of  pre 
venting  a  compromise  for  the  sake  of  trifles. 

The  state  of  affairs  was  much  more  rightly  described  by 
this  than  by  the  character  which  the  debate  soon  after 
wards  took  in  the  senate.  The  message  of  the  president 
had  been  referred  to  the  judiciary  committee,  which  brought 
in  a  bill,  Jan.  21,  intended  to  ensure,  that  is,  to  make  pos 
sible,  the  collection  of  customs  in  South  Carolina.3  The 
whole  body  of  state-rights  men  denounced  it  in  the  most 
unmeasured  language  and  soon  fastened  the  irritating  name 
of  "  force  bill"  upon  it.  Before  the  debate  proper  began, 

1  He  gave  as  a  reason  for  this  request  that  the  same  measures  of  pre 
caution  could  not  be  taken  in  the  harbors  of  Georgetown  and  Beaufort 
as  in  Charleston. 

9  Jan.  22,  1833.    Deb.  of  Congress,  XII.,  p.  23. 

8  The  bill  was  naturally  framed  in  such  a  way  that  it  applied,  in  form, 
to  the  whole  extent  of  the  Union.  It  is  given,  in  the  shape  in  which  it 
was  finally  adopted,  in  Stat.  at  L.,  IV.,  p.  632  and  also  in  Niles'  Ileg., 
XLIII.,Suppl.,p.46. 


488          STATE  SOVEREIGNTY  AND  SLAVERY. 

it  had  already  become  evident  that  the  bill  would  by  no 
means  be  quickly  passed.  Mangum  of  North  Carolina 
and  Bibb  of  Kentucky  moved  to  postpone  the  debate. 
The  latter  gave  as  his  reason  that  this  was  not  the  best 
time  for  the  discussion  of  principles  of  such  an  exciting 
character;  " events"  might  soon  happen  which  would 
make  the  debate  less  exciting.1  The  senate  adopted  a  com 
promise  motion  of  Clay,  in  accordance  with  which  the  de 
bate  began  Jan.  28.  The  senate  had  thus  coincided  with 
Mangum's  remark  that  congress  could  not  come  to  a  con 
clusion  before  February  1,  the  day  on  which  the  ordinance 
of  nullification  was  to  come  into  force.  But  not  much  im 
portance  was  attached  to  this  circumstance,  although  it 
was  to  be  expected,  from  the  previous  talk  of  both  parties, 
that  the  greatest  weight  would  be  laid  upon  it.  Bibb  was 
evidently  not  alone  in  expecting  the  "  events"  to  which  he 
had  referred.  And  the  expectations  entertained  were  not 
disappointed.  South  Carolina  was  in  no  more  of  a  hurry 
to  let  nullification  come  into  force  than  congress  had  been 
to  pass  the  "  force  bill."  A  "  suspension"  of  the  ordinance 
was  voted,  in  order  to  wait  and  see  what  congress  would 
do.2  Thus  both  sides  reached  an  equally  broad  water-way, 
by  which  the  harbor  must  finally  be  entered,  if  neither 
party  suddenly  turned  around  the  rudder.  This  explains 
the  significance  of  the  wild  war  of  words 'which  now  be 
gan  in  congress.  It  was  neither  a  stage-contest  for  the 
amusement  of  the  public  nor  a  womanish  wrangle  about  a 
mere  matter  of  dogmatism.  It  bore  from  the  first  instant 
the  stamp,  not  of  a  struggle  which  was  to  culminate  straight 
way,  but  of  one  which  had  just  happily  passed  its  culmin 
ating  point. 

"Wilkins  of  Pennsylvania,  as  chairman  of  the  judiciary 
committee,  opened  the  debate.     The  ground-thought  of  his 


1  files'  Reg.,  XLIIL,  Suppl.,  p.  51. 
« Ibid,  p.  382. 


DEBATES   ON    THE    BILL.  4:89 

speech  was  that  nullification  was  a  practical  dissolution  of 
the  Union,  for  it  overthrew  the  principle  of  the  supremacy 
of  the  law.  The  passage  of  the  bill  was  therefore  not  only 
justified,  but  absolutely  necessary,  for  its  provisions  went 
just  far  enough  to  maintain  the  authority  of  the  Union  if 
South  Carolina  tried  to  execute  the  nullification  laws.  For 
the  rest,  the  bill  was  not,  as  the  Opposition  had  affirmed, 
of  an  extraordinary  character.  The  committee  could  for 
tify  itself  with  precedents  on  every  point,  or  at  least  could 
cite  cases  in  proof  that  its  proposals  were  in  the  fullest 
harmony  with  previous  laws.  The  only  new  thing  was  the 
provision  which  gave  the  president  the  right  to  move  cus 
tom  houses,  and  this  was  simply  intended  "  to  avoid,  if 
possible,  all  collision."1 

Bibb  of  Kentucky  was  the  first  speaker  of  the  Opposi 
tion.  He  said  not  a  word  in  defense  of  nullification,  but 
he  threw  himself,  with  the  state-rights  shield  of  noli  me 
tangere  between  the  nullifiers  and  the  federal  authorities; 
the  bill,  he  said,  "  authorizes  a  declaration  of  war  against 
the  state  of  South  Carolina,  a  declaration  of  war  by  proc 
lamation  of  the  president  and  at  his  discretion,  not  upon 
the  basis  of  facts.'72  But  his  whole  speech  was  on  what 
the  federal  authorities  could  not  do;  the  positive  side  of 
the  question — the  way  in  which  they  could  defend  them 
selves  and  the  Union  against  a  nullification  of  the  laws  of 
the  Union — he  left  untouched.  If  his  whole  reasoning 
were  summed  up — something  which  the  orator  naturally 
failed  to  do — and  the  practical  result  asked  for,  the  only 
possible  answer  was  that  a  return,  in  essentials,  to  the 
standpoint  of  the  articles  of  confederation  was  demanded. 

1  Niles'  Reg.,  XL  V.,  p.  60.  The  two  last  points  were  much  more  strong 
ly  put  by  Frelinghuysen  and  Grundy.  The  latter  said:  "  Is  this  making 
war  ?  So  far  from  it,  it  is  the  most  pacific  course  that  could  be  presented ; 
it  is  retreating  from  threatened  violence,  and  this  is  done  upon  the  recom 
mendation  of  him  who  never  retreated  to  secure  his  own  personal  safe 
ty."  Ibid,  pp.  53,  88,  216. 

J  Ibid,  p.  65. 


4:90  STATE    SOVEKEIGNTY    AND    SLAVERY. 

These  articles  had  given  congress  many  rights,  but  had 
withheld  from  it  the  power  to  make  good  its  rights.  Ac 
cording  to  the  doctrine  of  the  anti-nullification  state-rights 
party,  the  constitution  gave  the  federal  government  suffi 
cient  rights,  and  gave  it  means  which  would  have  sufficed 
for  the  enforcement  of  these  rights,  but  it  had  not  given  it 
the  power  to  use  these  means,  if  a  state  objected  to  the 
exercise  of  the  rights.  Nullifying  and  anti-nullifying 
state-rights  men  came  to  substantially  the  same  belief  be 
cause  they  started  with  the  same  hypothesis.  Bibb  af 
firmed:  "  Sovereignty  rests,  in  the  people  of  each  state."1 
Tyler  formulated  the  creed  of  the  party  still  more  sharply 
by  saying  that  he  owed  obedience  to  the  laws  of  the  Union, 
because  he  owed  allegiance  to  Yirginia.2 

The  other  speakers  of  the  Opposition  followed  without 
exception  in  Bibb's  footsteps.  The  most  interesting  thing 
in  their  speeches  was  the  crowd  of  historic  illustrations. 
"Not  many  states  could  boast  that  they  had  never  done 
priest's  service  at  the  altar  of  state  sovereignty  and  had 
not  praised  as  the  flames  of  holy  sacrifice  what  they  now 
denounced  as  a  Moloch's  fire. 

The  debates  had  already  continued  fourteen  days  and, 
despite  all  the  eloquence  and  dialectic  sharpness  shown  by 
both  parties,  the  goal  was  not  a  single  step  nearer.  Clay 

1  McDuffle  said  in  an  after-dinner  speech:  "I  will  readily  concede 
that  a  state  cannot  nullify  an  act  of  congress  by  virtue  of  any  power 
derived  from  the  constitution.  It  would  be  a  perfect  solecism  to  sup 
pose  any  such  power  was  conferred  by  the  constitution.  This  right 
flows  from  a  higher  source.  All  that  I  claim  for  the  state  in  this  re 
spect  necessarily  results  from  the  mere  fact  of  sovereignty."  Niles' 
Reg,XLIII.,  pp.  41,42. 

8 "  It  is  because  I  owe  allegiance  to  the  state  of  Virginia  that  I 
owe  obedience  to  the  laws  of  this  government.  My  state  requires  of  me 
to  render  such  obedience.  She  has  entered  into  a  compact  which,  while 
it  continues,  is  binding  on  all  her  people.  So  would  it  be  if  she  haa 
formed  a  treaty  with  any  foreign  power.  I  should  be  bound  to  obey 
the  stipulations  of  such  a  treaty  because  she  willed  it."  Ibid.,  XLIIL, 
Suppl.,  p.  104. 


THE    CLAY- CALHOUN    COMPROMISE.  491 

therefore  asked  the  senate,  February  12,  to  allow  Lira  to 
bring  in  a  bill  to  modify  the  tariff  laws.1  Calhoun  spoke 
in  favor  of  granting  the  permission.  He  could  not  give 
his  consent  to  all  the  details  of  the  bill,  but  its  "  general 
principles"  and  its  "  object"  had  his  "  entire  approval." 
"A  very  large  capital,"  he  continued,  "has  been  invested  in 
manufactures,  which  have  been  of  great  service  to  the  coun 
try;  and  I  would  never  give  my  vote  to  suddenly  withdraw 
all  those  duties  by  which  that  capital  is  sustained  in  the 
channel  into  which  it  has  been  directed."  The  settlement 
of  the  minor  points  of  difference  would  present  no  diffi 
culty  if  men  met  each  other  "  in  the  spirit  of  mutual  com 
promise  .  .  .  without  at  all  yielding  the  constitutional 
question  as  to  the  right  of  protection."2 

Now,  in  fact,  nothing  remained  but  to  come  to  an  under 
standing  on  the  "minor  points  of  difference."  After  the 
leaders  of  the  protectionists  and  the  leaders  of  the  nulli- 
fiers  announced  that  they  had  agreed  with  each*  other  on 
the  main  points  of  the  arrangement,  the  latter  was  assured 
even  if  a  hot  battle  had  to  be  fought  for  its  sake.  Webster 
declared  that  he  found  principles  in  the  bill,  to  which,  as 
far  as  he  could  now  see,  he  could  never  give  his  approval. 
The  extreme  wing  of  the  protectionists,  too,  had  not  pre 
viously  been  won  over  to  support  the  compromise,3  and  it 
was  strong  enough  to  make  the  slightest  discord  between 
the  new  allies  a  serious  danger.  But  the  whole  history  of 
party  up  to  that  time  had  not  seen  stranger  bedfellows 
than  Clay  and  Calhoun  were  at  that  instant.  They  had 
begun  their  political  career  as  brothers  in  arms,  but  now 

1  Deb.  of  Cong.,  XII.,  p.  81 ;  Clay,  Speeches,  II.,  p.  139,  seq. 

'  Deb.  of  Congress,  XII.,  pp.  84,  85. 

3  Benton  relates  that  Clay  had  advised  Webster  of  his  intentions,  but 
that  the  latter  had  opposed  it,  saying :  "It  would  be  yielding  great 
principles  to  faction  and  that  the  time  had  come  to  test  the  strength  of 
the  constitution  and  the  government."  On  this  account,  he  had  not 
been  admitted  to  the  further  negotiations.  Benton,  Thirty  Years'  View, 
I,  p.  342. 


492  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

they  had  so  thoroughly  fallen  away  from  each  other  that 
they  did  not  even  speak  to  one  another.  Even  now,  no 
change  was  made  in  their  personal  relations.  Party  spirit 
and  personal  enmity  have  used  this  circumstance  in  order 
to  stamp  Calhoun  as  a  "  coward."  Benton  relates  that 
Calhoun  accepted  Clay's  conditions  after  he  had  been  told 
by  Letcher,  a  Kentucky  representative,  that  Jackson  wished 
to  hear  of  no  "  negotiation,"  but  was  resolved  to  have  him 
imprisoned  and  tried  for  high  treason.1  Clayton,  senator 
from  Delaware,  also  declares  that  Calhoun's  motive  was 
fear  lest  Jackson  should  let  him  "  hang."2  In  this  case, 
too,  persistent  repetition  has  sufficed  to  make  the  assertion 
of  extreme  partisans  become  in  the  popular  mind  an  his 
toric  fact.  It  has  never  once  been  asked  whether  it  was  in 
any  way  possible  for  Jackson  to  "  hang"  the  "  arch-traitor." 
Jackson  was  enough  of  an  autocrat 'not  to  let  Americans, 
proud  of  their  freedom,  look  back  with  too  great  satisfac 
tion  upon  this  chapter  of  their  history.  They  need  not  at 
least  boast,  upon  the  most  dubious  testimony,  that  he  had 
not  an  evil  pleasure  in  acting,  as  president,  with  the  same 
arbitrary  brutality  that  he  had  shown  as  a  general  in 
hunting  down  Indians.  Yet  the  law  and  Jackson's  will 
were  not  always  absolutely  identical,  and  however  certainly 
Calhoun,  according  to  the  European  ideas  of  state  rights, 
may  have  been  guilty  of  high  treason,  it  would  have  been 
difficult  to  have  convicted  him  of  it,  under  the  provisions 
of  the  constitution.3 

1  Benton,  Thirty  Years'  View,  I.,  p.  343. 

9  Ibid,  II.,  p.  113;  Colton,  Works  of  Clay,  Speeches,  II.,  p.  125. 

8  "  Treason  against  the  United  States  shall  consist  only  in  levying  war 
against  them  or  in  adhering  to  their  enemies,  giving  them  aid  and  com 
fort.  No  person  shall  be  convicted  of  treason  unless  on  the  testimony 
of  two  witnesses  to  the  same  overt  act  or  on  confession  in  open  court." 
Art.  III.,  Sec.  3,  §  1.  In  the  decision  of  the  supreme  court  in  the  cases 
Ex  parte  Bollmann  and  Ex  parte  Swartwout,  it  is  said:  "To  constitute 
that  specific  crime,  .  .  .  war  must  actually  be  levied  against  the 
United  States.  However  flagitious  may  be  the  crime  of  conspiring  to 


THE    GREAT   NULLIFIER.  493 

Calhoun  was  well  enough  acquainted  with  the  decisions 
of  the  supreme  court  in  the  cases  of  Burr  and  Bollmann  not 
to  be  as  much  frightened  bj  the  firsf  dark  threat  which 
came  to  him,  at  third  or  fourth  hand,  as,  after  a  truce  was 
agreed  upon,  his  bitterest  opponents  affirmed.  Only  the 
partisan  and  the  special  pleader  can  lay  weight  on  bits  of 
history  which  have  happened  in  the  night  and  without  a 
witness.  As  long  as  better  proofs  are  not  brought  forward, 
the  objective  historian  must  confine  himself  to  Calhoun's 
public  actions  and  omissions.  There  is  no  justification  in 
them  for  the  supposition  that,  on  account  of  anxiety  about 
his  personal  safety,  he  caught  quickly  at  the  chance  when  an 
opportunity  to  capitulate  was  offered  him. 

February  15  and  16,  Calhoun  delivered  a  speech  on  the 
force  bill.1  It  was  couched,  for  the  most  part,  in  the  meas 
ured,  doctrinaire  tone  of  a  logical  discussion.  Yet  in  parts 
it  fell  into  pathos,  which  was,  indeed,  not  free  from  decla 
mation  and  exaggeration,  but  which  certainly  did  not  show 
fear.  Calhoun  did  not  seek  to  avoid  by  humility  arid  flat 
tery  the  blow  which  it  was  alleged  that  Jackson  wished  to 

subvert  by  force  the  government  of  our  country,  such  conspiracy  is  not 
treason.  To  conspire  to  levy  war  and  actually  to  levy  war,  are  distinct 
offences.  The  first  must  be  brought  into  open  action  by  the  assemblage 
of  men  for  a  purpose  treasonable  in  itself,  or  the  fact  of  levying  war  can 
not  have  been  committed.  .  .  It  is  not  the  intention  of  the  court  to 
say  that  no  individual  can  be  guilty  of  this  crime  who  has  not  appeared 
in  arms  against  his  country.  On  the  contrary,  if  war  be  actually  levied, 
that  is,  if  a  body  of  men  be  actually  assembled  for  the  purpose  of  effect 
ing  by  force  a  treasonable  purpose,  all  those  who  perform  any  part, 
however  minute  or  however  remote  from  the  scene  of  action,  and  who 
are  actually  leagued  in  the  general  conspiracy,  are  to  be  considered  as 
traitors.  But  there  must  be  an  actual  assembling  of  men  for  the  trea 
sonable  purpose  to  constitute  a  levying  of  war.  .  .  It  is  therefore 
more  safe,  as  well  as  more  consonant  to  the  principles  of  our  constitution, 
that  the  crime  of  treason  should  not/be  extended  by  construction  to 
doubtful  cases."  Cranch,  Rep.,  IV.,  pp.  126,  127 ;  Curtis,  II.,  pp.  36,  37. 
Compare  also  Cranch,  IV.,  pp.  468-509. 

1  Calhoun,  Works,  II.,  pp.  197-262;  Jenkins,  Life  of  Calhoun,  pp., 
251-300. 


494:          STATE  SOVEREIGNTY  AND  SLAVERY. 

strike.  He  had  exasperated  him  both  as  president  and  as 
an  individual  and  he  well  knew  the  hard  feelings  and  the 
wild  passion ateness  of  the  man,  but  he  had  a  conciliatory 
word  neither  for  the  president  nor  for  the  individual. 
From  motives  of  "  decorum,"  he  refrained  from  answering 
the  personal  attacks  of  the  president,  but  he  accused  him 
in  the  sharpest  language  of  breach  of  faith  and  of  ingrati 
tude  towards  South  Carolina.  On  the  essential  question, 
he  led  the  fight  to  the  farthest  point  it  had  yet  reached.  As 
if  with  an  inner  satisfaction,  he  named  everything  plainly 
by  its  right  name  and  he  sought  the  strongest  words  with 
which  to  characterize  his  opponents  and  their  policy.  "  You 
propose  by  this  bill,"  he  said,  "to  enforce  robbery  by  mur 
der.  .  .  Force,  indeed,  may  hold  the  parts  together,  but 
such  union  would  be  the  bond  between  master  and  slave. 
.  .  .  I  tell  you  plainly  that  the  bill,  should  it  pass,  can 
not  be  enforced.  It  will  prove  only  a  blot  upon  your  stat 
ute-book,  a  reproach  to  the  year  and  a  disgrace  to  the 
American  senate.  I  repeat,  it  will  not  be  executed;  it  will 
rouse  the  dormant  spirit  of  the  people  and  open  their  eyes 
to  the  approach  of  despotism.  The  country  has  sunk  into 
avarice  and  political  corruption  from  which  nothing  can 
arouse  it  but  some  measure  on  the  part  of  the  government 
of  folly  and  madness,  such  as  that  now  under  consideration. 
.  .  .  I  proclaim  it,  that,  should  this  bill  pass  and  an 
attempt  be  made  to  enforce  it,  it  will  be  resisted  at  every 
hazard — even  that  of  death  itself.  .  .  .  There  are 
thousands  of  her  [South  Carolina's]  brave  sons  who,  if 
need  be,  are  prepared  cheerfully  to  lay  down  their  lives  in 
defense  of  the  state  and  the  great  principles  of  constitu 
tional  liberty  for  which  she  is  contending.  God  forbid 
that  this  should  become  necessary!  It  never  can  be,  unless 
this  government  is  resolved  to  bring  the  question  to  ex 
tremity,  when  her  gallant  sons  will  stand  prepared  to  per 
form  the  last  duty — to  die  nobly." 

Webster  answered  this  speech  on  the  day  Calhoun  ended 


WEBSTER    ON    NULLIFICATION.  495 

it, — Feb.  16. l  His  theme  was  not  the  force  bill,  but  the 
right  of  nullification  and  secession.  He  paid  a  full  recog 
nition  to  the  dialectic  keenness  of  the  Carolinian,  but  yet 
declared  that  he  might  be  compared  to  a  strong  man  who 
sunk  the  deeper  in  a  bottomless  quagmire,  the  more  tre 
mendous  efforts  he  made  to  extricate  himself.  He  com 
pared  with  classic  simplicity  and  clearness,  the  subtle, 
logical  deductions  from  legal  abstractions  with  the  demands 
of  sound  common  sense.  His  argument  started  out  with 
the  idea  that  the  state  and  government,  the  state  and  the 
supremacy  of  law,  were  conceptions,  each  of  which  abso 
lutely  involved  the  other,  and  that  the  rejection,  on  princi 
ple,  of  the  supremacy  of  the  law  therefore  could  not  be  the 
basis  of  the  right  of  a  state.  Each  state  exists,  he  said,  for 
the  sake  of  "  its  peculiar  .  .  duties"  and  its  constitu 
tion  contains  the  fundamental  rules,  in  accordance  with 
which  the  fulfillment  of  these  duties  must  be  sought,  and 
can  alone  be  legally  sought.  A  constitution,  the  first  im 
portant  sentence  of  which  negatives  the  idea  of  the  state, 
is  therefore  no  constitution;  a  state  with  such  a  constitu 
tion  is  no  state.  The  right  of  nullification  and  the  con 
ception  of  the  state  absolutely  exclude  each  other.  Nulli 
fication  and  secession  "  presuppose  the  breaking  up  of  the 
government.  .  .  The  constitution  does  not  provide  for 
events  which  must  be  preceded  by  its  own  destruction. 
.  .  .  The  constitution  of  the  United  States  was  received 
as  a  whole  and  for  the  whole  country.  If  it  cannot  stand 
altogether,  it  cannot  stand  in  parts;  and  if  the  laws  cannot 
be  executed  everywhere,  they  cannot  long  be  executed  any 
where."  How  can  law  be  spoken  of  when  the  construc 
tion  and  interpretation  of  the  law  are  not  one  and  the  same 
in  all  the  twenty-four  states,  but  every  single  one  of  these 
has  finally  to  decide  upon  its  legally  binding  force?  Have 
not  twenty-three  states  the  same  right  to  a  belief  that  one 

1  Webster,  Works,  III.,  pp.  448-505. 


496  STATE    SOVEREIGNTY   AND    SLAVERY. 

has?  And  if  twenty- three  states  cherish  the  conviction 
that  they  have  the  right  to  execute  the  law  in  opposition 
to  one  state,  is  the  judgment  of  the  one  state  alone  to  be 
then  decisive?  Then  the  only  true  law  of  the  land  is 
anarchy. 

Yet  Webster  did  not  limit  himself  to  these  unanswera 
ble  arguments,  deduced  directly  from  the  idea  of  the  state. 
To  his  and  his  country's  harm,  the  advocate  in  him  always 
spoke  loudly  in  the  reasoning  of  the  statesman.  This  time, 
indeed,  the  exterior  arrangement  of  his  argument  was  so 
unfortunate  that  its  opponents  could,  with  a  strong  seem 
ing  of  justice,  declare  that  the  final  basis  of  his  proof  was 
useless  hypercriticism  which  rested  upon  claims  which 
were  proved  to  be  historically  false  and  against  which  his 
own  earlier  speeches  could  be  quoted.1  Calhoun  was  thus 
able  to  do  more  than  confine  himself  to  a  precarious  defense 
in  his  answering  speech  of  Feb.  26.  Yet  thi^  speech  could 
have  no  influence  upon  the  decision  of  the  questions  just 
then  under  discussion,  since  the  senate  had  already,  on 
Feb.  18,  ordered  the  force  bill  to  a  third  reading  by  thirty- 
two  to  eight  votes2  and  the  fate  of  the  tariff  bill,  too,  had 
already  been  practically  decided,  although  this  had  not 
been  formally  passed.  For  an  instant  it,  and  with  it  the 
prospect  for  a  compromise,  was  seriously  threatened.  On 
February  21,  Clay  brought  in  an  amendment,  according  to 
which  the  duties  were  to  be  reckoned,  not  by  the  declared 
value  of  the  goods  at  the  port  of  export,  but  by  an  ap 
praisement  of  their  value  at  the  port  of  import.  This  was 
a  blow  which  Clay  dealt  wholly  unexpectedly  and,  as  it 
were,  from  an  ambush  laid  against  his  new  comrades.3 

1  See  Webster,  Works,  III.,  pp.  453-457,  and  Calhoun's  answer,  Works, 
II.,  pp.  262-309.  Compare  also  Wash.,  Writ.,  IX.,  pp.  278,  389,  390  ;Ann. 
of  Cong.,  I.,  pp.  932-935. 

8  Deb.  of  Congress,  XII.,  p.  III.  On  the  final  passage,  the  vote  was 
thirty-two  to  one,  since  all  the  opponents  of  the  bill,  except  Tyler,  had 
withdrawn. 

8  Benton,  Thirty  Years'  View,  I.,  p.  322. 


CLAY'S  TACTICS.  497 

Calhoun  at  once  declared  that  there  were  "  insuperable 
constitutional  objections"  to  this  amendment;  he  "  should 
be  compelled  to  vote  against  the  whole  bill,  should  the 
amendment  be  adopted."1  Clayton  replied  to  this,  saying 
that  the  bill  with  the  amendment  was  the  farthest  conces 
sion  to  which  he  and  his  friends — "only  for  the  sake  of 
arriving  at  a  reconciliation" — could  agree ;  if  Calhoun  was 
not  willing  to  accept  it  in  this  sense,  he  (Clayton)  would 
have  to  move  to  lay  it  on  the  table.  It  was  very  hard  for 
the  proud  planter  not  to  stand  unconditionally  by  his  word 
this  time,  especially  since  he  had  declared  the  amendment 
to  be  unconstitutional.  But  the  protectionists  were  re 
solved  not  to  let  themselves  be  bullied  any  longer,  and 
what  Calhoun  would  have  endangered  by  his  obstinacy  was 
out  of  all  proportion  with  what  he  would  sacrifice  by  yield 
ing.  On  the  next  day  he  voted  for  the  amendment,  yet 
only  "  under  two  conditions," — that  a  method  of  appraise 
ment  should  be  adopted,  which  would  neither  interfere 
with  the  equality  of  all  imposts  demanded  by  the  consti 
tution  nor  "  make  the  duties  themselves  part  of  the  ap 
praised  value,"  so  that  "  the  taxes  would  be  taxed."  This 
was  meaningless  talk;  he  sought  by  some  adroit  pretences 
and  some  weighty  blows  dealt  in  the  air  to  make  the  dis 
comfiture  which  he  had  unexpectedly  suffered  seem  as 
small  as  possible.2  While  he  abandoned  the  field  to  his 
opponents  on  this  one  point,  he  still  maintained  his  posi 
tion  on  all  the  others. 

Clay  now  discharged  all  the  duties  of  his  alliance  with 
his  whole  zeal.  He  defended  the  bill.  January  25,  against 
Webster  and  his  comrades,3  ascribing  to  them  the  entire 
responsibility  for  the  danger  to  which  not  only  the  peace 
of  the  Union  but  the  protective  policy  was  exposed  by  their 

1  Deb.  of  Cong.,  XII.,  p.  112. 

•  Compare  Clayton's  speech  at  Wilmington,  June  15,  1844.    Colton, 
Life  and  Times  of  H.  Clay,  II.,  p.  258  and  before. 

•  Clay,  Speeches,  II.,  pp.  157-176. 

32 


498  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND   SLAVERY. 

opposition.  He  pointed  out  as  Ms  main  motive  the  prob 
ability  that  at  the  next  session  of  congress  the  opponents 
of  protection  would  have  the  upper  hand,  and  declared  that 
an  agreement  could  therefore  be  arrived  at  now  at  a  less 
cost  than  then.1  Yet  he  did  not  deny  the  influence  which 
the  fear  of  a  civil  war  had  exerted  upon  his  conclusions, 
and  he  confessed  that  he  thought  war  almost  unavoidable 
if  the  next  congress  did  not  give  the  redress  solicited.2 
As  circumstances  were  now,  he  said,  a  man  could  only 
cherish,  as  a  patriot  as  well  as  a  protectionist,  the  most 
earnest  wish  to  see  a  decision  made  by  this  congress. 

If  Clay's  wish  was  to  be  realized,  the  majority  of  the 
house  as  well  as  of  the  senate  must  be  thoroughly  im 
pressed  with  the  conviction  that  the  greatest  danger  was 
delay.  The  congress  had  only  a  few  days  more  of  life,  and 
in  the  ordinary  course  of  business  it  would  have  needed 
weeks  under  the  most  favorable  circumstances  before  a 


1  "  In  this  body  we  lose  three  friends  of  the  protective  policy  without 
being  sure  of  gaming  one.  Here,  judging  from  present  appearances, 
we  shall  at*  the  next  session  be  in  the  minority.  In  the  house  it  is  noto 
rious  that  there  is  a  considerable  accession  to  the  number  of  the  domi- 
mant  party  [the  Democrats].  How,  then,  I  ask,  is  the  system  to  be  sus 
tained  against  numbers,  against  the  whole  weight  of  the  administration, 
against  the  united  south,  and  against  the  increased  impending  clanger 
of  civil  war  ?  .  .  .  Two  states  in  New  England,  which  have  been  in 
favor  of  the  system,  have  recently  come  out  against  it.  Other  states  of 
the  north  and  east  have  shown  a  remarkable  indifference  to  its  preser 
vation.  If,  indeed,  they  have  wished  to  preserve  it,  they  have  neverthe 
less  placed  the  powers  of  government  in  hands  which  ordinary  informa 
tion  must  have  assured  them  were  rather  a  hazardous  depository." 
•  *  Virginia  "  has  deputed  one  of  her  most  distinguished  citizens  [B.  W. 
Leigh]  to  request  suspension  of  the  measures  of  resistance.  No  atten 
tive  observer  can  doubt  that  the  suspension  will  be  made.  Well,  sir, 
suppose  it  takes  place  and  congress  should  fail  at  the  next  session  to 
afford  the  redress  which  will  be  solicited,  what  course  would  every 
principle  of  honor  and  eveiy  consideration  of  interests,  as  she  under 
stands  them,  exact  from  her?  Would  she  not  make  common  cause  with 
South  Carolina?  And  if  she  did,  would  not  the  entire  south  eventually 
become  parties  to  the  contest?" 


THE   NEW   TARIFF. 

tariff  bill  could  be  submitted  to  the  president  for  signa 
ture.  The  Opposition  in  the  senate  held  fast  to  the  asser 
tion  that  this  was  a  bill  which,  according  to  art.  L,  sec.  7, 
§  1  of  the  constitution,  must  originate  in  the  house,  and 
the  house  was  still  squandering  its  time  over  the  Yerplanck 
bill.  It  had  lost  sight  of  consequences,  as  soon  as  the  first 
excitement  was  over,  for  it  broke  with  the  protective  system 
too  quickly  and  too  completely.  In  order  to  get  both  diffi 
culties  out  of  the  way  at  once,  Letcher  moved,  February  25, 
at  the  instant  when  the  house  was  getting  ready  to  adjourn, 
to  strike  out  the  whole  Yerplanck  bill  after  the  enacting 
clause,  and  to  put  in  its  stead  the  bill  introduced  by  Clay 
into  the  senate.1  The  representatives  of  the  manufactur 
ing  states  of  the  north  were  completely  surprised  and  ex 
cited  to  the  highest  degree,  inasmuch  as  the  other  fractions 
of  the  house  had  evidently  come  to  a  secret  agreement  be 
forehand  and  were  resolved  to  allow  no  debate.  Davis  of 
Massachusetts  could  only  utter  a  few  words  of  protest 
against  such  a  rough  and  ready  way  of  law-making,  and 
then,  by  one-hundred-and-five  to  seventy-one  votes,  the 
third  reading  was  ordered  before,  as  Benton  says,  the  din 
ner  had  become  cold,  which  had  been  served  up  just  as 
Letcher  made  his  motion.2  The  following  day  the  bill  was 
passed  by  one-hundred-and-nineteen  to  eighty -five  votes.8 
The  house  now  took  up  the  force  bill.  February  8,  the 
judiciary  committee,  to  which  the  president's  message  of 
January  16  had  been  referred,  had  presented  a  report 
which  declared  the  use  of  force  against  South  Carolina  to 
be  impolitic  and  unjust  from  every  point  of  view.  "Wheth 
er  the  federal  government  had  the  right  to  resort  to  such 
means  under  any  circumstances  whatever,  was  left  unan 
swered,  but  it  was  evident  that  the  committee  doubted  the 

1  Deb.  of  Congress,  XII.,  p.  170. 

•  Benton,  Thirty  Tears'  View,  I.,  pp.  310-312;  Deb.  of  Cong.,  XII.,  p. 
175. 
» Deb.  of  Congress,  XII.,  p.  181. 


500  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY  AND   SLAVERY. 

existence  of  the  right.  It  was,  in  its  opinion,  the  "  im 
perative  duty"  of  congress  to  alter  the  existing  law,  for  if 
a  state  was  determined  to  oppose  the  law  "  at  any  risk," 
the  complaints  against  it  were  evidently  well  grounded.1 

The  committee  report  had  expected  too  much  from  the 
political  judgment  and  from  the  feelings  of  nationality  and 
honor  of  the  majority,  when  it  urged  the  latter  to  formally 
declare  the  impotence  of  the  federal  government  and,  so  to 
speak,  to  invite  the  states  to  make  use  of  this  impotence 
by  subordinating  national  to  particularistic  interests.  The 
majority  was  not  willing  to  unnecessarily  sacrifice  the  ap 
pearance  at  any  rate;  but  more  than  this  it  could  not  save. 
House  and  senate  now  supplemented  each  other's  actions 
in  a  way  of  which  the  Philadelphia  convention  would 
scarcely  have  dreamed.  The  senate  first  did  justice  in 
theory  to  the  supremacy  of  the  law  by  passing  the  force 
bill.  The  house  bowed  before  the  necessity  of  harmon 
izing  practice  with  theory,  but  delayed  its  recognition  of 
the  latter  until  the  senate  adopted  the  tariff  bill  already 
passed  by  the  house,  with  which  South  Carolina  was  will 
ing  to  be  bought  off  from  opposing  the  law.  M'Duffie 
asked  in  vain  what  practical  aim  the  force  bill  had  now.2 
Foster  exhorted  the  remarkable  representative,  who  con 
sidered  any  farther  resistance  by  South  Carolina  possible, 
after  every  senator  and  every  representative  of  the  state 
had  voted  for  the  tariff,  to  rise  in  his  seat.8  ISTo  one  craved 
the  laughable  distinction,  but  yet  the  third  reading  was 
ordered  by  one-hundred-and-twenty-six  to  thirty-four  votes, 

1  See  the  report  and  the  bill  brought  in  by  the  committee  in  Niles' 
Reg.jXLIIL,  Suppl.,  pp.  48,  49.  Very  significant  is  the  committee's 
apprehension  that  "among  the  unhappy  results  of  the  application  of 
force,  there  is  reason  to  fear  that,  from  a  controversy  between  the  gener 
al  government  and  a  single  state,  it  would  extend  to  a  conflict  between 
the  two  great  sections  of  the  country  and  might  terminate  in  the  de 
struction  of  the  Union  itself." 

•  Niles'  Reg.,  XLIIL,  Suppl.,  p.  263. 

»  Deb.  of  Congress,  XII.,  p.  190. 


THE   COMPEOMI8B   OF   1833.  501 

whereupon  the  senate  passed  the  tariff  bill  by  twenty -nine 
to  sixteen  votes.1  Jackson  signed  both  bills  on  the  second 
of  March.2  March  16,  the  South  Carolina  convention  re 
pealed  the  ordinance  of  nullification.3 

Thus  Clay's  second  great  "  compromise,"  which  was 
scarcely  less  portentous  to  the  country  than  the  first,  came 
into  being.  South  Carolina  had  not  obtained  all  she  at 
first  demanded,  but  the  Union  had  lost  much  and  won 
nothing.  The  protective  duties  were  not  done  away  with; 
only  a  gradual  reduction  had  been  granted  ;4  and  no  con 
cessions  had  been  made  as  to  the  constitutionality  of  the 
protective  system.  But  as  far  as  the  deeper  meaning  of 
the  contest  is  concerned,  the  only  point  of  importance  is 
that  the  delay  in  the  decision  of  the  principle  involved  in 
the  question  had  been  bought  by  concessions.  It  matters 
not  how  great  the  concessions  of  the  federal  government 
were.5  The  latter  had  not  given  up  the  principle;  the  force 

1  Deb.  of  Cong.,  XII.,  pp.  191,  1.23. 

•Parton  (Life  of  Jackson,  III.,  p.  481)  says:  "That  the  president 
disapproved  this  hasty  and,  as  the  event  proved,  unstable  compromise,  is 
well  known.  The  very  energy  with  which  Col.  Benton  denounces  it 
shows  how  hateful  it  was  to  the  administration."  This  passage  charac 
terizes  Parton's  value  as  an  historian.  Benton  writes:  "  Gen.  Jackson 
felt  a  positive  relief  in  being  spared  the  dire  necessity  of  enforcing  the 
laws  by  the  sword  and  by  criminal  prosecutions."  Thirty  Years'  View, 
I.,p.  346. 

8  Curtis  (Life  of  Webster,  I.,  p.  456)  says  that  the  ordinance  was  never 
formally  revoked.  The  fact  that  the  repeal,  on  the  motion  of  S.  D.  Mil- 
ler,  was  signed  only  by  the  president  and  secretary  of  the  convention 
does  not  justify  this  assertion.  See  the  proceedings  concerning  the  re 
peal  in  Niles'  Keg.,  XLIV.,  pp.  57,  86-88. 

4  The  duties  were  to  be  decreased  by  1842  to  20  per  cent,  ad  valorem. 
See  the  law  (Statutes  at  Large,  IV.,  pp.  632-635). 

5  The  fear  that  the  constitution  would  perhaps  not  stand  the  last  test 
was  not  the  only  reason  that  it  was  not  subjected  to  it.    Clay  wrote 
Brooks,  Jan.  17, 1833:  "As  to  politics,  we  have  no  past,  no  future.  After 
forty-four  years  of  existence  under  the  present  constitution,  what  single 
principle  is  fixed  ?  The  Bank  ?  No.    Internal  improvements  ?  No.    The 
tariff"?  No.    Who  is  to  interpret  the  constitution  ?    We  are  as  much 
afloat  at  sea  as  the  day  when  the  constitution  went  into  operation.  There 


502  STATE   SOVEREIGNTY   AND   SLAVERY. 

bill  was  an  indirect  declaration  that  it  held  fast  to  that.  Yet 
Calhoun,  immediately  after  the  force  bill  had  been  passed 
by  both  houses,  had  solemnly  affirmed  that  he,  too,  did  not 
yield  the  least  point  of  his  principles.  Clay  declared  that 
the  protective  system  had  obtained  a  new  "  lease"  for  nine 

is  nothing  certain  but  that  the  will  of  Andrew  Jackson  is  to  govern ;  and 
that  will  fluctuates  with  the  change  of  every  pen  which  gives  expres 
sion  to  it."  (Clay's  Priv.  Corres.,  p.  347.)  And  on  Jan.  23 :  "  It  is  mor 
tifying — inexpressibly  disgusting — to  find  that  considerations  affecting 
an  election,  now  four  years  distant,  influence  the  fate  of  great  questions 
of  immediate  interest  more  than  all  the  reasons  and  arguments  which 
intimately  appertain  to  those  questions.  If,  for  example,  the  tariff  now 
before  the  house  should  be  lost,  its  defeat  will  be  owing  to  two  causes, — 
1st,  the  apprehension  of  Mr.  VanBuren's  friends  that  if  it  passes,  Mr. 
Calhoun  will  rise  again  as  the  successful  vindicator  of  southern  rights; 
and,  2d,  its  passage  might  prevent  the  president  from  exercising  certain 
vengeful  passions  which  he  wishes  to  gratify  in  South  Carolina.  And 
if  it  passes,  its  passage  may  be  attributed  to  the  desire  of  those  same 
Mends  of  Mr.  VanBuren  to  secure  southern  votes."  (Ibid,  p.  348).  It 
was  an  equally  significant  fact  that  Jackson's  position  on  the  constitu- 
tional  question  was  uncertain  and  wavering.  A  part  of  his  supporters 
found  in  the  proclamation  of  December  11  the  "  consolidation  ideas" 
of  the  old  Federalists.  The  Congressional  Globe  met  this  reproach  with 
a  long,  "  authorized"  article,  in  which  Jackson  let  it  be  stated  that  he 
recognized,  not  only' in  the  states  but  in  the  state  governments,  the  rights 
claimed  in  the  Virginia  and  Kentucky  resolutions.  The  article  said: 
"  Its  [the  proclamation's]  doctrines,  if  construed  in  the  sense  they  were 
intended,  and  carried  out,  inculcate  .  .  .  that  in  the  case  of  the  vio- 
lation  of  the  constitution  of  the  United  States  and  the  usurpation  of 
powers  not  granted  by  it  on  the  part  of  the  functionaries  of  the  general 
government,  the  state  governments  have  the  right  to  interpose  and  arrest 
the  evil,  upon  the  principles  which  were  set  forth  in  the  Virginia  res 
olutions  of  1798  against  the  alien  and  sedition  laws ;  and  finally,  that  in 
extreme  cases  of  oppression  (every  mode  of  constitutional  redress  hav 
ing  been  sought  in  vain)  the  right  resides  with  the  people  of  the  several 
states  to  organize  resistance  against  such  oppression,  confiding  in  a  good 
cause,  the  favor  of  heaven  and  the  spirit  of  freedom,  to  vindicate  the 
right."  A.  H.  Stephens  (The  War  Between  the  States,  I.,  pp.  462-469) 
gives  the  main  contents  of  the  article  verbatim.  Tyler  (Memoir  of 
Roger  B.  Taney,  p.  188)  says:  "  When  the  instrument  [the  proclamation 
of  Dec.  11],  as  prepared  by  Mr.  Livingston,  was  presented  to  Gen.  Jack 
son,  he  disapproved  of  the  principles  and  doctrines  contained  in  it.  But 
as  the  conclusion  suited  him,  he  determined  to  issue  it  at  once,  without 


THE  BOOT  OF  ALL  EVIL.  503 

years.  This  was  true,  even  if  the  conditions  of  the  lease 
were  much  more  unfavorable  than  before.  But  it  might 
have  been  said  with  the  same  right  that  the  union-consti 
tutional  party  had  only  agreed  upon  a  new  lease  for  an  un 
certain  time,  and  indeed  with  a  mental  reservation,  on  the 
part  of  the  state-rights  men,  of  the  power  to  terminate  the 
lease  at  any  instant.  It  was  mere  talk  when  Calhoun 
said:  "  The  opposition  of  the  south  [to  the  force  bill]  will 
never  cease  until  the  act  has  been  erased  from  the  statute- 
book."  As  the  majority  had  the  courage  to  trumpet  abroad 
to  the  world  a  force-law,  when  nothing  remained  to  be 
forced,  so  the  minority  had  the  courage  to  declare  eternal 
war  against  the  law  when  it  had  resolved  to  no  longer  pro 
voke  the  application  of  force.  But  if  the  tariff  could 
scarcely  have  produced  such  a  crisis  a  second  time,  although 
the  discord  had  by  no  means  been  brought  to  a  definite  end 
by  the  compromise,  yet  the  possibility  was  not  in  the  least 
diminished  that  ere  long  new  and  worse  crises  would  have 
to  be  met.  The  struggle  over  the  tariff  was  itself  in  great 
part  only  a  manifestation  of  a  deeper  discord,  and  it  had 
not  now  been  forgotten  where  the  root  of  the  whole  matter 
lay.1  If  a  new  crisis  was  immediately  evolved  from  this 

waiting  to  correct  the  erroneous  doctrines  contained  in  it."  Tyler  has 
not  a  single  fact  to  bring  forward  as  a  proof  of  this,  any  more  than 
Neumann  has  for  the  opposite  assertion  already  mentioned.  Compare 
the  note  sent  by  Jackson  to  Livingston  in  Hunt,  Life  of  Edw.  Living 
ston,  pp.  371, 872. 

1  "  The  contest  will,  in  fact,  be  a  contest  between  power  and  liberty, 
and  such  I  consider  the  present, — a  contest  in  which  the  weaker  section 
with  its  peculiar  labor,  productions  and  institutions,  has  at  stake  all  that 
can  be  dear  to  freemen."  Calhoun,  Works,  II.,  p.  261.  Moore  of  Ala- 
bama  said  in  the  senate:  "  Disguise  this  matter  as  you  will,  this  is  the 
question.  We  have  long  seen  the  tendency  and  object  of  the  tari# 
policy.  We  deny  your  right  to  protect  the  free  labor  of  the  north  at  the 
expense  of  the  slave  labor  of  the  south.  .  .  And  it  is  because  I  be 
lieve  the  bill  involves  this  question,  and  because  I  know  the  people  of 
Alabama  have  a  common  interest  with  the  people  of  South  Carolina  i» 
resisting  this  oppression,  that  I  am  opposed  to  this  bill."  Niles'  Reg., 


504         STATE  SOVEREIGNTY  AND  SLAVERY. 

one,  the  eyes  of  even  the  politically  blind  must  open  to  the 
vast  scope  of  the  triumph  of  one  state  with  a  population  of 
581,185—315,401  of  them  slaves — over  the  Union  with  a 
total  population  of  12,866,020.*  Bobbins  of  Ehode  Island 
had  rightly  called  the  tariff  bill,  in  the  senate,  a  "  practical 
recognition"  of  the  right  of  nullification,2  and  John 
Quincy  Adams  had  cried  out  in  warning  to  the  house  that 
the  result  of  paying  such  a  premium  for  rebellion  against 
the  law  must  infallibly  be  the  dissolution  of  the  Union.3 
As  facts  began  to  prove  the  truth  of  this  prophecy,  the 
most  unreserved  admirers  of  Jackson  and  the  most  con 
servative  Democrats  recognized  the  fact  that  the  Caroli  nian, 

XLIII.,  Suppl.,  p.  144.  Quincy  (Life  of  J.  Q.  Adams,  p.  199)  relates 
that  Adams  said,  after  a  conversation  with  Oliver  Wolcott :  "  He  holds 
the  South  Carolina  turbulence  too  much  in  contempt.  The  domineering 
spirit  naturally  springs  from  the  institution  of  slavery;  and  when,  as  in 
South  Carolina,  the  slaves  are  more  numerous  than  their  masters,  the 
domineering  spirit  is  wrought  up  to  its  highest  pitch  of  intenseness. 
The  South  Carolinians  are  attempting  to  govern  the  Union  as  they  gov. 
ern  their  slaves,  and  there  are  too  many  indications  that,  abetted  as  they 
are  by  all  the  slave-driving  interest  of  the  Union,  the  free  portion  will 
cower  before  them  and  truckle  to  their  insolence.  This  is  my  appre 
hension." 

1  The  figures  are  taken  from  the  census  of  1830. 

8  "That  state  [South  Carolina]  hath  neither  disarmed  herself  nor  re- 
nounced  this  power.  Now  we  offer  to  her  this  bill  to  induce  her,  not  to 
renounce  this  power,  but  to  refrain  from  its  exercise  at  present.  Is  not 
this  a  practical  recognition  of  this  fatal  power  ?  "What  is  to  hinder  this 
state  from  resuming  this  attitude  hereafter?  Who  is  to  hinder  any  other 
from  assuming  the  same  attitude,  by  this  power  to  wrest  from  the  gen 
eral  government  any  one  of  its  powers  or,  what  amounts  to  the  same 
thing,  prevent  its  exercise  ?  In  that  case,  by  this  precedent,  we  are 
either  to  yield  the  disputed  power  or  to  buy  off  the  Union  by  a  com 
promise."  Deb.  of  Congress,  XII.,  p.  123. 

*  "  One  particle  of  compromise  with  that  usurped  power  or  of  con 
cession  to  its  pretensions  would  be  a  heavy  calamity  to  the  people  of  the 
whole  Union  .  .  .  and  directly  lead  to  the  final  and  irretrievable 
dissolution  of  the  Union."  Speech  of  Feb.  4, 1838.  Quincy,  Life  of  J. 
Q.  Adams,  p.  208,  seq. 


THE   SOVEREIGNTY    OF   LAW.  505 

whom  they  had  seen  in  spirit  already  hanging  on  the  gal 
lows,  had  wrung  victory  from  the  "  iron  man."1 

It  was  a  terrible  victory;  the  vanquished  have  been  ter 
ribly  scourged  for  the  defeat  suffered  through  their  sin,  and 
the  victors  have  been  shattered  to  pieces  by  the  results  of 
the  accursed  victory.  But  conquered  and  conquerors 
brought  down  punishment  upon  themselves  because  they 
did  not  understand  one  thing,  or,  if  they  understood  it, 
would  not  live  up  to  it:  "  Sovereignty  can  only  be  a  unit 
and  it  must  remain  a  unit, — the  sovereignty  of  law."2 

1  Benton,  Thirty  Years'  View,  I.,  p.  585  ;  Buchanan's  Administration, 
p.  92. 

"  Bismarck,  May  14,  1872.  Held,  Die  Verfassung  des  deutschen 
Reiches,  p.  19. 


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185,11.1 


